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ABSTRACT 
The theoretical questions investigated by the studies 
reported arise from the theory of Social Representations. 
Focus was put upon anchoring as a part of the familiarisation 
process with a new idea, its nature and its function. 
The target new idea for both studies was the unification of 
Europe in 1992. The existence of a belief system related to 
this target and expected to be involved in the 
representational process (i. e. the representation of the 
European Community) was established both in the press and in 
a target population (young Britons). 
The first study employed interviews, questionnaires and 
attribute checklists. The sample comprised of young Britons 
(17-19 years old). Findings supported the hypothesis that 
anchoring might occur during familiarisation with a new idea 
and that it may be an actively selective mechanism. As 
hypothesised, different kinds of involvement with the new 
idea were informing the representational process. 
The second study employed a longitudinal design; respondents 
completed two questionnaires at different times. The sample 
comprised of British undergraduate students. Findings 
supported the hypothesis that the purpose of anchoring's 
selectivity may be the preservation of stability in the 
representational system. In both the representational 
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process and its outcome, overall change was not observed. 
Only specific facets of the target representation changed in 
accordance with the significant events taking place during 
investigation. 
The requirement of employing structured multi-methodological 
approaches and longitudinal designs in the study of social 
representations was emphasised and the studies conducted were 
used to advance this argument. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis focuses upon theoretical and methodological 
issues within the framework of social representations. 
The review of the theory and the empirical work conducted 
within it indicates a number of issues that need 
investigation and explanation. So far, emphasis has been put 
upon the nature of already developed and established 
representations. The processes of social representation have 
been rather neglected. Furthermore, no single method of 
gathering information has been identified as the most 
appropriate for studying social representations. In most 
empirical pieces of work a variety of methods have been used. 
This thesis deals specifically with the anchoring mechanism, 
as a part of the familiarisation process with something new. 
It will depart from what is traditionally studied within this 
theoretical framework; i. e. already developed representations, 
and it will focus upon the processes of social representation. 
The emphasis is going to be shifted from asking what is a 
social representation of something, to questioning how a new 
representation develops as well as how and why it is anchored 
onto what people already believe in order to be explained and 
understood. The questions that this thesis is going to 
address involve whether anchoring indeed takes place, which 
conditions are necessary for its functioning and what 
purposes does this mechanism serve. 
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To investigate and answer these questions a multi- 
methodological approach and a longitudinal design are going 
to be used. The first is the most appropriate for studying 
social representations in their complexity as constructs. 
The second is considered necessary in order to enable the 
investigation of whether, how and why processes of social 
representations take place. 
So, the contributions that this piece of work will attempt to 
make are both theoretical and methodological. Yet, the two; 
theory and methodology are interwoven and inseparable. The 
methodological arguments and contributions could not be made 
without a sound theoretical background and specific 
theoretical questions to be investigated. On the other hand, 
the theoretical questions required the use of specific 
methods in order to be investigated and answered. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE THEORY OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS 
------------------------------------ ------------------------------------ 
1. INTRODUCTION 
------------ 
The aim of this chapter is to present the theory of Social 
Representations in a descriptive way in order to provide the 
framework within which subsequent work for this thesis took 
place. The theory of Social Representations is a theory of 
development and transmission of everyday beliefs and 
knowledge. It deals with the way these beliefs and knowledge 
create a social reality for groups of individuals by enabling 
them to cope with everyday life, communicate with each other 
and understand the world around them. First, in this 
chapter, the origins and the development of the theory are 
going to be presented as well as its place within social 
psychology. Second, the phenomenon of social representations 
is going to be described, in terms of characteristics, 
nature, functions and mechanisms. Finally, social 
representations are going to be discussed in relation to 
other constructs and theories within social psychology. 
I. I. Origins and Development 
----------------------- 
The theory of Social Representations borrowed the term 
'representation' from the Durkheimian notion of 
'representations individuelles' and 'representations 
collectives'. According to Durkheim (1898) the former were 
the subject matter of psychology, whereas the latter the 
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subject matter of sociology. In the early 1960's Serge 
Moscovici came to bridge this distinction by introducing the 
term social representations. He considered it to be the 
study matter of social psychology. Specifically, Moscovici 
introduced the term in 1961 in his study of psychoanalysis 
(1961/1976) and in his article on 'Attitudes and Opinions' 
(1963). He used the rather neglected and forgotten concept 
of Durkheim in an attempt to renew interest in the study of 
models of knowledge and in the role of symbolic processes in 
relation to human action (Farr, 1984). The choice of the 
term 'social' instead of 'collective' had two purposes. 
First, to indicate the social nature of representations as, 
interactive processes (Moscovici, 1987). Second, to show a 
departure from the Durkheimian term, which was considered to 
be rather static and descriptive by belonging to the same 
category as opinions and images (Farr, 1987). 
After its introduction, the theory instigated a large number 
of empirical studies, especially in France. It also created 
a lot of arguments and counter-arguments between social 
psychologists. In the mid-seventies the theory had already 
crossed the Channel and spread around Europe. Today, work 
within the theory of Social Representations is conducted in 
most West European countries as well as in the USSR and 
Australia. 
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1.2. Social Representations and their place in social 
------------------------------------------------ 
psychology 
When Moscovici introduced the theory of Social Representations 
his arguments suggested that it should be the main 
theoretical paradigm in social psychology. 
For Moscovici (1972) social psychology'had not been concerned 
either with social behaviour as 'a product of society or with 
behaviour in society. Social psychology had been devoting 
its largest share and its main interest to individual 
cognitions. Further, as a discipline, it had been changing 
its 'paradigm' every ten years, without continuity from one 
paradigm to another, without having a new paradigm that 
overcomes the difficulties of the previous ones and without 
crucial experiments to test and verify paradigms (Moscovici, 
1984a). Social psychology, as a science, needed to be 
renewed and redeveloped, it had to become a real science of 
the phenomena that form the basis of society's functioning 
and the processes that operate in it. It should be 
exclusively occupied by the study of social subjects and of 
the groups and individuals who actually create social reality 
and who control each other (Moscovici, 1972). In order to 
offer some contribution to this renewal of'social psychology, 
Moscovici worked to make the theory of Social Representations 
the new paradigm, able to handle all' the above mentioned 
interests of social psychology. 
However, the theory has not yet achieved the status of a 
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'paradigm' and according to Moscovici (1987) there is little 
hope that it will, if social psychology remains out of touch 
with other behavioural sciences. His argument is still that 
social psychology must be a social science ranking as-a major 
science alongside anthropology, economics and sociology, study 
problems of our time and deal with them in a historical 
dimension (Moscovici, 1987). Throughout the three decades 
since the introduction of the theory, Moscovici (1981a) has 
been suggesting that social psychology has to be seen as a 
science of culture and that it should be "the anthropology of 
the modern world" (p. viii). 
2. DESCRIPTION OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS 
------------------------------------- 
2.1. Definition of social representations 
------------------------------------ 
In 1963, Moscovici defined social representations as the 
elaboration of a social object by the community in order to 
enable behaving and communicating. This was rather a one- 
sided definition of the construct, describing its functions 
rather than its structure or processes. 
After almost ten years, during which many studies have been 
conducted based on and testing the theory of Social 
Representations, and after a number of challenges and 
criticisms of the theory, Moscovici (1973) offered a more 
elaborate and explicit definition. According to this a 
social representation is a system of values, ideas and 
practices with a two-fold function: first to establish an 
order which will enable individuals to orient themselves in 
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and master their material social world and, second, to 
facilitate communication among members of a community by 
providing them with a code of naming and classifying the 
various aspects of their world and their individual and world 
history. 
Although the definition is still criticised as being vague 
and imprecise (Litton and Potter, 1985, Potter and Litton, 
1985, Billig, 1988), most scientists working within the 
theoretical framework of Social Representations seem to 
accept it in general and agree that the construct is a rather 
complex one both in terms of its nature and of its functions. 
The description of the characteristics of social 
representations, presented below, seeks to clarify the 
obscure points of this definition of the construct. 
2.2. Social representations are of social nature 
------------------------------------------- 
One of the characteristics of social representations is that 
they are social in origin and that they remain social by 
being shared by groups and individuals. According to 
Moscovici (1984b) representations are created by individuals 
while communicating and co-operating. They cannot be created 
by individuals in isolation. Yet, representations keep a 
certain degree of autonomy, and after they have been created 
they lead an independent life, they "circulate, merge, 
attract and repel each other, and give birth to new i 
representations, while old ones die out. " (Moscovici, 1984b, 
p. 13). 
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Furthermore, through communication, representations become 
shared by individuals and groups. This idea of 
representations being shared is of central importance for the 
theory; by being shared they do create a social reality. 
This creation of social reality "means that the group's self 
representation or its representation of the social setting to 
which it belongs is an integral part of the group's identity, 
of its concrete existence" (Moscovici, 1987, p. 515). Social 
reality enables the people that share it to establish a group 
identity and a stream of communication and helps them cope 
with everyday life. Another aspect of life in which the 
social nature of social representations demonstrates itself 
is the socialisation of individuals (Moscovici and Hewstone, 
1983). During socialisation every member of a group has the 
group's representations impressed upon him (her). In this 
way representations not only direct individuals to the proper 
(for the particular group) conduct but also influence the 
core of their personality and help them establish a group 
identity. This relation between social representations and 
group identity, as a demonstration of the social nature of 
representations, has also been discussed by Breakwell 
(forthcoming). She suggested that social representations can 
be attached to a group or a community, become a part of its 
belief systems and emerge as defining the properties of the 
group identity. Thus social representations can shape social 
identities and, after they are identified with a group, they 
can be attributed to individual members of this group. 
8 
Therefore, the social nature of social representations has to 
be considered a central and defining characteristic of the 
construct. It is necessary for their creation, it enables 
communication between individuals and groups of individuals, 
it helps the creation of social reality and the shaping of 
social groups. 
2.3. Social representations are of conventional and 
---------------------------------------------- 
prescriptive nature 
------------------- 
Representations (Moscovici, 1984b) conventionalise the 
objects, persons and events, which individuals encounter in 
everyday life. By giving them a definite form and locating 
them in categories, they result in producing a distinct model 
shared by a group. New elements are bound to adhere to this 
model and be absorbed by it. In cases where a new element 
cannot be placed 'smoothly' into this model, it will be 
changed in order to conform and become identical to others. 
In this way it obviously loses its particular 
characteristics and properties and it runs the risk of being 
neither understood, nor decoded properly. This 
characteristic of social representations determines, in a 
way, groups' and individuals' reality; by seeing reality 
through the 'lenses' of prior conventions, people are bound 
to see only what these conventions allow them to see. 
Although conventions help people understand and absorb new 
elements, solve problems and interpret messages, at the same 
time, they restrict their views of reality by controlling 
the way these new elements are going to be absorbed. It is 
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in these kinds of conventions that one may find the roots of 
prejudices, biases and misunderstandings. 
By suggesting that representations are of prescriptive 
nature, Moscovici (1984b) implied that they are imposed upon 
people from the time they are born. They are -in a way- 
already created and then enter and influence people's minds. 
So, social representations may not be actually thought by the 
people who share them; they may be re-thought, re-cited and 
re-presented. The prescriptive nature of representations can 
be seen, in a simpler form, as tradition itself. Tradition 
is imposed upon individuals and provides them with codes of 
conduct and with already existing patterns of thinking. 
People tend to abide by tradition and respect its rules and 
codes because it enables them to communicate successfully 
with others, cope with everyday life and maintain their 
social identity. For example, in Greece it is a tradition 
that women in mourning should wear black clothes. By abiding 
by this, women make a social statement that people around 
them understand and they (women) avoid having to give 
explanations for other kinds of behaviour that are expected 
by people in mourning. By respecting and complying with this 
rule, women communicate with others, cope with everyday 
life 
and, at the same time, get specific treatment from other 
people (such as respect and sympathy). 
Although the conventional and prescriptive nature of social 
representations can be considered as two separate 
characteristics, they have to be discussed together as one 
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because they work together. Both influence the way people 
construct reality and impose rules and codes to handle and 
cope with this reality. 
These two characteristics of social representations 
immediately give the impression that the theory sees groups 
and individuals as passive receptors of already made 
representations. Although this issue is going to be 
discussed in detail in the evaluation of the theory, it has 
to be pointed out before going any further, that there are 
certain social representations that are indeed of 
conventional and prescriptive nature (culture, for example). 
On the other hand, it could be argued that there are a number 
of social representations that require from individuals and 
groups active participation in their creation and development 
(for example representations of new ideas and events). 
2.4. Social representations are "a specific way of 
--------------------------------------------- 
understanding and communicating, what we know already" 
------------------------------------------------------ 
(Moscovici, 1984b, p. 17) 
------------------------ 
After having discussed the social nature of representations 
and the ways through which they constitute an actual 
'environment' for the people that share them, one has to 
describe the means by which they diffuse in society. In 
order to communicate, people use verbal expressions; i. e. 
language. By expressing their thoughts, beliefs, opinions, 
ideas, and knowledge in words, people give meaning, structure 
and image to their representations. only when social 
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representations are given this meaning, structure and image 
through verbalisation, can they be communicated. Some 
representations are prescribed for people who may not be 
consciously aware that they share them with others. Only 
when these representations are verbalised (in discussions, 
arguments or even by being written and published) do they 
provide the person expressing them, as well as the person(s) 
receiving the message with an image and some meaning, thus 
enabling communication and understanding. Only by being made 
public can representations fulfil their purpose, and they 
can only become public by means of language. 
Individuals are constantly trying to understand the world 
around them and solve everyday problems. In their efforts to 
grasp some understanding, individuals become what Moscovici 
and Hewstone (1983) called 'amateur scientists'; they ask 
questions, they look for answers, they think, they create 
their own 'theories' (Moscovici, ý1981b). These 'theories' 
are communicated in everyday life through people's 
discussions and communication. Thus language becomes a way 
of acquiring and communicating knowledge. 
When Moscovici studied psychoanalysis in 1961, he actually 
investigated the way through which it diffused and circulated 
within society, the way it came to acquire an image and a 
certain meaning for people who were not scientists (and, 
specifically not psychoanalysts) and, furthermore, the way it 
influenced the understanding, the behaviour and the language 
of these people. By being published and popularised, this 
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new, at the time, science circulated into society, "became the 
subject of discussion and, as a result, it became a social 
representation. 
Therefore, language is a very important issue for the theory 
of Social Representations, because it is the 'tool' by which 
a science, a theory, an idea, an opinion and so on, can 
diffuse within society and become a social representation. 
At the same time it is the means that people use to give 
meaning and image to their representations, in order to 
communicate with each other. 
For Chebat (1975) language within the context of social 
representations is the 'symbol' that plays a role in 
structuring social order. During communication, language is 
used in order to enable the representation of society's 
environment and to reflect that society upon itself. 
Markova (1987) recognised the importance of language as the 
collective means of expressing ideas and social representations 
which is passed on from generation to generation. According 
to her., language lives an independent life of its own like 
any other human activity which, after it is fully learned, 
becomes automatised and is, carried out without constant 
mental monitoring. She claimed that once people acquire 
particular kinds of social representations and particular 
namings of people and events, they are no longer aware of the 
actual meaning of their verbal expressions. Finally, she 
suggested that any change of a particular word and any 
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substitution of a word by another signifies a change in 
people's implicit theories and in their social 
representations. 
This characteristic of social representations has a further 
implication. It makes them specific to human society, since 
language is considered a human specific characteristic. 
2.5. Social Representations are the means by which people 
---------------------------------------------------- 
understand the consensual universe 
---------------------------------- 
Moscovici (1984b) argued that there are two distinct 
universes within modern society that people have to deal 
with. "In'the consensual universe, society is a visible, 
continuous creation, permeated with meaning and purpose, 
possessing a human voice, in accord with human existence and 
both acting and reacting like a human being. 'In other words, 
man is, here, the measure of all things. In the reified 
universe, society is transformed into a system of solid, 
basic, unvarying entities, which are indifferent to 
individuality and lack identity. This society ignores itself 
and its creations which it sees only as isolated objects, 
such as persons, ideas, environments and activities. All 
things, whatever the circumstances, are, here, the measure of 
man" (p. 20). 
Consensual and reified universes are considered'to be unique 
in human culture. Human beings, in the consensual universe, 
are seen as active and responsible 'amateurs' or 'curious 
observers' engaging in the "art of conversation" (Moscovici, 
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1984b, p. 21). Through conversation people create stability, 
recurrence and communality of significance which enable them 
to share ideas and images. In the reified universe, on the 
other hand, people have different roles and belong to 
different classes and organisations. So, they are bound by 
the rules and regulations of these roles, classes and 
organisations. 
A further differentiation between the two universes is that 
the reified can only be understood through sciences, whereas 
the consensual through social representations. Sciences 
establish a chart of forces, objects and events that are 
independent of people's desires, outside people's awareness 
and to which people have to react impartially and 
submissively. On the other hand, representations aim at 
creating and shaping a collective awareness and at explaining 
objects and events (Moscovici, 1984b). 
By acknowledging this distinction between consensual and 
reified universes, one can grasp the scope of the study of 
social representations. Social representations focus upon 
objects created collectively and actively by human beings in 
their constant interaction and communication within the 
consensual universe. Only when an object is diffused from 
the reified universe into the consensual, by means of 
popularisation of science and scientific knowledge, can it 
become the subject of study for social representations. 
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2.6. The function of social representations 
-------------------------------------- 
For Moscovici (1984b) "the purpose of all representations 
is to make something unfamiliar, or unfamiliarity itself, 
familiar" (p. 24). Anything that strikes people as unfamiliar 
tends to alarm, intrigue and threaten them. People do not 
feel comfortable when they are facing something absurd, 
different, 'not right'. Anything strange is bound to produce 
fear and discomfort. In order to avoid these stressful 
conditions, people try to 'accommodate' whatever seems 
unfamiliar, from the outside world to the inside reality, 
they try to transfer it into an existing context, to define 
it; in other words they try to represent it. By constructing 
a representation of whatever seems to be threatening and 
confusing, people locate it and integrate it into their 
physical world, which, as a result, is enriched and 
transformed. Something that is perceived as unfamiliar does 
not have to be unknown, invisible and cut off from the world, 
social relations or language. The unfamiliar might well be 
part of individuals' world, relations and language but it has 
a feature that is not clear to them and that makes it 
confusing and threatening (Moscovici, 1987). 
In order for the unfamiliar to become familiar, two . 
mechanisms have to be set in motion. The first mechanism 
comes to anchor unfamiliar and strange ideas into already 
existing categories, within a familiar context. The second 
mechanism works so as to objectify these ideas, to turn them 
into something concrete, understandable and controllable. 
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2.6.1. Anchoring 
Anchoring (Moscovici, 1981b, 1984b) is the mechanism that 
enables individuals to 'accommodate' something unfamiliar and 
threatening into an already existing belief system. By being 
compared to a specific system the strange and intriguing 
acquires qualities and characteristics and, in this way, it 
can be explained, understood and re-adjusted to fit in it. 
These already existing belief systems are the ones that 
constitute a part of'the 'objective knowledge' of individuals 
and the ones that become the subjective point of departure 
and the frames of reference and comparison for the new and 
unfamiliar (Carugati, 1990). 
In order to succeed in this task, people have to name and 
classify whatever seems new and unfamiliar. If something 
remains unclassified and unnamed it is bound to be seen as 
strange, threatening, even, non-existent, whereas if it is 
classified and named it immediately acquires properties, it 
can be described and represented. By classifying something 
(or someone) people locate it (him/her) into a class and 
ascribe to it (him/her) certain linguistic, spatial and 
behavioural characteristics, as well as habits. In order to 
categorise something (or someone) people tend to choose from 
their memory an already existing image and compare the new 
and unfamiliar with it. There will be times that the outcome 
of this comparison will be the distortion of some parts of 
the new in order to achieve a stability of the pre-existing 
belief systems (Echebarria and Paez, 1989). On the other 
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hand, there may be times that the new will be 'accommodated' 
within the already existing system of beliefs without any 
distortion or selection. 
While categorising, individuals tend either to generalise or 
to particularise. The former results in reducing the 
distance between the new elements and the existing category 
and enabling positive or negative relation to it, the latter 
results in maintaining the distance and focusing on the 
differences between the new element and the prototype. 
The mere process of classification implies necessarily 
naming. After having named something (or, someone) people can 
describe it (him/her) in terms of characteristics and 
tendencies and (based on these descriptions) they can also 
distinguish it (him/her) from others. Further, it (he/she) 
becomes, for those who accept and share the naming, the 
object of a convention. 
The discussion of the mechanism of anchoring, leads to two 
conclusions concerning the theory of social Representations. 
First,. as Moscovici (1984b) pointed out, there is no thought 
or perception without anchor. Every thought or perception is 
related to a certain pre-existing belief system and has to be 
given a name, so as, to become familiar and understandable. 
Second, the main result of naming and classifying is that 
they permit people to form opinions concerning others by 
enabling them to interpret others' characteristics, motives 
and intentions. 
18 
2.6.2. Objectifying 
------------ 
Objectifying is the second mechanism that helps individuals 
to turn whatever seems unfamiliar into something familiar. 
Objectifying (Moscovici, 1984b) compared to anchoring, is a 
much more active mechanism, because, as a process, it 
involves the use of reality in order to saturate 
unfamiliarity. It actually results in producing a clear 
image of an imprecise idea or concept. It fills the gaps 
that exist in abstract an unfamiliar ideas, with substance, 
thus enabling people to create a representation of them. 
According to Breakwell (forthcoming) it is through 
objectification that abstract knowledge, science and 
scientific concept are transformed into representations and 
result in being domesticated into everyday discourse. 
So, by means of anchoring and objectifying the unfamiliar 
becomes familiar. To achieve this people rely heavily on 
memory and experience. Used as alive and dynamic elements, 
memory and experience, provide representations with stability 
as well as with a certain amount of autonomy from present 
events.. The mechanisms of anchoring and objectifying handle 
memory; the former uses it as a 'storage-room' taking things 
out and putting things in, labelling and classifying them; 
the latter being more active, takes ideas, concepts and 
images from memory, mixing them with new elements and 
reproducing them. 
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2.7. Social representations and behaviour 
------------------------------------ 
After having discussed the characteristics and function of 
social representations it is necessaryeto address the 
question of whether representations have any impact on human 
behaviour and, if they do, what form this impact takes. 
For Moscovici (1984b), representations do in fact determine 
responses to stimuli. Specifically, "representations 
determine both the character of the stimulus and the 
responses it elicits, just as in a particular situation they 
determine which is which" (Moscovici, 1984b, p. 61). 
Furthermore, whenever people acquire or change a social 
representation, they are expected to alter simultaneously a 
number of other- and self-directed behaviours (Moscovici, 
1973). 
Accordingly, behaviour depends not on stimuli themselves but 
on the way these stimuli are going to be classified and the 
names they are going to be given. Thus, the same stimulus 
can elicit different responses from the same or different 
individuals depending on the representation this stimulus 
creates or 'activates' at a particular moment in time and in 
a specific situation. As a matter of fact, individuals are 
not usually faced with a single stimulus. Again, which 
stimulus, among the plethora, they are going to respond to 
depends on the pre-established representations of the 
individuals. 
For example, Farr (1984) warned laboratory experimenters 
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employing human participants that what they are actually 
studying, while conducting a laboratory experiment, might be 
respondents' representations of this particular condition and 
not their reactions to the experimental stimuli. 
Respondents' reactions may be influenced by their 
representations of experimental laboratories (what they have 
heard or read about them) and not by the experimental 
condition itself. This does not suggest that people 
consciously use their representations of situations, events 
and others so as to pick up a stimulus and to produce a 
response to it. Although he did not offer any evidence for 
this claim, Moscovici (1984b) took this idea further and 
suggested that the more the origin of a representation is 
forgotten and the more its influence is ignored, the stronger 
it becomes. The less aware people are of their 
representations, the more these representations tend to rule 
their responses. 
On the same topic Abric (1971) suggested that representations 
lead to a subjective and personal transcription for 
individuals and in this way they (representations) become the 
determining and motivating factor of behaviour. 
Representations act as an orientation process for social 
behaviour and communication. The components of the 
representation of a task that individuals are asked to 
perform will be the basis of guidelines that will influence 
their future actions (Abric, 1982). In fact, the behaviour 
of an individual or a group is determined by the 
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representations held (Abric, 1984). 
Therefore, if it is accepted that social representations may 
influence behaviour, then they have to be dealt with as 
independent variables and explanatory devices, as far as 
behaviour is concerned. However, it is difficult to 
establish the direction of causality between social 
representations and behaviour. It might be the case that the 
relation is reversed or both ways; actions could influence 
social representations and vice versa. 
2.8. Social representations - groups and individuals 
----------------------------------------------- 
Another question that arises involves the way the theory of 
Social Representations deals with individuals and groups. 
The theory (Moscovici, 1984b) sees individuals and groups as 
active entities, thinking in an active and productive way, 
trying to explain whatever seems new and unfamiliar, 
producing and communicating their own representations 
('thinking society'). Social representations are for human 
beings their own 'theories' and as such are used to enable 
them to discover and organise 'reality'. In fact, this 
'reality' (although it is not suggested that it is an 
accurate 'picture' of the outside world) is the only 
'reality' individuals have and have to cope with. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter ordinary people 
(Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983) are to be seen as 'amateur 
scientists' who use their common sense to transform 
scientific knowledge in order to explain their own and other 
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people's behaviour, as well as the environment around them. 
People actively store and order information and knowledge and 
then reproduce and represent them as 'common sense theories'. 
By this means representations provide individuals with 
explanations and solutions to societal problems. 
The way the theory of Social Representations sees individuals 
and groups distinguishes it from any behaviouristic theory 
that sees them as passive receptors of stimuli. The theory 
describes active processes going on for representations to be 
created, communicated and used to provide solutions. 
This may seem a contradiction to the prescriptive image of 
representations, discussed earlier. How can people be 
considered active since their representations are imposed 
upon them from the time that they are born? This 
discrepancy can be dealt with in two different ways. First, 
(Moscovici, 1984b) representations although they may be 
forced upon individuals, do go through transformations, 
elaborations and changes that are the product of individuals' 
active communication and co-operation with others 
(individuals or groups) and of their efforts in understanding 
the world around them. The second way to deal with this 
problem can be based on Abric's (1984) suggestion that "all 
representations are organised around a nucleus" (p. 180). The 
nucleus is considered to be the most fundamental element of 
the representation, determining both the meaning and the 
structure of the representation. The nucleus acts both as a 
creative and an organising agent and, at the same time, is 
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the most stable element of the representation. Although it 
allows the meaning of the representation to change, the 
nucleus, remains unchanged. In cases where the nucleus 
itself has to undergo a major change, then the representation 
is radically changed. 
If one accepts Abric's idea, then one can proceed and suggest 
that what is actually imposed (prescribed) upon individuals 
is the nucleus; the structural core, of a representation. 
The peripheral elements can be changed and transformed, 
renewed and elaborated when needed. At this point, 
individuals have to be active, to accept or refuse changes, 
to accommodate, classify and name new elements and to 
reconstruct their reality according to the transformations 
that had taken place. 
So, although representations are of a prescriprive nature (at 
least as far as their nucleus is concerned), the theory still 
sees individuals as active, since it acknowledges their 
independence and flexibility to 'work' on them and change 
them (at least peripherally). 
3. SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS AND OTHER THEORIES AND CONSTRUCTS 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
3.1. Social representations and Attribution Theory 
Attribution theory studies the common sense explanations of 
human behaviour and of its direct and indirect effects. 
People make attributions when they explain events by 
attributing them to causes. 
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People infer from observation whether their own behaviour or 
that of others is caused by environmental or personal forces. 
These forces (or factors) are not seen as independent; there 
is an interdependence between personal ability (or power, or 
motivation) and the situational difficulty. However, a 
personal attribution is much more likely to occur than a 
situational one because actor and act are perceived as much 
stronger a unit than are situation and behaviour (Heider, 
1958). This tendency to attribute behaviour to personal 
rather than situational factors is the 'fundamental 
attribution error' (Ross, 1977). 
Perceived consistency or consensus or distinctiveness of an 
action are considered to affect the attribution of causality 
(Kelley, 1967,1973). The way information is used in making 
causal inferences depends on its representativeness and 
availability (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Since consensus 
of information is less available, less vivid and less direct 
than the entity or the actor it is considered less important. 
Furthermore, the fewer distinctive reasons an actor has for 
an action and the less these reasons are widely shared in the 
culture, the more informative is that action about the 
intentions or dispositions of that actor. Also, there is a 
tendency for personal attribution if the action is perceived 
as affecting a person's welfare in a positive sense (Jones 
and Davis, 1965). 
Attribution and Social Representations theories have some 
common features. They both investigate common sense 
25 
explanations, they both consider individuals as 'naive- 
scientists' analysing actions through inference of 
observations (Heider, 1958) and they both explain perception 
of covariation in the social domain as a function of pre- 
existing theories that people have (Nisbet and Ross, 1980). 
Yet, the two theories differ in a number of points. 
Moscovici (1984b) suggested that Attribution theory is 
restricted by being based on the principle that individuals 
think as statisticians and that their only effort is to 
establish the coherence of the information they receive from 
the environment. The theory seems to ignore the diversity 
that exists in the environment. On the other hand, the 
theory of Social Representations not only recognises the 
diversity of individuals, attitudes and phenomena, but also 
takes it as its point of departure. In fact, it is this 
diversity, in all its strangeness and unpredictability, that 
intrigues and provokes the theory in its effort to discover 
how individuals and groups proceed to produce a stable and 
predictable world out of this diversity. 
According to the theory of Social Representations, people try 
to explain and interpret their own and other people's actions 
as well as social events and phenomena, they try to find the 
causes of these actions, events and phenomena. Moscovici and 
Hewstone (1983) suggested that these explanations are part of 
social representations and that it is these representations 
which give to causes and explanations their cognitive power. 
Social representations are seen as imposing a kind of 
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automatic explanation upon behaviour; causes are proposed 
prior to any detailed search for and analysis of information 
(Jaspars and Hewstone, 1990). 
In agreement with these ideas, Farr (1987) and Augustinos 
(1990) view social representations as more basic and 
fundamental than social attributions; "social representations 
form the foundations of people's expectations and normative 
prescriptions and thus act as mediators in the attributional 
process" (Augustinos, 1990, p. 50). This mediating function 
of social representations in the explanation of social 
behaviour was described by Hewstone, Jaspars and Lalijee 
(1982) as their "attributional" (p. 243) function and it was 
heralded as a means of changing the individualistic nature of 
traditional attribution theories. 
Finally, Attribution theory has not been studying common 
sense explanations as part of the natural social context in 
which they are'expected to exist, whereas Social 
Representations theory emphasises the importance of studying 
representations in their natural environment and, in most 
empirical studies, this is attempted. 
Therefore, before studying and describing attributions, 
scientists should take under consideration the basis of these 
attributions; i. e. social representations. They need to 
investigate the representations that govern people's 
perceptions, inferences and social relations in order to 
arrive to causal explanations of behaviour. 
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3.2. Social Representations and Attitudes 
------------------------------------ 
The study of attitudes and attitude change has been one of 
the central issues of interest in social psychology for many 
decades (Jaspars, 1978a). 
Attitudes are regarded as behavioural dispositions which are 
introduced in the analysis of social behaviour as 
hypothetical constructs to account for variations in 
behaviour under similar circumstances. 
Attitudes are considered either implicit responses (by 
learning theorists) or as perceptual templates (by cognitive 
psychologists). Modern expectancy-value theories of 
attitudes (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980) combine these two views. 
The expectancy component of an attitude refers to the 
perceived usefulness of the attitude object to the person's 
goal or the perception that the attitude object has certain 
attributes. The value component refers to the evaluation of 
the goals or attributes related to the attitude object. 
Attitudes, therefore, are seen as the sum of evaluative 
weighted expectancies or beliefs. This definition does not 
describe attitudes as a distinctive concept, since it 
reflects the general notion of behavioural decision theory 
that human action is guided by considerations of subjectively 
expected utility. 
Although attitudes are considered to influence behaviour it 
is not easy to infer attitudes by observing behavioural 
responses in a wide variety of situations. So, it is a 
28 
standard procedure in attitude measurement to consider mainly 
verbal (evaluative) reactions to symbolic representations of 
the attitude object. 
The purpose of measuring attitudes is to predict behaviour. 
Yet, results from correlations of scores obtained on general 
attitude scales with overt behaviour have been rather 
disappointing. Recently, though, Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) 
showed that attitudes do predict behaviour if the attitude 
measured is congruent with the behaviour to be predicted and 
is specific rather than general. 
Attitude change is another area that evoked a great amount of 
interest and investigation. Attitude change is seen as 
depending upon the discrepancy between the attitude 
originally held by the receiver and the position advocated by 
the source of the message. In general, the greater the 
expertness, attraction, reward'or cognitive power of the 
source over the receiver, the greater`the attitude change 
(Jaspars, 1978b). 
Attitude change was also found to occur when people are 
forced to comply at a behavioural level. When there is 
dissonance between attitudes and behaviour, people tend to 
change their attitudes in accordance to their behaviour in 
order to reduce dissonant cognitions (Cognitive Dissonance, 
Festinger, 1957). 
Finally, attitude change occurs when the receiver is directly 
exposed to the attitude object. Exposure may be sufficient 
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to induce a positive evaluation of the stimulus ('mere 
exposure effect', Zajonc, 1968). 
The two constructs (attitudes and social representations) 
have some similarities; they are both of social nature, they 
are seen as acquired to a certain extent, they are considered 
to influence behaviour and they can undergo changes under 
certain conditions. 
However, the two constructs different significantly on a 
number of aspects. Moscovici (1963) considered attitudes 
together with the concepts of opinion and image, as stable 
and descriptive. Images, opinions and attitudes do not 
include anticipations to which they give rise (Moscovici, 
1973). While studying social issues from the point of view 
of opinions, images and attitudes, one is seeing individuals 
and groups in a static way, as simply using information and 
not actually creating it. According to Moscovici (1963), 
these concepts could be successfully replaced by the concept 
of social representations. 
The main difference between the two constructs is that, 
although they are both considered to be of social nature, 
this nature has been rather ignored in the case of attitudes. 
Although, attitudes (Jaspars and'Fraser, 1984) are seen as 
the evaluative components of shared cognitive 
representations and as, as such, are social in the sense that 
they deal with social reality, the emphasis is put on 
interpersonal aspects of this reality rather than on its 
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structural and cultural aspects. Also, even though attitudes 
are considered as learned predispositions and as such are 
conceived to be social in origin, little research has been 
devoted to the study of the development and origins of the 
content of attitudes. Attitudes are generally regarded as 
individual dispositions which were introduced in social 
psychology to explain differences between individuals. The 
idea that these dispositions might be shared by individuals 
belonging to the same social groups and the consequences of 
the social nature of attitudes has not been considered. Yet, 
this characteristic of attitudes makes them a form of social 
representations; they can be considered as predispositions of 
individuals to respond to certain aspects of the environment 
in particular ways (Farr, 1990). 
Gaskell and Fraser (1990) suggested that widespread attitudes 
are more narrowly focused than social representations. In 
fact, they claimed that social representations can be seen as 
made up of widespread attitudes. In their opinion, shared 
attitudes, social representations and public opinion seem to 
be markedly overlapping concepts. 
For Jaspars and Fraser (1984), the great advantage of the 
theory of Social Representations, compared with the study of 
attitudes, is that the former can provide explanations 
concerning the social origins of cognitive processes and the 
social nature of their consequences. These authors suggested 
that attitudes should be considered as individual response 
dispositions based on collective (social) representations. 
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3.3. Social Representations and Social Schema Theory 
----------------------------------------------- 
Social schema theory (Augustinos and Innes, 1990) employs an 
information processing model of perception and cognition 
which creates a mental knowledge structure for selecting and 
processing incoming information from the social environment. 
Social schemata create a set of general expectations, allow 
for predictions and for control of the social world. 
Social schema theory aims at investigating and explaining how 
people represent social information and how new information 
is assimilated with existing knowledge; i. e. how people are 
able to process, interpret and understand complex social 
information. 
The concept of schema has found extensive empirical 
applications. Research has been applied to four main content 
areas: person schemata, self-schemata, role schemata and 
event schemata. Person schemata research has dealt with 
abstracted conceptual structures of personality traits or 
person prototypes that enable a person to categorise and make 
inferences from the experience of interactions with other 
people. Self-schemata research examines the conceptual 
structures people have of themselves and looks at the degree 
to which such structures may affect the speed and efficiency 
of processing information which is relevant or irrelevant to 
the self. Role schemata refer to the knowledge structures 
people have of the norms and the expected behaviours of 
specific role positions in society. Event schemata have been 
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conceptualised as cognitive scripts that describe the 
sequential organisation of events in everyday situations. 
Event schemata provide the basis for anticipating the future, 
setting goals and making plans. They enable the individuals 
to set strategies to achieve goals by specifying the temporal 
events or appropriate behavioural sequences through which 
individuals must move to obtain the desired targets. 
Augustinos and Innes (1990) suggested that both theories 
(Social Schema and Social Representations) are knowledge 
structure approaches to social cognition. Schemata and 
representations are seen as existing knowledge structures 
which aim at guiding and facilitating the processing of 
social information. However, -the two theories as well as the 
constructs they study seem to differ significantly from each 
other. 
Social schema theory does not put as much emphasis as social 
representations on "the social interactive and cultural 
context within which human cognition takes place ... it views 
social knowledge as a 'fixed given' with little reference to 
the way individuals construct social reality through social 
interaction and communication" (Augustinos and Innes, 1990, 
pp. 214-215). The social representations approach, on the 
other hand, (Jaspars and Hewstone, 1990) stresses socially 
shared knowledge both in terms of contents and origins. 
Schema theory views classification and categorisation as 
elements of individual cognitive functioning, whereas social 
representations consider anchoring as a social process 
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(Augustinos and Innes, 1990). Furthermore, schema theory 
presupposes a rational view of individuals as information 
processors, something that often causes problems in 
explaining divergence between objective information and 
schema (Moscovici, 1983). Yet, for Social Representations 
theory, errors, biases and divergence are dealt with as 
reflections of underlying preconceptions or social 
representations that lead to distortions (Augustinos and 
Innes, 1990)., Finally, social schemata, once they are 
developed and strengthened through use, are viewed as stable 
and static structures, whereas representations remain dynamic 
and changing (Augustinos and Innes, 1990). 
So, although the two theories start from similar theoretical 
interests, they, very soon, diverge from each other. 
According to Augustinos and Innes (1990) it is the "social 
schema theory--that may benefit from'a social representations 
perspective. The latter can provide a social (societal) 
context which is lacking in most schema approaches" (p. 214). 
3.4. Social Representations and Personal Construct Theory 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Personal Construct Theory (Kelly, 1955) views the individual 
as 'man-the-scientist'. Individuals are seen as attempting 
to organise the events with which they are confronted and, in 
doing so, to gain control over these events and predict 
events in the future. According to Fransella (1984) Personal 
Construct Theory (PCT) "is the most explicit theory in 
psychology today" (p. 151). The Fundamental Postulate of the 
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theory states that "A person's processes are psychologically 
channelised by the ways in which he anticipates events and 
the first corollary of the theory (Construction) states that 
people anticipate events by constructing their replications" 
(Fransella, 1984, p. 151). A construct is "a representation 
of the universe, a representation erected by a living 
creature and then tested against the reality of that 
universe. Since the universe is essentially a course of 
events, the testing of a construct is a testing against 
subsequent events. In other words, a construct is tested in 
terms of its predictive efficiency" (Kelly, 1955, p. 12). 
According to PCT people subsume the way others see things, 
acquiring this way interpersonal understanding and engaging 
in communication (Sociality Corollary) (Kelly, 1955). 
For Fransella (1984) the main difference between 
representation and construct is that the latter has an 
inbuilt action component, allowing for relationships between 
thinking, feeling and behaving. For her, this relationship 
between social representations and behaviour can only be 
inferred. 
Although PCT and Social Representations theory have some 
similarities, mostly in terms of viewing the individual as a 
'scientist', trying to understand, control and predict the 
social world, PCT remains primarily an individualistic theory 
employing a purely cognitive approach (Farr, 1978). What 
differentiates the two theories, is that Social 
Representations theory approaches understanding, controlling 
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and predicting, as well as their outcome (i. e. representations) 
as having a social nature and as serving social functions. 
3.5. Social Representations - Ideology, Science and Culture 
------------------------------------------------------ 
The relation, the commonalties as well as the differences 
between social representations and ideology, science and 
culture have been considered significant throughout the 
development of the theory of Social Representations. 
The first point that has to be made is that ideology, science 
and culture can be (and have been) studied from a social 
representational approach. Specifically, it is the diffusion 
of aspects of these three constructs within everyday 
collective understanding and communication that can be the 
study matter of. social representations. Examples of such 
studies are Moscovici's (1961) investigation of 
psychoanalysis (science), Rommetveit's (1984) exploration of 
language in the creation and transmission of social 
representations (culture) and Scarbrough's (1990) discussion 
of ideology within the social representational framework. 
Yet, it is necessary to distinguish the three concepts from 
social representations in order to be able to establish what 
the theory has to offer in the study of each one of them. 
3.5.1. Ideology 
For Moscovici (1984b) ideologies (as well as events and 
sciences) provide people with "food for thought" (p. 16). For 
him, ideologies have not a specific structure; they can be 
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perceived either as representations or as sciences. The idea 
behind this argument is that ideologies derive their content 
from within society ( as a consensual universe) and then a 
form from the scientific world (as a reified universe). So, 
in a way ideologies fluctuate between the two worlds and in 
that sense can take both the form of a representation and 
that of a science. 
However, Scarbrough (1990) argued that ideologies and 
representations are always located in different parts of the 
world and that the former stand, conceptually and 
empirically, prior to the latter. So, they can never be seen 
as the same kind of phenomenon; ideology cannot be collapsed 
into a single representation or into a set of social 
representations. On the other hand, social representations 
cannot be elevated to the status of ideologies. 
These ideas should not be seen as contradicting Moscovici's 
(1984b) conceptualisation of ideology. He accepted the fact 
that ideologies are located and can be found within formal 
groups, classes and organisations, which, in fact, elevates 
ideologies into the reified universe and differentiates them 
from representations. What he implied with his suggestion 
that ideology can take the form of a representation, is that 
when ideology is discussed, explained, interpreted and 
practised in everyday life then it demonstrates itself as a 
representation. In this context, ideology facilitates 
understanding and communication, ' organises and leads 
behaviour, so it actually functions as a social 
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representation. 
Scarbrough (1990) acknowledged that social representations 
offer a new perspective in the study of ideology. They can 
be used to uncover the ideological components that structure 
social reality. They can track how ideologies emerge from 
the life of a society and how they influence attitudes and 
actions. 
3.5.2. Science 
To begin with, in his discussion of consensual and reified 
universes Moscovici (1984b) clearly differentiated between 
representations and sciences. Sciences are used to study and 
understand objects belonging to the reified universe, whereas 
representations deal with objects belonging to the consensual 
universe. However, later in his discussion of social 
representations he addressed again the relation between the 
two concepts by arguing that "science and social 
representations are so different from each other and yet so 
complementary that we have to think and speak in both 
registers" (Moscovici, 1984b, p. 28). The argument put 
forward is that although representations and science are 
different, they are strongly related to each other through 
the notion of common sense. Common sense is seen as the 
everyday understanding, the popularisation and the 
representation of science. 
Again, science might be seen as belonging to the reified 
universe, but this does not make it unapproachable for social 
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representation. When science crosses the borders between 
reified and consensual universes and it ceases being the 
object of exclusive scientific groups, then it becomes part 
of people's representations. In this form, science, can be 
studied from a social representational approach. 
3.5.3 Culture 
Culture, and specifically modern human culture, incites 
individuals to the creation of reality through 
objectification of everything they come across (Moscovici, 
1984b). Through objectification representations are turned 
into reality, and this, in fact, is the only reality that 
individuals have and have to cope with. 
Culture (Kaes, 1984) is a social system of more or less 
coherent representations, established by means of language 
and through interaction and communication. Culture is seen 
as a code common to all members of an organised structure 
comprising "social practices and systems of representations 
such as rites, myths, ideologies, conceptions of the 
universe, -philosophical-doctrines, -scientific theories etc. " 
(Kaes, 1984, p. 368). 
This approach to culture binds it closely to social 
representations, since, on one hand, representations are seen 
as part of the social code that defines culture and, on the 
other hand it incorporates within culture everything that the 
theory claims to be able to investigate. 
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The above discussion of social representations in relation to 
ideology, science and culture, leads to the conclusion that 
the three concepts can be seen as consisting of as well as 
creating representations, at least when they operate within 
the consensual universe. Consequently, this characteristic 
of the three concepts incorporate them within the topics of 
investigation of the theory of social representations. It is 
the belief of a number of scientists (Jaspars and Fraser, 
1984, Kaes, 1984, Roiser, 1987, Scarbrough, 1990) that this 
theory can offer a new perspective and a better understanding 
of these concepts, especially because of the social nature of 
social representations. 
4. COMMENT 
The aim of this chapter, as suggested in the beginning, was 
to present and describe the theory of Social Representations. 
It covered its origins and development, its definition, 
characteristics and function as well its relation with other 
theories and constructs within psychology. 
No attempt was made to evaluate and criticise the theory. 
Furthermore, methodological issues and empirical work within 
the theoretical framework of Social Representations, have not 
been discussed. Both these issues are going to be presented 
in the two following chapters. It has been considered more 
valuable to present the reader, initially, with the theory 
without the 'noise' created by evaluations, criticisms and 
empirical studies. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CRITICAL DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION OF THE THEORY 
------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------ 
OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS 
------------------------- ------------------------- 
1. INTRODUCTION 
------------ 
The aim of this chapter is to 
the theory of Social Represen 
the theory it is essential to 
counter-arguments it produced 
had on its development. This 
'isolation' of the aspects of 
will focus upon. 
critically discuss and evaluate 
tations. After having presented 
turn to the arguments and 
and the effects that these have 
chapter also aims to enable the 
the theory that this thesis 
2. ASPECTS OF THE THEORY CRITICALLY DISCUSSED 
------------------------------------------ 
2.1. Definition 
The first aspect of the theory that has been criticised and 
discussed extensively is the absence of any formal definition 
of social representations. 
A number of scientists such as Potter and Litton, (1985), 
Markova and Wilkie (1987) and Jahoda (1988) have said that 
Moscovici is unwilling to provide any precise or formal 
definition of social representations. Billig (1988) argued 
that the concept of social representations lacks precise 
definition and that it is used both as a particular one 
(specific to time and context) and as a universal one. 
In fact, social psychology and other social sciences often 
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have to deal with ill-defined concepts. This was actually 
Moscovici's (1988) first response to this criticism. He 
argued that concepts such as self, schema, attitude and so on 
have not just one but many definitions. "And if there are 
many, then there is none. So we are left with descriptions 
and intuitions, some of which meet with everyone's approval 
and others not" (Moscovici, 1988, pp. 238-239). 
However this argument, as well as the claim that social 
representations belong to the category of interesting but 
obscure concepts were not accepted by Jahoda (1988) as a 
justification of Moscovici's unwillingness to define social 
representations. 
This criticism that all of the above scientists (Potter and 
Litton, 1985, Markova and Wilkie, 1987, Jahoda, 1988, Billig, 
1988) made, had already been discussed by Moscovici himself 
in some of his earlier papers. He had already suggested 
(Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983) that the lack of precision of 
definition is a virtue of the theory since it allows a 
certain degree of flexibility. He had also pointed out 
(Moscovici, 1984a) that the main problem of the concept is 
that it is all-embracing and ill-defined. So, he proposed, 
the best way to understand it is intuitively and the way it 
takes on meaning is only through actual usage. However, this 
lack of clarity does not prevent the concept from being 
fruitful. And, he concluded, the concept of social 
representations must be seen as a fascinating but obscure 
one. Finally, Moscovici (1988) argued that although he, 
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himself, was reluctant to provide a clear definition of the 
concept others had done so. So, he cited several scientists 
(Doise, 1985, Flament, 1986, Jodelet, 1983, Codol, 1969) that 
had tried to define social representations and, in his 
opinion, had succeeded. 
This imprecision of the definition creates, yet, another 
problem. Scientists, working within the theory of Social 
Representations, have to define the concept themselves before 
setting out to study it. So, often, definitions of social 
representations are purely operational and they run the risk 
of both not agreeing with each other and of not following the 
theoretical formulations of the theory (Potter and Litton, 
1985). For example, Hewstone, Jaspars and Lalljee (1982) 
parallel social representations to social stereotypes. On 
the other hand, Di Giacomo (1980) considered them as "a 
socially determined universe of opinions" and "beliefs about 
the material or social environment" (p. 330). Finally, 
Herzlich (1973) stressed the active nature of individual's 
constructions and defined social representations as "the 
blending of concept and percept, and individual images and 
social norms... in this mode of perceiving an object or 
perceiving social reality" (pp. 10-11). Furthermore, in the 
same way that an ill-defined concept can fascinate and 
challenge, it can also make scientists sceptical and drive 
them away. 
For the present piece of work, social representations are 
seen as complex constructs involving knowledge, attitudes, 
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opinions, beliefs, images, feelings, 'naive theories', 
understandings and explanations. These constructs are 
created and shared by groups of individuals through 
interaction, communication and active seeking of information. 
Their function is to enable the understanding of social 
phenomena and events, as well as the creation of a social 
reality. 
2.2. The social nature of social representations 
According to Harre (1984) the concept of 'social' has not 
been fully exploited by the theory of Social Representations 
as it could have been. For him, 'social' implies "a 
plurality of persons, the idea of a group or aggregate" 
(p. 930). This plurality can either be distributive (i. e. 
when each member of the group has some similar attribute to 
every other)-or collective (i. e. when the group has an 
attribute which is not an attribute of any of its members). 
Social representations are considered by Harre (1984) to be 
distributive properties of groups; they "are not social in 
the sense of belonging to the group, they are individual 
representations, each of which is similar to everyone of the 
rest" (p. 930). So, he claimed, what one actually deals 
with, when dealing with the notion of social representations, 
is distributed intellectual representations. Furthermore, 
according to Harre (1984), the theory of Social 
Representations restricts the role of 'social' only to the 
influence social situations have on the minds of individual 
actors. This implication of the 'social' nature of 
44 
representations is, for him, nothing more than a version of 
individualism. 
Yet, the social nature of social representations is 
demonstrated in more than one way. According to Jaspars and 
Fraser (1984) social representations are social in at least 
three different senses. First, they deal with social reality 
in a structural and cultural sense, second, they are social 
in origin and third, by being widely shared, they become part 
of social reality itself. 
Still, Harre (1984) claimed that the way the theory deals 
with the notion of 'social' restricts its scope. He went on 
to argue that when people are studying the phenomenon of 
social representations they do so in the restricted scope of 
'taxonomic' groups and not in the much broader and, truly, 
collective scope of 'structured' groups. The former are 
groups that are formed "by virtue of human acts of 
classifying and are dependent on human interests. They are 
ideal entities and as real merely aggregates" (Harre, 1984, 
p. 932). The latter are real groups, that is to say that the 
relations among group members are not dependent on human acts 
but they do exist in reality (for instance, they can be 
biological links as well as rights, obligations and duties). 
For Harre, the theory of Social Representations can only deal 
with taxonomic groups. 
In replying to this criticism, Moscovici (1984a) agreed that 
the theory tends to study taxonomic groups, but he went on to 
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suggest that this is so because "such aggregates exist and 
indicate a certain state of association and interaction among 
individuals" (p. 958). There is also a practical reason for 
studying taxonomic groups. It enables people who belong to 
structured groups (for instance Marxists or psychoanalysts) 
to see how the different elements of a representation of 
their 'science' are diffused in society and what their 
effects are. But this does not imply that the people 
involved in the study of social representations consider them 
as a distributive property of groups in general, nor that 
they are only interested in taxonomic groups (Moscovici, 
1984a). 
Furthermore, Moscovici (1984a) suggested that in a society as 
complex and differentiated as today's society, both taxonomic 
and structured groups have to be studied; "the former 
allowing a large margin of variation to individuals, the 
latter more alike an organism whose members exist only as a 
function of the whole. These two types of groupings are 
counte. rparts to each other and act as complements" (p. 960). 
So, according to Moscovici's comments, it seems that he does 
not believe that the social nature of representations is not 
fully exploited. He valued the study of taxonomic 
aggregates, since they do exist in society and are 
interesting. He also stated that the theory of Social 
Representations is able to deal, and has in fact dealt, with 
structured groups as well (Moscovici referred to Jodelet's 
study in 1983 on the representations of mental illness). 
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In this way the theory grasps both the variety and 
differentiation in society as well as its structured and well 
defined parts. 
However, it is believed that social groups should not be 
dealt with as static entities. They tend to merge (at least 
partially) with each other and to change in order to 
accommodate the movement of members from one group to 
another. Through membership in a group, individuals acquire 
and share social reality and identity. This has to be taken 
under consideration whenever one aims at studying social 
representations. Yet, movement between and change within 
groups should also be considered. As Potter and Litton 
(1985) pointed out the satisfaction of one index of 
membership, however objective, does not guarantee that the 
individual will identify with, or act in terms of, the 
specific group. Group membership has to be seen as time and 
context specific. 
According to all these, it is suggested that the theory of 
Social Representations allows the investigation of both 
social groups (either taxonomic or structured) at a specific 
time as well as the process of their change over time and in 
different contexts. 
Yet, it should be mentioned that the tendency to study the 
social representations of taxonomic aggregates may be 
attributed to the fact that such aggregates are rather easily 
identifiable and membership in these groups can be controlled 
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by the researchers. Also, often scientists aim at comparing 
representations between groups and, again, it is easier to 
identify different groups according to their taxonomic 
characteristics. 
2.3. Familiarisation, anchoring and objectifying 
------------------------------------------- 
This criticism comes to question the hypothesised function of 
social representations, namely their ability to turn 
something unfamiliar, or unfamiliarity itself, into something 
familiar by means of anchoring and objectifying. As 
Moscovici (1984b) himself, pointed out this statement is 
nothing more than an intuition which he believed to be true. 
So, it should be expected that such an assertion will produce 
a certain amount of criticism. 
Jahoda (1988) pointed out that Moscovici introduced this 
notion as thought it were self-evident and he did not provide 
any relevant evidence to prove his point. Jahoda suggested 
that other reasons, such as curiosity motivation and 
attraction to novelty can play the role that unfamiliarity 
plays for social representations. However, accepting such an 
argument would reduce representations into a rather 
individualistic concept. It would deny them the social 
interaction that is essential for the unfamiliar, first, to 
be acknowledged and, second to be dealt with. 
Yet, Jahoda (1988) insisted that there is no evidence proving 
that unfamiliar and threatening ideas are turned into 
familiar ones by becoming representations, so he could not 
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accept "that there is a motivational basis for the 
transformation of strange notions into social representations" 
(p. 201). Answering this specific point, Moscovici (1988) 
claimed that, as far as evidence is concerned, he did not 
believe that there was any need to list all known facts when 
stating a proposition. For him, some indications were 
sufficient. 
Jahoda (1988) followed this line of argument to point out 
that an alternative to this notion would "be to view the 
genesis of social representations in Piagetian terms" 
(p. 201). He suggested that what seems, unfamiliar for a 
group can be transformed and accommodated in a modified form 
by means of interpersonal communications. This suggestion 
found Moscovici (1988) in total disagreement. The purely 
cognitive terms that this proposition was based upon could 
not be accepted from the point of view of the theory of 
Social Representations. For him, "a cognition is inseparable 
from its affective basis" (p. 234). In fact, Moscovici 
criticised Jahoda for considering the unfamiliar as based on 
intellectual uncertainties, as able to be defined objectively 
and as simple as a contradiction or dissonance between two 
cognitions, since, by doing this he was actually depriving it 
of its emotional component. For Moscovici "strangeness or 
unfamiliarity ... refers to a failure of communication with 
the world in which a person or object is situated and an 
overflow of meaningfulness which imbues the idea one has of 
him, her or it with ill-defined, hence disturbing emotions" 
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(pp. 234-235). It could be argued that Moscovici's reply did 
not answer Jahoda's critique. However, it is believed that 
familiarisation as a process, as well as its mechanisms may 
be difficult to be proven or disproven. Familiarisation, 
anchoring and objectifying may be useful as explanatory 
devices for social processes. Yet, it is possible that there 
will be other alternative explanations for the same 
processes, such as, in this case, the Piagetian notion of 
accommodation. 
Over and above these claims, a social representational 
approach (Emler, 1987) is considered to be more suitable to 
deal with the development of familiarisation than any socio- 
cognitive model. This approach grasps the content and not 
only the structure of thought, it emphasises the 
communicated, socially constructed and socially sustained 
character of thought and knowledge and can deal with 
variations in social knowledge as a function of social 
factors. 
Another point that found Jahoda and Moscovici in disagreement 
is the claim that there is no perception without anchor. 
Jahoda (1988) suggested that this was an "evident absurdity" 
(p. 201), since it implied that young children can neither 
think, nor perceive. But for Moscovici (1988) the only means 
by which an idea which is perceived as strange and unfamiliar 
can be dealt with is by being anchored to an already existing 
belief system. In this way what is strange acquires in the 
process, an everyday, familiar meaning. To illustrate this, 
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he went on to cite a study conducted in Italy after the 
Chernobyl accident, by Galli and Nigro (1987). In this 
study, involving children's representations of the-event, it 
was shown that the unfamiliar events were first absorbed by 
means of already existing ideas children had (religious, 
medical, science-fictional) and how, in the end, what started 
as unfamiliar was described, explained, assimilated and 
became a representation of something new. Although for 
Moscovici, himself, the explanations and clarifications 
provided are not adequate to prove his points, he was content to 
say that further observations could provide better: 
understanding of these ideas. 
Yet, it remains that both the mechanisms of anchoring and 
objectifying have been seen as-problematic in explaining the 
operation of social representations. As mentioned earlier, 
Billig (1988) suggested that social representations are used 
in both a universal and in a particular sense. This is 
especially demonstrated by the two mechanisms. Anchoring, 
according to him, is dealt with as a universal mechanism; 
i. e. it can occur in any sort of social arrangement. 
Objectification, on the other hand, is a particular 
mechanism; i. e. only certain sorts of beliefs can be 
objectified. As a result "only those groups, possessing 
objectified consciousness, can be said to anchor their 
thoughts and perceptions by social representations. Those 
groups with other forms of consciousness anchor their 
thoughts and perceptions into 'common sense', 'mythology', 
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etc., but not on social representations" (Billig, 1988, p. 8). 
The danger here is that thinking individuals will end up 
being perceived as unthinkingly seeking to avoid novelty by 
categorising new information in terms of familiar schemata. 
What is actually missing, for Billig, is the 
particularisation, the negation and the rhetorical thinking. 
People do not unthinkingly anchor new information, but they 
can also criticise it and negate it. A rhetorical or 
argumentative approach could deal with this part of the 
development of social representations, because it could grasp 
-- `------the« way- argumentation and -negation -affect -it. 
The first point that can be made in response to Billig's 
arguments is that in his description and discussion of the 
anchoring mechanism Moscovici (1984b) dealt with 
particularisation as an aspect of it. He suggested that when 
particularising people sustain and emphasise the distance 
between the new and the existing belief system. This way 
people, in a sense, negate and Argue with the new. 
Taking the points that Billig (1988) made even further one 
could suggest that what is actually missing is the idea that 
anchoring can be a selective and active mechanism (at least 
much more than Moscovici (1984b) considered it to be). The 
argument might not focus on whether the new is going to be 
classified or rejected but on where and how it is going to be 
anchored and what the effects of this process are going to 
be. This is a basic theoretical argument for the present 
work and it is going to be discussed again later. Yet, it 
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has be to mentioned here that it is believed that a kind of 
selection may be taking place during anchoring. It is 
possible that people select which belief system the new and 
unfamiliar is going to be anchored to. They may tend to 
anchor it to pre-existing belief systems related to the new, 
facilitating and speeding this way the process of 
familiarisation. 
Furthermore, different kinds of involvement with a new 
object; such as interest, evaluation of the possible effects 
that this object may have and other affective factors, may be 
informing the selectivity of the anchoring mechanism. 
2.4. Collective versus social representations 
---------------------------------------- 
Harre (1984) in his critical discussion of the theory of 
Social Representations wondered why Moscovici chose to 
substitute the term 'social' for the term 'collective' since 
he neither used fully the notion of 'social', nor worked with 
something more social than an aggregate. 
In answering this question, Moscovici (1984a), suggested that 
the shift from the traditional term 'collective' was 
necessary and had a purpose. Traditions, according to him, 
are to be broken and this breaking is unavoidable if one 
wants to update some of the out-moded ideas. Collective 
representations were considered to have an aggregating and 
constraining power that made individual mind and conscience 
powerless. But, representations in their up-dated sense, 
took on a social character and individual representations 
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remained independent from the collective ones and able to 
take shape on their own. So, the term social had been used 
to indicate that the representations are the outcome of the 
constant (internal and external) dialogue between individuals 
"during which individual representations are echoed and 
complimented" (p. 950). The main purpose of social 
representations is communication and action; individuals, by 
means of social representations, are able to communicate with 
and act upon others in the world. The term 'social' has been 
used to imply that representations are created by the 
individuals themselves. - 
Furthermore, Moscovici (1984a) pointed out that collective 
'representations were a very broad and general category 
including everything from science to religion and from myths 
to common sense.. But, for. him, representations "should be 
reserved for a special category of knowledge and beliefs, 
namely those that arise in ordinary communication and whose 
structure corresponds to this form of communication" (p. 952). 
This idea applies, for instance to scientific theories (such 
as psychoanalysis and Marxism) which influence individuals' 
consciousness and become part of everyone's concern and, as a 
result, they are discussed, assimilated and transformed. 
In his reply to Harre, Moscovici (1984a) offered three 
reasons for the substitution of 'social' for 'collective'. 
First, social was used to reject the opposition between 
individual and collective notions and everything that this 
opposition implied. Second, to stress that the concept of 
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representation should be used for a particular category of 
knowledge and beliefs. And third, to imply that social 
representations are a phenomenon characteristic of 
contemporary societies and the product of "their conventional 
wisdom" (p. 954). 
Yet, according to Jahoda (1988) Moscovici departed from the 
Durkheimian term 'collective' representation because it was 
too global and embracing every kind of intellectual form. 
Although he accepted this argument, Jahoda claimed that it 
-- - went- too far. ------He, --himself, considered -the -notion of 
collective representations as valuable for anthropologists 
who deal with small and homogeneous cultures. In modern 
heterogeneous societies it is difficult to apply such 
theoretical formulations as collective representations, and 
it is better to find more appropriate and less global ones. 
At this point Jahoda commended Moscovici for employing the 
term 'social' representations, but he immediately went on to 
pin-point that this shift implies a restricted scope for 
social representations and that, in fact, the distinction 
between social and collective is not a clear one. 
To these criticisms Moscovici (1988) replied that the change 
in word actually denotes a real change in perspective. Thus, 
he went on to repeat the three above mentioned reasons for 
shifting from 'collective' to 'social' representations, and 
to suggest that by giving up the term 'collective', he and 
his colleagues, wanted to emphasise the plurality of 
representations and their diversity within a group. The way 
they wanted to view representations made this shift 
necessary. They wanted to consider representations as being 
constantly "in the making, in the context of interrelations 
and actions that were themselves always in the making" 
(p. 219). In order to achieve this they had to leave behind 
the Durkheimian notion that viewed representations as 
inherently collective, pre-established and of coercive 
character and that excluded any active process from the 
individual groups concerned. A need for revision of the 
concept was prominent and by doing this, Moscovici and his 
colleagues, shifted the emphasis to communication which is 
the means by which individual thoughts and feelings converge 
and create something social out of something individual. 
Their purpose was to depart from tradition and understand 
innovation and to leave behind the pre-established 
'collective' life and focus on the social life in its active 
making. It was the sharedness and the spread of a social 
representation and the processes through which they are 
achieved that the theory aimed to study. And sharedness is a 
social' rather than a collective phenomenon. 
As far as the opposition between collective and individual 
representations is concerned, Moscovici (1988) considered it 
irrelevant. He suggested three ways through which 
"representations can become social depending on the relations 
of group members" (p. 221). First, are the representations he 
called hegemonic; that are shared by all members of a 
structured group without being the product of the group. 
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Second, are the emancipated representations which are 
produced by the communication of knowledge and ideas 
belonging to subgroups which are in close contact. Finally, 
are the polemical representations that are the result of 
social conflict and controversy and society as a whole does 
not seem to share them. 
All the above mentioned ideas are the explanations that 
Moscovici (1988) offered to suggest that there was a need to 
leave behind the concept of collective representations, in 
order to produce a view of social representations that is 
closer to reality. 
Another reason for which Moscovici rejected the notion of 
collective representations is that -in Durkheimian terms- 
they were treated as irreducible explanatory devices. For 
Moscovici the task of the theory was to study the structure 
and dynamic of social representations. According to Jahoda 
(1988) this means description and analysis. Therefore, 
Jahoda claimed that Moscovici contradicted himself when he 
suggested that social representations are independent 
variables and explanatory stimuli; they cannot be both 
simultaneously. He considered this to be a serious problem 
concerning the logical status of social representations. 
To this criticism Moscovici (1988) replied that although 
explanatory concepts are abstract and ill-defined, social 
representations belong to this category. He, actually, 
suggested that as other explanatory concepts, as for instance 
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the atom and social classes, social representations are 
assumed to exist and are considered useful in explaining 
different things, although they remain obscure. So, social 
representations are attributed an explanatory function, 
something that is considered necessary if they are to be used 
to explain the phenomena they are supposed to explain. 
2.5. Group mind and 'thinking society' 
-------------------------------- 
This criticism of the theory comes from Jahoda (1988) who 
questioned Moscovici's notion of 'thinking society'. Jahoda 
pointed out that there is a discrepancy between this notion 
and the suggestion that representations are social entities, 
living a life of their own, communicating between themselves, 
entering and influencing the mind of individuals and, 
actually, being re-thought, re-cited and re-presented by 
them. Jahoda's question at this point was: 'If 
representations impose themselves upon individuals with an 
irresistible force, how, at the same time, are individuals 
and groups something more than passive receptors, who can 
think-for themselves, produce and communicate their own 
specific representations? ' The fact that Moscovici (1984b) 
had already mentioned that, with some effort, individuals can 
become aware of the conventional aspects of reality and this 
way evade some of the constraints imposed upon them, did not 
seem to successfully answer this comment. Jahoda suggested 
that there is a great contradiction and a fundamental 
discrepancy between these two notions that cannot be easily 
explained. 
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As mentioned before, it could be argued that this 
contradiction might not actually be as great as Jahoda 
claimed it to be. Representations do not come as a 'set', 
prescriptive and conventional. Moreover, they do not lead a 
life as such. There are some representations that are 
imposed upon individuals and they do not allow them much 
flexibility (such as traditions). Yet, there are other 
representations (especially those of new social phenomena and 
events) that are actively created by people, that change 
themselves or cause others to change and that, before they 
become a social representation, they are negotiated and 
argued. 
Furthermore, Abric's (1984) notion of representations having 
both a nucleus and a periphery, can be used here to provide 
one more solution to what Jahoda (1988) described as a 
fundamental discrepancy. Abric suggested that the nucleus of 
a representation is its stable and unchangeable component, 
whereas the periphery is much more easily affected and can 
change. Therefore, even if the nucleus of a representation is 
imposed upon individuals, people could still actively alter 
its periphery. 
Yet, Moscovici was further criticised by Jahoda (1988) for 
using the notion of 'group mind' in different occasions and 
with different implications. Sometimes the 'group mind' is 
regarded as embodying the spirit of people, expressed by the 
dominant elites and, in these cases, it is considered 
superior to the individual mind. In other cases, the 'group 
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mind' is regarded as the mind of the crowd which is 
considered less rational than the minds of the individuals 
composing this crowd. However, for Jahoda, the second case, 
implies that the irrational beliefs are actually a function 
of socially created representations and not defects of the 
cognitive system of individuals or, at least, a combination 
of both. 
On many occasions, scientists such as Emler (1987) and 
Moscovici (1983,1988) had already suggested that one of the 
main differences between the theory of Social Representations 
and any socio-cognitive model is that the former can deal 
more efficiently than the latter with errors, misconceptions, 
irrationalities and so on, which are so often observed in the 
social world because the theory of Social Representations 
treats them as a social reality created by social groups. 
They may be wrong and irrational, but this does not make them 
less real and less influential in social behaviour. To treat 
them as defects of cognitive systems would reduce them to 
'pathological conditions' or to non-reality. The fact that 
the 'group mind' creates something that may be wrong, does 
not make it less important or less influential for the way 
society operates. 
However, Moscovici (1988) suggested that the notion of the 
'thinking society' is to be considered a modest and empirical 
one, mainly a protest against the view of an 'unthinking 
society'. Moscovici did not accept the belief that only 
individuals think and that groups think badly, if they do at 
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all. He disagreed with the idea that society reproduces and 
imitates the thoughts and beliefs of dominant elites. For 
him, society is a thinking system, although thinking, in this 
case, is not something simple, but a shared effort through 
which the 'thinking society' produces knowledge. 
Nevertheless, social representations do remain rather 
autonomous from the individuals and groups that create them, 
because they are the product of division of labour; there are 
certain groups of people that create representations (such as 
scientists, artists, doctors, politicians, media-people) but, 
after being created, representations diffuse into society and 
maintain a certain degree of autonomy and authority. 
2.6. Social Representations - Ideology, Culture, Science 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Common sense 
------------ 
The relation between social representations and ideology, 
culture, science and common sense, has been used by some 
scientists (Jahoda, 1988, McKinley and Potter, 1987) both as 
a specific problem of the theory and as an indication of its 
general vagueness. In fact, there is a certain degree of 
vagueness and imprecision in the discussion of these concepts 
and their relation to social representations which is 
demonstrated by the following quotations (all from Moscovici, 
1984b). 
"... their achievements and their beliefs, that is their 
ideologies, sciences and social representations" (p. 15). 
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"... the unifying systems -official sciences, religions, 
ideologies-" 
"... we see more clearly the true nature of ideologies..., 
that is to cast consensual into reified categories and to 
subordinate the former to the latter. Hence they have no 
specific structure and can be perceived either as 
representations or as sciences" (p. 23). 
"... common sense could be elevated to the rank of a major 
ideology" (p. 58). 
"... we organise our thoughts, in accordance with a system 
which is conditioned, both by our representations and our 
culture" (p. 8). 
"culture -though not science- incites us, nowadays, to make 
reality out of generally significant ideas" (p. 40). 
From these quotations and in general from Moscovici's 
writings two equations can be produced (Jahoda, 1988) which 
are mutually exclusive. These equations are: 
I. COMMON SENSE==SOCIAL REPRESENTATION==IDEOLOGY=/=SCIENCE 
II. SOCIAL REPRESENTATION==IDEOLOGY==SCIENCE 
It is clear that these two equations are incompatible, but 
for Jahoda (1988) the problem is not only and simply 
concerning these concepts and their relation'to social 
representations but the relation between them as well. For 
him, the important thing is that such blurrings and 
incompatibilities of notions pervade the theory of Social 
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Representations. 
Presented as such, the criticisms by Jahoda (1988) do seem 
justified. Yet, if one goes back to Moscovici's (1984b) 
distinction between consensual and reified universes, then 
one can understand how these concepts overlap. As it was 
mentioned earlier, ideology, science, and culture all belong 
to the reified universe and at this level neither are they 
social representations nor can they be studied by a social 
representational approach. Yet, when they cross the borders 
between the two universes and they become part of the 
consensual world (by being popularised and practised) they do 
create a social reality; i. e. a social representation. At 
this level they can be investigated by a social 
representational approach. This social reality might not be 
an accurate reflection of how ideology or science or culture 
operate in the reified universe, but it is the only reality 
that people have. Therefore, each time that one talks about 
these concepts,, one has to do so within a specific context. 
Then, their relation to social representations becomes 
clearer and the points of overlap more apparent. 
As far as common sense is concerned, one has to conceptualise 
it as the popularisation of science. As such common sense is 
a social representation. In cases when this social 
representation functions so as to create an ideology (by 
being so well and deeply established that is elevated from 
the consensual to the reified universe) then the relation 
should be used to indicate the movement, the process of 
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change, and not to equate common sense with ideology. 
As mentioned in the beginning of this section, there were 
also criticisms involving specifically ideology, culture 
(Jahoda, 1988) and science (McKinley and Potter, 1987) and 
the way they are treated by the theory of Social 
Representations. 
Jahoda (1988) claimed that ideology cannot be both a science 
and a representation. This argument has been discussed 
above. On the other hand, he argued that culture cannot be 
an active agent separate from social representations. If 
culture is seen as a symbolic meaning system then it becomes 
difficult to understand how it can be separate and 
independent from social representations. For Jahoda, social 
representations must constitute one of the central aspects of 
culture. First, it has to be pointed out that this is an 
assumption that Jahoda (1988) inferred from Moscovici's 
writings. However, it might not be an accurate one. Culture 
is separate from representations because it belongs to a 
different universe (reified rather than consensual). Yet, 
culture is related to social representations as a symbolic 
meaning that is referred to for explanations, that is 
employed to facilitate communication and to direct behaviour. 
Furthermore, other scientists, besides Moscovici, referred to 
culture and explained in more detail its relation to social 
representations. Both Sperber (1985) and Kaes (1984) 
considered culture as made of and defined by widely 
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distributed and long lasting representations. 
The final point that can be made here is that representations 
(and especially widely distributed and long lasting ones) can 
leave the consensual universe and be transferred into the 
reified, where they acquire the status of an 'organisation' 
with defined rules and regulations. Culture can be seen as 
such an 'organisation', so it might consist of representations 
and be defined by them, but it is distanced from them by 
belonging to a separate universe. 
According to McKinley and Potter (1987) the differentiation 
between science and social representations is a theoretical 
artefact. For them no scientific knowledge is immune from 
the effects of social representations since scientists 
themselves rely on social representations in order to make 
sense of their own activities. 
But the distinction that Moscovici (1984b) made was between 
knowledge and social representations and not between 
scientific activities and representations. Scientific 
knowledge is made of rules and regulations that have certain 
authority and clarity. It could be argued that as far as 
scientific knowledge is concerned, individuality and 
identity do not play any role. Scientists (when they operate 
as such) have to abide by these rules and regulations, they 
have to use linguistic formulae and they have to be specific. 
That is what differentiates them from the laypersons. 
Laypersons can-interpret scientific knowledge at will (or 
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according to their social representations) but they lack the 
authority of the scientists. Scientific activities are not 
scientific knowledge. For making sense of the former 
scientists may rely on their social representations, but for 
the latter the rules are predetermined and scientists have to 
abide by them. 
2.7. Distinctiveness of Social Representations 
----------------------------------------- 
As mentioned previously, one of the reasons for departing 
from the term 'collective' representation was, for Moscovici, 
the great generality and the excessive comprehensiveness of 
the term. However, Jahoda (1988) did not believe that this 
shift was actually progress, since as he suggested the idea 
of 'grasp-all, lose-all' applies to both the terms 
'collective' and 'social'. For him, the question was whether 
there is something that is not a social representation. And 
since everything is essentially social, he did not believe 
that this particular question could be answered. He claimed 
that "the concept of social representations is of doubtful 
value-as the key element of a theory" (p. 204), since the ways 
it can be applied, allow the theory to treat everything as a 
social representation. So, the application of this label has 
not been in any way justified; it has been used axiomatically. 
Something that definitely blurs the distinctiveness of the 
term 'social representation'. 
Yet, it could be argued that for an object to be treated and 
investigated as a social representation it needs to satisfy a 
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number of criteria, in terms of structure, content and 
functions; that is what are its components and whether they 
are enough to consider the object a representation, what is 
its relation to other objects and how it operates within the 
representational system. Therefore, not everything can be 
treated as a social representation and scientists should make 
sure that a representation of an object does exist (i. e. it 
satisfies a number of criteria) before they go on to 
investigate what this representation is. 
Furthermore, Jahoda (1988) disagreed with Moscovici's (1976) 
suggestion that the cognitive system of social representation 
implies its distinctiveness. He could not see any 
explanation why such a system is distinctive and in which 
ways it differs from other cognitive-systems. For him it was 
necessary to demand some clarification of this point. 
But for Moscovici (1988) things seemed to be clear. His 
response was that the mere fact that he " thought up and 
opened a field of research ahead of other social science 
research currents and independently of them" (p. 227), is the 
proof and validation of the distinctiveness of the theory. 
For him, the change of label did make a difference since 
it denoted a specific approach to the study of the social 
world. The theory and the term may have some resemblance 
with others but they are not identical to any other theory or 
concept. 
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2.8. Social Representations and other theories 
----------------------------------------- 
Among his other criticisms of the theory and in relation to 
his belief of lack of distinctiveness, Jahoda (1988) pointed 
out that the theory has many common points with other 
theories that Moscovici seems to ignore. The only theory 
that Moscovici discussed in detail and in relation to the 
theory of Social Representations is Durkheim's. Jahoda 
referred to the writings of Schutz in 1940 (on social 
constructivism and about 'familiarity and strangeness') and 
Bartlett in 1958 (on social schema and about 'everyday 
thinking'), who held similar ideas to Moscovici. Although 
Moscovici is familiar with these writings he did not seem to 
acknowledge these similarities. Furthermore, according to 
Jahoda, although Moscovici recognises similarities between 
the theory of Social Representations and several sociological 
theories, the only one he refers to in some detail is 
ethnomethodology. Jahoda also pointed out that the theory of 
Social Representations has similarities with the 
anthropological 'folk-models', but again Moscovici ignores 
them. 
Moscovici (1988) considered these criticisms as rather 
unfair, because he claimed that the theory is a step forward 
from other theories and models and instead of being 
criticised he should be credited for liberating himself and 
others from the already existing but insufficient models. 
For him, the theory of Social Representations brought new 
life to the field of social psychology, broadened it and 
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initiated useful research. 
Moreover, even if Moscovici himself did not discuss the 
theory in relation to others, other scientists have done so. 
They have acknowledged the points of similarity between the 
theory of Social Representations and other theories. Maybe 
they have not discussed it in relation to the ones that 
Jahoda (1988) thought they should but with a number of more 
current and influential theories and concepts in social 
psychology, such as Attribution Theory (Moscovici and 
Hewstone, 1983), Personal Construct Theory (Fransella, 1984), 
attitudes (Jaspars and Fraser, 1984) and so on. 
Finally, Jahoda (1988) suggested that it might be useful to 
go back to the well-established framework of social 
cognition. This found Moscovici (1988) in total 
disagreement. For him, theories of social cognition are 
inadequate in providing an understanding of social 
representations in the making. He claimed that these 
theories cannot account for the population or the cultural 
factor both of which are accommodated within and dealt with 
in the theory of Social Representations. 
Emler (1987) argued that the theory of Social Representations 
can deal with group and cultural variations as well as 
variations within social cognitions, whereas social cognition 
models cannot and asa result they tend to ignore variation. 
The social nature of social representations and the 
communicated and socially constructed and sustained character 
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of knowledge implied by the theory allows for the explanation 
of variation. This flexibility of the theory of Social 
Representations makes it more suitable in studying the social 
world than a social cognition model. 
Finally, another point of distinction between social 
representations and social cognitions is that the former are 
not purely cognitive in the sense that they involve a certain 
emotional energy (Moscovici, 1987). Markova and Wilkie 
(1987) stressed this emotional aspect of representations 
which they considered to be very important, distinct and, as 
they suggested, it should be given more attention and 
empirical investigation. 
3. GENERAL EVALUATION OF THE THEORY 
-------------------------------- 
From the above discussion it becomes apparent that the theory 
of Social Representations instigated a great amount of 
criticisms and comments. It cannot be denied that, after 
thirty years of theorising and empirical investigation, the 
theory still has obscure and imprecise aspects. This might 
be a result of the rather 'relaxed' attitude of Moscovici 
towards clear definitions and his acceptance of intuitions as 
axioms. This 'flexibility' might be considered by some as a 
virtue, but it can also backfire and result in never-ending 
discussions as well as in a large amount of empirical work 
with no clearly defined theoretical framework. 
Yet, it would be unfair to dismiss the theory on these 
grounds. It has brought a new perspective into social 
70 
psychology and it has provided an innovative view of society 
and social reality. Furthermore, even if Moscovici remains 
reluctant in offering clarification, other scientists have 
produced empirical work that adds to and explains some of the 
obscure points of the theory. 
The theory is a rather ambitious one; it introduced a large 
number of concepts and claimed to be able to incorporate a 
wide scope of subjects of interest. Maybe it is necessary to 
deal with aspects of the theory or of the concept of social 
representations singly rather than trying to explain and 
investigate them in an all-inclusive and comprehensive way. 
This stance may be considered as too modest, but since 
questions (and especially questions about the concept) remain 
unanswered it is better to try to answer them individually 
before testing the theory as a whole. This is actually what 
still keeps (after thirty years) the theory fascinating and 
challenging. There are questions, there are criticisms, but 
at the same time there is a great theoretical potential that 
should not be left un-exploited and un-explored. The theory 
offers a new approach to the development and transmission of 
social knowledge, by seeing it as a product of everyday 
communication. It also presents an innovative distinction 
between what is actually real and how this is interpreted and 
understood in order to create a social 'reality', as well as 
the way this 'reality' affects communication and behaviour. 
By putting emphasis on communication, the theory focuses upon 
and treats language, as the means of creating, structuring 
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and transmitting this 'reality'. 
4. SUMMARY AND SOME FINAL POINTS 
----------------------------- 
This chapter presented the criticisms of the theory of Social 
Representations and discussed them in an attempt to produce 
an evaluation of it. The criticisms have been seen 
throughout as constructive and as points of departure for 
further questioning and investigation. Some of the 
criticisms and questions, that are of particular interest for 
the present work, have been pointed out. 
The theory is criticised for accepting and dealing with an 
ill-defined construct and intuitively and axiomatically 
defined functions and process. The lack of clarity in a 
number of its points is still one of the main drawbacks of 
the theory. A further outcome. of this lack of clarity is 
that the distinctiveness of the theory of Social 
Representations from other theories has not been yet 
established. 
Yet, the theory has a number of valuable contributions to 
make in social psychology. It emphasises the social nature 
of phenomena and processes it deals with, it accepts that 
people are actively involved in the creation of social 
reality and it proposes ways of investigating these phenomena 
and processes from a social psychological perspective. 
This chapter did not deal with the empirical work conducted 
within the theory of Social Representations nor with the 
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criticisms on this work and methodological issues. Although 
theory, research and methodology are not independent of each 
other, it has been considered that, for the purposes of this 
thesis, methodological issues and empirical work will be 
better dealt with on their own. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY IN THE STUDY OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
------------ 
This chapter has three aims. First, to present and 
critically discuss the variety of methods used in the study 
of social representations. Second, to offer a general 
evaluation of the issue of methodology in relation to the 
theory of Social Representations. Third, to argue that the 
way to deal with methodological and theoretical problems is 
to employ a multi-methodological approach. 
So, the first part of this chapter will present a brief 
review of the studies conducted, with emphasis on the 
different methodologies employed. The focus will be upon the 
methods themselves and upon the fact that, so far, no method 
has been singled out as the most suitable in studying social 
representations. 
In the second part, the focus will be upon the way certain 
theoretical problems have been inherited by the empirical 
work and how this makes the choice of methodology even more 
difficult. This is expected to allow a general evaluation of 
methodological issues and to lead to the third and final part 
of this chapter. 
In this last part, the need for employing a multi- 
methodological approach and longitudinal designs will be 
stressed and argued. It is going to be suggested that the 
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nature and the processes of social representations should 
lead to the adoption of such approaches. 
2. REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL WORK ON SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS : 
------------------------------------------------------ 
THE METHODOLOGIES 
----------------- 
2.1. Introduction 
------------ 
The theory of Social Representations instigated a vast amount 
of empirical studies, investigating a large variety of 
topics. The larger number of studies involved social 
phenomena in situ; i. e. phenomena that have been seen to 
interest and perplex people in their everyday life and 
interaction (e. g. science, the body, health and illness and 
so on). However, purely experimental studies, that took 
place in a laboratory where conditions were controlled by 
experimenters, have also been conducted, aiming mainly at 
investigating relations between representations and 
behaviour. Finally, there have been a number of studies 
investigating social events as they were taking place (e. g. 
riot, protest movement and so on). 
The variety of topics of interest and the different 
theoretical hypotheses as well as the complexity and 
multiplicity of the concept of social representations, has 
often. led researchers to employ more than one method so as to 
achieve their aims. So far, no method has been singled out 
as the most appropriate for studying this concept. But, it 
might well be the case that this was never the purpose. 
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In this section the different methods will be presented and 
discussed, with examples from the empirical work. As 
mentioned before, most of the studies used more than one 
method, so the classification of studies according to the 
methods employed was not a straight forward task. This 
problem was dealt in two ways. First, the method that was 
emphasised and was considered most important for a study 
determined the study's classification. Second, studies were 
mentioned under more than one category, if, indeed, they 
reflected examples of more than one method. 
It should, also, be mentioned that the different studies are 
going to be presented, first, individually, so as to provide 
examples of how the methods used dealt with the specific 
theoretical questions investigated and what these methods had 
to offer in the study of social representations. On the 
other hand, the same studies are going to be used in order to 
discuss the limitations that each different method may have, 
especially in relation to social representations. 
2.2. The Methodologies 
----------------- 
2.2.1. Interviews 
Extensive or intensive, structured, semi-structured or 
unstructured interviews have been one of the most preferred 
methods of investigation of social representations. In some 
studies interviews were the only method, whereas in others 
they were combined with a variety of methods. In some cases 
the interviews. were conducted individually (Herzlich, 1973), 
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in others with groups (Emiliani, Zani and Carugati, 1981), 
whereas in some other cases (Campbell and Muncer, 1987) group 
discussions were simply observed. 
The biggest advantage of interviews, especially in the study 
of social representations, is that they allow the free verbal 
expression of feelings, understandings and explanations, 
since interviewees use their own words and expressions. This 
way they both tap some of the most distinguished components 
of the concept and, at the same time, they do so by employing 
language which is considered to be the means of meaning 
acquisition during communication and interaction. 
The topics investigated by this method varied a lot from 
representations of health and illness (Herzlich, 1973) and of 
the body (Jodelet, 1984) to children's representations of 
economic inequalities (Emler and Dickinson, 1985). 
Interviews were used as the only method of investigation by 
several researchers (Herzlich, 1973, Jodelet, 1984, Campbell, 
1984, Emler, Ohana and Moscovici, 1987). On the other hand, 
a number of researchers combined interviews with other 
methods such as observation (Emiliani, Zani and Carugati, 
1981), description of pictures (Emler and Dickinson, 1985), 
and attitude scales (Molinari and Emiliani, 1990). Variation 
can also be observed in the number of individuals 
interviewed; from eighty (Herzlich, 1973) up to around two- 
hundred (Emler, Ohana and Moscovici, 1987). 
In all cases the interviews were recorded, transcribed and 
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coded. In most cases the analysis was qualitative content 
analysis. However, there were studies where other methods of 
analysis of data were used, such as multivariate 
(quantitative) analysis based on the frequency of content 
units (Jodelet, 1984, Campbell, 1984, Molinari and Emiliani, 
1990). All these studies provided interesting insights about 
the topics they investigated, especially about the way people 
understood and represented them through their verbalisations 
and they demonstrated the use of interviews in studying 
social representations. Furthermore they provided 
researchers with answers to theoretical questions about 
social representations. Finally, these studies could also be 
used to demonstrate the limitations of this method. 
Herzlich (1973) used open interviews to ask professionals, 
middle class individuals and a small group of people living 
in the country about health and illness. She wanted to 
investigate, using this method, the way in which individuals 
construct social reality and orient themselves towards it. 
Her theoretical hypothesis was that the representation of a 
particular object forms a part of a more extensive 
representation of the whole society. She analysed her data 
according to already developed themes. Based on her findings 
Herzlich concluded that individuals give meaning and organise 
reality and their own experience by selective perception; by 
schematising or distorting. For the people she interviewed 
the picture of health and illness did not reflect a totality 
of knowledge but selective perceptions about illness and the 
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behaviour of patients. 
Emiliani, Zani and Carugati (1981), in their study of adults' 
representations about children, interviewed the members of 
staff in a day nursery. They combined this method with 
observation of play activities. The aim of this study was to 
investigate the way the behaviour of individuals or groups, 
in any given situation, may be determined by the social 
representation maintained by the individual or the group with 
respect to the relevant part of the surrounding social 
reality. They analysed their data by classification of 
utterances occurring during play and by the rules emerging 
during the interviews. Their findings suggested that the 
roles that adults adopted and enhanced were related to the 
rules they wanted children to learn. 
In her study on aggression by female gang members Campbell 
(1984) investigated, for two years, gangs in New York, by 
collecting verbal accounts of aggressive episodes. She 
focused on the social understanding of an act and she 
stressed that it is necessary to comprehend both the meaning 
and the personal and social significance attributed to an act 
by the actors and their peers. She claimed that behaviour 
acquires significance by the way it is represented to others 
and the attributions it leads an audience to make. The 
analysis of her data consisted of coding cases of fight 
accounts and multivariate analysis. She suggested that 
aggression as well as accounts of it might not be a matter of 
fact but a matter of social representation. Female gang 
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members were found to give accounts of aggression based more 
on the image they had acquired and they wanted to preserve or 
present, than on actual behaviour. 
Jodelet (1984) conducted a study on the representation of the 
body and its transformations using two sets of in-depth 
interviews that took place with a fifteen years interval 
between them. She used the 'social' and 'private' nature of 
the body to address theoretical questions involving the 
relation between social and individual representations, the 
relation between representations and behaviour and the 
relation between social representations and individual and 
social change. She analysed her data by classic content 
analysis and by analysis which distinguished the different 
types of information on the basis of which people develop 
discourses. Her findings led to the conclusion that cultural 
changes (such as women's liberation) provided new conceptual 
tools and new normative frameworks for thinking about the 
body. This new conceptualisation of the body was found to be 
related to the facts of everyday life of individuals by 
enabling them to interpret their social experience and to 
locate themselves in the modern world. 
In their study on children's knowledge about economic 
inequalities, Emler and Dickinson (1985) interviewed 
individually two groups of children (one from a lower 
working-class school and another from a private fee-paying 
school), asking them to estimate the income for different 
professions. They hypothesised that knowledge may be 
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socially generated and sustained and that it may be an 
attribute of collectives rather than of individuals, created 
and diffused through processes of social influence and 
interaction. They believed that social class constitutes a 
distinctive social environment, thus they expected that 
children belonging to different social classes would estimate 
income differently through the influence of different 
social worlds. They used mainly multivariate analysis of 
quantified content units (in terms of frequency). Their 
results suggested that children's knowledge of income 
inequalities takes the form of a social representation in the 
sense that it consists of shared, socially generated and 
sustained systems of ideas, beliefs and values. Also 
children were found to assimilate most readily those 
representations that were most dominant, widespread and 
important within their community. 
In studying children's beliefs about institutional roles 
Emler, Ohana and Moscovici (1987) focused upon children's 
representations of teachers. They used interviews of pupils 
in two kinds of schools in Scotland and France which they 
analysed in terms of content. Similarly to the above 
mentioned study (Emler and Dickinson, 1985) they hypothesised 
that social knowledge refers to a socially constructed 
environment, thus it is liable to variation between times and 
places. They found that there is an explicit priority of 
official obligations over personal inclinations, that 
legitimate behaviour is limited within specific 
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organisational roles and that there is a formally defined 
hierarchical distribution of powers and spheres of 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, they suggested that their 
findings indicate that this kind of representation is 
established quite early in life. 
Campbell and Muncer (1987) used group (males and females) 
interviews in their exploratory study of social 
representations of aggression. They expected that such a 
behaviour would give rise to social talk and that it would be 
involved in the construction of social reality. Furthermore, 
they expected that this talk and social reality would be 
different for men and women. They analysed the content of 
these interviews according to a number of categories. They 
reported that sex differences were apparent with respect to 
the reason for the occurrence of aggression, to the 
relationship with the opponent and the outcome of the 
aggressive episode. These differences were related to the 
way women and men represented and understood aggression. 
In her study on the changes in the profession of the 
psychiatric nurse, Zani (1987) employed semi-directive 
interviews (group and individual) which she analysed in terms 
of thematic content and complemented with questionnaires and 
observation. She used an on-going situation (i. e. the 
changes in psychiatric clinics) to focus on the dynamics of 
change. She showed how the changes affected nurses' 
representation of their profession and their own professional 
identity. She also showed that, according to these changes, 
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nurses had to re-evaluate and re-interpret both their role 
0 
and their profession. 
Finally, in their study of mothers' image of the child, 
Molinari and Emiliani (1990) used detailed interviews of 
mothers differentiated in terms of occupation (housewives, 
office workers, factory workers and teachers). They combined 
these interviews with attitude scales and observation of 
story telling by the mothers. They aimed at investigating 
the relation of social representations and social identities. 
They expected that the experience of conflicts of identities 
would constitute a source of transformation of social 
representations. They considered social representations as a 
link between symbolic processes and behaviour and they wanted 
to establish whether and to what extent the process of 
symbolic elaboration may be predictive of modes of behaviour. 
They analysed their data by classifying the phrases and the 
adjectives used by the mothers in a number of categories. 
They found that images of the child affect mothers' behaviour 
as well as their conversational styles when they talk about 
their children. 
Hewstone, Jaspars and Lalljee (1982) studied intergroup 
images of 'public and 'comprehensive' schoolboys by analysing 
essays the boys had written on similarities and differences 
between themselves and the opposite group. This study is 
included in this group since it involved the free expression 
of ideas, opinions and explanation. Yet, it should be 
pointed out that in contrast to traditional interviews, this 
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way of gathering information is void of interaction. Using 
this method the above researchers aimed at investigating the 
relation between social representations and social identity. 
They hypothesised that social representations may have a 
selective function (leading people to note the desirable 
characteristics of the in-group and the undesirable ones of 
the, out-group), a justificatory function (allowing the 
maintenance of social distance) and an anticipatory function 
(predetermining the interaction between groups). They 
expected that social representations would influence both 
causal attributions and social identity. In their conclusion 
they suggested that 'comprehensive' and 'public' schoolboys 
possess different representations of themselves and each 
other. They reported a general agreement within the groups, 
that indicated that these representations are indeed shared 
social beliefs. Furthermore, they suggested that these 
representations contained both evaluative connotations as 
well as cognitive classifications. Finally, they found that 
such representations are not isolated but connected with 
supportive beliefs so as to construct common-sense 
'theories' about aspects of social life. 
From the presentation of the above studies, it can be 
suggested that, indeed, by using interviews scientists have 
been able to raise and discuss a number of theoretical 
issues, including acquisition and development of knowledge 
(Emler and Dickinson, 1985, Emler, Ohana and Moscovici, 
1987), relations between representations and'behaviour 
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(Emiliani, Zani and Carugati, 1981, Molinari and Emiliani, 
1990), or perception (Campbell, 1984, Campbell and Muncer, 
1987), or social identity (Hewstone, Jaspars and Lalljee, 
1982), change in representations (Jodelet, 1984, Zani, 1987) 
and the construction of social reality (Herzlich, 1973). All 
demonstrated how useful and applicable this method is for the 
investigation of social representations. 
However, these studies also bring into light the limitations 
of this method in the study of social representations. 
First, interviews were not free from the interviewers' 
representations of the target object. While constructing an 
interview schedule and while conducting the actual 
interviews, researchers might have been led by their own 
representations and expectations. Second, the method of 
analysis that was used in most of-these studies; i. e. 
content analysis, has similar limitations. Coding and 
classification was not independent of the researchers' own 
representations and expectations. So, it could be suggested 
that both the interview itself as well as the interpretation 
of results might have been biased in actually producing the 
expected representations. This second problem could be 
controlled by having more than one person doing the coding 
and classification, and then comparing their decisions. 
These two limitations are general ones and apply to all 
studies employing interviews as the only or the main method 
of investigating social representations. Other limitations 
of this method are more evident in specific studies. 
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For example, a further problem of the way of analysing data 
gathered by interviews is that variation and diversity can be 
lost by coding and classifying (Emler and Dickinson, 1985, 
Emler, Ohana and Moscovici, 1987, Hewstone, Jaspars and 
Lalljee, 1982), so individual and intra-group differences may 
not be paid due attention. Also, often, different groups, 
expected to hold different representations of the same 
object, were interviewed separately (Campbell and Muncer, 
1987, Molinari and Emiliani, 1990), not allowing the 
different groups to emerge by their expression of different 
representations (if they indeed had different ones). 
Furthermore, interviewing individuals on 'delicate' issues, 
such as their job (Emiliani, Zani and Carugati, 1981, Zani, 
1987), and their children (Molinari and Emiliani, 1990), is a 
rather difficult task since individuals may want to present 
through their verbalisations a socially desirable image. 
Similarly, when combining interviews and observation 
(Emiliani, Zani-and Carugati, 1981, Zani, 1987) one may find 
that people behave in such a way (when observed) so as not to 
contradict what they said when interviewed. Also, when 
researchers aim at describing a social representation using 
interviews (Herzlich, 1973), they may accept every account as 
a representation irrespective of whether they satisfy any 
pre-established criteria that should be satisfied before an 
account is to be treated as a representation. Finally, no 
researcher went back to the sample with his (her) 
interpretation of results so as to establish their validity 
by negotiation or review. Both accounts and their 
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interpretation were accepted at face value. 
It is necessary to acknowledge both the advantages and 
limitations of interviews (and of any method, for that 
matter) if one is to use them in a reliable way in the study 
of social representations. 
2.2.2. Questionnaires 
-------------- 
Questionnaires, in the many forms they can take, have always 
been a very popular method of gathering data in psychology 
and especially in social psychology. Questionnaires have 
been the main investigatory tool in the study of attitudes 
and opinions. Since both attitudes and opinions have been 
considered components of social representations, this method 
has been frequently used in the study of representations. 
The main advantage of questionnaires is that, once they are 
created, they can be easily distributed to large populations. 
This enables another characteristic of representations to be 
tackled; i. e. its spread within a population. Furthermore, 
coding of questionnaires is rather easy. Finally, with the 
development and widespread use of statistical packages, 
analysis of large amount of data is a fast and straight 
forward process. 
Questionnaires were used in the study of a variety of targets 
(both empirical-and theoretical) within the social 
representational framework. Targets varied from intelligence 
(Mugny and Carugati, 1989, Carugati, 1990) to AIDS 
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(Echebarria and Paez, 1989) and from the effects of 
representations and behaviour on experimental games (Abric 
and Kahan, 1972) to causal attributions (Augustinos, 1990). 
Most studies combined questionnaires with other methods, such 
as manipulation of experimental conditions (Abric, 1982, 
1984), comparison of categories (Augustinos, 1990), recall of 
information (Echebarria and Paez, 1989), interviews and 
observations (Zani, 1987). Only Mugny's and Carugati's 
(1989) study involved solely questionnaires. The number of 
respondents again varied to a great extent from around eighty 
(Augustinos, 1990) to more than seven hundred (Mugny and 
Carugati, 1989). Most questionnaires described in the 
studies presented below involved statements and closed 
questions, restricting in this way the number of alternative 
answers. Only the questionnaire used by Hewstone (1986) had 
a few open-ended questions. In terms of analysis of data the 
most preferred and frequently used way was multivariate 
analysis. 
In the experimental studies conducted by Abric (1982,1984) 
and Abric and Kahan (1972) questionnaires were administered 
to participants, before and after they engaged in the 
experimental situation, asking them about their ideas about 
their partners in the task and the nature of the task, 
itself. It was hypothesised that there would be a relation 
between social representations and behaviour. Specifically, 
it was expected that co-operative or competitive behaviour 
would be determined by the protagonists in that situation. 
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It was demonstrated that participants' representations of a 
task and of their partners for this task (as described by the 
participants themselves in the questionnaire) were the 
determinants of interpretation and of behaviour in the 
situation. For the above scientists, behaviour and 
representation are dynamic and they change in an orderly 
manner. So, only by taking into consideration the connection 
between them, can one understand how the representational 
system operates. 
In another group of experimental studies conducted and 
reported by Codol (1974,1984), again identical 
questionnaires were administered before and after the 
experimental situation. The aim of these studies was to 
investigate anchoring as the interdependence that exists in 
the-cognitive universe of individuals between the 
representations of different objects within a given set up. 
It was expected that, -by 
inducing a representation of any 
object, one could produce an effect on the way all other 
objects are represented. The conclusion was that the induced 
representation of the situation had an impact on 
participants' interpretation and reaction to it. From the 
participants' answers to questionnaires it was shown that 
respondents' representation of the task or their partner or 
their group was dependent upon the initial description 
(before the experiment), whereas it became more independent 
of it after the task was performed. It could be argued that 
the definition of anchoring, in this specific study, is not 
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in agreement with the more generally accepted one. Anchoring, 
here, was not dealt with as a mechanism of familiarisation 
with a new object. By investigating anchoring as the 
interdependence between objects, Codol (1974,1984) really 
investigated the relations between these objects. Although 
this interdependence is of interest, since it showed the 
impact that a representation may have on the interpretation 
of and the reaction to an object, it could not be suggested 
that this was a test of anchoring in its generally accepted 
form. 
In his study of attitudes to the European Community in four 
European countries, Hewstone (1986) based his discussion of 
representations of the EC on a few open-ended questions 
included in a long questionnaire. He analysed these open- 
ended questions in terms of content. He considered 
representations as a fundamental set of ideas and he 
hypothesised that there is no need for knowledge in order to 
express them. In his conclusions he reported lack of 
knowledge or information about the EC. However, this did not 
mean lack of opinions. He demonstrated how rumours can be 
used as information and end up in creating opinions. 
Mugny and Carugati (1989) and Carugati (1990), in their study 
of the social representations of intelligence, used a very 
long and extensive questionnaire which they administered to 
different populations (e. g. workers, teachers and so on). 
They expected to find that "lay concepts (of intelligence in 
this case) predate persons. These concepts constitute a part 
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of the 'objective knowledge' of people and they may become 
the subjective point of departure for thought processes at 
the individual level" (Carugati, 1990, p. 134). Their results 
showed that different groups of people (parents, teachers, 
working mothers, and so on) held different representations of 
" intelligence. They suggested that the way these different 
groups represented intelligence depended on their definition 
of it, the way they believe it develops, the way they view 
children, their parental identity and experience,, the number 
of children they had, their gender and their occupation. 
They showed that intelligence is a multidimensional and 
complex construct, which can be explained and represented in 
relation to all of the above factors. 
Echebarria and Paez (1989) used AIDS as their target object 
in order to investigate the mechanisms involved in keeping a 
representation stable. -They expected that distortions in 
information recall would act as mechanism to guarantee the 
stability of pre-existing representations. By means of a 
questionnaire they were able to distinguish between two 
groups of people within their sample. The first was a 
'conservative' one attributing AIDS only to marginal and 
high-risk groups, the second was a more 'liberal' one that 
believed that AIDS is a problem for the general population. 
They showed that the two groups differed in their 
recollections of information about the disease, making 
mistakes consistent with their representation of AIDS. The 
above researchers suggested that their results demonstrated 
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the influence that pre-existing representations have upon 
recall of information and that new information was distorted 
so as not to disturb the stability of the representation. 
Augustinos' (1990) study of attribution of success and 
failure involved a questionnaire where respondents were asked 
to express agreement or disagreement with a number of 
statements. She suggested that representations should be 
viewed as the basis upon which attributions are made. They 
form the foundations of people's expectations and normative 
prescriptions and they act as mediators in the attributional 
. __ _ ____ _. _. _ process . --Her. --results demonstrated . _the_ 
degree 
-to -which -a 
social representation for a person (or a group of persons) 
works as a primary causative and autonomous agent by giving 
rise to automatic dispositionalist or personal explanations. 
These explanations were seen as ready-made and consensually 
sanctioned by culture and society. 
Attribute checklists sometimes complement and are included in 
questionnaires. Attribute checklists are used in order to 
allow researchers to establish to what degree respondents 
believe that certain characteristics (attributes) apply to a 
target object. Checklists, like questionnaires, allow 
researchers to include large numbers of characteristics and 
target objects and administer them to large samples. In 
discussing research on young people's attitudes to technology 
at work (Fife-Schaw, Breakwell, Lee and Spencer, 1987, 
Matthews, Breakwell and Fife-Schaw, 1989), Fife-Schaw 
(forthcoming) described how attribute checklists were 
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developed and used for the purposes 
with questionnaires and interviews. 
a number of manifestations of new tee 
had to indicate whether or not each 
'new technology'. For these studies 
of this research, along 
Checklists consisted of 
chnologies. Respondents 
fell into the category 
social representations 
" were considered to be complex and interlinked belief systems, 
yet, not necessarily parts of first-hand experience. 
Contrary to the hypothesis that there would be more than one 
representation of technology, depending on interest and 
motivation, the results from this research showed one 
representation, at least within the specific'population 
investigated. 
All the above mentioned studies demonstrate the various uses 
of questionnaires'in the study of social representations, 
especially by enabling differentiation of sub-groups within 
populations (Echebarria and Paez, 1989), 'since they allow the 
collection of a large quantity of information for large 
groups and then, with statistical analysis, the 
differentiation of sub-groups. They also enable the 
establishing of the spread of a representation within 
different populations (Mugnyand Carugati 1989). 
Furthermore, questionnaires are useful in answering a number 
of theoretical questions, especially if they are combined 
with other methods, such as the relation between 
representations and behaviour (Abric, 1982,1984, Abric and 
Kahan, 1972), the functioning of the mechanisms of 
representations (Codol, 1974,1984, Echebarria and Paez, 
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1989),, the role of knowledge and information in forming and 
expressing representations (Hewstone, 1986) and the role of 
representations in attribution (Augustinos, 1990). 
However, questionnaires have several limitations, especially- 
when they are used in the investigation of representations. 
First, they usually constrain respondents to a specific range 
of'answers; they do not allow them to freely express their 
views, opinions and explanations. Thus questionnaires are 
only able to tackle aspects of representations, such as 
attitudes and opinions. This makes the presentation of 
indings _as.. '_a -representation' . _(for example _of _intelligence_. ___ __. __. 
as in the Mugny and Carugati (1989) study) and the discussion 
of processes of representations (Codol, 1974,1984, 
Echebarria and Paez, 1989) rather difficult. It is important 
that, in such cases, scientists acknowledge that they are 
dealing with the aspects of social representations that the 
method they are using allows them to tackle. Second, the 
statements and the questions in a questionnaire may carry the 
researchers' own representations of the target of the study. 
This problem can be reduced by careful piloting of a 
questionnaire. Third, when presenting people with statements 
and ask them to agree or disagree with them, there is no way 
of controlling that each statement is part of people's 
representational system. In the same way, people may have 
beliefs and meanings not included in the questionnaires. For 
instance in the experimental studies mentioned above (Abric, 
1982,1984, Abric and Kahan, 1972, Codol, 1974,1984) there 
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was no control for participants' representations of an 
experimental laboratory, something that could have interfered 
and affected-the situation (Farr, 1984). Finally, the main 
advantage of questionnaires; i. e. that they allow the 
collection of large amounts of information from large groups, 
has not always been used. Instead, in some cases, 
researchers (Mugny and Carugati, 1989, Augustinos, 1990) pre- 
established the existence of sub-groups within the 
populations they investigated and they expected these. groups 
to have different representations of a target object. They 
did not allow these sub-groups to emerge on their own, if 
they really had different representations and they did not 
investigate whether people assigned in different sub-groups 
identified with them. 
Nevertheless, this method has advantages so it is not to be 
disregarded. When combined with other methods it can 
contribute to a better understanding of a target 
representation. For example, while an interview could allow 
the description of the content ofa representation of an 
object, a questionnaire could demonstrate its spread within a 
population. The two together could offer information 
satisfying a`number of criteria so as to accept that what one 
is studying is actually a social representation. Also, by 
quantifying information, collected by a questionnaire, one 
may be able to describe relations between representations and 
thus explain'in'more detail information gathered by other 
methods. 
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2.2.3. Drawings 
F 
Drawings have been often used in the study of social 
representations. There are many reasons for this. First, 
drawings can be used to get to people's images of a target 
object, and image is a component of a representation. 
Second, and especially with young age groups , it is much 
easier to ask them to draw something than talk about 
something. Third, it has been suggested that, contrary to 
linguistic expressions, drawings could be considered free. 
from rationalisations, thus allowing researchers to get to 
the most unconscious nuclei of representations (De Rosa, 
1987). However, it could be argued that when one is studying 
social representations, one is actually after these 
rationalisations. Thus, something that is presented as an 
advantage of the method could really be a limitation. 
Fourth, drawings are easy to make and not too-time consuming, 
so they allow large sample numbers. 
The different topics investigated by studies that used 
drawings combined with other methods, were representations of 
cities'(combined with recognition of pictures, Milgram, 
1984), urban space (Pailhous, 1984), mental illness (combined 
with questionnaire,, De Rosa, 1987) and radioactivity 
(combined with comments and definitions, Galli and Nigro, 
1987). Samples, in these studies, tended to be rather large; 
more than one hundred respondents. Drawings were usually 
content analysed. 
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Pailhotis (1984) studied the representation of urban space by 
asking taxi-drivers to construct drawings of journeys in the 
city where they worked. He expected that people would hold 
individual representations of a social object within which 
they carry their social activities and that there would be a 
relation between their operational and imaginary activities. 
He suggested that the representation of space is developed-on 
the basis of people's activity and that it has both a content 
and a structure which are used in a precise manner so as to. 
enable people to carry on their activities. 
In his study of representa'tions' of cities (Milgiam, 1984)-- 
asked people to draw maps of Paris and name all the elements 
of the city that came to their mind. He used this method in 
order to investigate whether mental maps of cities satisfy 
the criterion of being a social representation. He aimed at 
establishing whether these maps are social objects, whether 
they are products of social interaction with the physical 
environment, whether they have a social meaning in their 
construction and whether they are individual cognitive tools 
or they serve larger social functions. He claimed that a 
great degree of people's knowledge about a city and their 
feelings about various parts of it are social facts. 
People's own neighbourhoods were found to correspond to their 
social positions and their social goals. Furthermore, their 
social identity was related to their neighbourhoods and the 
social connotations attached to them. For Milgram, the 
social representation of a city gives meaning to people's 
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surroundings and helps define the social order of the city 
and individuals' place in it. 
p 
De Rosa's (1987) study investigated the social representation 
of mental illness in children and adults. She asked a large 
number of participants to make drawings of a human figure, of 
a 'madman' and of a human figure as a 'madman' would. She 
dealt with the target representation in a historical and 
developmental perspective and she expected to find a 
polymorphism and collective imagining in the representation 
of mental illness. She showed that certain ideas about 
-- -- -mentally ill --people - are -derived - from an archaic - and -mythic -- -- -- -- 
frame of reference and that they are still found to dominate 
peopl, e's representations of mental illness. She also 
described how children's and adults' representations of the 
mentally ill differ from each other, as well as how they meet 
each other when individuals reach adolescence. She discussed 
this development of the representation, from early childhood 
to adulthood, by describing where ideas are derived from for 
each different developmental stage by comparing the drawings 
with pictures of mental illness (or the mentally ill) 
throughout the history of mankind. 
Galli and Nigro (1987) used drawings in order to study 
children's representations of radioactivity immediately after 
the Chernobyl accident. Using these drawings, together with 
children's explanations for and definitions of radioactivity, 
they discussed the function of the anchoring mechanism. They 
aimed at studying a social representation as it was formed, 
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by investigating the reasons that make an object leave the 
reified universe and move into the consensual, the 
distinctive feature that an object must have in order to 
become the object of a social representation, the time that 
is required for the creation of a representation as well as 
" the factors that may be involved in the acceleration of the 
shaping of a social representation. They suggested that 
social representations function by integrating a new idea or 
event, by interpreting it and by orienting behaviour and 
social relationships. They showed that children, in order to 
explain and understand something new, identified it with 
something they already knew (i. e. a cloud). For them, a 
social representation can be built in a very short time, 
especially if circumstances call for it. Finally, they 
concluded that for a phenomenon or event to become an object 
of a social representation it has to concern people and 
require them to develop a theory about it. 
All these studies demonstrated how drawings can be used to 
investigate target representations and that, indeed, they 
allow researchers to test the theory of Social 
Representations. Using this methods researchers have been 
able to test theoretical issues such as the relation between 
representations and activities (Pailhous, 1984), the content 
and the functions of representations (Milgram, 1984), their 
development (De Rosa; 1987) and their mechanisms (Galli and 
Nigro, 1987). 
Yet, the limitations of the method also became apparent in 
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the studies mentioned. First, drawings lack explanation of 
the images they represent. Researchers (as Galli and Nigro, 
1987) have to ask specifically for explanations of drawings 
if they want to include them as a further component of the 
representation. Second, as in the case of interviews, the 
analysis of drawings (content analysis) has the already 
mentioned limitations; the representations of the person(s) 
coding and classifying the content of the drawings could 
influence the results and the interpretation of this 
analysis. Another problem, specific for the case of drawings 
as a method for studying social representations, is that when 
people are asked to draw an object, there is no way for 
ensuring that the contents of these drawipgs will be 
comparable. For instance, when, in Milgram's (1984) study, 
people were asked to draw a map of the city, some might have 
drawn, a map showing the whole city, others only a small area 
and so on. This would have made it rather difficult to 
establish the consensus for and the sharedness of the 
representation. So, in most cases, respondents are given 
details. instructions about what they have to draw (e. g. De 
Rosa, 1987) which could restrict their freedom of expression. 
Still, drawings are a useful means of gathering data. It 
could be argued that the main advantage of this method, for 
the study of social representations specifically, is that it 
enables researchers to answer questions about social 
representations of young age groups or of groups of people 
that cannot express themselves verbally. 
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2.2.4. Analysis of representations as presented by 
------------------------------------------- 
the mass media 
-------------- 
The studies to be reported in this section have the common 
characteristic that they used as their main means of 
investigation of social representations written or 
transcribed material. They dealt with them as expressed in 
books, magazines, newspapers, television and/or radio 
programmes, films, advertisements and posters. Published 
material and material from the mass media has often been used 
in the study of social representations; especially in order 
__ ___ ... __. ___to - 
investigate - their'-social .. nature __at__a different -level. and 
the extent to which there is a match in their expression by 
the media and by common people. It is generally believed 
that social representations circulate between different 
sources of information and the general public. So, it is 
always of interest to see how this movement takes place and 
'what distortions and/or changes occur during it. 
Furthermore, in the advertising industry and social campaigns 
organisation, people are interested to know what impact 
advertisements and posters have on people's behaviour. 
Again, in such instances, studying people's representations 
helps to evaluate this impact. 
Chombart de Lauwe's (1984) study investigated changes in the 
representations of the child by analysis of child literature 
(novels, tales), autobiographies, and films as well as - 
advertisements targeted at children. Besides this, she also 
analysed a large number of essays written by children 
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themselves. She treated social transmission as an 
interactional and dynamic process and she suggested that 
social representations function at the heart of this process. 
She considered social representations as both a psychic 
mechanism (i. e. an expression ofrthe human mind) and a social 
one (i. e., a cultural product). She reported that the genesis 
and the transformation of a representation is a dynamic 
process involving interactions between individuals and their 
social environment (material and human). She suggested that 
such a representation is a means of remodelling values and 
behaviour.. 
--, - ,Y___ 
Kruse, Weimer and Wagner (1988) studied the social 
representations of gender roles by analysing text chosen from 
magazine articles. Texts were chosen so as to involve 
interactions between males and females and the aim was to 
demonstrate different linguistic manifestations of typical 
male and female patterns of behaviour and experience. This 
study employed, besides content analysis, multivariate 
analysis as well. Results showed that the social 
representations of gender roles emerging from the analysis 
were consistent with results from other studies on sex- and 
gender-stereotyping. It was asserted that the media, as part 
of the external culture, are accessible to all members of a 
community and as such they unavoidably exert an influence on 
the development, maintenance and change of representations. 
Even from the small number of studies reported here, it can 
be suggested that this method has a valuable contribution to 
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make in the study of social representations. It enables the 
investigation of specific object representations within a 
'sample' other than groups of individuals. However, like 
every method discussed so far, it does have limitations. 
One of these limitations involves the method for deriving and 
selecting information from different sources. This problem 
presents itself in a number of stages of information 
selection; from the selection of the kind of source of 
information (i. e. newspapers, magazines, TV programmes and so 
on), the specific sources to be used (i. e. which magazines, 
TV -programmes -and --so on)-, -the -way of- selecting information - 
from the specific source (i. e. which articles, letters, 
comments, news and so on), and, finally the choice and 
criterion for the unit of analysis (i. e. themes, words, 
pictures and so on). In every stage there is a danger of 
choosing material that reconfirms the researchers' own 
representations and explanations of the target object. One 
way to control for such biases would be to have more than one 
person choosing the material. For example in the Kruse, 
Weimer and Wagner (1988) study, it is possible that the 
selection of information was subject to this limitation. 
Furthermore, this method has limitations in the analysis and 
interpretation of the selected material as any method that 
employs content analysis. 
Another problem in the-investigation of social 
representations as they are reflected by the mass media is 
that these representations are created, expressed and 
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controlled by a very small number of people (such as editors, 
authors and so on). It could be argued that these people 
constitute a 'powerful elite' through which representations 
are filtrated, recreated and reflected back to the general 
public. It is rather difficult to suggest that the 
" representation of an object, as re-presented by the press, is 
an accurate reflection of what the general public thinks and 
believes. On one hand, if one accepts that the media 
presents social representations, one has to take into account 
issues of authorship, control and partiality. The way 
representations would be re-presented by the media would be 
influenced by the persons who represent them, the person who 
owns and controls the specific kind of media (newspaper, 
magazine, TV channel and so on) and what these persons 
believe or they want the general public to believe. The 
media is not a 'mirror' onto which representations are 
reflected. The media is the people who create, influence and 
control, representations. On the other hand, if one accepts 
that the general public's representations could be influenced 
by the ones presented by the media, then one should take 
under consideration the fact that not everybody has access to 
the media, in general, or the same kind of media. So, the 
assertion of Kruse, Weimer and Wagner (1988) that media 
constitute a culture accessible to, all members of ä community 
could be challenged. Thus, it could be suggested that 
representations as presented by the media should be treated 
as such (i. e. as representations of an object in a specific 
kind of mass media) and it should not be assumed that they 
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will be the ones that the general public holds. 
The main usefulness of such a method, in the study of social 
representations, is that it can provide information about a 
social object, from a historical perspective (as in the study 
of Chorabart de Lauwe (1984)) and demonstrate development and 
change of a representation through time. 
2.2.5. Observation 
Observation is. a rather common method of gathering data in 
social psychology, as well as in other social sciences such 
as 
. _anthropology. 
It has been used in the study of social 
representations, primarily in the form of observation of 
interaction between children and children and adults. 
Observation has taken both the form of pure, non-interactive 
as well as participant observation. For the study of 
representations, specifically, it is a rather appropriate 
method since it enables the investigation of interaction and 
communication (verbal and non-verbal) in a natural 
environment. 
Different topics have been investigated by this method; such 
as children's representation of gender (Lloyd and Smith, 
1985, Lloyd, 1987, Lloyd, Duveen and Smith, 1988, Lloyd and 
Duveen, 1990), children's representations of adult rules 
(Corsaro, 1990) and the changes in the representation of the 
profession of psychiatric nurse (Zani, 1987). In most of the 
cases observation was the only method used. Only Zani 
(1987), as mentioned earlier, used also interviews and 
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questionnaires. Usually data gathered by observation are 
presented in a descriptive way; i. e. frequencies of specific 
behaviours occurring during the observation. 
Lloyd and her colleagues, Smith and Duveen (1985,1987,1988, 
1990) used observation in a number of studies investigating 
the social representation of gender in young children. Using 
this method they aimed at investigating a number of 
theoretical issues, such as the transition from sensorimotor 
to'symbolic understanding of gender (Lloyd and Smith, 1985), 
the role of social representations in children's development 
- ---- - -and -socialisation - (Lloyd, - 1987). - and .. the- use--of signs -. as a. --. - - . -- 
means of communication for social groups (Lloyd and Duveen, 
1990). They expected that signs operation would be dependent 
on the intersubjectively shared representations of group 
members and that signs would be an expression of social 
representations. In general, they observed pairs of children 
of the-same or opposite sex playing with each other or a 
child playing with a familiar adult. They also observed 
children sorting and labelling pictures. Their findings 
(Lloyd and Smith, 1985, Lloyd, Duveen and Smith, 1988) 
indicated that, from quite early in life, children become 
socialised to the appropriate gender roles and they 
demonstrate acquisition of a social representation of gender 
and gender differences by their choices of toys and by 
engaging in different kinds of play depending on the gender 
of their partner. From observations of children playing with 
their mothers or engaging in sorting and labelling pictures, 
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Lloyd (1987) reported differences between children of 
different ages. Older children (three and a half year olds) 
were found to hold adult-like representations of gender. 
These-children could recognise (both linguistically and 
conceptually) and employ gender-marked nouns and pronouns as 
well as use them to-label themselves. Children of this age 
group were also able to sort people according to gender. 
None of these abilities was strongly demonstrated by younger 
children (two years old). Furthermore, Lloyd suggested that 
the social representations of gender, which are 
psychologically embedded in mothers' thinking, regulate 
gender differentiation in children's behaviour through 
interaction. Finally, Lloyd and Duveen (1990), discussing 
the relation between social identities and social 
representations, suggested that the same representation 
contains the material for the development of two different 
social identities (male and female). Boys and girls 
demonstrate similar competence in terms of the semiotic code 
of gender. It is when they engage in social activities that 
the different social identities of boys and girls are 
demonstrated. 
Corsaro (1990) used participant observation in his study of 
young children's representations of adult rules. He was 
especially interested in observing how children violate adult 
rules. His aim was to investigate the familiarisation process 
in children. He hypothesised that children transform 
confusion and ambiguities from the adult world into the 
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familiar routines of their peer culture. For him the 
development of social representations was considered to be a 
collective process, involving children's interactions with 
adults and peers. He suggested that children's understanding 
of adult rules has to be seen as a productive-reproductive 
" process. Children learn the rules from adults and then 
transfer them in their own peer culture where they are given 
new meaning thus changing children's representations of adult 
rules. Children need to anchor developing social 
representations within their peer culture, which in turn 
enables the objectification of these representations and 
their use in interaction. 
Zani's (1987) study on the changes in the profession of the 
psychiatric nurse has already been discussed. Yet, it has to 
be pointed out here that she used observation so as to 
reconstruct a typical working day. of nurses,. the type of 
organisations used and the mode of communication between 
staff. She reported that the observation had been used for 
'isolation' of problematic areas for further investigation by 
the interviews and questionnaires and for familiarisation 
with the personnel. , 
Observation is a method that, as demonstrated by the studies 
mentioned above, can be used with a significant degree of 
success in the study of social representations. Yet, as 
expected, it has several limitations. First, it is a rather 
time consuming method and, when practised by more than one 
researchers, it has to be well structured and rigid. Second, 
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there is always the danger of observers observing what they 
expect to happen and not what is actually taking place. 
Third, and this limitation is specific in relation to social 
representations, it allows the observation of interaction 
between small groups at any given time, so it is debatable 
" whether two or three people constitute a social group and 
whether what is studied is a social representation. Fourth, 
not everything is observable and, as it has been already 
shown, a, large number of target representations could not 
have been observed in a natural environment. Fifth, 
observing adults is a more difficult task than observing 
children, because the observation could affect adults' 
behaviour. In general, observation is a method used with 
powerless groups, something that could create ethical 
problems. 
Yet, it could be argued that the main problem of the method 
is that representations are inferred from behaviour. 'There is 
lack of people's own verbalisations and explanations of what 
they think, believe and understand. Taking for granted that 
behaviour is a direct outcome of representations and not 
considering alternative explanations for specific behaviours, 
could lead to non-justifiable conclusions. For example, 
Lloyd and Smith (1985) concluded that children's choice of 
gender-appropriate toys is'an outcome of the development of 
social representations of gender. However, it could be, 
alternatively, suggested that children's choice was 
influenced by the familiarity of the toy. If girls, for 
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instance, were used to play with dolls, they may chose to 
play with them, when observed, because they felt familiar 
with dolls. 
Still observation is a useful method, especially in the study 
of non-verbal communication between individuals, children and 
small groups as well as a preliminary method for enabling the 
construction of interview schedules and questionnaires. 
2.2.6. Matching - Sorting 
------------------ 
In a number of studies investigating social representations 
researchers asked participants either. to match objects in 
terms of similarities or to sort them in different 
categories, defining the categories themselves and repeating 
the sorting as many times as-they thought appropriate or to 
decide to what degree certain characteristics (attributes) 
were applying to a number of target objects. The main 
advantages and common characteristics of these methods are 
that : i. they are simple, ii. they allow the free expression 
of images of the target objects, iii. they do not require 
verbalisation, and iv. they allow the, demonstration of how 
people explain, categorise, organise and differentiate 
objects, all of which are parts of the function of 
representations. 
Data gathered by such methods are usually analysed by 
Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) and/or Correspondence 
Analysis. These analyses provide a map of the relative 
spatial distribution of objects in more than one dimension. 
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Usually objects close to each other in space are considered 
to be similar, whereas those distanced from each other are 
considered different. 
r 
In their study of relationships between higher order models 
and everyday conceptions of personality, Semin and Chassein 
(1985) employed a sorting task and a pairwise similarity 
estimation task. For the first, they asked participants to 
sort a list of 31 trait terms into groups according to 
similarity in meaning. For the second, participants had to 
estimate similarity in meaning for pairs of traits on a scale 
-- of-similarity: - --Their aim was-- to --investigate the transition --- 
of ideas from the reified to the consensual universe. They 
expected that there would be an overlap between 'scientific' 
and common sense theories of personality. To analyse their 
data, Semin'and Chassein, used MDS. Their findings suggested 
that scientific and common-sense organisations of personality 
traits display notable communality, demonstrating the 
diffusion of knowledge in everyday understanding. 
Similar methods have been used by Stockdale, Dockrell and 
Wells (1989) in their study of mass media representation of 
HIV and AIDS and its relation with self. Besides asking 
respondents to judge the similarity between pairs of people 
on a 9-points scale and to sort members of a stimulus set 
into groups (both in a free and a directed way), they also 
used posters and advertisements and asked respondents to rate 
them on a number of dimensions. These researchers used these 
methods to investigate how social representations can be 
111 
employed to measure the effectiveness of posters of 
advertisements. They analysed their data by MDS. They 
suggested that representations of HIV and AIDS differ between 
heterosexual and homosexual groups. Messages brought forward 
from posters and advertisements had different impact upon the 
two groups in relation to their definitions of themselves. 
Verges (1987) in his study of economic representations 
employed a number of methods (interviews, questionnaires, 
definitions, matching). He asked respondents to connect 
words most related out of a list of twelve and to sort twenty 
-. - ----. -------target. -words -into -groups as well -_as to name . the groups. 
Verges considered representations as a form of knowledge 
relate'd'with behaviour. He considered them 'representations' 
in the cognitive organisational sense and 'social' in the 
sense that they are a series of references which are 
preconceived and they are collective but also in conflict 
because they are part of the social argument. He reported 
that his findings suggested that economic representations are 
cognitive and social objects, with a nucleus, an organisation 
and a certain complexity. People attach economic phenomena 
to certain pieces of information and they proceed to 
associate them with social consequences, thus acquiring a 
representation which is very similar to economic models as 
described by social sciences. 
A multiple sorting task was also used by Canter and Monteiro 
(forthcoming) in their study of representations of 
occupations. They asked respondents to sort twenty-five 
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manikins, each labelled to identify an occupation, according 
to where they thought they would live, their social class and 
potential for social mobility. They hypothesised that any 
individual could have some representations in common with all 
members of his (her) culture and some that would be specific 
to the sub-community of which he (she) is a part. For Canter 
and Monteiro the similarities and differences between the 
social representations of different communities within a 
culture provide the matrix out of which societies evolve and 
change. They expected that there would be an interplay of 
social representations that would have enough in common to 
allow communication but, at the same time, they would be 
different enough to require accommodation or assimilation 
that create the dynamics of society. They analysed their 
data by Partial Order Scalogram Analysis (POSA), which is 
another kind of Multidimensional Scaling. They found that 
different groups held different representations of 
occupations. According to them, representations were 
different because they reflected different kinds of 
interactions between and within groups. 
The main limitation of these methods is, that the information 
gathered is void of people's own verbalisations and 
explanations about the way they match and sort objects. 
Canter and Monteiro (forthcoming) argued that such 
methodologies could complement the intensively verbal 
procedures (frequently used in the study of social 
representations) by allowing people to reflect their way of 
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anchoring and objectifying aspects of their world without the 
need for detailed verbal accounts. Yet,. this limits these 
methods as only complementary ones, with no power of their 
own. It could be suggested, that these methods are useful 
for answering specific questions about specific aspects of a 
target representation (e. g. the spread of the image of a 
target object within a population). As such matching and 
sorting tasks can provide information which could complement 
verbal accounts about a target object. Furthermore, the 
construction, of the tools of gathering data by these methods 
and the interpretation of the data gathered could be subject 
to researchers' own expectations and representations. It 
would be better if the sets of objects, to be matched or 
sorted, are allowed to emerge from systematic piloting. 
2.2.7. Definitions - Free association 
------------------------------ 
The common characteristic shared by, definitions and free 
association, as methods of gathering data, is that 
respondents' are presented with one or more stimulus object 
and then they are asked either to define them or to freely 
associate in relation to them. In doing so, respondents are 
expected to express freely their images of the target objects 
and the relations they see between them and other objects. 
This way the stimulus objects' place in the representational 
system of respondents is demonstrated. Such methods have 
been considered useful as complementary to others and for 
preliminary stages of research, since they enable the 
collection of a large amount of data which can be used in the 
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creation of interview questions and questionnaire items. 
These methods are usually analysed by MDS, Correspondence 
Analysis and content analysis. 
Di Giacomo (1980) used questionnaires and free association in 
his study of the representation of a protest movement. He 
used stimulus words, related to the movement specifically, 
its politics, the political action proposed as well as 
participants' identity (i. e. students). Each respondent was 
asked to free associate in relation to one stimulus word. He 
expected that a given group's social representations of an 
object are a complex product of available information about 
that object and the attitudes towards it. He suggested that 
it should be possible to deduce a group's potential 
involvement in a protest movement from a comparison of its 
social representation of itself with its social 
representations of the proposed action and its promoters. 
Di Giacomo reported that the difference between student's 
opinions about the movement (general interest about its 
issues) and their actions (no participation) could be 
explained by their representations (as demonstrated by the 
free association results). Students viewed the movement as 
alien to them; they could not identify with it. He concluded 
that it was the representation that people held that provided 
them with an evaluative criterion and an attributive 
dimension which, in fact, determined their behaviour and gave 
it a moral label. 
In studying the representations of radioactivity among 
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children, Galli and Nigro (1987) asked children both to draw 
and to define radioactivity. From the analysis of these 
definitions they were able to suggest that through anchoring 
of, something new onto reality, children managed to classify 
" it and to evaluate it. Radioactivity was given properties 
and was built around its effects and consequences. 
Verges (1987) used both free association and definitions in 
conjunction to other methods in order to create a complete 
picture of economic representations. 'He asked respondents to 
--- -free associate in -response-- to the -stimulus word -' work'- as 
well as to define a number of words related to economics. He 
suggested that economic representations, are well established 
early in life, since young pupils were able to define and 
explain them, give them characteristics and properties and 
relate them to other representations. 
Finally, Mahjoub, Leyens, Yzerbut and Di Giacomo (1989) 
conducted a study on the representation of self-identity and 
time perspective among Palestinian children. The focus of 
this study was on the influence of war on this 
representation. They asked children to define themselves and 
to react to four stimulus concepts; family, past, present and 
future. They aimed at investigating the way behaviours of 
active or accommodating adaptation are dependent on the 
'representation' that is created by the interaction between 
the individuals and the environment. They found that by 
applying a social representational approach to interaction 
among people, war and environment, one could grasp the 
symbolic, consensual and emotional aspect of an experience. 
Especially, in this case, the experience involved daily 
attitudes of coping for survival both as a person and as a 
group. 
Although employing definitions and free-association as 
methods for investigating social representations can be 
useful in answering different theoretical questions, such as 
the relation between representations and behaviour (Di 
Giacomo, 1981), processes of social representations (Galli. 
and Nigro, 1987) and so on, these methods have a number of 
_limitations. _. __First, _ 
is 
--the 
choice of the stimulus objects. 
This could, again, be biased by researchers' expectations 
and representations. It is necessary that researchers engage 
in some preliminary exploration before making these choices. 
Second, the number of objects a researcher may ask a 
respondent to define or free-associated with have to be 
rather limited in terms of numbers, otherwise the task could 
be time-consuming and repetitive. To counteract this 
problem, Di Giacomo (1981) asked each respondent to free- 
associate with only one target object, so different 
respondents were presented by different objects. Yet, this 
could cause another problem when the information coming from 
different individuals and for different target objects is to 
be interpreted as a whole. Third, as any method using as a 
means of analysis content analysis, MDS and Correspondence 
Analysis, definitions and free association are limited by the 
criticisms for these analyses. Researchers' own expectations 
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and representations can interfere with the interpretation of 
information. 
As mentioned, complementary to other methods and in 
preliminary levels of investigation, these methods can be 
very useful. 
3. GENERAL EVALUATION 
------------------ 
After having discussed the different methods used in the 
study of social representations, it becomes evident that, in 
general, there has not been one method to prove itself as the 
. _most_suitable 
for this purpose. So, any methods have been 
used and, as shown, `often in conjunction with each other in 
order to provide a better understanding of the structure and 
processes of social representations. Each of these methods 
was brought within the study of the theory with its in-built 
limitations, as well as advantages, and not. much was done in 
developing them in order to become tools specifically for the 
study of social representations. 
The problem of methodology, here, is actually two-fold. 
First, and as suggested throughout, there is not one single 
method that is considered to be the most appropriate for the 
study of social representations and that could resolve the 
difficulty of selecting a method for each different study. 
Second, theoretical problems are reflected into the empirical 
work within social representations. Theoretical problems 
create even more difficulty in choosing, justifying and 
employing a method. 
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Potter and Litton (1985) discussed a number of these 
problems in relation to the studies conducted by Herzlich 
(1973), Di Giacomo (1980) and Hewstone, Jaspars and Lalljee 
(1982). Potter and Litton attacked these studies both 
specifically and in general. They suggested that none of the 
" above mentioned researchers actually studied and developed 
the theoretical formulations of social representations. They 
criticised them for treating groups as undifferentiated units 
without testing whether participants identified with the 
groups they were assigned to or not. They pointed out that 
consensus in the social representation was over-emphasised, 
neglecting in this way any inter- or intra-group variation 
and difference. So, context specificity of representations 
was not. accounted for; representations were treated as 
unitary and static entities. 
Besides these specific theoretical points, Potter and Litton 
(1985) suggested that the researchers, mentioned above, 
employed methods that treated the language used by 
participants in an insensitive way. Further, they analysed 
and interpreted their results in a biased way; according to 
their own representations and the ones they expected to find. 
For Potter and Litton all the methods used in these studies 
(interview, free association, essays) are not suitable for 
the study of social representations. They suggested that 
when one is studying this phenomenon, one should focus upon 
"linguistic repertoires" (Potter and Litton, 1985, p. 89) 
which they defined as recurrently used systems of terms for 
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characterising social events and phenomena. 
The theoretical problems that Potter and Litton identified 
have been countered by a number of scientists (Moscovici, 
1985, Semin, 1985, Hewstone, 1985) who, in general, suggested 
" that the studies criticised at least attempted to develop the 
theory's formulations and that they reported and emphasised 
consensus since they found it to dominate over variety and 
they validated it empirically. The value of studying 
'linguistic repertoires' was dismissed for a variety of 
reasons. For Moscovici (1985) such repertoires do not' 
-- - correspond -exactly -to - social representations; -they can--- 
account for the mentioning of representations but not for 
their use and interpretation in everyday communication. 
'Linguistic reperto. ires' were seen as unable to account for 
the dynamic nature of social representations (Semin, 1985) 
and, if they were to be used, they would reduce them to 
purely linguistic phenomena (Hewstone, 1985). 
Other scientists identified methodological problems of a 
different nature. For instance, Farr (1977) pointed out how 
problematic an interview could be in the sense that it can 
lead interviewees to the production of the expected 
attributional statements. He also suggested that by 
accepting accounts at face value; without trying to revise 
them through negotiations, researchers risk mis- 
interpretation and generalisation of their findings. 
Over and above all these methodological problems, what 
120 
becomes apparent from the review of the empirical work on 
social representations is that the representational process 
is never actually studied. For this present piece of work 
the representational process is considered to involve the 
creation, development and change of social representations. 
This process is seen as central for the theory of Social 
Representations. It functions in such a way so as to enable 
communication between individuals as well as the 
understanding and explanation of social objects (i. e. 
phenomena, events, ideas and so on). The representational 
process is especially important because it is considered to 
help the accommodation of new objects and new information 
within the representational system. It could also be argued 
that this process may be an active one, yet, not necessarily 
conscious. This process is often inferred from the findings 
in different studies (e. g. De Rosa, 1987, Galli and Nigro, 
1987) but it is never, itself, studied. This becomes even 
more apparent by the observed lack of studies involving 
longitudinal designs. The target object is studied at an 
isolated moment in time and no effort is made to investigate 
it as a process. In some cases the representational process 
is investigated from a historical perspective (Jodelet, 1984, 
Chombart de Lauwe, 1984), but no attempts have been made to 
investigate the same target in the same population over time. 
This, in fact, is a major methodological drawback since 
social representations are considered as a dynamic phenomenon 
and not a static one. This could actually be a major 
contribution of the theory of Social Representations; 
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introducing a dynamic phenomenon and a process. Yet, it has 
not been taken on board in the empirical investigation of the 
phenomenon, thus denying the theory empirical support for one 
of its most innovative arguments, which could revolutionise 
social psychology. 
4. THE CASE FOR A MULTI-METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
-------------------------------------------- 
This section has two aims; first, to argue that social 
representations have to be seen as complex constructs and, as 
such, they should be studied by a multi-methodological 
approach, and second, that the representational process 
should not be simply inferred but studied directly by 
longitudinal studies. 
Throughout the development of the theory, scientists, such as 
Parker (1987) and Jahoda (1988) have been calling for the 
development of 'a' methodology for the study of social 
representations. Yet, 'a' methodology does not have to mean 
one single method. It is believed that, by now, it should 
have become clear that there is no single method able to 
satisfactorily cover all aspects of the construct. The 
construct consists of knowledge, ideas, attitudes, opinions, 
beliefs, images, feelings, understandings, explanations and 
practices. As it has been shown different methods can tap 
different components of the construct. This has not been 
left un-observed by a number, of scientists. Breakwell 
(forthcoming) suggested that there is need for a methodology 
that will enable the description of the construct in all its 
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complexity and will also show the distribution of a 
representation in a population. So, it is necessary to use 
an integrated package of methods which are not going to be 
seen as competitors but as complementary to each other. This 
view is shared by other scientists such as Verges (1987) and 
Purkhardt and Stockdale (forthcoming) who suggested that 
single methods do not provide sufficient information and that 
different methods have to complement each other so as to make 
up for each other's limitations, fallibilities and biases 
and to allow a better understanding of the phenomenon. 
___.. _ 
Such. an. approach 
--should 
be preferred to--a. purely eclectic 
approach for a number of reasons: 
i. It accounts for the complexity of the construct itself by 
employing different and more appropriate means of studying 
the different components of it. In a way the different 
components of a representation, researchers set out to 
investigate, direct them to which methods they have to use. 
It also allows researchers to set criteria about which 
components are necessary to exist in order to conclude that a 
social representation is indeed present in a population. A 
questionnaire can be used for tapping opinions and attitudes, 
an interview for understandings and explanations, attribute 
checklists for images and so on. 
ii. It accounts for the social nature of the construct by 
allowing both the distribution of and the consensus about a 
representation within a population to be demonstrated, by 
123 
employing questionnaires, analysis of mass media information 
and so on. ' Appropriate analysis allows the differentiation 
of sub-groups within a rpopulation according to their 
representation, thus controlling for the problem of 
circularity as discussed by Potter and Litton (1985). 
Circularity has been identified as a problem in a number of 
studies (e. g. Hewstone, Jaspars and Lalljee, 1982) where 
different groups are expected to have different 
representations of the same objects and then these groups are 
investigated separately and-differences between them are 
discussed. For Potter and Litton (1985) this is problematic 
because groups are not allowed to emerge from-their different 
representations and there is no control of whether 
individuals assigned to a group identify with it. 
iii. It takes into consideration the importance of language 
in the representational process, by allowing people to 
express themselves freely and, through-their verbalisations, 
to give structure, meaning and image to their representation, 
by employing interviews. 
iv. It enables the demonstration of different levels of a 
representation, since some methods can tap the more salient 
and rationalised characteristics of it (interview), whereas 
others can get to its nucleus and its unconscious parts 
(drawings). 
v. It accounts for the fact that, although social, 
representations have to be studied in the expressions of 
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individuals. Besides using group interviews or observation 
of group interaction, scientists can bring together 
information given by individuals by different analytic 
techniques. 
vi. Finally, a multi-methodological approach allows 
researchers to ask different questions about social 
representations and to choose different groups within which 
to investigate them. For example, they may want to 
investigate the representation of a single object in a single 
group. In this case they may use questionnaire to get to 
- ---this .. group's --opinions--and -interviews -for.. 
its explanations. -- - 
Or they may be interested in the representations of a single 
object held by different groups. Then they may want to use 
analysis of the media, ' interviews to tap the representations 
of the same object in an adult population and observation or 
drawings for a children population. Similarly, they may want 
to ask different questions for the same target in the same 
population. In such a case they may use interviews to 
explore the structure and the content of a representation and 
questionnaires to establish its spread within this 
population. 
It has to be made clear that the aims of different studies 
should be the factors determining which methods are going to 
be used. So, it is not argued that aspecific set of methods 
should be used in every study. Researchers, depending on the 
purposes of their studies, will have to develop and structure 
themselves the methods that they are going to use. 
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It is suggested that researchers, before going on to 
investigate this phenomenon, should decide on its components 
they want to tackle and use a multi-methodological approach. 
Yet, the point is not primarily what different methods can 
do, but how these methods come together to bring about a 
better understanding of the phenomenon and its process. 
Different methods may bring similar as well as contradictory 
information for the target representation. Scientists should 
use information from one method to explain that coming from 
others. They should discuss them in a complementary way so 
as to complete gaps from one method with information from 
another. For instance, contradictory information about 
consensus might have its roots in different sub-groups or in 
different levels of understanding/and differentiation. Such 
findings could be explained by using information from 
different methods. Furthermore, scientists should be 
flexible in the analyses of data they employ. Data 
collection should not define data analysis. So, for example, 
interview data could be analysed by statistical procedures 
and questionnaire data could be analysed in terms of 
structure and content. Flexibility should also be applied in 
the description and interpretation of results. Often, strict 
and traditional interpretation of information deny its 
richness and width. Finally, looking for a representation 
does not necessarily mean that it exists. By using a multi- 
methodological approach, scientists can define, from the 
beginning, the conditions that a target phenomenon has to 
satisfy in order to be considered a social representation 
I 
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(complexity, distribution, level and so on). By bringing 
together information collected by more than one method, they 
have a better chance to establish whether or not the target 
phenomenon satisfies these conditions. 
This approach should also be used in the study of the 
representational process. This process could be studied from 
a historical or developmental perspective (Doise, 1984, De 
Rosa, 1987); that is to employ historical sources to 
investigate change in a target object over time or 
investigate an object in populations that are in different 
. developmental_stages (children,., adolescents, adults). The  
representational process could also be studied by time-series 
designs; i. e. investigate the same target in different but, 
similarly, representative populations in different points of 
time. Finally, longitudinal designs can be used to 
investigate the same target in the same population over time. 
Such a design (combined with a multi-methodological approach) 
allows the investigation of the representational process by 
enabling the description of the changes that might occur in 
the understanding of the same individuals as well as the 
factors that may influence such changes. If scientists really 
believe in the potential of the theory of Social 
Representations, then they should see the representational 
process as its biggest challenge, its main contribution, its 
point of departure from traditional models and theories in 
social psychology. 
The investigation of the representational process is 
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different from studying a target representation. Although it 
is necessary to establish the existence of a target 
representation within a population, before going on to 
investigate process, scientists have to develop specific 
techniques that would allow them to gather information about 
the target in different points of time and about the factors 
that might have interfere with the representational process. 
They also have to interpret this information so as to 
describe the process and explain its purpose and outcome. 
Studying process is a very ambitious task, but until 
scientists really engage into it they will not 'know whether 
it is feasible or not. There is need to develop a 
methodological. approach (and, in fact, a multi-methodological 
one for that matter) that will enable scientists to, at 
least, try to study the representational process. 
The present work will stick to both these methodological 
arguments. It will use a multi-methodological approach in 
the investigation of its target representation and the 
representational process and it will try to demonstrate the 
usefulness of such an approach. It will also employ a 
longitudinal design aiming at studying the representational 
process as it takes place. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FOCUSING ON THE TARGET REPRESENTATION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
------------ 
As mentioned in the previous chapters the aim of this piece 
of work is to focus on theoretical and methodological issues 
in relation to the theory of Social Representations. In this 
chapter the aim is to briefly present these theoretical and 
methodological issues and then introduce the target 
representation on which the empirical part of this work is 
to be focused, It has to be mentioned here that these__. ___, 
theoretical and methodological issues determined, in a way, 
the selection of the target. 
The theoretical issue which is going to be investigated is 
the representational process. This process has already been 
defined as involving the creation, development and change of 
a social representation. Its functions are considered to be 
the enabling of communication between individuals and the 
understanding and explanation of social objects. It is 
believed that the process helps the accommodation of new 
objects and new information within the representational 
system. Finally, the representational process is considered 
to be active, ýbut not necessarily conscious; i. e. it may 
serve specific functions, such as the induction of change or, 
on the other hand, the preservation of stability in the 
representational system. Two aspects of this process are 
going to be focused upon in this present study. First, is 
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the anchoring mechanism which is assumed to take place during 
familiarisation with a new and unfamiliar object (an idea, an 
event, a phenomenon). Second, is the change that a 
representation may be going through during times of social 
upheaval and unrest. 
These two theoretical points are going to be investigated by 
a multi-methodological approach, which as mentioned before is 
considered to be the most appropriate way to study social 
representations. This work will actually try to illustrate 
the usefulness and the applicability of such an approach. 
Further, and as far as change is concerned, a longitudinal 
design is going to be adopted. It has been already argued 
that this is one of the ways to study a process, besides 
time-series design and a historical or developmental 
approach. Again, the usefulness and applicability of such a 
design is going to be investigated. 
in order to achieve these aims, it was necessary to focus 
upon a target that was considered to be new and unfamiliar 
and that could undergo changes due to external social events. 
The idea of the unification of Europe in 1992 was selected as 
the target representation. Furthermore, it was decided that 
this target should be investigated within a population for 
which there was already some evidence that it is still new 
and unfamiliar. So, the population for the empirical work, 
conducted for this thesis, consisted of young Britons. The 
preliminary stages of the research started in April 1989, but 
this population was approached in October 1989. 
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After it had been decided which the target representation 
will be, it was necessary to acquire some information about 
the pre-existing systems onto which it was expected to be 
anchored. The representation of the European Community was 
considered to be such a system. It was expected that people 
would try to explain the target representation (to some 
extent, at least) according to what they knew, felt, 
believed, imagined, and understood about the European 
Community. 
It has to be made clear from the very beginning that this 
target representation has been throughout considered a 
'vehicle' for the investigation of the theoretical and 
methodological issues mentioned above. However, before going 
on to discuss the empirical work conducted, it is necessary 
to present some historical information about the European 
Community in order to establish common ground for further 
discussion. In the following sections the history of the 
European community is going to be presented, with an emphasis 
on the British membership in it and on the attitudes of the 
British public towards it. It is expected that this 
discussion will justify the selection of the unification of 
Europe as the target representation. 
Finally, it should,. be understood that since this discussion 
is to be used as a background for the work that followed it, 
the historical information presented goes up to that 
available until the summer of 1989, after which data 
collection for the empirical work began. 
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2. THE HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
------------------------------------- 
AND THE BRITISH MEMBERSHIP 
-------------------------- 
2.1. Creation and History of the European Community 
---------------------------------------------- 
The creation and the history of the European Economic 
Community is a very complex topic, in terms of politics, 
economics, military strategies and trade policies. The 
origins of the idea of European unity can be traced back at 
around the end of World War I. At that time, Count 
Coudenhove-Kallergi talked about a 'Paneuropean Union' and 
Aristide Briand about a 'European Federal Union'. 
Yet, nothing happened till after the end of World War II. 
In fact, it was Winston Churchill, who in September 1946, in 
Zurich, expressed the necessity of the creation of the 
'United States of Europe'. It took more than ten years for 
such ideas to develop and to be accepted by several European 
countries. Finally, the 25th of March 1957, under the 
guidance of Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, six European 
Countries signed the Treaty of Rome, founding the European 
Economic Community (referred to, from now on, as EC), or 
Common Market. These countries were France, West 
Germany, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxemburg. 
The aim of the Community, as described in article 2 in the 
Treaty of Rome, was '... to promote throughout the Community 
a harmonious development of economic activities, a 
continuous and balanced expansion, an increased stability, 
an accelerated rise in the standards of living... '. 
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In 1973, the six countries were joined by Ireland, Denmark 
and the United Kingdom, and in 1979, Greece became the tenth 
member of the EC. Recently (1986), the members of the EC 
became twelve, when Spain and Portugal joined. 
Today, the EC has its Parliament of European MPs from all the 
member countries. EMPs are elected by the electorate of 
their own country which they represent in the European 
Parliament. Elections take place every five years and the 
last elections took place in the summer of 1989. 
Furthermore, in 1992, the countries of the EC are supposed 
to strengthen their economic agreements and become 
politically united, creating what W. Churchill visualised and 
talked about in 1946; i. e. the United States of Europe. 
This political and economic unification has been discussed 
extensively, since it sometimes proves difficult for all the 
countries to arrive to a unanimous agreement of its 
implications in terms of politics, economics, finance, 
employment, trade, banking, laws and defence. There are 
countries that desire and accept the unification because 
their governments believe that it would be strengthening and 
constructive. Other countries resist the terms of 
unification because they find them limiting and intrusive on 
their own national policies. 
The outcomes of this unification remain to be seen, if it 
is actually ever completed. Yet, the date, 1992, is very 
close and there are many adjustments that have to be made, 
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thus it is a period where ideas are expressed, discussed and 
even changed. It is a period where personal, national and 
international interests are put into perspective. It is a 
period that calls for thought and work, for explaining and 
understanding, with the hope to learn more about Europe and 
its people. There are many questions to be asked by 
different people. Politicians may be interested in the 
politics of the unification. Political scientists may focus 
on the nature and the form these politics take. Historians 
may study the events that would take place. Finally, social 
psychologists may be interested, amongst other things, in the 
way the people of Europe will see the unification and the way 
their thinking and understanding may change in relation to 
the unification. 
2.2 The fIistory of the British membership in the EC 
The history of the British membership in the EC is one of 
the most interesting ones, compared to other countries. 
Although, as was previously said, W. Churchill supported the 
idea of the United States of Europe from as early as 1946, 
the U. K. didn't join the Community until 1973. In fact, 
there has always been an antipathy in Britain towards Europe. 
Statesmen such as Churchill and Bevin might have been pro- 
European but the average citizen remained doubtful (Furnham 
and Gunter, 1989). As Barzini (1983) stated "... Britain 
still sees itself as the sceptred isle cut from the continent 
by divine will. If God wanted to tie it to the rest of 
Europe, He would eventually have dug a Tunnel" (p. 59). 
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However, full membership was not achieved till 1973 and 
that, according to Barzini (1983), happened "... disastrously, 
too late, too expensively, at the wrong moment... reluctantly 
and somewhat squeamishly" (p. 60). The same idea is supported 
by Lewis (1987) who commented that Britain joined the Common 
Market "halfhearted. The loss of empire had not been 
emotionally digested and there was a feeling of comedown in 
being just another member of a middle power club" (p. 59). 
Even-after joining the EC, Britain was not happy with it. 
The main problems were the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
____.. ___. and 
-U. K. -'. s_-contribution to the Community budget (Hewstone, 
1986). 
In 1975, for the first time in the history of the U. K., a 
nation-wide referendum took place, asking the nation to 
decide whether Britain should remain in the EC or not. At 
that time, membership was supported both by the political 
elites and the media. As a result, 67.2% of the people who 
voted said 'yes' to membership and 32,8% said 'no', with a 
65% turn-out (Jowell and Airey, 1985). 
Yet, since 1975, the support of U. K. 's membership in the EC 
dropped. Although, at that time, the clear anti-EC line was 
followed only by the Labour Party, on several occasions, 
opposition to the Community united Labour and Conservative 
parties (Hewstone, 1986). 
Today, that the date of European integration is very close, 
the U. E. seems more and more cautious towards the EC. 
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Although the Conservative government did not directly oppose 
it, it did not, on the other hand, agree with the whole plan 
of integration. This position became especially obvious 
between 1979 and 1984 when P. M. Thatcher frequently demanded 
'our money back' (Newman, 1989). The issues that found the 
U. K. government in disagreement were the banking system, the 
common currency, laws and taxation, the power of the European 
Parliament, to mention only a few. 
Again, what is going to happen remains to be seen. Now,, 
that the U. K. has both the experience of being a member of 
'""- the--EC and the knowledge of--what -this - means, - -it -has to decide - 
whether to proceed into the European unification or not. One 
should expect even more and stronger arguments, discussions 
and negotiations on this issue. 
3. ATTITUDES OF THE BRITISH PUBLIC TOWARDS THE EC 
---------------------------------------------- 
The public opinions and 
have been thoroughly me, 
long time before U. F:. 's 
In the beginning (1963, 
should join the EC were 
'no' and 'do not' know' 
Appendix A). 
attitudes in the U. K. towards the EC 
asured since the early 1960's, quite a 
actual membership in the Community. 
1966, ) opinions of whether the U. K. 
almost evenly divided between 'yes', 
(Jowell and Airey, 1985, Table 1, 
In 1971, Hedges and Jowell, conducted a study in Britain 
measuring the public's attitudes towards the EC based on 
2,030 interviews. The results of this study were that, in 
general, the British public was against Britain's entry into 
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the EC. The large majority believed that in the beginning 
(if Britain was to join the Community) sacrifices would be 
necessary. The two most frequently mentioned short-term 
effects were expected to be price and unemployment rises. 
Yet, the British public seemed to recognise that, in the long 
term, Community membership could have positive outcomes. 
First, they believed that there would be economic growth, 
since joining the Community would result in competition and 
thus modernisation and efficiency. Second, they expected 
that there would be a strengthening of national security. 
In the mid-70's polls, British membership was highly 
supported and especially in 1975, the year of the referendum. 
After this, support steadily declined (Jowell and Airey, 
1985, Table 1, Appendix A). The public views on Community 
membership, have also fluctuated from 1973 till 1987. 
Although the percentages of people thinking that membership 
is neither good, nor bad, never changed radically (they 
ranged from 22% up to 30%), the percentages of people 
thinking that it was either good or bad changed a lot during 
these years (Eurobarometre, Nos. 16 to 29,1981-1988, Table 
2, Appendix A). This showed that, in general the British 
public had not establish a firm and shared opinion of 
whether membership in the EC was a good or a bad thing. 
All studies that have been conducted more recently trying to 
investigate and explain British attitudes towards the EC and 
the unification of Europe, came up with similar findings. 
These findings are going to be presented here, according to 
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different themes and chronological order. This approach was 
chosen because it is interesting to see how different 
approaches, methodologies and samples, came up with similar 
outcomes and underlying themes as well as to pin-point any 
changes over time. 
3.1. Benefits and bad effects 
----------------------- 
The first common outcome concerned the benefits and the bad 
effects that the British public saw as a result of Britain's 
membership of the EC. This idea was supported by a study 
reported by Hewstone in 1986. This study involved 
questionnaires, interviews and analysis of the press and it 
was a cross-national one comparing attitudes about the EC 
between adult populations in four European countries; namely 
France, W. Germany, Italy and Britain. The results of this 
study showed that the British public felt that the gains (for 
the U. K. ) out of the Community were less than the losses. 
In another report, presented by the commission of the 
European Communities in 1988, investigating young Europeans' 
attitudes on many topics in all twelve member countries, it 
was reported that 52% of-young Britons felt that Britain has 
benefited from her membership of the EC, whereas 25% felt 
that she had not. Yet, in contrast with young people from 
all other European countries, six out of ten young Britons 
saw issues such as the elimination of customs controls (as a 
result of EC directives) as a disadvantage. 
For Furnham and Gunter (1989), who conducted a study on young 
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Briton's (12-22 y. o. ) attitudes on various topics, including 
Europe, the EC was seen as partly successful, especially in 
economic matters. In particular, the respondents in this 
study believed that EC membership has made food prices more 
reasonable, industry more efficient, working in other 
countries easier and collective decisions on world affairs 
more easily attainable. However, the same respondents seemed 
to believe that Britain gained less and lost more by joining 
the, EC. Specifically, Britain was seen as contributing more 
to the EC budget than she was receiving from it and becoming 
less competitive as as result of belonging to the Community. 
Furnham and Gunter (1989) suggested that "the EEC may be seen 
by some as an excuse for Britain's relative economic decline" 
(p. 64). 
In. general, and as polls conducted by the Eurobarometre (Nos. 
17,19,22-29,1984-1988 Table 3, Appendix A) suggested, only 
recently has the British public begun to see some benefits 
from joining the EC. 
3.2. The European unification 
----------------------- 
A second common theme, investigated and explained by different 
studies is that of the unification of Europe in 1992. Again, 
as Table 4 (Appendix A) shows, public opinion had not been 
stable over the years and there has not been public agreement 
on this issue. In 1986 and 1987 at, least two thirds supported 
unification, either 'very much' or 'to some extent' (Eurobarometre, 
140 
Nos. 16 to 29,1981-1988). 
Hewstone's (1986) findings supported the idea that the 
British public is not too keen on the idea of unification. 
He suggested that: "The British do support the loose notion 
of European unification but appear unsure or unconvinced that 
the Common Market is the best means of bringing it about. 
The British are not anti-European, but they are not pro- 
Community" (p. 38).. 
The results reported by the Commission (1988), although they 
involved the beliefs of young people from all over Europe and 
not only from Britain, were similar. It was reported that 
"young Europeans are as keen as their elders on the basic 
ideas of building a united Europe, but. they have less 
perception of their ideas being realised. European 
institutions seem distant and unknown to young people, who 
lack the perspective necessary to perceive what progress has 
been made. And, finally, they are simultaneously impatient 
to see results, and a little indifferent towards the 
beginning steps of a construction which doesn't aim as high 
as their desires" (p. VIII). It was also specifically 
mentioned that "young people feel less concerned about and 
less involved in building a united Europe than do adults" 
(p. 91). The same report suggested that the support for a 
united Europe is the weakest in Britain (42%) among all other 
countries, and that the idea of. going beyond a single 
European market gets little backing. 
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Similarly, Furnham's and Gunter's (1989) results led them to 
suggest that the sample they investigated did not appear to 
be eager for a closer political union with the EC and for the 
strengthening of a pan-European state. 
All these different sources, indicated two specific ideas. 
First, that, in general, British public's support towards a 
united Europe is rather weak (or at least weaker than in 
other member countries). Second, this trend is shared by 
both adults and adolescent British citizens. 
The weak support towards a united Europe was also evident in 
some of the polls presented by the Eurobarometre (Nos. 22 
(1984), 24 (1985)). These polls showed that the British 
public did not seem to consider the idea of a 'United States 
of Europe' as a good one. In fact, 48% in 1984 and 50% in 
1985, supported that it is a bad idea (Table 5, Appendix A). 
Furthermore, a big percentage of the public agreed (from 1973 
till 1984) that there is no reason to speed up the process of 
European integration and that it would be better to continue 
at the present speed (Eurobarometre, No 22 (1984), Table 6, 
Appendix A). 
Yet, the findings of the report of the Commission (1988) 
suggested that young Europeans (in comparison to adults) 
"have a strong desire to see things moving faster. The 
difference in viewpoint between youth and adults is 
particularly strong in countries like Denmark, Ireland and 
the U. K., where the general population does not seem to 
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desire rapid European unification" (p. VIII). What seems 
surprising is not so much the disagreement of opinions 
between young and adult British people, but the discrepancy 
between young Britons' reluctant attitude towards the 
unification and, at the same time, their desire for faster 
steps towards it. The most probable explanation is that when 
they expressed their opinions about unification, young 
Britons visualised it differently than when they suggested it 
should be speeded up. In the first case they might have 
focused on its negative aspects and the disadvantages of it, 
whereas, in the second, they might have been influenced by 
its positive aspects. Another explanation might be that 
young Britons, although not very keen on the unification, 
believed that, eventually, it is going to happen. They might 
even believe that the terms their country is putting forward 
will be accepted, so they might desire the process to be 
speeded up. Finally, one could always suggest that it is 
nothing more than adolescents' impatience, even for something 
undesirable. 
3.3. Lack of equality between member countries 
Another interesting theme suggested by Furnham and Gunter 
(1989) is the lack of equality between countries perceived by 
their young respondents. Forty-one percent of them saw 
France as benefiting most and nearly half suggested that 
Britain is-contributing most. In discussing this finding 
Furnham and Gunter suggested that: "Like adults, our 
adolescent respondents tended to feel that Britain (and to a 
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lesser extent Germany) got a bad deal out of EC membership 
while France was the net beneficiary" (p. 66). 
This seemed to be one more factor negatively affecting 
(both adult and adolescent) attitudes towards the EC; not 
only Britain is not getting out of it as much she is putting 
in, but also other countries are getting much better deals. 
Furthermore, by this perceived lack of equality and balance 
the whole idea of uniting all countries seems less attainable 
and, most probably, less desirable. 
Nevertheless, British economy was generally seen by Furnham 
and Gunter's (1989) respondents as one aspect of British life 
that has benefited, at least to some extent, from EC 
membership. In fact it was reported that young Britons 
supported closer economic ties and were in favour of a single 
monetary unit. 
3.4. Culture 
Another aspect of life that was seen to be positively 
affected (Furnham and Gunter, 1989) was culture, although it 
was presented as rather all-inclusive; from football to food 
and wine. In general, closer cultural ties seemed to be 
highly desirable to most of their respondents. 
This notion of people being more eager to accept cultural 
ties rather than economic and political ones, is explained by 
Wober (1981) who suggested: "It is not parsimonious to 
presume that television news and current affairs analysis, 
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which are predominantly preoccupied with politics and 
economics, made little impact in producing knowledge in these 
fields, but somehow contributed to cultural approval of 
Europe. The items in the cultural subscale -entertainment, 
language, driving, food and metrication- are matters which 
enter viewers' experience through holidays, weather 
forecasts, travel programmes and a variety of sources other 
than simple didactic current affairs material" (p. 187). 
3.5. Language 
_.. _. _________Language ____ _ 
Language and fluency in speaking foreign languages is again a 
common theme investigated by different studies. Young 
Europeans, in general, tend more to learn and to be more 
fluent in foreign languages than adults. Yet, in comparison 
with young people from other European countries, only 30% of 
young Britons were found to have a good grasp of at least one 
language other than their own (this percentage is as high as 
84% for young Danes, Commission of the European Communities, 
1988) . 
The limitations of monoglotism of British people were 
reflected in the information reported by Furnham and Gunter 
(1989); 82% of the female respondents and 66% of the male 
recognised the need for learning foreign languages. 
The fact that English is one of the most popular languages in 
Europe and all over the world, has, probably, made British 
people indifferent and, perhaps, lazy in learning foreign 
languages. Yet, they have started to understand that being 
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fluent in other languages is necessary in today's Europe and 
that if themselves were not fluent they might well be left 
behind by the citizens of other countries. 
3.6. The European elections and the European Parliament 
-------------------------------------------------- 
" As far as European elections were concerned, polls showed 
that the British public had not been either interested in or 
informed about the elections that took place in 1979, and 
1984 (Eurobarometre, No 22 (1984), Table 7, Appendix A). 
Actually, 19% of the people who did not vote in these 
elections admitted that they were not interested in this 
kind of election (Eurobarometre, No 22 (1984)). 
Such findings were mentioned and discussed by Newman (1989) 
who pointed out that: "In both 1979 and 1984 the turn- 
out for the elections to the European Parliament was less 
than that of any other member state at 31.8% of the 
electorate, and the campaign was dominated by domestic 
politics" (p. 3). 
Similar findings came'up in relation to the European 
Parliament; the British public seemed to hold a generally 
unfavourable attitude towards it (Eurobarometre, No 24 
(1985), Table 8, Appendix A). Hewstone (1986) reported that 
it looks as if the British public considered the European 
Parliament as something 'foreign' and indifferent and this 
confirmed the general attitudes towards the Community, which 
are less positive than in the other European countries. 
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The indifference of the British public and the lack of 
importance to them of the European Parliament might have been 
a reflection of the little importance it always seemed to 
have for Britain's politicians. As Newman (1989) reported: 
"The 45 Conservative and 32 Labour MEPs elected in 1984 were 
not, in general, prominent political figures with a major 
influence on policy making in their respective parties, and 
the SDP/Liberal Alliance, which is the most enthusiastically 
pro-European political formation in Britain, failed to return 
a single MEP because of the electoral system and the size of 
the constituencies" (p. 3). 
3.7. Sovereignty 
What seem to be related to the British public's attitudes 
towards the EC and the unification, partly at least, is the 
fear of loss of national sovereignty. Furnham and Gunter 
(1989) claimed that this fear could be specifically focused 
on losing sovereignty to a European Parliament. Yet, for 
Newman (1989) national sovereignty is a much more general 
concept. For example, during the referendum of 1975, the 
issue of sovereignty was a much discussed one. "Anti- 
marketeers proclaimed that crucial powers would be lost, 
while pro-marketeers maintained that participation in the 
Community would enable Britain to regain its power through 
'pooling sovereignty'" (Newman, 1989, P. M. In fact Newman 
differentiated between national and parliamentary 
sovereignty. He argued that if national sovereignty is 
defined as total autonomy and independence from other states, 
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then Britain was not in such a position even before she 
joined the EC. Yet, by membership in the EC, British 
sovereignty was definitely affected. First, Britain had to 
accept existing treaties and subsequent enactments and 
amendments, thus accepting commitment to policy choices. 
Second, Britain became only 'a voice amongst others' in 
decision making, and that affected aspects of sovereignty. 
Parliamentary sovereignty was also affected both in terms of 
legislation and as an institution controlling executive 
powers, again by having to abide by, at least some, European 
rules and regulations. 
What seems to be hidden behind this fear of losing national 
sovereignty, is most probably a strong feeling of nationalism 
and national pride. Before going any further in the 
discussion of nationalism and the way nationalist beliefs may 
be related to people's views about the EC and the unification 
of Europe, it should be mentioned that there is some 
indication (Jaspars, Van De Geer, Tajfel and Johnson, 1972) 
that nationalist beliefs may be established, at least to 
some degree, in children from seven up to twelve years old. 
In experiments conducted and reported by the above mentioned 
researchers it was shown that the children's own country was 
preferred to other countries, and the more a country was 
perceived as similar to one's country, the more it was liked. 
Although this specific study was conducted in the Netherlands 
there is no reason to doubt that similar results would have 
been found in Britain. Nationalism seems to be uniting the 
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British public with much stronger ties than people in other 
countries. Topf, Mohler, and Heath (1989) found that national 
pride directed to shared national symbols can lead to a sense 
of integration and cohesion, in this way reducing the 
likelihood of division and strife. The British public has 
been found to be proud of national symbols such as the 
political and legal system (Almond and Verba, 1963) and the 
monarchy (Shils and Young, 1956, Kavanagh, 1985, Topf, Mohler 
and Heath, 1989). 
There are two conflicting forces here, that have to be taken 
--- - ___ 
into__account__. 
_if_ one -really -wants 
to understand the. 
- 
British__. 
public's attitudes towards the EC and the unification. On 
the one hand there is the understanding that the country 
needs to be in the EC and to accept the advances towards a 
more complete union with the rest of the other countries. On 
the other hand there is the fear of losing everything this 
nation is proud of, and this feeling has been thoroughly 
cultivated by anti-Europeans. Macfarlane (1981) pointed out 
that "the British public clearly did not see themselves as 
Europeans in the sense in which the inhabitants of the 
(other) member states did, and at no time displayed any 
strong desire to participate in the European integration 
movement" (p. 144). This could be explained by Lewis' (1987) 
claim that "European nationalism is largely ethnic. It is 
not so much a passport but a language, a shared culture, a 
tradition, a custom of behaviour, that defines identity" 
(p. 60). Thus the lack of a European identity may not be a 
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problem only for the Britons, yet it seems to affect their 
integration of the U. K. into the Community more than it does 
for any other country. For Lewis (1987) "the salient fact 
about Europe remains the nation-state. There is a sense of 
shared Europeanness which has waxed and waned in the last two 
generations, but it is still secondary to the sense of unique 
nationality which begun to arise after the Renaissance and 
the decline of feudalism" (p. 13). 
So, the British public, clinging on the institutions it 
considers important and for which it is proud, rejected the 
idea of European identity. As reported in the Eurobarometre 
(Nos. 17 (1982), 19 (1983), 26 (1986)) the great majority of 
the British public agreed that they never felt as citizens 
of Europe (Table 9, Appendix A). 
3.8. Britain, other European countries and the US 
Common language, similar culture and traditions, can also 
provide an explanation why the British public has often been 
found. to more easily identify with Americans than with any 
European nation. Britain has always been considered as 
having a 'special relationship' with US; there have always 
been important ties of culture, law and sentiment (Lewis, 
1987). 
Furthermore, the British public has been rather suspicious 
and even hostile towards other European countries, and 
especially France. This distrust and dislike appears to be 
mutual. People in certain EC countries were found to dislike 
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Britain's membership in the Community and this was expressed 
in a poll conducted in March and April 1984; 33% of the Dutch 
public, 38% in Luxemburg and 41% of the French, said that if 
they would like to see any country leaving the EEC, this 
would have been Britain (Eurobarometre, No. 22 (1984)). 
The French dislike of British membership is an old one. It 
has its roots in De Gaulle's vetoes towards the first British 
attempts to join the Community. Furthermore, it is generally 
believed that membership itself has increased the rivalry 
between the French and the British (Hewstone, 1986). 
3.9; Lack of knowledge 
Going back to the more recent studies involving young 
people's attitudes towards the EC (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1988, Furnham and Gunter, 1989), there is one 
more common theme that needs to be discussed; i. e. the 
general lack of knowledge about Europe and European 
happenings combined with a great degree of apathy and a lack 
of interest demonstrated by young people. 
The results reported by the Commission of the European 
Communities (1988) showed that young Europeans, in general, 
have less knowledge about the EC than adults. This could be 
a possible reflection of their lack of interest. Yet, young 
Europeans seemed aware of this lack of knowledge and 
information, since only a quarter of them claimed to really 
have an understanding of the EC. Furthermore, there was a 
strong demand among 15-24 years olds to be better informed 
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about this subject. In the same report, it was specifically 
mentioned that, in Britain, only one young person in ten 
could recall having read, seen or heard anything about the 
European Commission. 
When reporting their results for every group of questions, 
Furnham and Gunter (1989, working with British adolescents) 
mentioned that: "these results show a mixture of either 
ignorance or apathy, given the very large number of 
respondents unable to agree or disagree" (p. 63). When they 
asked their respondents to choose the member countries of the 
EC from among a number of countries, they found that: 
"overall, the respondents appeared to have a moderately good 
knowledge of who were EC members and who were not, though 
roughly equal numbers thought some non-EEC members like 
Sweden and Switzerland to be members, not members, or didn't 
know" (p. 67). In their general conclusion, they did report 
and commented upon this finding; "something needs to be said 
about the large number of 'undecided', mid-point responses 
which varied between a fifth And two thirds of the 
respondents. This may be seen to indicate a certain lack of 
interest in the EC from respondents of this age. Clearly 
their knowledge of certain EEC functions and regulations is 
minimal and it may not be easy to observe direct effects of 
EEC decisions in their daily lives" (p. 72). 
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3.10. Explanations for British attitudes towards the EC 
-------------------------------------------------- 
From the empirical findings and theoretical discussions, 
discussed so far, it seems that the attitudes of the British 
public towards the EC and the unification are based on a more 
or less vague knowledge about it, in shared nationalistic 
ideas and in an ambivalence between willingness to commit and 
fear to lose national sovereignty. 
For Furnham and Gunter (1989) the agreement in the responses 
of adults and adolescents is an indication "that attitudes to 
the EEC are formed very early and remain unchanged, monitored 
perhaps by the ubiquitous media" (p. 72). This overall 
similarity between adults' and adolescents' attitudes towards 
the Community was also suggested by the Commissions' report 
(1988). 1 
There are several approaches and explanations of this 
specific position of the British public towards the 
Community. Newman (1989) suggested that the general 
reluctance and "indifference to Europe is rooted in British 
political culture, arising from Britain's historical 
experience as a island power, with a world wide empire rather 
than a specifically European involvement. And the attitudes 
formed as a result of long term history were doubtless 
reinforced by post-war factors : the humiliation of a 
declining'Great Power eventually, and with great difficulty, 
entering a Community which it had earlier rejected" (p. 3). 
The same idea; i. e. that historical background influences the 
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way people think and act many years later, was supported by 
Hewstone (1986). Britain's history as a powerful empire 
seems to make people believe that, even today, there is no 
need for alliances and support from other countries. 
Another factor that seems to be related to the way the 
British public stands towards the Community is its political 
leaders and politicians in general. When nearly all 
political leaders supported the membership, as at the time of 
the referendum (1975), the majority of the public was 
strongly in its favour. When, on the other hand, party 
leaders were divided, as they had been a year earlier (1974), 
public opinion was similarly divided (Dowell and Airey, 
1985). 
The British government under Mrs Thatcher held a peculiar 
position in relation to EC, which was again reflected in 
public opinion. Specifically, M. Thatcher had never been 
closely identified with the European cause. In respect to 
defence she seemed pro-European, but, in general, the 
Community has very little (if anything) to do with defence. 
Further, she did not appear likely to abandon popular 
sentiment and move towards closer links with Europe 
(Rutherford, 1981). 
Finally, the press and the media in general seem to have 
influenced public opinion. When publicity for the EC was 
very favourable, as in 1975, so was public opinion. Yet, 
when publicity was negative, something broadly true since 
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1979, support for continued membership declined (Jowell and 
Airey, 1985). As Inglehart (1970) suggested "the British are 
least European, despite the fact that they show the highest 
rates of media exposure and are most likely to have opinions 
of any of the nationality groups. Presumably the content of 
communications relevant to Europe has been less favourable 
here than in other countries" (p. 45). 
4. FINAL COMMENT 
It is believed that the specific position that the British 
public, and especially young people, holds towards the EC and 
the European unification, presented above, explains the 
reasons for which the target representation and the 
population were selected. The population seemed to react to 
the idea of unification as something unfamiliar, this was 
expected to allow the investigation of the anchoring process. 
Furthermore, since the political scene in Europe was, more or 
less, in unrest (especially due to the events in Eastern 
Europe that took place while the first study was about to be 
conducted), it was also expected that this would allow the 
investigation of change. 
The review of the literature related to the EC and the 
British public's attitudes towards it, allowed the 
identification of a number of factors that could be expected 
to function as pre-existing belief systems for the new idea 
of the unification of Europe (e. g. what people already 
believe for the EC, nationalist and political beliefs and so 
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on) as well as factors that may be related to people's views 
about the EC and the unification (e. g. information, knowledge 
and so on). It is expected that employing a multi- 
methodological approach and a longitudinal design in the 
studies to be described in the following chapters as well as 
dealing with the EC and the unification of Europe from a 
social representational perspective would provide a 
description of it the target representation and an 
understanding of the relations between it and the different 
factors. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
INVESTIGATING THE PRE-EXISTING REPRESENTATION AS PRESENTED 
BY THE PRESS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
------------ 
As mentioned earlier one of the theoretical aims of the 
present work is to investigate the anchoring mechanism as a 
process of familiarisation. If indeed this mechanism takes 
place when people are engaging in the representational 
process in relation to a new and unfamiliar object, then it 
involves the anchoring of the new onto already existing 
belief systems. 
The target representation for the present piece of work has 
been already identified as the unification of Europe. If 
people are expected to go through a familiarisation process 
with this target and, especially, to anchor it to pre- 
existing belief systems, then it is necessary to also 
identify these systems. It is expected that at least one of 
these'systems is going to be people's representation of the 
European Community. That is to say that people will rely on 
this representation in order to explain, understand and 
represent the new. However, before going on to actually 
investigate this and other pre-existing systems in the 
specific population, it was considered necessary to, first, 
establish it as presented by the press. 
This chapter has three aims. First, to establish the 
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different themes and ideas related with this pre-existing 
representation, as presented by the press, before actually 
investigating it within the specific population chosen. This 
has been considered necessary so as to enable the creation of 
investigatory tools (such as interview schedules and 
questionnaires) to be used in the empirical studies that 
follow. Second, to enable the description of this 
representation as presented by the press; i. e. at a level 
different from the population to be investigated. The third 
aim of this chapter is to present and discuss the usefulness 
and applicability, as well as the limitations, of the method 
to be described below in the investigation and description of 
this specific component of a representation. 
The press and the media, in general, have to be seen as part 
of the circular movement representations are assumed to be 
constantly, in, especially in today's society where the media 
occupy a very dominating role and are quite often the main 
source of information. Representations, as expressed by the 
public and by politicians are taken and presented by the 
media and then are reflected back to this public as 
information, knowledge and opinions. However, the way 
information, knowledge and opinions are expressed by the 
press is controlled by a small number of 'powerful elites', 
such as authors, journalists, editors and owners, who, at 
this point 'own' the representation. At this point the 
representation is recreated and filtered by these 'powerful 
elites', so it could not be suggested that what is re- 
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presented are the representations of the general public. 
Representations, as presented by the press, are subject to 
the partiality (and possibly the specific intentions) of the 
people who 'own' them. On the other hand, not every member 
of the general public has access to the same sort of press or 
to the press in general. So, although there might be a sort 
of circularity of representations between the press and the 
general public, it cannot be suggested that these 
representations would be identical at the two levels. 
Yet, as discussed in the previous chapter, it has been argued 
that as far as the European Community is concerned the media 
in general and the press in particular, as well as political 
leaders, have always played a role in influencing public 
opinion. So, if one wants to have a complete picture of the 
representation of the EC (as pre-existing that of the 
unificationl then one has to investigate and describe the 
degree and the kind of this influence. Even when the public 
was found to demonstrate lack of knowledge'about the EC, it 
still held opinions about it. 
This chapter, therefore, will present and discuss the image 
of the representation of the EC as an outcome of the analysis 
of articles, comments, letters and so on related to it, 
coming from two specific daily papers and during a specific 
period of time. 
i 
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2. METHOD 
2.1. Selection of material 
Since the analysis was to be done by one person within a 
specific time limit, the amount of material to be analysed 
had to be realistically restricted. So, two daily papers 
were selected and the time during which these were monitored 
was limited to a month. The two newspapers were 'The Times' 
and 'The Guardian' and the month covered was June 1989. 
These newspapers were selected for a number of reasons. 
First, because they were considered to seriously and 
frequently refer to the EC and the unification of Europe and 
that they present a literate coverage of the issues. Second, 
because they were seen as well informed and as presenting a 
good range of information. Third, they have a rather wide 
circulation and they are regular papers. 
The period of time during which these newspapers were 
monitored was selected because two events related to the EC 
were to take place. First, the elections for the European 
Parliament (15th of June 1989) and, second, the Madrid Summit 
(which begun the 26th of June 1989). It was expected that 
for the whole month there would be a lot of material related 
with these two issues. 
So, for the June 1989 'The Times' and 'The Guardian' were 
read carefully and every article, comment, letter and so on 
related to the EC was included in the analysis. It was 
decided that-for something to qualify for inclusion it had to 
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refer to the EC specifically. For instance, an accident that 
might have happened in Italy, would not have qualified. 
2.2. Analysis 
The analysis of the material (i. e. coding and classifying) 
was done in terms of content (themes) by one person. The 
selection of coding categories was decided in two ways. 
First, there was a number of pre-established categories, 
based on the literature review related with the EC. It 
should also be mentioned that although content analysis was 
conducted on the material published during June 1989, the 
press was monitored and material had been gathered since 
January 1989, so there was a general idea of themes 
dominating the press. Second, during the analysis, certain, 
not pre-established, categories emerged. The rule here was 
that a new category would be created only if its theme was 
mentioned in at least five different pieces of information. 
A piece of information (for this analysis) was defined as any 
article, - comment, leading comment, editorial, letter 
mentioning the EC. So, every piece of information collected 
during this month was carefully read and sentences or phrases 
(which are going to be referred to as 'statements' from now 
on) falling into different coding categories were 
appropriately classified. 
2.3. Limitations 
The main limitation of the selection and the analysis of the 
material, described above, is the fact that they were 
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conducted by only one person. It could be argued that this 
person's expectations and representation interfered both with 
selection and analysis. Yet, it will be counter-argued that 
the way the pulling out themes from the body of information 
was done was not open to subjectivity of selection and 
interpretation. (For an example of the way the analysis was 
conducted see Appendix B. 1. ) Furthermore, no quantification 
of information was attempted, thus, the estimation of 
intercoder reliability was neither necessary nor possible. 
This limitation is acknowledged and taken into consideration. 
Yet, the time limits, in a way, dictated this 'selective' 
approach. However, it"was expected that even with this 
limitation the aims set in the beginning could be achieved. 
3. THE EVENTS THAT TOOK PLACE DURING JUNE 1989 
------------------------------------------- 
3.1. Introduction 
------------ 
Before going on to present the findings of the analysis of 
the press it is considered necessary to give some information 
of what actually were the events that happened during June 
1989 always in relation to the EC. As already mentioned, 
there were two events that led to the selection of this month 
for the press to be monitored; i. e. the European Parliament 
elections and the Madrid Summit. It was expected that these 
two events would produce a significant amount of news, 
comments, articles and so on that would enable the 
description of the target representation as presented by the 
press. On the other hand, this would bias against 
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'typicality', since these two events would create an 
'unusual' amount of news. 
3.2. The European Parliament elections 
These elections took place on the 15th of June 1989. So, for 
the first half of the month, the press was dominated by 
opinion-polls, trying to predict both the turn-out and the 
outcome for these elections. Also, the press carried a 
substantial amount of political parties' campaigns for these 
elections. 
The results were, more or less, as predicted. The Labour 
Party came first with 40.2%, the Conservatives second with 
34.1% and the SLD third with 6.4%. The turn-out for these 
elections was 37%. In the following days the press was 
dominated by articles trying to explain the loss of about 6% 
by the Conservatives. Such articles were also trying to 
predict the effects of this loss for the Party and the 
government at a national level, as well as the (then) Prime 
Minister, M. Thatcher, and her position among other European 
Prime Ministers and Presidents. The most frequently 
mentioned reasons for this loss were the general negative 
attitude of the Conservatives and the Prime Minister towards 
Europe and the election campaign conducted by the party. 
3.3. The Madrid Summit 
----------------- 
The Madrid Summit begun the 26th of June 1989. Summits, like 
the Madrid one, take place twice a year and during these 
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summits the presidency of the EC is handed to a new country. 
The Presidents or the Prime Ministers of all twelve member 
countries meet during these Summits and they usually take 
decisions about the issues that they have been dealing with 
during the previous six months. During the Madrid Summit the 
presidency of the EC was handed to Spain. 
Again, the press covered this event with a large number of 
articles and comments. The most distinctive feature of these 
publications was the Prime Minister's position, after her 
party's defeat in the European elections, in negotiating the 
two most important issue in the agenda; i. e. the European 
Monetary Union and the European Social Charter. On both 
issues the government was negative, presenting them as a 
threat to national sovereignty and independence. 
4. RESULTS 
4.1. Introduction 
------------ 
The results of the analysis of the press are going to be 
presented according to the themes under which statements were 
classified. A few comments are going to be made for the 
theme and its sub-themes and then examples from the press, 
characteristic of these themes, are going to be presented. 
(For the coding scheme for this analysis see Appendix B. 2. ) 
4.2. Description of Results 
---------------------- 
4.2.1. Views about the EC in general: This theme were 
included all the ideas about the EC as such but not in 
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relation to Britain or to any of the specific themes 
presented later. It presents a general description of the EC, 
in terms of both positive and negative aspects. 
4.2.1.1. Positive 
The first positive aspect of the EC is that it provided a 
Single free market. In this sub-theme were classified all 
statements presenting the EC as an economic institution 
facilitating trade between member countries and those 
emphasising the benefits of a single market. (Examples: 
"... benefits to business which the single market will 
bring... practical, everyday benefits which are the logical 
consequence of a unified market. ", The Times, 23.6, p. 10, 
"... internal free market with comprehensive social 
provision... ", The Guardian, 12.6, p. 2) 
The second positive aspect of the'EC is Co-operation. In 
this sub-theme were included all statements presenting the EC 
as a group of countries working together and co-operating 
with each other. (Examples: "... co-operation inside the 
Western European Union should be the basis... ", The Sunday 
Times, 18.6, p. B2, "... trade and co-operation agreement... ", 
The Guardian, 13.6, p. 8) 
The third positive aspect attributed to the EC is that it 
presents a Challenge. -Statements included 
in this sub-theme 
involved the idea of-the EC as a challenge both to nations 
and their leaders. (Examples: " Europe needs vision 
attached... Europe is a call to statemanship and clear 
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thinking. ", The Guardian, 15.6, p. 18) 
4.2.1.2. Negative 
The first general negative aspect of the EC is the Fear of 
Protectionism. This sub-theme includes statements claiming 
that there is always a danger that the EC will try to 
dominate the individual countries. The statements included 
did not mention specific countries, or the possible outcomes 
of this protectionism. (Examples: "... protectionist 
group... ", The Times, 20.6, p. 16, "... people who claim to 
know what's best for us. " The Guardian, 13.2, p. 6) 
A second negative aspect of the EC is Bureaucracy. 
Statements pointing out that the EC is an institution 
suffering from bureaucracy or that it is run by bureaucrats 
were included in this sub-theme. (Examples: "... resting over- 
weening bureaucracy... ", The Guardian, 12.6, p. 20, "... EC is 
of nature a bureaucratic institution... bureaucratic 
machinery... ", The Times, 19.6, p. 27) 
The third general negative aspect of the EC is that it can 
lead to Isolation from the rest of the world. In this sub- 
theme statements referring to this possible isolation or 
seclusion of a 'fortress Europe' were included. (Examples: 
"... a fortress Europe cut off from the rest of the world. ", 
The Times, 3.6, p. 6, "... impenetrable wall across Europe... ", 
The Guardian, 14.6, p. 10) 
4.2.2. Britain and the EC: Statements classified under this 
theme involved Britain in relation to the EC, in general. 
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Again, it was divided into positive and negative aspects and 
these into more specific sub-themes. However, statements 
mentioning any of the specific issues, which created separate 
themes themselves and are to be presented later, even if they 
involved a relation between Britain and the EC, were not 
included. 
4.2.2.1. Positive 
Again the first positive aspect of Britain's relation to the 
EC was Co-operation. Statements presenting Britain as 
willing and able to work together with her European 
counterparts or those stressing the need and the positive 
effects of co-operation for Britain were included in this 
sub-theme. (Examples: "... we must work with our European 
colleagues and not against them. ", The Times, 23.6, p. 10, 
"... we want to work together with our friends in Europe at 
the things we can do better together than alone. ", The Times, 
13.6, p. 24) 
Furthermore, Britain was presented, always in relation to the 
EC as; a 'good-European'. Statements presenting Britain as 
committed to the EC, abiding to its rules, promoting its 
causes and, in general being a 'model' member country were 
included in this sub-theme. (Examples: "... we play by the 
rules... ", The Guardian, 13.2, p. 6, "... practical and 
positive role Britain has been playing in Europe... ", The 
Times, 26.6, p. 27) 
The relation between Britain and the EC has one more positive 
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aspect since Britain has Influence within EC. Statements 
included in this sub-theme involved this idea of Britain 
being able to influence and control EC decisions and actions 
by being a member of the Community, this was often presented 
as necessary for British national interests. Furthermore, 
there were also statements implying that the EC should not be 
trusted, so Britain has to be always alert. (Examples: "Once 
inside... Britain could argue forcefully to adapt the Delors 
proposals. ", The Guardian, 20.6, p. 18, "... need to keep a 
check on Brussels... ", The Times, 22.6, p. 15) 
A fourth positive aspect of the relation between Britain and 
the EC is that Britain has a Promising future in it. This 
sub-theme-included statements pointing out that Britain's 
future lies in theýEC and that this is the place to be for 
future prosperity and general well-being. (Examples: 
"... Britain's destiny lay in Europe... ", The Guardian, 13.6, 
p. 6, "... future really lies within the Continent and we 
intend to play our part in making it prosper. ", 
The Sunday Times, 25.6, p. B2) 
Something that could improve further the relation between 
Britain and the EC is active Demonstration of commitment. 
Although this sub-theme represents an 'ought' rather than an 
'is' argument, it is included in the positive aspects of the 
relations between the EC and Britain because demonstration of 
commitment could improve these relations. The statements 
included in this sub-theme emphasised the need to demonstrate 
commitment to the rest of the EC member countries so as to 
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persuade them that Britain is whole-heartedly in the 
Community. The emphasis here was both upon actual commitment 
as well as upon its demonstration. (Examples: "... commitment 
to Europe ought to override domestic consideration. ", The 
Guardian, 15.6, p. 18, "... whole-hearted commitment... ", The 
Guardian, 22.6, p. 22) 
4.2.2.2. Negative 
One of the commonest negative aspects in the relation between 
Britain and the EC is related to the Disagreements and 
arguments that Britain often had with her partners. In this 
sub-theme, the statements included involved ideas such as 
'fighting', 'opposing', 'vetoing', 'objecting', all done on 
the part of Britain and leading to arguments and 
disagreements. (Examples: "... determination to object... ", 
The Guardian, 21.6, p. 2, "... refusing to sign any 'solemn 
declaration' and vetoing any proposals... ", The Times, 21.6, 
p. 16) 
Another general negative aspect is that British people and 
their political leaders are seen as Anti-Europeans. 
Statements describing Britons as anti- and bad-Europeans as 
well as not pro-Europeans were included in this sub-theme. 
(Examples: "... pro-British is to be anti-European... ", The 
Times, 2.6, p. 10, "... Britain is certainly not pro-European 
in the messianic, quasi-federalistic sense... ", The Sunday 
Times, 18.6, p. B2) 
4.2.3. One large theme of ideas and statements expressed in 
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the press was National identity, Nationalism, Sovereignty. 
The different sub-themes, of this larger one, covered a 
number of topics all related with National Identity, 
Sovereignty and Nationalism. Although, some of the sub- 
themes could go under the general negative aspects of the 
relation between Britain and the EC, it was considered that 
these three issues created a separate major theme. This was 
so, because, as mentioned before, the review of the 
literature showed that the notions of nationalism, national 
identity and sovereignty are closely related and often 
referred to in discussions about the EC. Also, it seemed 
that these notions could provide some explanations for 
British attitudes towards the EC and the unification of 
Europe. 
The first sub-theme involves the Danger of losing national 
identity. Here were-included statements claiming that 
Britain run the danger of losing her national identity and 
traditions by being a member of the EC. (Examples: 
"... British tradition requires a different approach to other 
countries. ", The Guardian, 13.6, p. 2, "... this is a debate 
over the value of having a national identity. ", The Times, 
2.6, p. 10) 
Similarly, the second sub-theme involves the Danger of losing 
sovereignty. Here the idea was that by being a member of the 
EC, Britain could lose power which would be transferred to a 
central European government. (Examples: "... proposals seen 
as going beyond Community competence and threatening national 
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sovereignty. ", The Times, 21.6, p. 16, "... seriously 
diminishing our sovereignty... ", The Times, 24.6, p. 11) 
In relation to the two above mentioned sub-themes a third one 
emerged emphasising the need of Preserving identity and 
sovereignty. (Examples: "... resistance to the biggest 
transfer of national sovereignty we have ever had. ", The 
Guardian, 28.6, p. 1, "... only limited effective powers be 
passed on to a higher authority, preserving sovereignties for 
local regional and present national state levels. ", The 
Times, 23.6, p. 10) 
Furthermore, there was another common idea related to 
identity and sovereignty. This was that countries should be 
Independent within Europe. In this sub-theme, the statements 
included claimed that it is better for countries to be 
independent but in close co-operation with each other. This 
was presented as ,a means of preserving identity and 
sovereignty but remaining in Europe, at the same time. 
(Examples: "... Europe of independent states... ", The Times, 
12.6,. p. 7, "... leave crucial economic decisions in our own 
hands... ", The Guardian, 30.6, p. 6) 
However, there was another sub-theme, contradicting the 
previous ones. According to it the Need to preserve 
sovereignty is outdated. The statements included in this 
sub-theme mentioned either that there is no fear of losing 
sovereignty, or that sovereignty is something of the past. 
(Examples: "... British public less worried about British 
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sovereignty and willing to embrace a new co-operative spirit 
with Europe. ", The Times, 19.6, p. 6, "... almost paranoid 
attachment to an outdated concept of national 
sovereignty... ", The Times, 23.6, p. 5) 
The fear of losing national identity or sovereignty is very 
closely related to the idea of Nationalism. All statements 
included in this sub-theme mentioned nationalism in one way 
or another; national pride, traditions, national independence 
and so on. (Examples: "We are British and proud of it. Proud 
of our traditions, proud of our national character, proud of 
our Westminster Parliament. We want to preserve them and we 
shall. ", The Guardian, 13.6, p. 6, "... backwards looking and 
nationalistic.... coming from an island still hooked on 
memories of empire. ", The Times, 26.6, p. 27) 
So, what will happen if nationalist sentiments are ignored 
and national identity and sovereignty are surrendered to the 
EC? What are The effects of 'Surrendering'? In this sub- 
theme the different results of 'giving away' power were 
included. For a statement to be included it had to be 
presented as a direct result of 'surrendering'. In general, 
'surrendering' was associated to loss of power, traditions, 
independence and democracy. (Examples: "... transfer some of 
government's most important decisions from parliament to an 
un-elected supra-national body. ", The Times, 22.6, p. 15, 
".,.. beginning to transfer ... power to the 
Community... ", The 
Guardian, 27.6, p. 1) 
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4.2.4. Related to the above mentioned theme is Interference. 
This theme consists of two sub-themes. First is the Fear of 
Interference. For statements to be included in this sub- 
theme they had to involve the idea of interference, 
intrusion, and 'meddling' from the EC to national matters. 
(Examples: ".. intrusion into industry's affairs... ", The 
Guardian, 12.6, p2., "unaccountable and corrupt bureaucracy 
interfering in areas where even national governments should 
treat warily. ", The Sunday Times, 18.6, p. B2) 
Second, and as an outcome of the previous sub-theme, is the 
need to Fight against Interference. The statements included 
here mentioned that Britain should not accept any kind of 
interference and that she has to fight against it. This 
fight should also involve showing the EC the limits between 
co-operation and interference. (Examples: "... fight any 
effort from Brussels to interfere in Britain's taxation, 
social security, health service or industrial relations. ", 
The Times, 13.6, p. 1, "... resist intrusion from Brussels. ", 
The Guardian, 20.6, p. 1) 
4.2.5. Another large theme, which again is going to be 
discussed on its own, referred to Isolation. Statements 
included in this theme had to mention the idea of Britain (or 
her leaders) being (or running the risk of being) isolated 
from European partners. (Examples: "... an isolated 
pariah... ", The Guardian, 24.6, p. 23, "... minority of 
one... ", The Times, 22.6, p. 15) 
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This theme was complemented by two sub-themes. First, it was 
the danger of Others moving without Britain. For a statement 
to be included in this sub-theme, it had to specifically 
mention that the rest of the European countries are going to 
move towards a greater integration without waiting for the 
isolated Britain to decide whether to follow or not. 
(Examples: ".. if we remain outside, then our partners will 
understandably get bored and proceed towards economic 
integration without us. ", The Guardian, 20.6, p. 18, "... the 
others will eventually go ahead without her (Britain). ", The 
Times, 20.6, p. 12) 
The results of isolation and of other countries moving ahead 
without-Britain emerged in the second sub-theme; i. e. Britain 
being left out. Statements included here involved generally 
the idea of Britain being left out, not being allowed to 
participate in decision making, being seen as less important 
than her European partners due to her isolationist attitude. 
(Examples: "Britain will eventually be left out of 
discussions altogether. ", The Guardian, 19.6, p. 5, "Britain 
is put in the sin-bin while the rest of Europe tut tuts and 
goes about its business. ", The Times, 19.6, p. 27) 
4.2.6. The Elections for the European Parliament were one of 
the topics that were extensively covered by the press. In 
itself it creates a separate theme, consisting of a number of 
sub-theme. The first is the Lack of awareness. In this sub- 
theme all statements mentioned the observed lack of awareness 
of the elections by the British public. (Examples: "... many 
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people are unaware that the elections are even to take 
place... 'What election? '... alarmingly common response... ", 
The Times, 5.6, p. 2) 
The second sub-theme in relation to the elections was the Low 
Participation. Statements included in this sub-theme either 
predicted or commented upon this low participation (turn-out) 
of the British public. (Examples: "... only 2996 of the 
electorate were certain they would vote. ", "... not so much on 
how people intend to vote as on whether they vote at all. ", 
The Guardian, 15.6, p. 5) 
As a result of both the lack of awareness and the low 
participation, a third sub-theme emerged; i. e. the Non- 
importance of Elections. For a statement to be included here 
it had to mention this non-importance, the idea that the 
elections did not matter for the British electorate. 
(Examples: "... European elections did not matter. ", The 
Guardian, 15.6, p. 19, "... shown indifference to the 
elections... ", The Guardian, 12.6, p. 20) 
Another theme related to the elections was the line followed 
by the Conservative party during its elections campaign. The 
emphasis was put upon the Socialist Danger. For statements 
to be included in this sub-theme they had to, first be 
related to the Conservatives' campaign and second, to 
specifically mention the socialist danger coming from the EC. 
(Examples: "... we haven't rolled back the frontiers of 
socialism in this country to see them reimposed from 
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Brussels. ", The'Times, 13.6, p.!, "... back-door 
socialism... ", The Guardian, 12.6, p. 2) 
4.2.7. In fact the position of the Conservative Party towards 
the EC, created a theme on its own. This theme consisted of 
two contradictory sub-themes. In the first the Conservatives 
are presented as Pro-Europeans. Statements included in this 
sub-theme referred to the Conservatives with adjectives such 
as 'good' or 'true' Europeans and presented them as committed 
to the EC. (Examples: "... Conservative party is 
traditionally pro-European and internationalistic. ", The 
Times, 10.6, p. 11, "We are the Party of Europe. ", The 
Guardian, 15.6, p. 1) 
Yet, in the other sub-theme the Conservatives were described 
as Anti-Europeans. Although, most of the statements included 
in this theme referred to M. Thatcher and her anti-European 
stance, this was considered to reflect the party's stance as 
well. For statement to be included they had to refer either 
to M. Thatcher's or the party's anti-European stance and to 
describe it a such. (Examples: "... M. Thatcher's paranoia 
about all things European... Conservatives are now seen as 
Britain's main anti-European party. ", The Sunday Times, 25.6, 
p. B3) 
4.2.8. Another theme emerging-from the analysis of the press 
was the Monetary Union. This was expected since it was one 
of the topics to be discussed at the Madrid Summit. This was 
a larger theme consisting, in general, of everything that 
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mentioned the monetary union (EMU) and the European Monetary 
System (EMS). It was divided into a number of sub-themes. 
The first was Opposition; where, statements included, 
mentioned the need to resist, oppose or fight against EMU and 
presented the dangers of monetary union (losing monetary 
sovereignty). (Examples: "... against Britain joining.. . not 
to be rushed in to joining", The Guardian, 19.6, p. 5, 
"... sovereignty at the heart of their objections to EMU... ", 
The Times, 22.6, p. 15) 
On the other hand, the second sub-theme, related to EMU and 
EMS, was Acceptance. For a statement to be included in this 
sub-theme it had to mention EMU or EMS together with some 
notion of acceptance, approval, benefit and so on. 
(Examples: "... monetary union is the key to a United 
Europe. ", The Guardian, 22.6, p. 22, "... gains from monetary 
union are quite important... ", The Guardian, 21.6, p. 11) 
In between opposition and acceptance is the third sub-theme, 
involving Compromise. In this sub-theme statements 
mentioning 'compromise', 'soft approach', 'joining if... ' or 
'joining when... ' in relation to EMU and EMS, were included. 
(Examples: "... compromise might be possible on monetary 
union... ", The Times, 21.6, p. 16, "... joining when the time 
is ripe. ", The Guardian, 17.6, p. 1) 
4.2.9. The second topic debated in Madrid was the European 
Social Charter. This created a theme on its own. Statements 
included in this category had to mention the Charter. All 
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statements presented a negative attitude and opposition to it 
on the part of Britain. (Examples: "... plan to give women 
throughout the EC new rights to demand equal pay and job 
opportunities with men is being held up by the lone 
opposition of Britain. ", The Guardian, 21.6, p. 2, "Britain 
yesterday rejected the European Commission's social charter 
of workers' rights. ", The Times, 13.6, p. 19) 
5. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
--------------------- 
5.1. Introduction 
------------ 
In general, the results of the analysis of the press present . 
a well-structured and well-negotiated representation of the 
European Community. This representation consists of images 
of the EC, attitudes and opinions towards it, and 
explanations for these attitudes and opinions. 
Furthermore, the analysis showed that the different themes 
create a complex network of arguments. These themes do not 
exist on their own; they constitute 'sets' and they are used 
together as complex arguments expressing attitudes and 
opinions about the EC. 
5.2. The representation of the EC as presented by the press 
------------------------------------------------------ 
One of the findings of the analysis of the press is that the 
image of the EC has both general and specific aspects. So, 
there are a number of, general characteristics attributed to 
it, but also a number of specific ones. The latter, 
actually, are the ones that define the details of this image 
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and make it a more complete one. 
In general terms, the EC, as such, is presented as being 
both 'good' and 'bad'. It is 'good' because it provides a 
large and free market where countries can trade with each 
other, it helps countries work together and it provides a 
challenge. Yet, at the same time, it is 'bad' because it has 
protectionistic tendencies, decisions and actions are blocked 
due to bureaucracy and it may end up being isolated from the 
rest of the world. The arguments here, are simultaneous and 
part of the same representations. The different themes and 
-+- - _sub-themes- are used'in conjunction in order--to create complex 
networks. Themes are not presented as separate and 
independent from each other; they are presented together, 
very often in the same piece of information constructing 
complex arguments. For example, in one piece of information 
one may read about the importance, benefits and necessity of 
a free common market, where member countries of the EC are 
trading without the constraints of controls, taxes and so on. 
Yet, in the same piece of information, the reader may be 
cautioned that this may lead in a 'limited' market if the 
countries of EC make, it difficult to trade with countries 
outside it. 
Again in general, but in relation to Britain this time, the 
EC is once more presented both as 'good' and 'bad'. It is 
'good' because, again, it promotes co-operation between 
Britain and other countries, it allows Britain to have a say 
in and influence decisions and promises a prosperous future. 
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It is also seen a 'good' (though in a different way; i. e. 
more in a 'cognitive dissonance' sense), at least whenever 
Britain demonstrates commitment to it and presents her 'good- 
face; that is to say that if Britain is a part of European' 
the EC and she tries to show commitment and be a good 
" partner, then the EC must be a 'good' thing. Yet, it is also 
'bad' because it leads to arguments and disagreements between 
Britain and her European partners and it is then when Britain 
shows her 'anti-European' face. Again, the arguments here 
are the outcome of closely networked themes and sub-themes, 
since in the same sources and pieces of information one can 
get both sides of the relation between Britain and the EC. 
For instance, Britain's membership of the EC is valued 
because it allows her to participate actively in decision 
making, yet, this participation and influence often leads to 
disagreements with her European partners, creating tension 
and friction both in the European and the national political 
scene. 
So,, in general there is a 'yes, but... ' position adopted 
towards the EC and this is very clearly presented both by the 
image of it in general and in relation to Britain. This 
position is further elaborated and explained by the specific 
parts of the image. 
National identity and sovereignty, as well as everything that 
the British people are proud of, are in danger from the EC. 
This, although considered sometimes outdated, is seen as a 
real threat and every effort has to be made to preserve 
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identity and sovereignty. Nationalist sentiments are very 
strong and the possible effects of surrendering power to a 
central government are presented as disastrous. The EC is 
also presented as aiming to interfere in Britain's national 
affairs. Again, this is seen as a real danger and something 
worth fighting against. However, it is recognised that if 
Britain goes on fighting, arguing and disagreeing, she runs 
the risk of being isolated and left behind by her European 
partners which do not show any tendency to wait for her. 
The public's interest in the EC can be inferred from its 
general-lack of awareness for issues such as the elections 
for the European Parliament and its low turn-out for these 
elections. Both these findings show a general indifference 
and demonstrate that the elections, at least, were a non- 
important event. 
The position of the governing Conservative party is also 
indicative of this 'yes, but... ' situation. The Conservative 
party is presented both as pro- and anti- European, depending 
on the issue and its importance for Britain. Yet, the fact 
that the main issue in the party's election campaign was the 
'socialist danger coming from the EC' is one more indication 
of the Euro-phobia often demonstrated by its members and 
leaders. 
The specific issues of the monetary union and the social 
charter, again present the 'yes, but... ' position. Both are 
seen as dangerous for Britain, if they were accepted without 
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negotiation and opposition. 
This image of the EC as presented by the press agrees to a 
great extent with the information presented by the literature 
review presented in the previous chapter. Ideas of the EC as 
being both a 'good' and a 'bad' thing (Jowe11 and Airey, 
1985, Hewstone, 1986), lack of public awareness for and 
knowledge about it (Furnham and Gunter, 1989), sovereignty 
(Newman, 1989) and so on were reflected by the analysis of 
the press. 
Accordingly, it could be suggested that there is a 
consistency between the image of the EC as presented by the 
reviewed literature and that emerging by the present analysis 
of the press. What remains to be seen is whether this image 
is reflected and, if it is, to what extent in the 
representation of the population to be studied. 
Another finding, coming up from the analysis of the press, is 
that the unification of Europe did not occur as a theme. One 
reason for this may be that two events that took place during 
the period of gathering of information (i. e. the European 
Elections and the Madrid Summit) dominated the press and did 
not allow the discussion of other issues. However, the idea 
of unification was sometimes mentioned in relation to a 
number of themes; e. g. isolation (i. e. Britain has to move 
towards further economic and political integration, otherwise 
she will be isolated) and Monetary Union (i. e. that 1992 is 
very close and provisions for a smooth transition to a common 
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currency have to be made). Commonly, when the European 
unification was mentioned, it was done so in relation to what 
already is known and believed about the EC. What was 
actually presented was not the unification as an event (which 
is justifiable since this event has'not happened yet) but as 
a process. The image of the unification was presented in a 
rather anticipatory way and was consistently related to and 
inferred by what is already known-about the EC. 
A further finding from this analysis is that it did not show 
any consistent differences in the way the EC was presented by 
-two __differ_ent newspapers__ analysed. 
Neither of them kept, 
consistently, a specific approach to the EC which was 
different from that of the other. This finding may be a 
result of the non-typicality of the period during which 
information was collected; the specific issues that were of 
importance during this period might not have allowed much 
variety in opinions. Another explanation may be that several 
pieces of information included in this analysis involved the 
presentation of the opinions of political leaders, as they 
expressed them in speeches and interviews. So, often the 
information coming from the two newspapers was similar for 
that reason. Yet, there were comments or articles where 
different journalists expressed specific opinions about the 
EC and argued for them. Although these pieces of information 
differ from each other (there were some strongly supporting 
the EC, whereas others were opposing it) they did not 
differentiate between newspapers, since there both kinds of 
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opinions were presented in articles in both newspapers. 
"Finally, it was observed that there was a change over time, 
in both newspapers, in terms of focus and presentation. 
During the first fifteen days of June 1989 the EC was 
mentioned mainly (and sometimes exclusively) in relation to 
the elections. Then, the focus was shifted towards the 
Madrid Summit and what had to be achieved during it. During 
the pre-election period the emphasis of the presentation of 
the EC was mainly put on benefits from it, its importance as 
well as on the importance of Britain's participation in it. 
The themes presented during this- time. -'were-- put together in 
such a way so as to highlight this image of the EC. It may 
be that the intention was to alert the general public and 
increase its awareness of and turn-out for the elections. 
After the elections, though, the emphasis was shifted towards 
the issues that differentiate Britain from the rest of the EC 
members; such as the Monetary Union and the Social Charter. 
Again, it could be suggested that the press aimed at 
informing the, public beforehand about the possible frictions 
that could occur during the Madrid Summit. 
6. CONCLUSION 
So far, only the the second aim set in the beginning of this 
chapter has been discussed; i. e. what is the image of the EC 
as presented by the press. It is expected that, after the 
representation of the EC is investigated within the target 
population, it would be possible to discuss similarities and 
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differences between this image and the representation. 
The first aim of this chapter; i. e. to establish different 
themes and ideas related with the representation of the EC, 
so as to use them in the creation of interview schedules and 
questionnaires, is considered to have been achieved. Ideas 
such as co-operation, national identity, sovereignty, 
interference, isolation and so on, that emerged from this 
analysis were to be used in the creation of the investigatory 
tools to be used in the empirical studies. 
The third aim was to present and discuss the advantages and 
limitations of the method used to arrive at a description of 
the representation of the EC as presented by the press. 
Analysing the press publications related to the EC in terms 
of content is actually the only method that could allow such 
a description. It provided an image of the EC and allowed 
its description in terms of both variety and complexity. 
Nevertheless, it could not be argued that this is the only 
image of the EC. Being limited in analysing only two daily 
papers and for only one month, this present analysis managed 
to describe this image as well as its variety and complexity 
in respect to these conditions. Also, it could not be 
suggested that this image is totally free from pre- 
conceptions and expectations of what it might be. When this 
method is complemented by others and information from all of 
them is presented together, claims about the complexity of 
the representation could be made. 
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However, at-this preliminary stage of investigation, this 
method provided a useful insight and information about the 
specific ideas related to the EC, something that, a, 
mentioned, will facilitate further investigation. It also 
offered a general idea of what constitutes the pre-existing 
beliefs which the target representation is expected to be 
-anchored onto, at least as these are presented by a section 
of the press during a specific period of time. 
/ 
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CHAPTER SIX 
INVESTIGATING THE PRE-EXISTING REPRESENTATION AND 
THE ANCHORING OF THE TARGET 
--------------------------- --------------------------- 
1. INTRODUCTION 
------------ 
1.1. Aims 
The main aim of the study to be presented in this chapter is 
to investigate anchoring as a mechanism that may take place 
during familiarisation with a new and unfamiliar object. 
If anchoring indeed takes place, then one would expect that a 
new object will-be explained by already existing belief 
systems. Therefore, the first step of this study will be to 
establish that at least one such system is present within a 
target population. Such a system could be an already 
existing representation. If it is referred as 'system' here, 
it is because the emphasis is put upon its possible relation 
to the. new object; that is, that it pre-dates the object. 
If such a system is present, then one could proceed to the 
second step; that is to investigate the anchoring of the new 
object onto this pre-existing belief system (possibly amongst 
others). 
Furthermore, this study aims to focus upon the way that 
different kinds of involvement with a new object may be 
informing the representational process. 
Finally, this study aims to demonstrate the use of a 
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structured multi-methodological approach in the investigation 
of social representations and the representational process. 
Different methods of gathering and analysing data are going 
to be used in order to achieve the different aims of this 
study. An interview and attribute checklists will be 
employed to gather information about the pre-existing belief 
system. A questionnaire is expected to provide further 
information which, after being appropriately analysed, could 
enable the creation of indices of involvement, pre-existing 
beliefs and the evaluation of the new object, as well as the 
investigation of the relations between them. Information 
from all these different sources will be discussed together 
and also in relation to the information gathered by the 
analysis of the press. 
1.2. Theoretical hypotheses 
As mentioned in chapter one, when people are faced with a new 
and unfamiliar object, they tend to feel uncomfortable about 
it. They need to explain and understand it, make it part of 
their representational system. In order to achieve this, 
people are expected to anchor the new object to already 
existing belief systems. These systems may be used to 
facilitate the representational process and to turn°the 
unfamiliar into something-familiar, by enabling its 
classification,, categorisation and comparison with what is 
already known. It could be argued that for a pre-existing 
belief system to be used as a reference for the anchoring of 
the new object there may need to be & relation between them. 
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Relatedness here may involve a similarity in terms of context 
or the belonging in the same framework or a relation in terms 
of time. 
Therefore, for the first step of this study, the theoretical 
hypothesis is that there will be a pre-existing belief 
system, related to the target new representation, within the 
population to be investigated. As mentioned, this system 
could be an already existing representation consisting of 
beliefs, images, understandings, explanations, knowledge and 
opinions. As such, this system may be used for the 
explanation and understanding of. the new object. Finally, it 
is also expected that this already existing representation 
may have some similarities with the one, discussed 
previously, as presented by the press. 
If this hypothesis is right, then one could proceed to test 
the main hypothesis of this study; that anchoring may occur 
during familiarisation and that it may be an actively 
selective mechanism. It is expected that there will be 
specific pre-existing belief systems that may inform the 
representational process and enable the anchoring of the new 
object. Again, if these systems are to be used as comparison 
templates for the new, they may have to be related to it. 
Consistency between the pre-existing belief systems and the 
target new object would be an indication that the anchoring 
mechanism takes place. However, consistency could not be 
considered a proof that the mechanism operates during 
familiarisation. Although it will support the hypothesis, 
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there may be alternative explanations for this consistency. 
On the other hand, if what is observed is lack of 
consistency, then it could be argued either that anchoring 
does not take place or that there are pre-existing belief 
systems other than the ones to be used here that inform the 
representational process. However, if there is a consistency in 
the relation between specific pre-existing belief systems and 
the new object, indicating that anchoring may be taking place, 
then one could suggest that this mechanism is an actively 
selective one. It is expected that 
during the representational process, people may actively 
select the systems onto which they are going to anchor the 
new and unfamiliar. It could be argued, at this point, that 
if anchoring is an actively selective process then it cannot 
be predicted. However, it is believed that this selectivity 
may be unconscious and serve specific structural or 
functional purposes. Thus, what may be predictable is the 
pattern of anchoring as a mechanism; whether there is a 
consistency in the relations between the pre-existing belief 
systems and the new object and not the content of the new 
representation. 
Furthermore, it is expected that not everybody faced by the 
same new idea is going to proceed to become familiar with it 
at the same speed and arrive at similarly complete and 
complex representations. Different kinds and levels of 
involvement with a new idea are considered to be related to 
the process of familiarisation as well as the complexity of 
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its outcome; that is the representation. 
Involvement here is defined as the relation that individuals 
may have with something that is new and unfamiliar, either by 
choice or by chance. Individuals can be involved with a new 
idea due to proximity, relationship to the source of 
information, effects that may come as a result from this 
idea, obligation, ideology, interest, group membership and so 
on. These different kinds of involvement can be related with 
the familiarisation process by influencing when a new idea is 
going to be faced, what kind of information will be received 
and from whom, how information is going to be understood, 
what kind of exchange of information is going to take place 
and between whom. Involvement also adds an emotional and 
individual aspect to the familiarisation process. Evaluation 
of the effects that may come as outcome from a new idea or 
event, for instance, may create an emotional kind of 
involvement with this new idea or event and thus end-up by 
influencing the familiarisation process. 
Therefore, this study aimed at investigating the following set 
of hypotheses: °(a) That anchoring will take place during 
familiarisation with a new object, (b) That anchoring is an 
actively selective mechanism, and (c) That different kinds of 
involvement with the new object will inform and influence both 
the representational process and the representation which the 
process produces. 
191 
1.3. Operational hypotheses 
---------------------- 
As mentioned before, the idea of the unification of Europe in 
1992 has been chosen as the target representation for this 
piece of work. This idea is considered to be new and 
unfamiliar for the specific population to be investigated by 
this study; i. e. young Britons aged approximately 18 years. 
This is believed to be so because, although people are more 
or less familiar with the European Community, the idea of a 
'United States of Europe' is still something new, vague and 
amorphous. 
It is expected that this population will be able to verbalise 
their beliefs, feelings, understandings, explanations and 
knowledge about the EC, when interviewed on this topic. 
Also, it is expected that this representation will have 
similarities with the representation of the EC as expressed 
by the press. Further, it is believed that people's images 
about different countries (both members and non-members) will 
contribute to the understanding and more complete description 
of this representation. 
As far as the anchoring mechanism is concerned, the pre- 
existing belief systems to be investigated focus upon 
i) racism, ii) nationalist beliefs and iii) beliefs about the 
European Community's effects on Britain so far. These 
factors may be related to the way people would approach and 
understand the unification of'Europe and can be taken to be 
pre-existing belief systems in the sense that they are 
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beliefs about things that have already happened. These 
specific factors may be related to the unification for a 
number of reasons. First, by both the related literature and 
the analysis of the press it was suggested that these factors 
may influence and explain the way people view unification. 
Secondly, if the unification is considered the extension and 
the tightening of relations between countries that are now 
members of the EC, then one would expect that what people 
believe about the EC may inform their views about the 
unification., Similarly, in the case of nationalist beliefs 
and racism, it, could be argued that what people believe about 
their own country, other countries, and people from different 
races may be related to views about the unification, which 
would involve the union of different countries and peoples. 
Indeed, consistency between these pre-existing belief systems 
and beliefs about unification would indicate that anchoring 
may be taking place. 
Involvement is to be investigated by indexing the following: 
i) Contact with European issues involving keeping in touch 
with European events by reading about them, watching related 
programmes on TV and discussing them. This kind of 
involvement represents a specific behaviour that brings 
information about the new idea and which, at the same time, 
allows individuals to come closer to it. ii) Evaluation of 
effects of the unification. This is an index of how 
intensely people feel they are involved with the new idea 
because of the possible effects that this may have on their 
193 
country and, as a result of this, on themselves personally. 
rý 
All these factors could be thought to be 
person's social class and gender because 
(i. e. social class and gender) may influ 
understanding of new ideas and therefore 
consideration in an attempt to study the 
process. 
related to a 
these two factors 
ence people's 
should be taken into 
representational 
The operational hypothesis to be tested by this study is that 
nationalist beliefs, racism, and views about the EC (as pre- 
existing belief systems) may be used to explain a degree of 
the variability of an aspect of the social representation of 
the unification, to be indexed as views about the 
unification. Also, it is expected that contact with European 
issues and evaluation of the possible effects of unification 
(as two different kinds of involvement) may be involved in 
the explanation of the views about unification. Finally, a 
third sort of variables; social class and gender are expected 
to inform the representational process. 
The studies related to this topic have already been-discussed 
in detail in Chapter 4 (Hedges and Jowell, 1971, Wober, 1981, 
Jowell and Airey, 1985, Hewstone, 1986, Furnham and Gunter, 
1989, Commission of the European communities, 1988). 
However, Hewstone's (1986) findings about British people's 
attitudes towards the EC are of specific interest here since 
he used a methodological approach similar to the one to be 
described later in this chapter. He identified a number of 
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variables that were found to explain a significant amount of 
variance (55%) in the overall attitudes towards the EC. 
These variables were support for the EC, expectancy-value, 
active interest, liking, knowledge and national image. 
However, Hewstone's study differs most from this present one 
in that he dealt with attitudes towards the EC and not 
towards unification and that, whenever he dealt with the 
unification he saw it as an ideal and not as a 'reality' with 
possible positive and negative outcomes. 
In general, this present study differs from the previous ones 
in more than one way. First, the objective of the present 
study, is to investigate the theoretical questions already 
discussed. The unification of Europe is the means for this 
investigation rather than the object of the study. Secondly, 
this study's interest goes beyond opinions and attitudes 
towards the EC and the unification of Europe, investigated 
and reported by the other studies already mentioned. It is 
expected that the different methods to be used for this study 
will enable the description and discussion of more components 
of a representation than opinions and attitudes. 
The present study also differs from studies investigating 
aspects of the theory of Social Representations in general. 
First, most studies conducted so"far have focused upon 
already developed representations, 'whereas the present one 
focuses upon one that is still considered to be in the 
making. Secondly, the main interest of the present study is 
the representational process and specifically the anchoring 
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mechanism, assessed through patterns in consistency between 
pre-existing belief systems and the new idea. Very few 
studies, so far, have dealt with this process (e. g. Galli 
and Nigro, 1987, Echebarria and Paez, 1989). Finally, what 
further separates the present study from the ones conducted 
to date within the framework of social representations is the 
use of a systematic multi-methodological approach for the 
investigation of its target. 
2. METHOD 
2.1. The Sample 
2.1.1. Some background information on the sample 
----------------------------------------- 
The present study employed a group of people who comprised 
the younger cohort (17-19 years old) of a sample that 
participated in a longitudinal national survey studying the 
political and economical socialisation of young people in 
Britain. The original sample was randomly selected from all 
the young people in two cohorts (15-16 and 17-18 year olds), 
stratified by gender, who had been educated in the state 
sector schoolsýin four areas; Swindon, Sheffield, Liverpool 
and Kirkcaldy. This sample was sent three postal 
questionnaires at annual intervals (1987-1989). The second 
and third postal questionnaires were also sent to a Boost 
sample of 250 people drawn from each of the four areas. One 
hundred and seven people out of the Swindon sample were also 
interviewed in 1987. 
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2.1.2. The Interview Sample 
In 1989, the 107 people who had been previously interviewed 
were sent letters which informed them of the topic of the 
present interview and asked them whether they would agree to 
be interviewed again. All the people who did not send back 
the refusal slip (sent with the letter) were contacted by 
telephone. Forty-nine individuals (22 males, 27 females, 22 
younger cohort, 27 older cohort, mean age: 18.97) out of the 
ones contacted by telephone agreed to be interviewed. The 
response rate was 45.8%. All interviewees were also asked to 
complete a questionnaire after the end of the interview. 
2.1.3. The Questionnaire Sample 
'In addition to the forty-nine questionnaires given to the 
interview sample described above, questionnaires were sent to 
4the younger cohort in Swindon who returned their first postal 
questionnaire completed and all those respondents in the boost 
(sample who completed the second wave questionnaire in Swindon. 
797 questionnaires were posted to this sample. A personal 
letter explaining the purpose of the questionnaire and asking 
the respondent to complete it and send it back in the 
Freepost envelope provided, was sent with each questionnaire. 
out of the 797 that were sent out, 175 questionnaires were 
sent back completed. On the whole, the response rate was 
22.4%. However, it has to be pointed out that this percentage 
drops to 8.2% and 8.0% for the people who had answered only 
the first questionnaire and the first and second ones 
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respectively, whereas it goes up to 42.6% for the people who 
had answered all the three previous questionnaires. Since 
difficulty in maintaining response rates is a rather common 
phenomenon with longitudinal studies the generally low 
response rate in the present study was not surprising. All 
175 respondents who completed the questionnaire were living 
in Swindon at the time; mid-November 1989. There were 85 
males and 90 females. At the time of the present study the 
respondents were 17 to 18 years old (mean age: 17.87). (For 
distribution of sample by wave and gender see Table 1, 
Appendix C. 1. ). 
2.2. Piloting 
. (k) 
Both the questionnaire and the interview schedule were 
piloted in a small number of undergraduate students in the 
University of Surrey. As they were found to function 
satisfactorily and to elicit the expected sort of responses, 
no changes were made. 
2.3. The Interview 
------------- 
2.3.1 Procedure 
The interviews took place from the end of October till mid- 
November 1989. All interviews took place in the houses of 
the interviewees at a time convenient for them. The 
interviews were taped after the interviewees had given their 
permission. Every effort was made not to be interrupted or 
disturbed during the interview and in most cases this was 
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(*) The pilot work was designed to ensure that the wording of the questions as well as the questions themselves were meaningful, relevant and comprehensible. Due to the small sample no statistical analysis was carried out on the pilot data. 
achieved. Each interview lasted between 45 to 60 minutes 
approximately. All interviews were transcribed. 
2.3.2. The Interviewers 
There were four interviewers, all females. One interviewer 
was British, one was Australian, one was from Cyprus and one 
was from Greece. Before engaging in the actual interviewing, 
all interviewers conducted one training interview which was 
taped and then discussed. Mistakes were pointed out and 
explanations and claritications were given. All interviewers 
were given the same script from which they should not deviate 
during all interviews. They were also provided with some 
information about the topic of the interview (the EC) so as 
to be able to explain and reply to any queries from the 
interviewees. 
Before leaving for the interviews, interviewers were given 
information about the interviewees from the respective 
questionnaires and interviews. Each interviewer normally 
conducted three interviews during each evening she went to 
Swindon. 
2.3.3. The Interview Schedule 
---------------------- 
The questions included in the interview were based both on 
the already existing literature-about Europe (Chapter 4) and 
on the themes that emerged from the analysis of the press 
(Chapter 5). Beyond this, the questions were determined by 
the components of the representation of the EC that the 
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interview was aiming to tackle. 
First, the interviewees were thanked for agreeing to be 
interviewed. They were then given an introduction by the 
interviewer to the subject of the interview. (For the 
interview schedule see Appendix C. 2. ) 
The first questions were on knowledge; it was considered 
necessary to establish an index of knowledge which, besides 
being a component of a representation, could provide some 
information about the interviewees' contact with and interest 
in Europe. The interviewees were asked to name the member 
countries of, the EC. No prompts or any kind of help were 
offered. After this, the interviewees were asked whether 
they knew any other countries currently applying for 
membership of the EC and, if so, which. In the next 
question interviewees were asked about the date when Britain 
joined the EC. 
Following this question, interviewees were presented with a 
card with the names of all member countries of the EC and 
were asked to say in what chronological order they joined the 
Community. They were also told that if they thought that two 
or more countries joined simultaneously they could put these 
countries together. 
The rest of the questions involved personal opinions, ideas, 
beliefs, feelings and explanations. Interviewees were asked 
to express their opinions on whether Britain has benefited 
from joining the EC and, if so, how, and whether Britain's 
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membership of the EC has had any bad effects on Britain and, 
it so, what. They were also asked what they thought the aims 
of the EC were and whether these have been achieved so far. 
Furthermore, interviewees were asked what they thought the 
individual member countries wanted to achieve when they 
joined the EC. 
All these questions aimed at eliciting from the interviewees 
their own feelings and ideas about and understanding and 
explanations of the EC, Britain and other member countries. 
After these questions the interviewees were presented with 
eleven different reasons (one at a time) for which different 
countries might have joined the EC and they were asked to say 
how important each reason was for each country, on a 5-point 
scale ranging from Not Important At All to Very Important. 
For this specific task (which actually constitutes the first 
checklist) only some of the member countries were used, as 
well as Turkey, which is a country that has applied for 
membership. The member countries were Britain, France, 
Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Germany. The reasons given 
were: a. To strengthen national defence, b. To protect the 
interests of Western Europe, c. To bring about economic 
expansion in Europe, d. To help achieve lasting peace in 
Europe, e. To increase the standard of living throughout the 
EC, f. To achieve a greater mutual understanding between 
European nations, g. To provide the third block between the 
two Super-powers, h. To develop their economy at the expense 
of richer countries, i. To take advantage of other countries' 
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technological achievements, j. To dominate other countries, 
h. To exploit other countries. After each reason was 
presented for each country, the reply of each interviewee was 
coded (on a scale from 1 to 5) on a coding sheet. The 
countries were selected because they were considered to 
represent the whole range of member countries of the EC. The 
reasons included came from the related literature and the 
analysis of the press and were considered to cover a wide 
range of possible reasons for which different countries might 
have joined the EC. 
The aim here was to establish some indices of differentiation 
between the different countries in terms of the reasons for 
which the interviewees believed they joined the EC. It was 
expected that what people thought and believed for different 
countries would be related to the way they would attribute 
different reasons for joining the EC to them. 
Then the interviewees were asked which country, they thought, 
influences EC policies most and why. Again, here the target 
was differentiation between countries or groups of countries. 
The next question involved the personal effects the EC has 
had on interviewees' life. The last question of the 
interview was on voting in the last European elections in 
June 1989. First, interviewees were asked whether they were 
eligible to vote in these elections. Then they were asked to 
say whether they had (or would have) voted. If their answer 
was-yes, they were asked for whom they had (or would have) 
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voted and why. If, on the other hand, their answer was no, 
they were asked to explain why. These two last questions 
were trying to establish first, how people saw themselves in 
relation to the EC and, second, how much involved and willing 
to participate they were as well as what their political 
affiliations were. 
After the interview was over, the interviewees were presented 
with the second checklist. This was, actually a booklet each 
page of which had a characteristic and then a line going from 
Applies Very Much to Does Not Apply at All. The interviewees 
were asked to rate all twelve EC countries plus USA and 
Turkey on each of these characteristics by putting a cross 
for each country and the name of this country on the line. 
An example was provided for the interviewees to help them 
understand the nature of the task. The checklist is presented 
below: 
Applies Doesn't Apply 
Good quality Very Much at All 
food <--------------------------------> 
Applies Doesn't Apply 
Pollution Very Much at All 
<----------------------------------> 
Applies Doesn't Apply 
Industrial Very Much at All 
conflict <---------------------------------- 
Applies Doesn't Apply 
Fashionable Very Much at All 
<----------------------------------> 
Commitment to the Applies Doesn't Apply 
defence of Very Much at All 
Western Europe <-----------------------------------> 
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Applies Doesn't Apply 
High literacy Very Much at All 
level <-----------------------------------> 
Applies Doesn't Apply 
Unemployment Very Much at All 
<--------------------------------- > 
Applies Doesn't Apply 
Prosperity Very Much at All 
< ---------------------------------> 
Applies Doesn't Apply 
Suffers from Very Much at All 
terrorism <---------------------------------> 
Applies Doesn't Apply 
Healthy Very Much. at All 
< ---------------------------------- > 
Applies Doesn't Apply 
Good performance Very Much at All 
in sports <----------------------------------> 
Applies Doesn't Apply 
Sense of humour Very Much at All 
<----------------------------------> 
The idea behind this task was, again, to establish people's 
perception of differences and similarities between countries, 
as well as images for individual countries something that 
could be used to complete the general picture of the European 
Community. 
After this task was completed, the interviewees were handed 
the questionnaire-about-Europe, which is described below and 
were asked to complete it. When they had finished, they were 
asked whether they had any questions and, if they had, these 
questions were answered. Finally, the interviewees were 
thanked for their co-operation. 
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2.4. The Questionnaire 
----------------- 
Again, the questions and statements included in the 
questionnaire were based both on the related literature and 
the analysis of the press. However, once more, the most 
influential factor for item inclusion was the aim of the 
questionnaire; i. e. to create indices of involvement, of pre- 
existing beliefs and of the target representation. 
The questionnaire consisted of four different sections. (For 
a copy of the questionnaire see Appendix C. 3. ) 
Section A: YOUR CONTACT WITH OTHER COUNTRIES 
This section consisted of questions dealing with people's 
contact with other countries. It aimed at establishing 
different indices of contact, closeness and involvement with 
Europe and the world outside Britain in general. The 
questions in this section were expected to provide some 
information on respondents' actual contact with other 
countries as well as their motivation to get closer to them. 
There were questions where respondents had only to tick their 
answer in the appropriate box (E. g. 'Have you been abroad in 
the last five years? ' Yes/No) and other questions when they 
had to write down their reply (E. g. 'Please write down which 
countries you 've been to: '). 
In particular, this section consisted of questions asking 
whether people had been abroad'in the last five years and 
which countries they had been to, whether they spoke any 
foreign languages, which and with what level of fluency, 
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whether they would consider living abroad and in which 
country, whether they knew any people living in a European 
country other than Britain, what their relation with them wan 
and how well they knew them. There were also questions 
asking people whether they were interested in European 
happenings, whether they kept in touch with them and by what 
means; i. e. reading, watching TV, and discussing with others. 
Section B: YOUR VIEWS ABOUT BRITAIN 
This section aimed at providing an understanding of people's 
views, opinions, ideas and beliefs about Britain. It 
consisted of 15,5-point Likert type, items involving beliefs 
towards Britain, as a nation, in order to provide an index of 
the extent to which people think that Britain is superior to 
other countries and whether they believe that whatever is 
British is best (E. g. 'British democracy is the model for the 
rest of the world'). Other statements aimed specifically at 
people's beliefs in traditions and traditional way of life 
and whether these have to be preserved (E. g. 'Britain's 
" national identity has to be preserved'). Finally, there were 
statements aiming at respondents' opinions on whether Britain 
as a nation has to advance towards the unification and become 
more committed to the European cause (E. g. 'Britain should 
accept the changes occurring in Europe'). 
Section C: YOUR VIEWS ABOUT THE EEC 
Section C consisted of 6 Likert-type items concerning people's 
views about the EC. All statements aimed at creating an 
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index of whether Britain has benefited or not by her 
membership of the EC and in what aspects was Britain 
benefited or was harmed by it so far (E. g. 'Britain 
contributes too much to the EEC budget', 'Britain has gained 
political power from her membership of the EEC'). 
Section D: YOUR VIEWS ABOUT THE UNIFICATION OF EUROPE 
This section consisted of two subsections. Subsection (A) 
involved 21 Likert-type items related to the unification of 
Europe. There were statements aiming at producing a general 
index of whether people believe that the unification will 
benefit Britain or not and in what aspects (E. g. 'In a united 
Europe, Britain will lose its individuality', 'British 
culture will be enriched in a united Europe'). Other 
statements aimed at the personal feelings of the respondents 
towards unification; i. e. whether or not they themselves are 
in favour and they want it to happen and whether or not they 
believe that they and people their age are going to benefit 
by it. (E. g. 'I would like to see Europe unified', 'A united 
Europe will have nothing to offer to young people in 
Britain'). 
Subsection (B) involved 22 different aspects of life; from 
agriculture to arts, science and technology and from 
Britain's sovereignty to the different political parties. 
Here, respondents were asked first to say whether or not they 
believed that an aspect would be affected by the unification 
and then whether the effect or the lack of it would be a good 
or bad thing. The aim of this subsection was to create 
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indices of differentiation between aspects that would be 
affected (positively or negatively) and those which would not 
be affected (and whether this would be good or bad). 
Furthermore, it was expected that responses to these 
questions would enable the creation of indices of change and 
the positivity of this change. The purpose, therefore, of 
this subsection was not only to establish opinions and 
beliefs but also to evaluate of perceived effects of the 
unification of Europe. 
3. ANALYSIS-AND RESULTS 
------------------- 
3.1. The Interview 
------------- 
3.1.1. Analysis 
According to the theory of the Social Representations and the 
specific aims of the study the interviews were analysed in 
two different ways. First, they were analysed in terms of 
components in order to find out which and what components of 
a representation were present in the data coming from the 
interviews. As has been suggested, a representation is 
considered to be a very complex construct consisting of a 
number of different components. The first, step, therefore, 
was to decide which criteria had to be satisfied in order to 
enable one to suggest that there is a social representation. 
Accordingly, a representation was considered to have both a 
nucleus and a periphery. The components defining the nucleus 
of a representation were opinions or beliefs and explanation 
and it was believed that it was a necessary condition for 
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these components to exist in the information gathered in 
order to enable the suggestion that a representation exists. 
Furthermore, there were a number of components defining the 
periphery of the representation. These components (presented 
and defined below) were considered to offer some more 
information about the representation, especially in terms of 
the level of its sophistication, but-their absence would not 
mean that there was not a representation. Therefore, the 
criterion for deciding whether a representation existed 
within-the specific population was the existence (or absence) 
of a nucleus, consisting of opinions or beliefs and 
explanation. Some of these components were included for 
theoretical reasons; i. e. they were part of a representation 
as discussed in the theory. Others were included for 
empirical reasons; i. e. they were evident during the 
interviews and they were considered important to the 
completion of the specific representation. The components in 
the nucleus of the representation were defined as: 
a. OPINION/BELIEF: Expression of any kind of opinion on any 
topic-. (related to the EC), either by just answering a 
question that sought an opinion or voluntarily expressing a 
view (mostly in evaluative terms). 
b. EXPLANATION: Simple answers to WHY questions. 
The components included in the periphery of the 
representation were the following: 
, a. 
KNOWLEDGE: Existence (or absence) of any answer to 
knowledge questions. 
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b. FEELING: Expression of any kind of personal feeling to any 
question (e. g. 'happy', 'hurt'). 
c. FACT: Mentioning of anything that indeed has to do with 
EC, besides answering the knowledge questions; e. g. Common 
Agricultural Policy, free movement of persons, goods, 
services and capital, and so on. It was believed that the 
factual things that people would volunteer (without having 
been specifically requested), would give an indication of 
what ideas are in the forefront of the representation. 
d. 'THEORY': Personalised and rather comples understanding 
and explanation of any opinion, belief and so on, expressed. 
Emphasis was put upon series of explanations (deduction or 
induction), using related arguments and ideas. 
e. PAST/PRESENT/FUTURE: Comparisons through time and/or 
mentioning of past/future. This was expected to, possibly, 
provide some indication of whether people use what they 
believe happened in the past to explain the present and the 
future, as well as using what is happening now to project 
into the future. 
f. SELF: Mentioning of personal experiences, judging from 
personal experiences, seeing oneself in relation to EC. 
Self-reference was believed to provide an indication of 
people's perception of personal involvement with the EC. 
Besides all the above components of a representation, the 
ability of interviewees to distinguish and separate different 
categories, mostly in terms of countries (e. g. stronger, 
bigger, and so on), as well as grouping of countries in terms 
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of similarities was also investigated. This sort of 
differentiation, although it was not considered to be a 
component of the representation, was expected to provide some 
indication of the sophistication of the representation. 
The second step in this analysis was to go through the 
transcript of each interview and note whether each and every 
component (as it had been operationally defined) was present 
in this specific interview or not. In the end a table was 
created which had on the top horizontal axis all the 
components and on the vertical axis the case number for each 
interview. Whenever a component was present in an interview, 
this was recorded as YES in the appropriate column, whenever 
it was not this was recorded as NO. Only knowledge was 
recorded differently. Here there were four different 
categories: i. NO: for not answering any knowledge questions, 
ii. LITTLE: for answering partially; i. e. less than 4 member 
countries of the EC, iii. SOME: for answering partially; i. e. 
mentioning from 4 up to 7 member countries, and iv. GOOD: 
either mentioning more than 7 member countries or answering 
questions on applying country and date that Britain joined. 
This different way of recording knowledge was considered 
necessary because a binary (YES/NO) coding here would result 
in a very undifferentiated, classification of information. 
After this kind of analysis was completed, all interviews 
were analysed again in terms of content. This time focus was 
put upon the different themes that were prominent and 
frequently occurring in the interviews. This second analysis 
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aimed at establishing both what themes occurred frequently 
throughout the interviews as a whole and what themes were 
more prominent in each individual interview. The idea here 
was to enable one to end up with a description of the 
representation that might exist and at the same time to 
determine whether this representation was a shared one. 
The coding categories, were, again, decided both in terms of 
the existing literature and the analysis of the press. 
However, if an idea was mentioned at least five times (in 
five different interviews) then a new theme was created. 
Coding was done by two different individuals. Intercoder 
reliability, measured by Cohen's Kappa, was found to be 
k=0.86, indicating a high degree of agreement. (For the 
coding scheme for this analysis see Appendix C. 4. ) 
3.1.2. Results 
3.1.2.1. Some information about the Interviewees 
Before presenting the results from the interviews, both in 
relation to components and content of the representation of 
the EC, it-is essential to present some general information 
about the interviewees. 
In general, and as far as the EC is concerned, the 
interviewees did not demonstrate a great amount of knowledge. 
Although most had a vague idea of which are the member 
countries, only three knew that Turkey was applying at around 
that time for membership, only one knew that the U. K. joined 
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in 1973 and only 12 were wrong (as far as this date is 
concerned) by less than three years. As far as the order 
with which countries joined the EC, no interviewee managed to 
sort them in the right order. 
A large group (nineteen; 38.8%) of the interviewees believed 
that the EC had achieved its aims. However, an equal number 
of people (twelve; 24.5%) either did not know or believed 
that the EC had achieved its aims to a certain degree. Only 
four people (8.2%) believed that the EC had not achieved its 
aims. Furthermore, the majority (thirty; 61.286) of the 
interviewees did not believe that the EC has had any effects 
on them personally. 
As far as politics are concerned, the participation (i. e. 
voting in the European elections in 1989) was rather low. 
Out of the forty eligible to vote individuals, only nineteen, 
actually voted.. In terms of political affiliations, out of 
the thirty-two individuals who expressed an opinion, fourteen 
supported the Conservative party, ten Labour, seven the Green 
party and one an Independent candidate. Yet, although the 
political questions involved the European elections 
specifically, when people explained why they preferred a 
political party they referred to national issues (and 
especially the Poll-tax) and not to European ones. 
3.1.2.2. The Representation of the EC: The Components 
-------------------------------------------- 
The outcome of this analysis is shown in Table 2 (Appendix 
C. 1. ). By looking at this table from left to right, one can 
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see individual profiles indicating how many and which 
components of a representation were to be found in each 
interview. By looking at it from top to bottom, one can see 
to what extent every component of a representation was to be 
found throughout interviews. 
As expected, individual profiles created by a rather large 
number of components (six) plus differentiation were rather 
distinct. There were some occasions where more than one 
interview produced the same profile in. terms of components, 
but this was extremely rare and the number of interviews in 
which- the . -profiles were. -identical _ were.. -three 
at the most. 
The profiles varied from those which consisted of only one 
component to those which consisted of all seven of them. In 
terms of which and how many components were present 
throughout interviews, the results were as follows. Six out 
of forty-nine interviewees had no knowledge about the EC at 
all, fifteen had little knowledge, nineteen had some 
knowledge and nine had good knowledge. Only one interviewee 
was unable to express even a basic opinion about the EC, the 
remaining forty-eight did express an opinion of some kind. 
Only four people were unable to provide even a simple 
explanation of any opinion or belief they had expressed, the 
other forty-five managed to explain why they believed what 
they said they did. Ten out of the forty-nine interviewees 
were able to express some sort of feeling in relation to the 
topic they were interviewed about. Twenty-four (half) of the 
interviewees referred to something that was factually 
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relevant to the interview topic. Twenty-eight of the 
interviewees could come up with a personalised 'theory'; i. e. 
take the interviewer through their understanding and 
explanations of things, whereas twenty-one did not. Only 
seven interviewees could make comparisons or references in 
terms of past, present and future, either their own, their 
country's or Europe's. Eighteen people were able to relate 
themselves to the topic they were interviewed about. 
Finally, nine out of the forty-nine interviewees came up with 
some kind of differentiation between countries. 
3.1.2.3. The Representation of the EC: The Content 
----------------------------------------- 
The first most common theme (for the whole coding scheme, see 
Appendix C. 4. ) that came up from the content analysis of the 
interviews and involved the EC in general was that the EC is 
something that has to do with the Economy and Trade 
(mentioned by twenty-seven interviewees). For a statement to 
be included in this theme it had to specifically involve 
economy, trade, import and/or export. Such a theme occurred 
frequently in answers to all sorts of questions; from 
benefits of Britain's membership of the EC to aims of 
individual countries. (E. g. "... easier to export goods to 
other countries. " Case No. 4294, "Britain joined because of 
the trade they can get from other countries. ", Case No. 4370, 
"... keep the economy fairly stable... ", Case No. 5183). 
This theme was sometimes accompanied with the idea of a Wider 
variety of products becoming available for people throughout 
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Europe, by means of imports and exports (mentioned by six 
interviewees). Again, for a statement to be included in this 
sub-theme it had to specifically involve the idea of variety 
of products. (E. g. "... more range of products... food. ", 
Case No. 5049). 
Yet, often (in ten interviews) the idea of free trading and 
importing/exporting goods was also associated with Surpluses, 
Expensive products and Unemployment, all of which were 
considered to be affecting Britain negatively. For a 
statement to be included in this sub-theme, it had to involve 
any of the three above mentioned results, always in relation 
to economy and trade. (E. g. "... more charge for other 
countries' products instead of British. ", Case No. 5172, 
"... food mountains are bad. ", Case No. 4569, "... unemployment 
in Britain, because we are selling more than our own goods. ", 
Case No. 4637). 
Nevertheless, no matter how it was evaluated, economy, in the 
sense of trading, importing and exporting goods, was the idea 
most readily associated with EC. 
The second commonest theme (mentioned by eighteen interviewees) 
was that of Togetherness, Closeness, Friendship in the 
relations among countries. Again, this theme was frequently 
related to the EC in answers to all sorts of questions, from 
benefits to aims and so on. For a statement to be included, 
it had to involve any of these ideas. (E. g. "Try to unite 
Europe, make it easier for countries to be more together... ", 
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Case No. 4294, "Brings countries together, not being just 
separate... people closer. ", Case No. 4681, "... increase 
friendship between countries. ", Case No. 5796, "... don't want 
to be separate from anybody. Get better relations. ", Case 
No. 5123). 
This theme was often related to three other ideas, occurring 
frequently. First, there was the idea that countries close 
to each other would create some sort of Alliance or third 
super-power opposite USA and USSR (mentioned in seven 
interviews). Statements included in this sub-theme had to 
involve this idea of alliance, of EC countries being able to 
stand against or opposite other countries or to avoid wars by 
being allies. (E. g. "Protection... they are like an 
alliance, like if one is in trouble... they 'd all be out to 
help, not just one country. ", Case No. 5397, "... united front 
against all other countries. ", Case No. 5741, "... now is going 
to be a third super-power. ", Case No. 5405, "... stopping 
nuclear wars. ", Case No. 5123). 
The-second idea related to the theme of closeness, friendship 
and relations between countries was that of Balance and 
equality among them (mentioned by six interviewees). 
Statements in this sub-theme suggested that when countries 
come closer to each other, they will treat each other fairly 
and they will achieve some kind-of balance so no country will 
be left out. ME. g. "... equal trade zone among member 
countries... take away unfair advantages, balance it out. ", 
Case No. 4586, "Balance. That one country isn't greater than 
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the other. ", Case No. 4501). 
The third idea that appeared in some cases (in five 
interviews ) in relation to the theme of closeness and better 
relations was that when countries are united they are able to 
establish better Communication and Understanding among them. 
Furthermore, this communicating and understanding was 
extended to peoples of the different countries. For a 
statement to be included in this sub-theme it had to mention 
this idea in relation to closeness or as a result of. it. 
(E. g. "... all separate individuals, like Britain, Germany, 
France... bring them together so to understand them more. ", 
Case No. 5139, "... easier to communicate... ", Case No. 4059, 
"... understand each other... communicate", Case No. 4463). 
However, when related to Britain, specifically, this theme of 
togetherness, closeness and unity was often seen in different 
ways than the ones described above. First, it was seen more 
as a Necessity than as a choice. This idea was mentioned by 
six interviewees. Statements included in this sub-theme 
involved the idea that the U. K. 'had' to join in order to 
avoid being left out or that the country could not survive on 
its own. (E. g. "We wouldn't survive on our own,... have to 
join somebody and the nearest people to us must be them. ", 
Case No. 4294, "... it made Britain's role to Europe a lot 
easier... while the rest of Europe is a continent, Britain is 
an island off to the side... always has been off in the 
corner... by joining the EEC brought us in Europe. ", Case 
No. 4350). 
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Second, the fact that Britain is now closer to the rest of 
Europe was associated to Loss of independence (mentioned by 
seven interviewees). In this sub-theme, the statements 
included had to involve such ideas or the obligation to abide 
to rules and regulations without actually agreeing with them, 
which again was interpreted as loss of independence and 
always in relation to being closer to the rest of the EC 
countries. (E. g. "... had to restrict ourselves. Where the 
other members have said 'We don't want this to happen'. So, 
even if people in Britain do wanna do this, the rest of 
Europe said 'no'. Or say Europe is quite happy to agree to 
do something with another country and Britain didn't like the 
idea, we 've been out-numbered ... we have to go ahead with 
that... EEC is a big group, so it's a group decision. ", Case 
No. 4350, "We lost our independence... ", Case No. 4370). 
One further implication of this way of thinking about the EC 
was that Britain is not fairly treated by her European 
counterparts, whereas other countries were enjoying all the 
benefits. This idea was mentioned by five interviewees. 
(E. g. "... grants to EEC, grants to people... Britain is not 
getting a fair share... France gets an awful lot more. I don't 
think we 've done well. Some countries benefit more than we 
do. ", Case No. 4148). 
There were a few more ideas that were related to the EC. 
Although these ideas were not frequent enough so as to be 
considered themes, they are worth mentioning. First, in a 
few cases the EC was related to Travelling abroad and 
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Holidays. It is interesting to point out that in most of the 
cases when such an idea was mentioned, nothing else could be 
related to the EC. (E. g. "... EEC is related to going on 
holidays. ", Case No. 5781). In a few other cases the EC was 
related with Employment opportunities in countries other than 
Britain. The reverse (i. e. people coming from other 
countries to work in Britain) was also mentioned a few times, 
but in this case it was mostly regarded as a bad effect. 
(E. g. "I could apply for a job in France. ", Case No. 4345). 
As far as other countries are concerned, one common 
characteristic throughout the interviews was that 
interviewees made references to individual countries (except 
Britain) that they felt familiar with. These countries were 
France and Germany and they were mentioned in eighteen 
interviews each in different occasions (sometimes as 
examples, other times in answers to specific questions). 
This characteristic was stressed by some of the interviewees 
themselves who, - when asked to explain why they believed that 
a country tends to influence EC policies most, suggested that 
they based their opinion on the fact that this country 'is 
heard'. (E. g. "... say you were in France... ", Case No. 5397, 
"... people coming from France, Germany... ", Case No. 4370, 
"France and Germany seem like Europe to me. ", Case No. 5796). 
It should also mentioned here that 60.5% of the people who 
mentioned at least one member country of the EC, in the 
knowledge questions, mentioned France first. 
A common theme related to which country influences EC 
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policies most and involving countries other than Britain was 
Power and Strength (mentioned by eleven interviewees). For a 
statement to be included in this theme it had to involve 
power in relation to the ability of a country to influence EC 
policies. This could be done either in a general way or 
power could be attributed to a specific characteristic of the 
country, such as industry, economy and so on. Again, the 
most frequently mentioned countries were France and Germany 
(always with the exception of Britain). (E. g. "... must have 
power above the others. ", Case No. 4681, "... the strongest two 
countries. ", Case No. 5139, "... strength in economy, trade... 
economic strength. ", Case No. 4059). 
Another common theme, again in relation to countries 
influencing EC policies most, suggested that for a country to 
be influential it has to Have a say in the Community, by any 
means available; i. e. shouting, insisting, and so on. This 
idea was mentioned in eight interviews. Again it was related 
more often with France and Germany than with any other 
country (except for Britain). (E. g. ".. shout the loudest.. ", 
Case No. 4501, "... speaking the loudest and getting a lot of 
saying. ", Case No. 5183). 
Furthermore, 'a common theme throughout interviews and 
questions was the differentiation between Stronger/Bigger 
countries and Weaker/Smaller ones. This theme occurred in 
five interviews especially in answering the question 
involving individual countries' aims when joining the EC. 
was obvious that people believed that different countries 
it 
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joined the EC with different aims and expectations. For a 
statement to be included in this theme, it had to involve 
this differentiation either by referring to specific 
countries or not. (E. g. "Smaller countries like Luxemburg 
and Belgium... being such a small country, like Belgium which 
is close to France... the size difference, France being so 
big. ", Case No. 4350, "... unfairly treated by another larger 
country who would be in advantage. ", Case No. 5183, "... stop 
smaller countries getting swallowed under... ", Case No. 5752). 
As far as people's image of their own country (Britain) is 
concerned, this manifested itself in different themes that 
were repeated throughout interviews. Britain was described 
and attributed a number of characteristics by interviewees 
both in relation to all other countries and the EC and as an 
individual country. 
In the first case; i. e. Britain in relation to other countries 
and the EC, a commonly repeated theme was the differentiation 
between Britain (Us) and all other member countries of the EC 
(Them (mentioned by eight interviewees). For a statement to 
be included in this theme it had to describe Britain as a 
separate entity and, in the same time, all other countries as 
an entirely undifferentiated group. (E. g. "... the nearest 
people to us must be them. ", Case No. 4294, "Europe is being 
abroad, not us as well. ", Case No. 5796). 
Another theme occurring fairly frequently and associated with 
Britain's relations with other countries was, as mentioned 
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before, the loss of independence. This time, though, the 
emphasis was put upon Compromise and Changing ways of doing 
thin s. This idea was mentioned in five interviews. For a 
statement to be included in this theme, it had to 
specifically mention compromise and adoption of different 
ways of doing things (even if they are wrong). However, in 
this case the theme was not related to togetherness and 
c1ojeness as it was before. (E. g. "... we have to 
conform... people will have to conform... ", Case No. 4059, 
"... a country loses almost its unique... I would rather let 
Britain stay as Britain than taking other countries' 
policies... ways of doing things. ", Case No. 4463). 
As far as Britain as an individual country is concerned, 
interviewees' ideas were dominated by Nationalist beliefs 
which they expressed on every possible occasion. For 
example, twenty-six interviewees (53.1%) suggested that 
Britain is the most influential country of the EC. The 
explanations given for such opinions is that Britain is 
Bigger (in five interviews, e. g. "... one of the biggest 
countries", Case No-4576) and More Powerful than other 
countries (in eight interviews, e. g. "... it seems to have a 
lot of power... ", Case No. 5111). Furthermore Britain is seen 
as able to Make and impose decisions (in five interviews, 
e. g. "... seems to make the decisions more than anybody 
else. ", Case No. 4347), even if this is achieved by actually 
Disagreeing with other countries (in six interviews, 
e. g. "Somebody who disagrees strongly is bound to have a word 
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decisive over the rest. ", Case No. 5752). Britain was also 
considered as Equal to the big super-powers (USA and USSR) 
(in five interviews, e. g. " You think of US, USSR and you 
think of U. K..... seem more important... more influential", 
Case No. 4262). 
Several interviewees made judgements and expressed opinions 
basing them on Personal experiences and Feelings in relation 
to the EC (this occurred in ten interviews). For a statement 
to be included in this theme , it had to involve this personal 
relation to the EC in a number of different aspects of life; 
i. e. travelling abroad, jobs, learning more about other 
countries, becoming more aware and more involved and so on. 
(E. g. "... it brought in different things for me to eat, 
clothes for me to wear, technology, TV for me to watch. ", 
Case No. 4376, "... brings to life what's happening to other 
countries more... if there wasn't any relations we wouldn't 
know what was going on. Makes you less selfish person in 
yourselt... you can realise what other people are going 
through and you can start doing things about it... can't turn 
a blind eye to it. ", Case No. 5123). 
As mentioned already, the answers to the politics questions 
were focused on national issues, although the questions 
themselves involved the European elections. Thus, no themes 
related to the EC emerged from these questions. Yet, this 
finding in itself is of interest and is going to be discussed 
later. 
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3.1.2.4. Discussion of Results from Interviews 
------------------------------------- 
From the first step of this study, (i. e. to investigate 
whether a representation of the EC exists within the specific 
sample, and if it does, to describe it) there are some 
conclusions to be drawn. The first conclusion from the 
analysis of the components of the representation is that the 
components that were considered to constitute the nucleus of 
the representation and, thus, the criterion for its existence 
within the specific population., were present. The majority 
of the people interviewed expressed opinions or beliefs about 
, __ 
the EC and some explanation for them. This finding satisfied 
the criterion set for deciding whether a representation of 
the EC existed within the interview sample. 
Furthermore, more than half of the interviewees had their 
own, personalised 'theory' about the EC and half of them 
could relate it to something factual. This indicates that 
at least some of the components considered to constitute the 
periphery of the representation were present within this 
sample and that there were fairly widespread. It also 
indicates that there is no need for knowledge in order for 
people to express opinions and explanations. People can base 
these on things they heard (or seen, or read) without really 
knowing many things about the EC. This is suggested by 
Hewstone (1986) who, when discussing representations of the 
EC, claimed that although people did not know many things 
about the EC, they based their opinions on rumours. 
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However, there were a number of components expected to exist 
in the periphery of the representation that were not shared 
by the majority of the interviewees. These components 
(feelings, relating the EC with past, present and future, as 
well as the self) are in fact the ones that could allow the 
suggestion that this representation is a complex and well- 
developed one. The absence of these components from most 
interviews is an indication that the representation of the EC 
is_not well-developed within the specific population. This 
idea is further supported by the general lack of 
differentiation between countries, degrees of benefits and 
bad effects from the EC and so on. 
It could be argued that the representation of the EC, within 
this sample and in terms of components does exist in people's 
opinions and explanations,; but it is a rather simple and not 
well-developed one. The fact that people could not express 
any feelings about it or relate it to themselves indicates 
that they see it as something 'foreign' to themselves. 
As far as the content of this representation is concerned, 
the most wide-spread ideas about the EC were those of economy 
and togetherness. What is quite important here is that 
people were able to discuss and express opinions, 
explanations and 'theories' about these two characteristics 
in a rather differentiated sense. They were able to see both 
positive and negative aspects in both economy and 
togetherness. It is of interest that the positive aspects 
were seen as benefiting the EC countries as a whole, whereas 
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the negative ones were specifically affecting Britain. This 
differentiation between Britain and the rest of the EC 
countries was another wide-spread belief, most evident in 
people's images about their country as expressed in the 
interviews. People seemed to see the EC as something 
'foreign' both to their country and to themselves personally. 
The rest of the EC countries were usually referred to as an 
undifferentiated group. The only exceptions were'France and 
Germany; the two countries that people often referred to 
specifically, most probably because they seemed to have some 
information about them. 
Nationalist beliefs were evident and wide-spread. People 
were really proud'of their country, considered it better 
than any'other in a large number of traits and described it 
(in relation to the EC) both as a 'scapegoat' and as a 
'leader'. 
As mentioned before, although the politics questions asked 
specifically about European politics, the answers given 
focused on national politics. For instance, when 
interviewees mentioned a political party they referred to it 
in terms of what the party could do (or has. done) for Britain 
and not for what it could do in the EC. This could be 
considered one more indication that it was easier for 
interviewees to talk about national. issues than about 
European ones. 
In general the results from the interviews indicate that 
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there is a representation of the EC (in terms of nucleus 
characteristics) and that this is shared by the sample 
interviewed. As a whole the EC is seen as both good and bad, 
but (in relation to Britain) it is rather strange and 
'foreign'. This representation is much influenced by the 
nationalist beliefs, which were, again, shared by the 
interviewees. 
As expected, this representation has some similarities to the 
one presented by the press. Ideas about the EC-being related 
to the economy and bringing togetherness between countries 
were present both in, -the- press and -the --interviews. 
Furthermore, in both, the distinction between positive and 
negative aspects of the EC was evident. Similarly, ideas of 
national identity, sovereignty and independence being in 
danger from too close links with the EC, were found to exist 
in both the press and the interviews. These similarities 
were expected, since the press may be one of the sources of 
information (besides other kinds of media, friends, family 
and so on) from which people acquire ideas, knowledge and 
opinions. 
Yet, the representation of the EC as presented by the press 
and that of the interview sample are not identical. It could 
be suggested that the one presented by the press was more 
complex and sophisticated than the one of the population 
interviewed. As mentioned already representations presented 
by the press should not be expected to be accurate 
reflections of the ones held by the general public. The 
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people who re-create the representations in the press have 
their own beliefs and intentions,. which may influence the way 
people's ideas and opinions are going to be re-presented. 
The press and the general public should be seen as two 
different 'groups' whose representations may overlap at some 
" point. 
3.2. The Checklists 
-------------- 
3.2.1. Analysis 
Both checklists were analysed using Correspondence Analysis. 
- -This method is based -on-principle-component--analysis. --. It 
allowed the countries to be plotted in their component space 
and for the reasons and characteristics to be similarly 
presented in spaces, (Greenacre, 1984). Therefore, the 
different countries were plotted in space according to the 
reasons that made them join the EC and then, separately, 
according to their characteristics. Countries that lay 
closer together in space were seen, by the interviewees, as 
similar to each other, whereas those distanced from each 
other were seen as different. The same principle was applied 
in the case of reasons and characteristics. Reasons (or 
characteristics) that lay close together in space were 
considered to share a similar attribute, whereas those 
further away from each other were considered different. 
Furthermore, countries that were close to reasons or 
characteristics were considered to "tend towards the objects" 
(Fife-Schaw, forthcoming). This means that the plots where 
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both countries and characteristics or reasons were included 
could not be interpreted in the same way as the plots 
including only countries, characteristics or reasons. The 
fact that some countries were close to characteristics or 
reasons could not be interpreted as evidence that these 
" characteristics or reasons were attributed to these 
countries. It was only an indication that the attributes 
tended towards the objects. 
For this analysis, the means of perceived importance that 
different reasons had for different countries in order to 
- ----make -them - join the EC - and means - of -perceived degree . to -which _. -- 
different characteristics applied to different countries were 
used. The aim of this analysis was to enable the discussion 
of differentiation and perceived similarities between 
countries both in terms of the reasons and in terms of 
characteristics. 
3.2.2. Results 
3.2.2.1. Images of Countries: Reasons for joining EC 
------------------------------------------- 
From the Correspondence Analysis three plots were created, 
showing the positions of countries (Plot la), reasons (Plot 
ib) and countries and reasons together (Plot lc), in two 
dimensions. These two-dimensional plots explain 94% of the 
total variance. 
Plot la presents the positions of the seven countries that 
were included in this checklist. These countries were U. K., 
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Plot la: Correspondence Analysis for Countries 
------- (in terms of Reasons) 
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Plot lc: Correspondence Analysis for Reasons and Countries 
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Germany, France, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Turkey. This 
plot can be divided, with two diagonal lines (from left to 
right and from top to bottom), into three regions. The first 
region (Region I, right hand side) is occupied by the U. K. 
and Germany, which are very close to each other and, in fact, 
closer than any other countries. The second region (Region 
II, centre) is occupied by Greece, Italy and France, which, 
although distanced from each other, lie on an almost straight 
line. The third region (Region III, left hand side) is 
occupied by Portugal and Turkey, which are rather close to 
each other. This split between countries actually divides 
them into three groups. It could be said that in the first 
group (Region I) are the countries that are considered to be 
the Biggest Powers in the EC. In the second group (Region 
II) are the Mediterranean countries. In the third group 
(Region III) are the New and non members. 
Plot lb presents the distribution in space of the reasons 
countries had for (or have for, in the case of Turkey) 
joining the EC. " This-plot could be divided into two regions 
with a vertical line in the middle of it. In the first 
region (Region I, right hand side) are what could be 
described as the Caring and Internationalist Reasons, such as 
'To protect the interests of Western Europe' and 'To achieve 
lasting peace'. In the second region (Region II, left hand 
side) are the reasons that could be described as Selfish and 
Nationalist , such as 'To take advantage of other countries' 
technological achievements' and 'To develop their economy in 
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the expense of richer countries'. The only reason that is 
11 
rather distanced from all others is 'To strengthen national 
defence'. But again, it is in the appropriate region (Region 
II) . 
As far as Plot ic, presenting the distribution in space of 
both countries and reasons, is concerned, closeness and 
distance between them cannot be interpreted as before. In 
this case closeness (or distance) does not imply similarity 
(or difference) as it did before. The only legitimate 
statement is that a country is 'pulled by' a reason or that 
it 'tends towards' a reason. - Therefore, countries like the 
U. K. and Germany tend towards the Caring and 
Internationalist reasons and especially the ones denoting 
power (such as 'To create a third-block between the USA and 
USSR'). As far as France and Italy are concerned, they are 
somewhere in the middle, but. they tend more towards the 
Caring and Internationalist reasons, and especially the more 
Humanitarian ones (such as 'To achieve lasting peace). 
other three countries are much more scattered in space. 
they are definitely in Region II, where the Selfish and 
Nationalist reasons lie. 
Before going, on it has, to be mentioned that two of the 
reasons for joining the EC; i. e. 'To dominate other 
The 
Yet, 
countries' and 'To exploit other countries', were treated in 
a very interesting way by interviewees. 'Dominating' was 
attributed to the more powerful countries and was clustered 
with the caring and nationalist reasons, whereas 'Exploiting' 
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was attributed to the non-powerful countries and was 
clustered with the selfish and nationalist reasons. 
3.2.2.2. Images of Countries: Characteristics 
There were three plots, created by the Correspondence 
Analysis, presenting the characteristics (Plot 2a), the 
countries (Plot 2b) and the countries and characteristics 
together (Plot 2c) as they are distributed in two dimensions. 
The two-dimensional plots account for 74% of the total 
variance. 
It has to be pointed out that these plots are more complex 
than the previously presented ones. This could be attributed 
to the fact that in this checklist there were fourteen 
countries included (the twelve members of the EC plus USA and 
Turkey) and twelve characteristics. Also, the absence of 
Luxemburg and Belgium in these plots is a result of the 
similarity of these two countries with Denmark and the 
Netherlands, respectively. Finally, it should also be 
mentioned that these plots do not differentiate countries and 
characteristics as clearly as the previous ones. 
Plot 2a presents the distribution of characteristics in 
space. First, there are three characteristics distanced from 
any other; namely Terrorism (right hand side, top corner), 
Literacy (left hand side, middle) and Fashion (right hand 
side, bottom corner). The rest of the characteristics can be 
divided into two groups with a horizontal line. The first 
group (Region I) consists of Unemployment, Pollution, 
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Plot 2a: Correspondence Analysis for Characteristics 
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Plot 2b: Correspondence Analysis for Countries 
------- (in terms of characteristics) 
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Plot 2c: Correspondence Analysis for Characteristics and 
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Industrial Conflict and Sense of Humour. Although, in the 
first place it is difficult to see any connection between the 
three rather negative characteristics and sense of humour, 
this finding can be explained by looking at the way these 
characteristics were treated. These characteristics were 
invariably treated as attributes of technologically and 
industrially advanced countries. People seemed to believe 
that when a country is advanced (technologically and 
financially) then it is bound to suffer from pollution, 
industrial conflict'and unemployment. Thus, although the 
characteristics themselves might seem negative, they are in 
fact seen as Results of progress. "Accordingly, it is not so 
peculiar that sense of humour joins these characteristics. 
The second group (Region II)` consists, again, of four 
characteristics, which are all Positive; Interested in 
defending Europe, Prosperity, Good Food, and Healthy. This 
distinction between characteristics leaves one more 
characteristic out of a group; namely Good performance in 
Sports. 
Plot 2b presents the distribution of countries in space. The 
first thing to be noticed in this plot is that Ireland (top) 
and France (bottom) are the two countries rather distanced 
from any other. This is a finding to be discussed later. 
So, leaving out these two countries for the time being, the 
plot can be divided in two with a diagonal line from right to 
left and from top to bottom. This creates two large regions. 
In the first (Region I) lie Greece and Turkey. These two 
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countries could be described as Less in Europe, both in 
geographical terms and, possibly, in terms of similarities 
with the rest of the European countries. The rest of the 
plot can be divided into three regions with two diagonal 
linefi, starting from the line dividing the plot into two and 
moving towards the right and bottom. The first of these 
regions (Region II, bottom left) consists of Denmark and the 
Netherlands (incorporating Belgium and Luxemburg), a group of 
countries that could be described as Close to Britain but not 
very well known. The second (Region III, centre) includes 
Portugal and Italy; countries which could be described as 
Fairly well known. The third region (Region IV, top) 
consists of USA, U. K., Germany and Spain. This group of 
countries could be described as Familiar. 
It seems that, as far as this plot is concerned, the 
distribution of countries is a result of two factors; first, 
geographical closeness to Britain and second, familiarity, 
either in terms of having been to a country or in terms of 
amount of information for a country. 
The most interesting finding that plot 2c presents is the 
explanation of the position of Ireland and France in space. 
Ireland seems to be pulled by Terrorism and France by 
Fashion. In the case of Ireland, Terrorism was the 
characteristic attributed to this country more than any 
other. For France, Fashion was the second (after Good Food). 
Furthermore, Ireland and France scored higher than any other 
countries on Terrorism and Fashion, respectively. 
241 
This plot (2c) also shows that the countries described above 
as familiar seem to tend towards the characteristics 
considered as results of progress, whereas countries not very 
familiar (such as Denmark and the Netherlands) seem to tend 
towards the positive characteristics. 
3.2.2.3. Images of Britain: Reasons and Characteristics 
---------------------------------------------- 
Britain as a country was presented, both in terms of reasons 
and characteristics, as 'the best'. As far as reasons for 
joining the EC are concerned, Britain was attributed, to a 
great extent and by the majority of people, all the reasons 
that have been described as denoting power and 
humanitarianism. The three reasons that were most attributed 
to this country are 'Economic expansion in Europe', 'Lasting 
peace' and 'Better mutual understanding'. Britain scored 
equally high on these three reasons and higher than any other 
country. These reasons were followed by 'Provide a third- 
block between USA and USSR' and then by 'Protect the 
interests of Western Europe' and 'Increase the standards of 
living throughout the EC'. Thus the first six reasons, on 
which Britain scored high, were the 'positive' ones. The 
only non-positive reasons, on which Britain scored in the 
middle of the scale were 'To take advantage of other 
countries' technological achievements' and 'To strengthen 
national defence'. From then on, however, Britain's scores 
on the last three characteristics were very low. The lowest 
score for this country was on 'To exploit others' and, 
actually, Britain (together with Italy) scored lower than the 
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rest of the countries on this reason . However, although 
Britain scored very low on 'To dominate others', she 
(together with Germany) was the country scoring higher on 
this reason than any other country. 
In terms of characteristics, the general finding was that 
Britain scored very high on all of them (on all, scores were 
over 100, with a range from 0 to 140). More specifically, 
Britain scored highest (and higher than any other country) on 
Interest in defending'Western Europe. The lowest score was 
on Terrorism, but even there Britain scored higher than most 
of the rest of the countries. Therefore, Britain scored high 
on both positive (such as Prosperity and Literacy) as well as 
negative (such as Pollution and Industrial Conflict) 
characteristics. Yet, as mentioned before, the negative ones 
were generally seen as a result of progress. The only 
country with which Britain can be compared, in terms of these 
scores, is the USA. Only the USA scored, in general, very 
high, although in most of the cases not as high as Britain. 
3.2.2: 4. Discussion of Results from Checklists 
------------------------------------- 
The checklists were used toýprovide a description of the 
images of different countries, as seen by the interviewees. 
The first finding of the analysis of both checklists, but 
mainly based on the reasons, is that there is a broad 
distinction between countries. In one category there are the 
smaller, non powerful ones which are not attributed any 
special characteristics and which are seen to use their 
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membership in the EC to benefit themselves without offering 
anything to the Community. In the other category are the 
ones considered powerful which are attributed a number of 
positive characteristics, and which are seen as advanced and 
prosperous ones and as willing and able to contribute towards 
the in, general well-being of the Community. 
Another consistent finding was that people were able to 
attribute traits to countries they were familiar with in more 
than one way. So, it was easier for them to attribute 
characteristics to Britain, since it is their own country, to 
Germany, France, Ireland and the USA, since it seems that 
they get a. large amount of information about these countries 
(from the press, TV, films and so on), to Spain since it is a 
country frequently visited by people from Britain. Countries 
such as Italy and Portugal were somewhere in the middle; 
people could, attribute to them some traits but not to the 
same extent as to the countries mentioned before. Denmark, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg were seen as very 
similar to each other, to a point that it was impossible to 
differentiate between the profile of each of these four 
countries. In general, people tended to see these countries 
as wealthy and 'clean', where people are healthy. Although, 
Greece and Turkey are frequently visited by British people, 
they were generally seen as not-Europe (which is justifiable 
for the case of Turkey). However, neither of these two 
countries was attributed any specific traits that would 
differentiate them, which left them as 'outliers'. 
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Nationalist beliefs were, again, very evident in the 
description of Britain. In itself, the country, was 
presented as better than any other in every sense. 
Furthermore, it was put in the same group with the ones 
considered the most powerful, such as Germany and the USA. 
The 'special' relation between Britain and France was also 
evident; the two countries, although attributed similar 
traits, were consistently distanced (because of differences 
on specific traits), showing that respondents considered them 
different. 
A few words need to be said for Ireland. Although this 
country was attributed traits that actually should put it 
with the ones people consider familiar, it was distanced from 
the rest because of the issue of Terrorism. It is quite 
interesting that terrorism, which is much more evident in the 
Northern Ireland (which is a part of the U. K. ) was 
generalised as a problem for the whole of the island and thus 
was attributed to the Republic of Ireland. In general, it was 
obvious that people were making judgements about countries 
either according to what they, themselves, knew or according 
to what is a general and, even, stereotypical image of them. 
Building upon what is already known about the sample's 
representation of the EC and different countries, these 
findings offer some further understanding. These findings 
explain and support the idea of Britain, being Us, which is 
different from the rest of the countries, Them. The 
representation of the EC comprises the idea of twelve 
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countries working together and exchanging goods, but when 
these countries are seen individually, Britain is not a part 
of the group. The only European country with which Britain 
could be compared is Germany, otherwise Britain is only 
compared with the USA; a finding supporting the affinity 
between Britain and the States and the belief that the USA is 
the best ally and partner for Britain. 
As suggested earlier, what is missing, in a way, from this 
representation is 'oneself', both as a nation and as an 
individual. And this is what actually makes the 
representation even more simplistic and, in a sense, 
superficial. Again, it is evident that strong nationalist 
beliefs influence this representation. 
3.3. The Questionnaire 
----------------- 
3.3.1. Analysis 
Data gathered by the questionnaire were analysed by 
multivariate techniques. This allowed the description of the 
sample, the creation of indices and the investigation of 
relations between indices. It also allowed the testing of 
the theoretical hypothesis through modelling. ' 
3.3.2. Results 
3.3.2.1. Some information about the Sample (Frequencies) 
----------------------------------------------- 
The first point to be mentioned here is that, in the analysis 
of the questionnaire results, both the people who were sent 
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the questionnaire and those who answered it after the 
interview were included. This was considered acceptable 
since the data from the questionnaires of the interview 
sample, when analysed separately, gave the same results in 
terms of factors and scales. So, the total number of 
questionnaires included in this analysis was 224 (109 
answered by males, 115 by females, mean age: 18.17). 
As far as travelling abroad is concerned, the majority of 
respondents (171; 76.3%) said that they-had been abroad in 
the last five years. Most of the people who had been abroad 
said that they had visited France, followed by Spain and then 
the Netherlands, Germany and Greece (together). 
Again, the majority of people (136; 60.7%) said that they 
had some knowledge of a language other than English, whereas 
86 (38.4%) respondents said they had no knowledge of another 
European language. The most frequently mentioned language 
was French (110 people), followed by German (47) and then by 
Italian (18). Most people said that they had some knowledge 
of only, one foreign language (84; 62.2%), forty-two (31.1%) 
said that they knew two, seven (3.1%) said three and two 
(0.9%) said four. However, most people said that their 
ability in reading, writing and speaking these languages was 
basic. 
Most respondents (175; 78.1%) said that they would consider 
living abroad, whereas only forty-nine (21.9%) said that they 
would not. Yet, the first two countries mentioned in respect 
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to this question were not European. Most of the people who 
would consider living abroad mentioned the USA and Australia 
as the countries they would like to live in. These countries 
were followed by France, Germany and Spain. 
In terms of knowing people living in a European country other 
than Britain, respondents were divided almost in half; 104 
(46.4%) said they did, whereas 109 (48.7%) said they did not. 
Most respondents who did, described these people as friends. 
As far as being interested in European happenings and events 
and keeping in touch with them, the majority of people were 
in the middle, saying that they have some interest and that 
they make some effort to stay informed. Similarly, most 
people said that they occasionally read articles about the 
EC, or watch programmes on TV about it or they discuss it 
with others. However, the proportion of people who said that 
they never or hardly ever discuss the EC with others was much 
larger than when they were asked about reading or watching 
programmes about it. (See Tables 3 and 4, Appendix C. 1. ). 
3.3.2.2. Creation of indices: Factor Analysis - 
-------------------------------------- 
Reliability Testing 
------------------- 
Section A: YOUR CONTACT WITH OTHER COUNTRIES 
In order to develop an index of involvement with European 
issues and events, reliability testing was conducted for 
questions 6,7,8, and 9, involving respondents' keeping in 
touch with European happenings by reading, watching TV 
programmes and discussing about them. These four items were 
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found to scale together reliably (Cronbach's Alpha=. 8311, 
Mean=11.67, Standard deviation=3.23, Standardised item 
alpha=. 8319, N=220). This derived variable is an index of 
respondents' actual contact (involvement) with European 
issues and events. The higher scores indicate more contact. 
Section B: YOUR VIEWS ABOUT BRITAIN 
(*) 
Oblimin factor analysis was conducted for all fifteen items 
in Section B. It was expected (according to the theoretical 
basis upon which the items were created) that there would be 
three factors; one involving Britain as a country, one 
Britain in relation to the EC and one British traditions. 
Indeed, the oblimin rotation extracted three factors 
(explaining 49.2% of the total variance) in 18 iterations. 
(For items and their loading weights in each factor and for 
correlations between factors see Tables 5a, 5b, 5c and 5d, 
Appendix C. 1. ). 
There were eight items loading on the first factor (Table 
5a), all related to the idea that Britain is a country 
superior to others (E. g. 'No other country is as good as 
Britain'). Reliability testing showed that these eight 
items scale together reliably (Alpha=. 7662, Mean=21.14, 
Standard deviation=4.78, Standardised item alpha=. 7663, 
N=220). This derived variable is indexing respondents' 
nationalist beliefs. The higher scores indicate stronger 
nationalist beliefs. 
There were three items clustered in the second factor (Table 
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(*) All factor analysis reported for this study was exploratory oblimin factor analysis. 
5b), all involving Britain's commitment to the EC (E. g. 
'Britain should actively participate in the developments in 
Europe'). The items in this factor were found to construct 
a reliable scale (Alpha=. 7712, Mean=7.50, Standard 
deviation=2.15, Standardised item alpha=. 7719, N=221). The 
derived variable that was created is an index of respondents' 
beliefs about Britain's commitment to the EC. The higher 
scores indicate stronger beliefs in Britain's commitment. 
There were three items clustered in the third factor (Table 
5c), all related to the preservation of national identity, 
sovereignty and traditions (E. g. 'Britain's national identity 
has to be preserved'). Reliability scaling showed that 
these items scale together reliably (Alpha=. 6553, Mean=10.72, 
Standard deviation=2.27, Standardised item alpha=. 6590, 
N=222). The derived variable created from this scale is an 
index of respondents' beliefs in preservation of the British 
traditional way of life. The higher scores indicate stronger 
beliefs in preservation. 
It has to be mentioned that the structure of the three 
factors was not a simple one. There were three items that 
were loading in two different factors. In these cases, the 
loading weight and the content of the items was used to 
determine to which factor they belonged. (See Tables 5a and 
5b, Appendix C. 1. ). 
Section C: YOUR VIEWS ABOUT THE EEC 
Oblimin factor analysis conducted on all six items of this 
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section extracted one single factor. This was expected 
because of the nature of the items; all were closely related 
to the EC. The factor was extracted by one oblimin rotation 
and it accounts for 40.3% of the total variance. (For items' 
loading weights see Table 6, Appendix C. 1. ). These items 
were found to construct a reliable scale (Alpha=. 7006, 
Mean=18.25, Standard deviation=2.88, Standardised item 
alpha=. 6990, N=222). The derived variable created from this 
scale is indexing respondents' general views about the EC. 
The higher scores indicate more positive views. 
Section D: YOUR VIEWS ABOUT THE UNIFICATION OF EUROPE 
Oblimin factor analysis was conducted for all twenty-one 
items in the first sub-section of section B. It was expected 
that this analysis would extract at least two factors; one 
general, involving effects of unification on Britain and one 
personal, involving effects of unification on individuals. 
This analysis extracted four factors with no simple structure 
and with strong correlations between them. Furthermore, 
there was not a conceptual coherence within the factors. 
This led the conclusion that there may be a single underlying 
factor. Reliability scaling for all twenty one items showed 
that they form a reliable scale (Alpha=. 9188, Mean=66.19, 
Standard deviation=12.02, Standardised item alpha=. 9186, 
N=214). The derived variable created is an index of general 
positive (or negative) views about the unification of Europe.. 
The higher scores indicate more positive views. 
The items in the second sub-section of section D were used to 
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create two new variables. The first is an index of the 
amount of change perceived by the respondents as a possible 
result of the unification of Europe (Mean=12.32, Standard 
deviation=5.36, N=224). This was created by adding up all 
the aspects of life that respondents considered that would be 
affected by unification. The second is an index of the 
positivity of change perceived by the respondents as a 
possible result of the unification (Mean=2.32, Standard 
deviation=. 47, t=187). This was created by adding up all the 
aspects of life that respondents considered that would be 
positively affected by unification, divided by the sum of all 
aspects affected. The higher scores indicate more change and 
more positivity of change. 
The tact that there was already a vast amount of information 
for the sample participating in the present study, gave the 
opportunity to use in further analysis two variables from 
previous data. These variables were: i) Social Class; 
measured by the revised Cambridge Social Status scale 
(Prandy, Steward, Blackburn, 1982). The occupation of the 
respondent's step-father or father was taken as an indicator 
of the respondent's social class. In the case of missing 
data for the father, the mother's occupation was used. 
Scores on this scale range continuously from 0 to 100, with 
higher scores indicating greater social advantage. 
(Mean=44.55, Standard deviation=19.52, N=204). ii) Racism; 
this was a reliable scale created by four items (see Table 7, 
Appendix C. 1. ) involving opinions and attitudes towards 
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people from other races (Alpha=. 8285, Mean=6.71, Standard 
deviation=2.46, Standardised item alpha=. 8324, N=195). The 
higher scores indicate stronger racist views. 
Finally, the Gender of respondents was also used in the 
subsequent analysis. 
Table 1 presents all variables created by the analyses 
mentioned above, as well as the ones included in further 
analysis and coming from previous information about the 
sample. 
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Table 1: Variables created by factor analysis and reliability 
------- testing and v ariables from previou s information about 
the sample. 
---------------------- 
Variable ; No. 
----------------- ; --- 
------------- 
Items Alpha 
------- _----- 
-------- 
Mean 
- ; ------ 
------------- ----- 
Std. Dev.; N 
- ; --------- 
s 
1 Nationalism 8 . 76 21.14 : 4.78 220 
--------------------- ------- - - ------- 
1 to 
- 
11 
----- -------- - - ------- 
11 
Europe 3; . 77 { 7.50 2.15 221 
11 i i i i1i 
--------------------- -------- ----- -------- ------------------ 
11 Preservation 11 11 11 11 1 
of traditions 3 . 65 1 10.72 2.27 222 1 
------- ------------------ 
Views about EC 6; . 70 18.25 1 2.88 222 'ý i It 11 11 11 
---------------------- ------- ------ ------- ------------------ 1 about ; ; 11 _ 
unification 21 = . 92 1 66.19 12.02 1 
214 1 
---- ------------------ 
Change -- ; -- 12.32 5.36 ; 224 
---------------------- -------- ----- ------- ------------------ 1 1 
of change -- _ -- ; 2.32 1 . 47 187 I 
1 II1 
---------------------- 
I 
-------- 
I 
----- -------- 
s 
-----------------_ 
s 
Social class -- -- . 44.55 19.52 I 204 ; 
---------------------- -------- ----- -------- ----------------- 
Racism 4 . 83 I 
6.71 
I 
1 2.46 1 195 1 
I 
----------------------- 
i 
-------- ----- 
i 
-------- 
11i 
----------------- 
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3.3.2.3. Relations between indices: Correlations 
--------------------------------------- 
All variables were correlated with each other in order to 
enable the understanding of relations (or lack of relations) 
existing between them, as well as the direction and the 
significance of these relations. This was also necessary in 
order to establish the validity of proceeding in further 
analysis to test the original hypothesis. Table 2 shows the 
Zero order correlations. 
The first finding, suggested by the correlations, is that the 
variables that correlate significantly with each other do so 
in the expected direction. Social class was positively 
correlated with beliefs in' preservation of British 
traditions, contact with European issues, amount and 
positivity of change perceived as a result of the 
unification. These relations showed that the higher the 
social class, the stronger the beliefs and the greater the 
contact, the amount and the positivity of change. 
Gender was correlated with racism and positivity of change; 
indicating less racist attitudes and less positivity 
perceived by females. 
Racism was positively correlated with nationalism and beliefs 
in the preservation of British traditions and negatively with 
commitment to Europe; suggesting that the stronger the racist 
attitudes, the stronger the nationalist beliefs and the 
beliefs in tradition, whereas the weaker the commitment to 
Europe. 
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Table 2: Zero order correlations between variables 
Class Gender Racism Nationid Britind Fuirocom DC Uniall Contact Change 
Gender n. s. 
-. 2545 
Racism n. s. ( 152) 
P=. 001 
'. 2523 
Nationid n. s. n. s. ( 149) 
P=. 001 
. 1596 . 1793 . 4157 
Briti. nd ( 157) n. s. ( 150) ( 171) 
P=. 023 P=. 014 P=. 000 
-. 1521 -. 4084 -. 3543 
Eirocam n. s. n. s. ( 150) ( 171) ( 173) 
? =. 032 P=. 000 x. 000 
-. 3224 -. 2663 . 4499 DC n. s. ' n. s. n. s. ( 169) ( 171) ( 171) 
P=. 000 P=. 000 P=. 000 
-. 4424 -. 4151 . 7542 . 5945 Uniall n. s. n. s. n. s. ( 164) ( 165) ( 165) ( 165) 
P=. 000 P=. 000 P=. 000 P=. 000 
. 1395 -. 2264 . 3488 . 3385 Contact ( 155) n. s. n. s. ( 168) n. s. ( 170) n. s. ( 152) 
P=. 042 P=. 002 P=. 000 P=. 000 
. 1642 -. 1857 . 1611 . 2472 Change ( 159) n. s. n. s. ( 171) ( 173) n. s. n. s n. s. ( 171) 
P=. 019 P=. 008 P=. 017 P=. 001 
. 1449 -. 1476 -. 3845 . 3342 . 2783 . 4493 . 
3806 . 4508 
Poschan ( 144) ( 159) n. s. ( 155) n. s. ( 157) ( 157) ( 152) ( 155) ( 159) 
P=. 042 P=. 032 P=. 000 P=. 000 P=. 000 P=. 000 P=. 000 P=. 000 
n. s. : correlation statistically non significant (P). 05) 
Variable labels 
Mationid: Nationalism, Britind: Preservation of British traditional way of life, 
Dr=on: C andtment to Europe and European unification, EC: Views about the EC, 
Uniall: Views about the unification of Europe, Contact: Keeping in tauch with Eiropean 
issues and events, Change: Amount of change perceived fron unification, 
Posaun : Positivity of change 
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Nationalism was positively correlated with beliefs in 
traditions and amount of change perceived and negatively with 
views about EC and the unification of Europe, contact with 
European issues, and positivity of change. These 
correlations showed that the stronger the nationalist 
beliefs, the stronger the beliefs in traditions and the more 
the changes perceived as a result of the unification, and, on 
the other hand, the weaker the commitment to Europe, the less 
if I 
positive the views about EC and unification, the less the 
contact with European issues and the less the positivity of 
change perceived. 
Preservation of British traditions was positively correlated 
with amount of change perceived as a result of the 
unification, 'showing that the stronger the belief in 
preservation', the more the change perceived. It was 
negatively correlated with commitment to Europe, views about 
the . EC and unification of Europe, indicating that the 
stronger the beliefs in traditions, the weaker the 
commitment, and the less positive the views. 
Commitment to Europe was positively correlated with views 
about the EC and unification, contact with European issues 
and positivity of change perceived as a result of the 
unification. This showed that the stronger the commitment to 
Europe, the more positive the views, the more the contact and 
'the higher the positivity of change. 
Views about the EC were positively correlated with views 
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about unification and positivity of change. These relations 
suggested that the more positive the views about EC, the more 
positive the views about unification and the higher the 
perceived positivity of change. 
Views about unification were positively correlated with 
contact with European issues and positivity of change. This 
indicated that the more positive the views, the more the 
contact and the higher the positivity of change. 
Contact with European issues and events was positively 
correlated with amount and positivity of change. These 
relations showed that the- möre the contact', "the more-, (in 
terms of amount) and the more positive the changes perceived 
as a result of the unification. 
However, several expected correlations were not evident. 
Social class was not found to significantly correlate with 
racism or nationalism. Gender was not correlated with 
nationalism. Racism was not correlated with contact with 
European issues, or views about EC, or positivity of change, 
or views about the unification of Europe. Finally, Contact 
with European issues was not found to correlate with Views 
about EC. 
Although the correlations showed that many variables were 
correlated with each other, it was decided to use only some 
of them for further analysis, in consistency with the 
theoretical and operational hypotheses. 
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Furthermore, since the next step in the analysis of results 
was to use path analysis (regression), some variables had to 
be excluded so as to avoid multicollinearity. The ones that 
were not to be used were : a. Preservation of British 
traditions, because of its very high correlation with 
nationalism it was considered to measure very similar 
beliefs, b. Commitment to Europe, because of its very high 
correlation with views about unification and c. Amount of 
change perceived as a result of the unification, because of 
its high correlation to positivity of change. 
However gender, social class and racism were to be used, 
although they were not found to correlate with many of the 
rest of the variables. This was done because the aim was to 
discuss these variables in relation to the subsequent 
analysis and especially to elaborate on this lack of any 
relation. 
3.3.2.4. Modelling: Multiple Regression (*) 
------------------------------ 
The next step was to proceed to building a regression-based 
path-like model. This model was determined by the 
theoretical hypotheses. Table 3 presents this hypothetical 
model. What was done, in fact, was a series of ('Enter- 
type') regression analyses to enable the detection of 
specific relations between variables. At the first stage 
Racism and Nationalism were separately regressed onto Social 
Class and Gender. At the second stage Contact was regressed 
onto Social Class, Gender, Racism and Nationalism. At the 
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(*) See note on page 262 
Table 3: Hypothetical model to be tested by multiple 
------- regression 
------------------------- , ------------ --------------------------- 
, 
, - 
, 
, 
RACISM. 
, 
GEN ER 
VIEWS ' ABOUT 
EC 
, 
\ 
A 
CLASS 
1ý` 
NATIONALISM POSITIVI`I' 
OF C ANGE 
VIEWS ABOUT 
UNIFICATION 
ONTACT 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Hypothesised relationship 
---------------- : Relationship possible 
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third stage Views about EC and Positivity of Change were, 
again separately, regressed onto Social Class, Gender, 
Racism, Nationalism and Contact. Finally, at the fourth 
stage, Views about the Unification was regressed onto all 
previous variables. The order with which the different 
" dependent variables were regressed onto the independent ones 
was determined by the theoretical hypothesis and its 
operationalisation. It was expected that Views about 
Unification, being, something new, would be explained (to a 
certain degree at least) by all preceding variables, which 
were considered to be pre-existent. The outcome of these 
series of multiple regressions is shown in Table 4 (only 
statistically significant betas are presented in the table). 
59% of the variance of the respondents' views about the 
unification of Europe is accounted for by the predictor 
variables. 
This model shows successfully that there are three variables 
directly related to the general views about the unification 
of Europe. These variables are: views about the EC (beta 
=. 60), contact with European issues and events (beta =. 22), 
and positivity of change (beta =. 18). However, contact with 
European issues and events was also indirectly related to 
general views towards European unification, through its 
relation with positivity of change (beta =. 27). 
Furthermore, nationalism had an indirect relationship with 
general views towards unification by being related to views 
towards EC (beta =-. 34), positivity of change (beta =-. 34) 
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and contact with European issues and events (beta =-. 24). 
Gender was found to be related only to racism (beta =-. 29). 
However neither racism nor social class were found to be 
related with any of the rest of the variables. 
It has to be pointed out here that, in these regressions only 
the postal questionnaire data were included, reducing the 
number of respondents for these analyses to 120. This was 
done because when the interview data were separately used in 
the same analyses the outcome was different, most probably 
because of the very small number of interviewees (N=32). The 
numbers are actually so reduced because in this kind of 
analysis only respondents who do not have any missing data in 
any of the variables used can be included. 
'(*) Although the use of multiple regression (which is a technique where 
variability of the dependent variable is accounted for by the independent 
ones) might seem inappropriate for investigating social representations 
(where the emphasis is put on consensus within a sample), this method was 
used for two reasons. First, at this stage of the study the interest had been shifted from consensus to the investigation of the structure of 
relations between variables. Second, it is acknowledged that there is 
always going to be a certain degree of intra-group variability over and 
above consensus. This variability allowed the investigation of relations between variables by means of multiple regression and if anchoring is the target process to be investigated, covariation between representations must be analysed. Regression is one way to do this. 
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Table 4: Path diagram resulting from the regression analyses. 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
R CISM 
9 
1 GENDER 
IEWS ABOUT 
EC 
CLASS -. 34 
. 60 
NATIONALISM' -. 34 POSITIVITY 
OF C NGE 
-. 24 . 27 .1 VIEWS A OUTI CONTAC NIFICATIONI 
2 
. 22 r =. 59 
I --------------------------------------------------------------- 
Summary of sub-analyses 
1 OUTCOME 2 
VARIABLE Adj RF Sign. 
RACISM 0.06 5.38 . 00 
NATIONALISM -0.01 . 14, ns 
CONTACT 0.03 2.21 ns 
{ VIEWS ABOUT EEC 0.06 2.73 <0.05 
POSITIVITY OF CHANGE 0.22 7.97 . 00 
VIEWS ABOUT UNIFICATION 0.59 22.74 . 00 
1 N=120 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
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3.3.2.5. Discussion of Results from the Questionnaire 
-------------------------------------------- 
The model that was presented as an outcome of multiple 
regression indicates that there are certain factors 
accounting directly and indirectly for a large amount of 
variance of the dependent variable. Respondents' views about 
the unification of Europe are directly related to their views 
about the EC, to the contact they have with European 
happenings and events and to the extent to which the 
respondents evaluated positively the effects they perceived 
as results of the unification. The strongest relation is 
the one between general views about the unification and the 
views about the EC, indicating that what respondents already 
felt and believed about the EC is the factor most strongly 
related to the way they feel about and perceive the 
unification of Europe, which is something they do not yet 
know. 
Yet, positivity of change, perceived as a possible result of 
unification, besides being directly related to the view 
towards unification, was also directly related to contact. 
This relation has two implications. First, that the relation 
of contact with views about unification is a twofold one; 
both direct and indirect, through positivity of change. 
Secondly, the direct relation between contact and positivity 
indicates that respondents' contact with European issues and 
events is related to the way (i. e. how positive) they 
perceive the possible changes that may occur as a result of 
the unification. 
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However, Contact was not found to have the expected relation 
with Views about the EC. Although, this relation was 
expected for theoretical reasons, its non-existence could be 
explained by referring to findings from the interview and the 
checklists data. There, it has been suggested that the 
representation of the EC is influenced, to a large extent, by 
nationalist beliefs and that it is not necessary for people 
to have contact and factual information (as defined here; 
keeping in touch with European events by reading, watching TV 
and discussing about them) in order to have opinions about 
it. Contact (seen as having been to a country and having 
general information about it, not specifically as an EC 
member) was more influential for opinions about EC and member 
countries. 
Therefore, the fact that, in the present model, a certain 
amount of variance of views about the EC is explained by 
nationalism and that contact is measured as keeping in touch 
with specific means might explain the non-relation between 
these two factors. Yet, contact is important in explaining 
views about unification, since it is the only means of 
knowing something about it. For instance respondents might 
have an opinion about the EC because they have visited a 
number of member countries. This does not necessarily imply 
that they keep in touch with European issues and events in 
order to have an opinion. Yet, as far as unification is 
concerned, they could not have first-hand experience, so they 
may rely on whatever they can find about it by reading 
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newspapers and magazines, watching TV programmes and 
discussing with others. 
Furthermore, the general views about the unification of 
Europe are indirectly related to nationalism. This 
relationship is manifested through nationalism's direct 
relation with views about EC, positivity of change and 
contact with European issues and events. These relationships 
were found tobe negative; the minus signs indicating that 
the stronger the nationalist beliefs, the less positive the 
views about the EC, the less the positivity of change, the 
less--the-- contact --with=European- issues and-vice versa, 
indicating a negative relation between nationalism and views 
about unification as well. 
The only other relation that emerged from the multiple 
regressions is the negative one between gender and racism; 
indicating that females have weaker racist views than males. 
This is consistent with previous findings indicating that 
females are more sympathetic towards races discriminated 
against (Furnham and Gunter, 1989). 
However, gender, social class and racism were not found to 
be, either directly or indirectly, related to any other 
variable. These three variables may have'an impact on the 
way of understanding new concepts, but they were not found to 
relate to the present representational system. The finding 
that Social class was not related with nationalism, as was 
expected, could be attributed to two different reasons. 
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First, it might be the way that social class was measured 
(according to parents' occupation). It is possible that for 
the age of the respondents the occupation of their parents is 
not an accurate index of their social status. Respondents 
were approximately 18 years old and most of them were already 
working, so they might not identify with their parents' 
social status. Secondly, it is likely that nationalism is 
not class-based in Britain. However, one might expect a 
different outcome if the relation between Class and 
Nationalism was to be measured under different conditions of 
elicitation. On one hand, results might have been different 
if respondents' own social status had been indexed. On the 
other hand, if nationalism was indexed differently; more in 
terms of willingness to sacrifice oneself for one's country, 
for example, again the results might have been different. 
The finding that racism is not related to any of the other 
variables, whereas nationalism is, has two implications. 
First, it indicates that racism and nationalism operate 
differentially in the model; i. e. although correlated with 
each other they do not relate similarly with the rest of the 
variables. Secondly, Racism is most probably a construct 
directed towards individuals and not towards institutions, as 
it is in this case with the EC and the Unification of Europe. 
Going back to the model and the operational hypothesis it can 
be suggested that the model verifies it, at least partly. 
Nationalist beliefs, views about the EC, contact with 
European issues and events, and positivity of change 
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perceived as a possible result from the unification do work 
as factors explaining the general views about unification. 
In terms of the theoretical hypothesis that this part of the 
study set out to investigate, this model shows that people 
try to understand and explain something new and unfamiliar 
(in this case the unification of Europe) by relating it to 
pre-existing beliefs (nationalism and views about the EC) and 
different kinds of involvement (contact and perceived 
positivity of change). 
This shows that, during the representational process and 
especially during familiarisation with something new, people 
may anchor it to pre-existing belief systems while, at the 
same time, involvement with this new idea informs this 
process. Over and above this, the model brought up the 
specific pre-existing belief systems and different kinds of 
involvement that are related to the way the new and 
unfamiliar is going to be understood and explained. The very 
strong and direct relation between the pre-existing beliefs 
about. something very relevant with the new and unfamiliar 
(i. e. views about the EC and views about the unification, 
respectively) indicates that when people are faced with 
something new and unfamiliar they will rely heavily, for 
explaining and understanding it, on something with which they 
already feel familiar that resembles and can be directly 
compared to the new. This way the new object may be 
gradually named and classified, acquire properties and 
become, eventually, understood and represented. 
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Involvement with the new and unfamiliar (in terms of 
evaluation of perceived effects and gathering and exchanging 
information) is also directly related to the representational 
process, though to a lesser degree than pre-existing belief 
systems. Contact especially has a twofold relation; it is 
related directly both to the way the new is going to be 
understood and the evaluation of effects which may occur 
because of it. 
Another kind of pre-existing belief (i. e. nationalism), 
which has already been established, is found to have an 
- -- indirect relationship -with the_. new. and unfamiliar-. _ . _This_ 
possibly 'deeper' system of beliefs is related to the new by 
being directly related both to more recently established 
belief systems and involvement. 
The relations between belief systems and the new idea offer 
an indication that the anchoring mechanism may be taking 
place during the familiarisation process. This taking place 
could be inferred by the consistency in the relation between 
pre-existing belief systems and the new. The theoretical 
hypothesis that anchoring is a selective and active mechanism 
is supported by the fact that the new idea has a stronger 
relation with a closely related to it pre-existing belief 
system than with any other. This can be further supported 
by the finding that, although related to each other, two 
other pre-existing belief systems (nationalism and racism) do 
not function similarly in the representational process. 
Nationalism is involved in this process, whereas racism is 
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not. This supports the hypothesis that only belief systems 
which are related to the new idea are going to operate during 
the representational process. In this case it could be 
suggested that what is taking place may not be a passive 
accommodation of something new, but the active comparison of 
the new with selected, differentiated and related pre- 
existing belief systems. 
4. SOCIAL REPRESENTATION AND ANCHORING: 
----------------------------------- 
GENERAL DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
----------------------------- 
The aim of this study was to investigate the existence and 
the content of a pre-existing belief system in a specific 
population and the operation of the anchoring mechanism 
during familiarisation with a target representation. A 
multi-methodological approach was used in order to achieve 
this aim. 
The interviews provided confirmation of the existence of the 
pre-existing belief system (i. e. the social representation of 
the EC). The information gathered by the interviews 
satisfied the criterion set for considering it a social 
representation; i. e. it consisted of opinions or beliefs and 
explanations about the target object, expressed by almost all 
the interviewees. Opinions or beliefs and explanations were 
considered to be the components in the nucleus of the 
representation; their existence was necessary for allowing 
the claim that a representation was present within the 
specific population. The peripheral components of the 
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representation (such as knowledge, 'theory' and so on) were 
present in some interviews but not in a large enough number 
so as to allow the suggestion that they were part of the 
representation of the population interviewed. The existence 
of, some or all of, these peripheral components would have 
added to the complexity and the sophistication of the 
representation. However, their absence indicated a rather 
simple and not well-developed one. On the other hand, the 
interviews also provided information about the content of 
this representation. It could be argued that the content 
was, generally, spread within the population interviewed. 
Many interviewees were found to share similar opinions and 
explanations about the target representation. 
Furthermore, this representation was also compared with the 
one presented by the press. It was shown that there are 
content similarities between them, but, on the other hand, 
that there are differences in terms of structure and 
sophistication. 
The checklists added to this representation by providing 
people's images related to it. They also offered further 
explanation of this representation by bringing up the way 
people see the different objectsý(i. e. countries) comprising 
it; their traits as well as the similarities and differences 
between them. 
Having established that a belief system, considered to pre- 
exist the target one, existed, the next step was to proceed 
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in investigating the anchoring mechanism. The questionnaire 
allowed the creation of indices of involvement, pre-existing 
belief systems and an evaluative component of the target 
representation. The relations between these indices provided 
an indication that the anchoring mechanism may be taking 
place. The consistency observed in these relations is not a 
proof of the operation of the anchoring mechanism. It could 
be argued that it may not be possible to empirically prove 
the taking place or the function of this mechanism. However, 
the analysis of the data gathered by the questionnaire offer 
some support that the operation of the mechanism may be as 
hypothesised; i. e. aspects of the target new representation 
may be anchored on pre-existing belief systems in order to be 
explained and understood. Furthermore, information gathered 
by the questionnaire indicated that the anchoring mechanism 
may be an actively selective one, since not every pre- 
existing belief contributed to the explanation of the target 
representation, irrespective of its relation to it. Again, 
it could not be claimed that this is a proof that the 
mechanism is actively selective. The only justifiable claim 
would be that the data did not contradict this hypothesis. 
The finding that only some pre-existing systems (nationalism 
and views about the EC) were related to the evaluative aspect 
of the target representation, whereas others (racism) were 
not, might be an indication of the selectivity of the 
anchoring mechanism. It could be argued that the belief 
systems that were related to the target were the ones that 
belong to spheres similar to it. For instance, it could be 
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claimed that nationalist beliefs, being indexed as beliefs 
about one's own country, has a stronger conceptual relation 
to the unification of Europe, since this involved the 
evaluation of what the possible effects of the unification 
might be on one's country. On the other hand, racism, 
indexing views about individuals from other races, was not 
involved in the explanation of unification, which is an 
institution. Still, this is only an indication that people 
may select pre-existing belief systems related to the new 
object, in order'to explain and understand it. However, if 
this is the case, this selection may not be a conscious one; 
At may-serve--specific-functions--of-individual cognitions 
One could hypothesise what these specific functions may be. 
Selectivity may function so as to-allow change to occur in' 
aspects of the representation or the representational 
process. On the other hand, it could be suggested that 
purpose of selectivity may be the preservation of stability 
in the representational system. Such hypotheses require 
further investigation. 
Furthermore, different kinds of involvement with the target 
new representation were related to its evaluative aspects. 
Again, this is an indication that involvement may contribute 
to the explanation and understanding of something that is 
seen as new and unfamiliar. Information gathered by the 
questionnaires offered some indication and support for this 
hypothesis. The finding that the target was related to 
different kinds of involvement, whereas a pre-existing system 
273 
(views about the EC) was not, may be a further indication 
that while something is still new and unfamiliar, everything 
that might be related to it would be used for its explanation 
and understanding. On the other hand, when something becomes 
part of the representational system of individuals, it may 
become, at the same time, rather independent from this sort 
of relations. 
The systematic multi-methodological approach adopted for this 
study does not only provide information from a variety of 
sources, but it also allows the discussion of these pieces of 
- ------------ --information-. in relation. -to each--other. _. -The integration .. of _ -- 
this information was attempted in a number of different ways. 
First, the different methods were used as progressive steps. 
Information gathered from one method was used as a building 
block for the next step of investigation. For instance, 
information from the analysis of the press provided ideas 
that were used in the construction of the interview schedule 
and the questionnaire. Second, different methods were used 
to answer different questions about the same targets. For 
example, the interview provided some answers about the 
existence of a representation, whereas the questionnaire 
allowed some claims about the representational process. 
Finally, information from one method was employed in order to 
explain questions left unanswered by a different method. 
This way the different methods complemented each other so as 
to provide answers to the different theoretical questions. 
In the following part of this general discussion, information 
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from-the press, the interviews, the checklists and the 
questionnaire are going to be discussed together. 
Before proceeding to this discussion it has to be pointed out 
that the fact that the interview data were not included in 
the multiple regression analysis does not disqualify them 
from discussion in relation to the rest of the questionnaire 
data. The non-inclusion was a strict and conservative 
statistical measure. The finding that the model was not 
confirmed by the interview data is most probably the result 
of the very small number of individuals with no missing data, 
---whose--scores -were--used -_in_ this -analysis... - There... 
is- 
-no. reason 
to believe that the interviewees differ significantly from 
the people who responded to the questionnaire. Furthermore, 
in previous statistical analyses, the data from the 
interviews and that-from the questionnaire (when analysed 
separately) produced the, same indices. 
The simplicity of the representation (of the EC) as 
demonstrated by the interviews may be an indication of the 
'non-informed opinion' which is suggested by all sets of 
data. People did not demonstrate a high level of knowledge 
(interview) or interest (questionnaire) about the topic. 
Similarly, the press data indicated a general lack of 
awareness about and interest in issues related to the topic 
(such as the European elections). This lack of interest was 
also demonstrated by the interview sample's non-voting in the 
elections. Opinions (both about the EC and the countries) 
seemed likely to have been influenced more by people's 
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personal experience (having been to a country) than by 
factual information. This idea could be supported by the 
finding that people were able to express opinions about 
(interviews) and attribute traits to (checklists) countries 
that were found to be most frequently visited 
" (questionnaire). 
Another finding was that, as expected, the representation of 
the target was definitely one in the making; people were not 
familiar with it at all. This was demonstrated first by the 
lack of any reference about it in the interviews. People 
--- ---- -- ------were -able -to -talk- about-the -pre-existing representation, but _-. 
they would not refer to the target one. This was an 
indication that the target was not-yet a part of their 
representational system. Although interviewees were not 
specifically asked about the unification, it could be argued 
that if it were a salient idea, it would have emerged without 
having to be specifically elicited. This was further 
confirmed by the unidimensionality of the target idea as 
demonstrated by the questionnaire data; i. e. that it was 
either good or bad. This unidimensionality is considered to 
be a further indication that the target has not yet been 
established as a part of the representational system and that 
it is still in the process of being elaborated and 
understood. 
This difference between the pre-existing representation (of 
the EC) and the target (the unification of Europe) was 
further demonstrated by the finding that the former is not 
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related to contact (involvement), whereas the latter is. As 
mentioned, the former may not rely on involvement since it is 
considered to be already established as a belief system. The 
latter, though, being new and unfamiliar, may require any 
available means of explanation in order to be understood. 
The involvement of another pre-existing belief system 
(nationalism) in the representational process was 
demonstrated consistently from all sources of information. 
This consistency may be an indication that this system is 
really important in the understanding and explanation of the 
target. Nationalism was demonstrated both in the press and 
the interviews in a very similar form (loss of national 
identity, sovereignty, independence). It was also strongly 
evident in the results of the checklists.. Actually, these 
results enabled the more complete understanding of the pre- 
existing representation, by indicating that this is seen 
differently when it comes as a whole (EC) than when it comes 
in parts (member countries). 
Furthermore, both the analysis of the press and the 
questionnaire indicated that the way the target 
representation is understood and explained may be related to 
what is already believed about something similar to it 
(unification and the EC, respectively). In the press 
opinions and ideas about the unification were sometimes 
expressed as inferences from what is already known and 
believed about the EC. 
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Similarly, the analysis of the questionnaire gave some 
indication that this may also happen when people are asked to 
express their own opinions about the unification. 
The way information from different methods was found to add 
up and complement each other allows a certain amount of 
confidence in discussing the results and in concluding that a 
representation actually exists and that it is shared by the 
population investigated. It also allows the suggestion that 
the target representation-is still in the making and that 
people are trying to familiarise with it by anchoring it onto 
--- . -. - ------. -already- existing-systems- of beliefs. __ 
Such conclusions might 
-_ 
have been difficult to draw if one had used a single method 
for gathering and analysing information. 
Each method, on the other hand, was individually valued for 
the specific information and answers it provided. The 
interview brought information about opinions and explanations 
as components of a representation. The checklists provided 
images as one more component of it. The analysis of the 
press gave the opportunity to describe this representation in 
a different context, as well as to compare it with the one 
described by the people themselves. Finally, the 
questionnaire provided information about the spread of this 
representation within a population and about the way it may 
function as a pre-existing belief system, among others, for 
the facilitation of the representational process with the 
target representation. But it is the discussion of all 
different pieces of information together that offers more 
278 
clear conclusions and explanations about the pre-existing 
representation, the target one, and the representational 
process. 
By considering together, in a systematic way, the different 
methods used in this specific study, some of their 
limitations might have been overcome. So, although the 
interviews had to be limited in number due to time 
constraints, the questionnaire allowed the investigation of a 
larger sample. Having already established some ideas from 
the analysis of the press might have counteracted the problem 
of subjectivity in the creation of the interview schedule, 
the checklists and the questionnaire. However, it is not 
claimed that the construction of the investigatory tools or 
the interpretation of the interviews and the checklists was. 
totally free from the expectations and representations of the 
people who constructed and interpreted them. The fact that 
the checklists did not ask people for explanations for their 
classification of countries and that the questionnaires 
restricted respondents to a specific range of answers might 
have been counteracted by the explanations asked during the 
interviews. 
Employing this systematic multi-methodological approach 
provided some indication that the anchoring mechanism might 
operate during the representational process. It also 
indicated that the mechanism might be a selective one. As 
mentioned, the information gathered did not prove that this 
is the case; it only offered some support for the theoretical 
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hypotheses. If the hypothesised relations between pre- 
existing belief systems and the new idea were not observed, 
then it could have been argued either that the anchoring 
mechanism does not take place or that the pre-existing belief 
systems (indexed for this present study) were not the 
appropriate ones. Yet, the observed relations could be 
explained by the operation anchoring mechanism. So, if the 
mechanism is a selective one, it may be important to move a 
step further and investigate what is the purpose of this 
selectivity. It is believed that another study employing a 
longitudinal design may provide some answers to this 
-- --- --- --- question. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
INVESTIGATING CHANGE IN THE TARGET REPRESENTATION AND THE 
REPRESENTATIONAL PROCESS 
------------------------ ------------------------ 
1. INTRODUCTION 
------------ 
The study reported in the previous chapter indicated that the 
anchoring mechanism might operate during familiarisation with 
a new idea and that this mechanism might be a selective one. 
However, both the results of this study and the theory of 
Social Representations create further theoretical questions 
related to the function of anchoring. Specifically, these 
questions involve the function of anchoring during periods of 
social upheaval. Does the representation of something new 
change when significant related social events take place and, 
if it does, in what way does it change? Does the outcome of 
the anchoring mechanism change? Does the relationship 
between pre-existing belief systems and the new object 
change? What might be the purpose of the mechanism; does it 
enable change or does it induce stability? 
The theory of Social Representations gives contradictory 
information as far as these questions are concerned. On the 
one hand, the theory suggests that social representations 
are created, modified or changed in times of social upheaval 
(Moscovici, 1984b). Yet, on the other hand, the proce3s of 
familiarisation, by anchoring and objectifying, indicates 
that the function of every representation is to induce 
stability. This stability is achieved by explaining 
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something that is new and unfamiliar by means of whatever is 
already known. Such an argument implies that the tendency is 
to avoid change or to only allow small changes at the 
periphery of a representation. The idea of stability has 
been discussed by Abric (1984) who suggested that it is the 
periphery of a representation that can be changed, whereas 
its nucleus does not change. Abric defined the nucleus of a 
representation as its fundamental element determining both 
its meaning and structure. The nucleus has both a creative 
and an organising function. Through this creative function 
of the nucleus the other elements of the representation 
acquire or change their meaning. Through its organising 
function, the nucleus determines the nature of the links 
uniting the elements of the representation. It is, in a way, 
considered to be the unifying and stabilising element in the 
representation. Abric also argued that, as such, the nucleus 
is the most stable element in the representation; i. e. the 
one that most resists change. So, for Abric, the evolution 
of a representation will start with the modification of the 
non-central or the peripheral elements. "In fact the 
transformation of nucleus calls into question the totality 
and structure of the representation. A representation is 
thus likely to evolve and change superficially by a change in 
the meaning or the nature of its peripheral elements. But it 
can only be radically changed when the nucleus itself is 
called into question. " (Abric, 1984, p. 181). On the same 
topic Echebarria and Paez (1989) argued that people select 
what information to remember so as not to disturb their 
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already existing representations and to avoid instability and 
change in these representations. People feel uncomfortable 
when something seems strange and unfamiliar and by anchoring 
it onto already existing systems of reality they use what 
they already know to transform it into something familiar 
(Moscovici, 1984b). However, it should be pointed out here 
that it is possible that a new object may not necessarily 
trigger the familiarisation process. There may be cases 
where the new will be ignored altogether. 
1.1. Aims of the study 
The above theoretical questions led to the design of a second 
study which aimed to investigate whether or not a target 
representation changes during a period of social upheaval. 
Specifically, this study aimed to investigate whether change 
occurs in the evaluative aspects of the representation of a 
target new object and in its relation with pre-existing 
belief systems and, if it does, in which ways this change is 
manifested and to where it could be attributed. 
It may be the case that change does not occur or, if it 
does, it occurs only in the peripheral elements of the target 
representation and not in its nucleus (as defined by Abric, 
1984). One way to achieve this aim, besides adopting a 
historical approach or using a time-series design, was to 
design a longitudinal study- A longitudinal design was 
considered appropriate for the aim of this study because it 
could enable one to look at these possible changes in the 
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(*) It is considered appropriate to define here what is understood by the term 'longitudinal study', since the study conducted for the present 
piece of work may differ slightly from what might be considered a longitudinal study by some researchers more used to extensive data 
collection. The emphasis here is put on the repeated data collection 
from the same population over time in order to detect changes in this 
representational systems of the same individuals over time. 
Furthermore, such a study had to take place before and after 
certain significant social events had taken place. It was 
believed that if change in a target representation were to 
occur, then this change would be manifested after such events 
would have taken place. Therefore, it was necessary to 
investigate a target representation in the same population 
both before and after these events happened. It was also 
necessary to acquire information about the importance of 
these events, both in an 'objective' way; i. e. whether they 
have a social significance in general and they were presented 
by the press as such, as well as in a 'specific' way; i. e. 
whether they are considered as significant by the population 
to be investigated. 
1.2. Theoretical hypothesis 
---------------------- 
The theoretical hypothesis that this study investigated is 
that - changes will occur 
in a 
target new representation during a period of social upheaval. 
These changes could manifest themselves both in the structure 
of this representation and in its relation with pre-existing 
belief systems and kinds of involvement. Change may therefore 
be observed either in the outcome representation, or in the 
relation of this representation with the pre-existing belief 
systems and kinds of involvement or in the relation between 
pre-existing belief systems and kinds of involvement. 
i 
Changes, however, were expected to be small and at the 
periphery of the representation. Anchoring, as a mechanism, 
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population's understanding of social events. The fact that the 
population was tested only twice and that the time interval was rather 
short does not disqualify this study from being considered a longitudinal one. However, this study could not be considered an 'effects study', since there was no experimental control over the 
events that_happened between the two data collections. 
was not expected to undergo changes in terms of its pattern. 
However, the conditions under which it may operate could be 
involved in these changes. For instance, if the purpose of 
anchoring was to allow changes in a new representation, then 
one would expect the new'to be anchored to different pre- 
existing systems than if its purpose was to induce stability. 
On the other hand, change in the target representation could 
be observed if it were to be anchored on the same pre- 
exiting systems but these systems were to change 
significantly over time. Finally, if the relations between 
pre-existing belief systems and kinds of involvement were to 
change, then again it might be possible to observe changes in 
the explanation of the target new representation. 
In the case that change is not manifested either in the 
structure of the representation of the new, or in the 
relation between it and the pre-existing belief systems, this 
then could be explained in a number of ways. First, it might 
be that the events that have happened between the times of 
investigation of the target representation were not 
significant enough to produce changes. Secondly, if the 
events were 'objectively' significant, it might be that the 
population investigated did not perceive them as such. 
Thirdly, it may be that the new information that might have 
been available for the events was in agreement with the 
representation of the target object, so no change could be 
observed. Fourthly, lack of change might indicate that, in 
fact, the anchoring mechanism functions as an agent of 
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stability and that it does not allow change. In such a case, 
change would be sacrificed for the sake of stability and 
tamiliarity. If this is the case, then it could be argued 
that even in times of social upheaval (and especially in 
today's society when information is abundant and readily 
available), people selectively anchor new and unfamiliar 
ideas onto pre-existing belief systems in order to induce and 
preserve stability and, at the same time, to avoid conflict 
between the already known and the new. 
There are two more points that have to be made clear, if what 
is observed is stability instead of change. First, if change 
is not observed, this would not necessarily indicate absence 
of a cognitive process. New or different information (as an 
outcome of significant social events) might be processed and 
yet the outcome of this process might be stability or very 
small changes at the periphery of the target representation. 
Secondly, lack of change would not necessarily imply that the 
representational process is not a dynamic one. On the 
contrary, it might imply that people actively interact with 
new information they receive for a target representation so 
as to induce and preserve this stability. 
Thus, this study aimed to investigate whether changes occur 
in a target representation after certain significant social 
events have taken place and, if they do, what kind of changes 
they are. It also aimed at studying any changes that might 
occur-in the relations between pre-existing belief systems 
and kinds of involvement, as well as in the relation between 
286 
the target representation and systems of belief and 
involvement. It was expected that, if changes were to occur 
at all, they would be at the periphery of the representation 
and not at its nucleus. It was also expected that people 
would anchor the new in order to achieve stability at the 
expense of change. 
1.3. Operational hypothesis 
---------------------- 
In order to test the theoretical questions and hypothesis 
mentioned above, there was need to have again a new idea that 
would be considered the target representation, as well as 
constructs that would be expected to function as pre-existing 
belief systems and different kinds of involvement with the 
new idea. 
Once more the idea of unification of Europe in 1992 was to 
be focused upon as the target new representation. The 
previous study showed that, as expected, the people who 
participated in it were not familiar with this idea since it 
involves something that has not actually happened yet. Thus, 
it was again expected that the population to be investigated 
in this second study (i. e. undergraduate students) would also 
be relatively unfamiliar with the idea of the unification. 
Although the new and unfamiliar idea remained the same for 
both studies, there were some changes (in this second study) 
in the constructs considered to be pre-existing belief 
systems and kinds of involvement. Nationalist beliefs were, 
again, considered to be an already existing belief system 
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onto which views about the unification of Europe might be 
anchored. However, this time another construct was 
introduced; namely, beliefs about international co-operation, 
defined as people's views about different countries working 
together and the difficulty individual countries may face if 
they decide to stand alone. The two constructs were seen as 
belonging to the same level in terms of their possible 
relation to people's views about the unification of Europe. 
It has to be pointed out, though, that although they were 
expected to be negatively correlated with each other, they 
were considered to be rather independent. According to 
Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) who conducted a study comparing 
patriotic, nationalist and internationalist attitudes in an 
American population, these two constructs (nationalism and 
internationalism) have to be treated as relatively 
independent attitudinal or dis positional dimensions. In that 
study, Nationalism and Internationalism were found to be 
negatively correlated. However, the correlation was only 
-. 18, indicating that only a small degree of variance is 
shared by the two variables. 
As far as this present study is concerned, both these two 
belief systems were considered to be related to the way the 
new idea is going to be understood and explained. 
Furthermore, political ideology, in general, was also 
expected to be involved in this representational process. 
The decision to introduce political ideology as a set of pre- 
existing beliefs was based on the finding of the previous 
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study that anchoring may be a selective mechanism, where 
constructs related to the new idea are used to enable 
familiarisation. Therefore, political ideology was chosen as 
a related construct to views about unification. The European 
integration is a political event, expected to bring about 
changes in the political life of Britain and Europe. 
Furthermore, the handling of relations with Britain's 
counterparts in the EC has already produced upheaval in 
British internal politics. So, it was believed that people's 
political beliefs would be related (as a pre-existing belief 
system) to their views about unification. 
Political ideology was approached as a complex construct; 
involving beliefs about economy, social welfare, social 
structure (class, culture), environmental concern, 
participation in political life, and so on. Furthermore each 
of these aspects of political ideology was seen as bipolar; 
i. e. having a conservative and an -opposite- liberal pole. 
As Fleishman (1988) reported political ideology is a multi- 
factor construct and social issues often enter its sphere. 
In his analysis of data gathered from a survey of 1,473 
adults in the US he found twelve first-order factors within 
political and social attitudes. Factors varied from 
'Government Aid' (Government efforts to improve social 
welfare and to insure minimum standards of living) and 
'Defence' (Defence spending and confidence in the army) to 
'Racial Discrimination' (Equal rights and social acceptance 
of blacks) and 'Free speech for atheists, communists, 
289 
homosexuals'. 
For the present study it was decided to establish and use (as 
pre-existing, political, belief systems) a rather limited but 
diverse as possible number of aspects of political ideology. 
So, political ideology was indexed in terms of a number of 
beliefs in aspects such as social welfare, government's 
interference in the economy, environmental issues, 
multiculturalism, extreme conservativism, extreme liberalism, 
and nationalism (as a general construct in this case, and not 
specifically in relation to Britain as a country). Finally, 
people's trust in politicians; political cynicism (i. e. 
whether or not politicians are genuinely interested in the 
general public's well-being) was also to be indexed, but it 
was considered to be a kind of involvement, rather than a 
pre-existing belief system. Political cynicism was not 
treated as a pre-existing belief system because it was not 
considered to be beliefs about politics but a way of 
approaching politics. It is a kind of involvement in the 
sense that it involves the degree of influence people believe 
they, themselves, 'could have on political decisions by being 
represented by genuinely interested politicians. If people 
believe that politicians do represent them and care for them 
and that what interests them interests politicians as well, 
then they may believe that they have an impact upon political 
decisions. This trust is seen as a kind of involvement with 
the political life of a country and it might be related to 
the target representation by being in the same sphere (i. e. 
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politics). Similarly, all the different aspects of political 
ideology were considered to be pre-existing systems of belief 
likely to be involved in the representational process of the 
target new representation. 
In terms of different kinds of involvement, contact with 
European events was again believed to be related to people's 
views about unification. Furthermore, general interest in 
politics and knowledge about Europe were introduced as two 
additional kinds of involvement. The former a more general 
one and belonging in a similar sphere like the target 
representation (i. e. politics), the latter a very specific 
one, but both seen as related to the target representation. 
The fact that, this time, the population to participate was 
students enabled the introduction of one more kind of 
involvement; i. e. whether or not the course one is doing in 
the University is related, in any way, to Europe. This kind 
of involvement, again quite specific, was thought likely to 
have a relation to this population's beliefs about Europe. 
People might have chosen a specific course (related to 
Europe) because they were interested in Europe or, on the 
other hand, the course they have chosen (if related to 
Europe) might have triggered their interest in Europe. 
Having established the target representation, the pre- 
existing belief systems and the different kinds of 
involvement, the next step was to decide on the significant 
events that might induce change in any of them or in the 
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relations between them. It was decided that such events, 
again, should come from the political sphere. 
When the first part of this study was designed the 
possibility of war in the Gulf was increasing day by day. So 
the study was organised in such a way as to be conducted both 
before the outbreak of this war (first part - T1) and after 
the war had started (second part - T2). It was expected that 
if the target representation or the representational system 
were to undergo any changes, then such an event (if it were 
to happen) would be sufficient for this purpose because it 
could create a certain degree of social upheaval. Yet, 
although emphasis was put upon the Gulf war, other 
significant events that took place between the two parts of 
this study, were also taken into account. These events are 
described later in this chapter. 
A survey conducted for the Eurobarometre (No 34, December 
1990) during the first week of October 1990 in all member 
countries of the EC "showed that people were divided as to 
whether progress towards political union had been made easier 
(33%), more difficult (25%) or remained unchanged (32%) by 
the crisis, although more people believed that it had been 
helped rather than hindered. " (p. 41) These percentages were 
somewhat different for the British sample. In Britain, 29% 
believed that progress has become easier, 21% that it has 
become more difficult and 45% that the prospects for 
political union remained unchanged. Such findings 
strengthened the belief that it was possible to find a lack 
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of change in people's views about the unification. However, 
the present study was to be conducted both before and after 
the war was started, when it would be a reality and not a 
possibility, as it was in October when the Eurobarometre 
survey was conducted. Furthermore, this study aimed also at 
investigating possible changes in relations between 
constructs and not merely changes in people's views about 
unification. 
In order to acquire an understanding of the significance of 
events, it was necessary, first, to monitor the news as 
presented by the media and, second, to ask the people who 
participated in the study to express their own opinions about 
the events that had happened. The former would allow the 
establishment of an 'objective' account of what the 
significant events were, whereas the latter would provide the 
respondents' subjective accounts. The term 'objective' here 
is employed as an opposite to subjective. The media were 
monitored to establish events and their importance; however, 
value judgements and opinions, as presented by the media, 
could not be avoided. Furthermore, people's own account of 
whether and how their views about the European unification 
have changed due to the important events that have taken 
place had to be established. 
One of the operational hypotheses was that, again, 
consistency between people's views about unification and 
nationalism, internationalism and political ideology would be 
an indication that the anchoring mechanism may operate. 
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Furthermore, contact with, interest in and knowledge about 
Europe, as well as the course that students were doing and 
its relation to Europe, were also expected to be involved in 
the representational process. 
However, the focus and the main theoretical hypothesis of 
this study was that, although general views about unification 
will not change between times, there would be small changes 
in specific aspects of these views and that these aspects 
would be related to the significant events that would take 
place between times. It was also expected that there might 
be changes in the relations between constructs considered to 
be pre-existing belief systems and kinds of involvement 
related to the events. Finally, it was expected that the 
purpose of anchoring views. about the unification onto any 
pre-existing construct would be to achieve stability, so any 
new information that might come as an outcome of the 
significant events would be accommodated so as not to disrupt 
this stability. 
2. THE EVENTS THAT TOOK PLACE BETWEEN TIME 1 AND TIME 2: 
---------------------------------------------------- 
AN 'OBJECTIVE' ACCOUNT 
---------------------- 
Before presenting the social and political events that took 
place between the two times of data collection three points 
have to be made clear. (i) The time span between Ti and T2 
starts from the date the first questionnaire was sent (10th 
December 1990) and ends the date the last of the second 
questionnaire was received completed (14th March 1991). 
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Although respondents were sent each questionnaire the same 
day there was no way of controlling when they actually 
completed it. So, depending on the day they completed the 
second questionnaire, significant events might have been 
different or of different importance. (ii) The presentation 
of events that follows aims at being as objective and non- 
evaluative as possible. The events that are going to be 
presented are the ones that were extensively presented by the 
media. Newspapers as well as news bulletins were monitored 
for the whole period between Time 1 and Time 2. However, 
since the aim of the present study was to investigate whether 
and how significant events could change people's views about 
the unification of Europe, events are going to be presented 
with reference to European relations. (iii) Some of the 
events were presented and considered to have both national 
and international importance, as well as being important 
within the European political and social scene. Therefore, 
such events are not classified as specifically national or 
international or European. 
2.1. Events that had importance for the national, 
-------------------------------------------- 
international and European scene 
-------------------------------- 
2.1.1. The War in the Gulf 
------------------- 
The event that dominated the news for a long period of time 
was the War in the Gulf. Although the war did not start till 
the 16th of January 1991, the occupation of Kuwait by the 
Iraqi forces (since August 2,1990) was mentioned daily and 
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discussed. Table 5 presents a brief 'diary' of the most 
crucial events that happened during this war. 
Table 5: Brief diary of some of the events that took place 
------- during the Gulf war 
DATE 
August 2,1990 
October 21,1990 
November 29,1990 
January 9,1991 
January 15,1991 
January 16,1991 
January 18,1991 
January 21,1991 
January 25,1991 
January 29,1991 
January 30,1991 
February 2,1991 
February 13,1991 
-February 15,1991 
February 23,1991 
February 28,1991. 
EVENT 
The invasion 
Heath's visit 
The deadline is set 
Talks fail 
The deadline passes 
Air war begins 
First Scuds 
Parade of POW's 
Pollution 
War at sea 
Battle for Khafji 
Iraqi collapse 
Shelter bombing 
Iraq seeks peace 
Ground war 
Cease fire 
As the deadline for starting war operations approached and 
diplomatic roads for resolving the crisis were closed one by 
one, the media in general started dealing with the issue more 
and more. - The Gulf crisis moved from the second or third 
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page in neýspaýers and second or third issue on TV news 
bulletins to front page headlines and to first (and quite 
often the only) issue on the TV bulletins. From then on and 
until the war actually ended the Gulf crisis dominated the 
media. In a way every other event not related to the war was 
rather diminished in terms of importance and coverage, at 
iedst between the 15th of January and the 28th of February. 
The pollution of the sea in the Gulf by the oil slicks from 
the bombarded oil reserves in Kuwait was seen as a very 
important event. Since it was directly related to the war, 
it was presented in parallel to it. 
Although the war was not a national event per se, it was seen 
and presented as such. Britain was largely involved with it 
in all of its phases. Britain participated in the diplomatic 
talks and efforts to resolve the crisis, British politicians 
tried to intervene, British troops were sent in the Gulf, 
British soldiers were captured and killed. Britain and the 
US were working very closely together and they were presented 
as running this war much more than anybody else. American B- 
52 bombers were allowed to land in Britain so as to be able 
to get to the Gulf. So, although the war was taking place 
very far away, it was 'brought home' 
by constant media 
coverage. 
As far as Europe and relations between member countries of 
the EC were concerned, the Gulf crisis 
had some impact. 
Immediately after the invasion, the member countries adopted 
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a resolution in the framework of European Political Co- 
operation demanding the withdrawal of Iraqi troops. They 
also announced a trade embargo and suspension of all co- 
operation agreements with Iraq. Britain also proposed 
(through her Minister of Foreign Affairs, D. Hurd) to her 
European counterparts a closer European defence co-operation 
within NATO (The Guardian, 11/12/90). However, this was not 
seen as necessary by the rest of the countries. 
On the other hand, the EC countries (Britain included) 
expressed fears that they were being left out of any 
consultation about the handling of the war by the US (The 
Guardian, 14/12/90). Although all countries (except 
Germany)had sent forces to the Gulf, it was believed that it 
would not be necessary for them to fight (The Guardian, 
14/1/91). This was not exactly true because, when the war 
started, both French and Italian forces joined in the air 
war. 
Still, as the deadline for the beginning of the warfare 
approached, several problems started to occur between the 
member countries of the EC. First, the countries were 
unable to adopt a common stance on the crisis. Britain was 
much more in agreement with the way the crisis was being 
handled by the US than with the 'softer' approach that the 
EC, and especially Germany and France, wanted to adopt. 
These countries were supporting diplomatic solutions and 
sanctions against Iraq till the last moment before the 
beginning of the war. The 15th of January 1991 (the day the 
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deadline set by the UN expired) President Mitterant of France 
was trying to intervene through diplomatic roads ("Mitterant 
in last ditch effort", The Guardian, 15.1.91, p. 1). After 
the beginning of the war most countries of the EC followed 
the decisions of the UN and the US and took part in the 
warfare, but not without a general feeling of 'being dragged 
in' rather than participating ("European rift over Gulf 
crisis widens as US seeks early ground war", The Independent, 
5/2/1991, p. 1). 
Another issue that caused a great deal of discussion was the 
fact that Germany did not send any troops to the Gulf because 
this was not allowed under the German constitution. Germany 
was only able to support the war and the countries fighting 
it financially. Such facts caused a certain amount of 
tension among the countries of the EC. Britain pressed 
Germany to at least share the 'bill' (The Guardian, 25/1/91). 
This was more or less done. Nevertheless, it left the 
British public feeling that the British troops were paid by 
Germany (and Japan) to fight the war for them. On the other 
hand the rest of the EC countries, and especially France and 
Germany, accused Britain of blindly following the US and of 
rushing into the war. Actually, it was Britain who used the 
war to cast doubts on European unity (The Guardian, 4/2/91, 
The Independent, 5/2/91). In general, Britain was seen as 
more involved in the war than any other European country, 
something that often ended up in resentment by the British 
public and put Britain closer to the US than Europe. 
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To sum up the situation, the war in the Gulf and the 
reactions to it by the countries of the EC may have left them 
divided, mistrustful of each other and less well-off. 
2.1.2. The events in the Soviet Republics 
---------------------------------- 
The revolts that started from the Republic of Lithuania and 
spread across to other Soviet Republics took place mostly 
during the Gulf crisis, so they were not given the media 
coverage they could have have under other circumstances. 
However, these events did make it to newspapers front pages, 
at least before (19,20,21,22,27,28 of December 1990, The 
Guardian) and after the war (The Guardian, 12 of March 1991). 
Some of the riots ended up in civilian deaths and many of 
them involved the use of military or police force in order to 
be subdued. The aim of these revolts, riots, protests, 
marches and so on was the recognition of these Republics as 
independent from central soviet government. There are a 
number of reasons why Republics demand independence. These 
Republics seem to disagree with the central government on 
many issues; political, economic, religious, and 
administrative. Most revolts were subdued leaving however 
the USSR in a chaotic state. The governing body (the 
Kremlin) faced lots of internal problems; the Minister of 
External Affairs and one of the most valued colleagues of 
President Gorbatchev, E. Shevardnadze, resigned from his 
post, the Kremlin attacked one of the most powerful men in 
the USSR, B. Yeltsin, who, on the other hand, gained 
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significant popular support. President Gorbatchev's image 
suffered a severe blow from these events both within the USSR 
and around the world. Finally, further attempts for reforms 
('perestroika') were put on a stand-still. 
This crisis was dealt with a general agreement by the 
countries of the EC. Food aid was sent to the Soviet Union 
from early December 1990, in order to help with the enormous 
economic problems the country was facing. Yet, when the 
clashes begun in Lithuania the Soviet government was urged 
to avoid the use of force in order to resolve the crisis (The 
Independent, 12/. 1/91). When this did not happen, the EC 
countries decided to suspend economic and humanitarian help 
to the Soviet Union (The Guardian, 14/1/91). Finally, when 
the situation seemed to be more under control, the EC decided 
to resume the economic aid (The Guardian, 14/1/91). 
2.2. International Events 
-------------------- 
2.2.1. The abolition of Warsaw Pact and Commecon 
----------------------------------------- 
Another event that happened between T1 and T2 and is related 
to Europe was the decision of Eastern European countries to 
abolish the Warsaw Pact and Commecon. The decision was made 
as a result of the recent political changes in these 
countries (Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and 
so on ) towards"independence from the USSR. This is a very 
important development for Europe and the EC, since Commecon 
used to be the East European' alternative to EC. Many of the 
newly revolutionised countries in Eastern Europe expressed 
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their willingness to join the EC. Whether this will happen 
remains to be seen. 
2.2.2. Events in Yugoslavia and Albania 
-------------------------------- 
Still within the events in Eastern Europe, there were riots 
in Slovenia and Croatia (Yugoslavia) and quite a degree of 
upheaval in Albania. In the first case the two Republics 
were demanding independence from the central Yugoslavian 
government. In the case of Albania, people were asking for 
changes in the government, democratisation, freedom of 
movement and free elections. Again such events are related 
to Europe and the EC, since they imply that, in the future, 
there might be more countries apply, ing. to join the EC. 
2.2.3. South Africa 
------------ 
Although South Africa is far away from Europe, events and 
developments there have always interested European countries. 
So, when on the 21st of December, 1990, President F. W. De 
Klerk announced the partial abolition of apartheid and 
promised its total abolition soon, the news made the 
headlines. Such developments are of great interest to the EC 
countries who imposed sanction on South Africa due to its way 
of dealing with the black population. However, violence 
between blacks and the police, as well as within the black 
community, soon after this announcement, caused (or was used 
as) an obstacle to the promised reforms. So, until the 
monitoring of the press for the purposes of this study 
stopped, the abolition of apartheid had not taken place. 
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2.3. National Events 
--------------- 
2.3.1. John Major as Prime Minister 
---------------------------- 
Although J. Major became Prime Minister on the 27th of 
November, 1990, the issue was still presented by the media on 
further occasions ("Honeymoon is over for Major", The 
Guardian, 13/12/1990, p. 1). Furthermore the new Prime 
Minister's stance on every issue was scrutinised and 
extensively discussed. His handling of the Gulf crisis was 
considered rather successful and his official visits to US 
and USSR and his meetings with Presidents Bush and 
Gorbatchev, respectively, were seen as quite important. His 
position on European issues were also often discussed and 
presented by the media. First, the new Prime Minister was 
presented as much more committed to European unity than his 
predecessor, M. Thatcher ("Major rejects Thatcher's Europe", 
The Guardian, 12/3/91, p. 1, "Major sets new tone on' EC", The 
Independent, 15/12/90, p. 1, "Major promises EC enthusiasm", 
The Times, 1/4/91, p. 8). Secondly, J. Major showed in 
practice his commitment to the EC by moving forward and 
deciding (together with the Cabinet) that Britain will join 
the ERM ("Cabinet stands firm on decision to join ERM", The 
Times, 22/2/91, p. 1). - Still, J. Major's stance towards 
Europe has not been left uncriticised ("EC 'treaty' puts 
Major on the spot", The Guardian, 14/12/90). 
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2.3.2. The IRA terrorist attacks in Britain 
------------------------------------ 
Although terrorist attacks by the IRA are a very common topic 
in the news, the two major attacks in London were seen as 
very important events. The first took place on the 7th of 
February, 1991, and its target was the War Cabinet (including 
J. Major) that was meeting at Downing Street. This attack had 
no victims. The second took place on the 18th of February, 
1991, in Victoria Rail Station. One man was killed and 38 
people were injured. These attacks produced a general 
feeling of vulnerability and of lack of safety. Very strict 
-" " security- measures were taken -following -these -attacks and the - 
already existing security measures (due to the war) were 
" tightened. 
2.3.3. Recession, high interest rates, unemployment, poll-tax 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Britain has been having economic problems for quite a long 
time now, but things seemed to get even worse between 
December (1990) and March (1991). In February (on the 9th) 
the media announced that the expected unemployment figures 
were going to exceed two million. Such news was followed by 
decisions of major companies in Britain (such as BA) to cut 
jobs (12th February). Interest rates remained high for most 
of the period between Ti and T2. There was only a half 
percent cut towards the end of the Gulf war. Furthermore, 
the poll-tax was still causing problems and a great deal of 
discussions. Not only was it considered an unfair tax, but 
councils also faced extreme difficulties collecting it. 
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Discussions to abolish it, change it or reduce it were taking 
place throughout the time this study covers. 
2.4. European Events 
--------------- 
In this section the aim is to present some of the events and 
developments that happened in Europe and the relations 
between member countries of the EC between Ti and T2. 
Furthermore, emphasis is going to be put on events that 
specifically involved Britain and her relations with the EC. 
2.4.1. The new British stance 
---------------------- 
As mentioned before the new Prime Minister, J. Major, was 
considered to be more pro-European than M. Thatcher. He met 
his European counterparts for the first time as a Prime 
Minister at the Rome Summit (16th and 17th of December, 
1990). During this summit, the European union was debated. 
Although the rest of the European governments welcomed the 
change of Prime Minister in Britain, expecting a more 
positive stance from J. Major, they found out that things 
had not changed dramatically. Britain's proposal for a 
'hard-ECU' as an alternative to a common currency was treated 
with mistrust. In addition, J. Major re-established 
Britain's disagreements with the Social Charter. The only 
actual positive move towards more unity was Britain's 
decision to join the ERM. 
Surveys conducted in Britain and the rest of European 
countries around this time (The Guardian, 12th and 14th of 
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December 1990) showed that people in Britain still support a 
slow road to union and that, in general, they are much less 
supportive towards union than any other member country of the 
EC. 
2.4.2. The Bruges Group and M. Thatcher 
The Bruges Group's opposition to European unity became more 
emphatic after M. Thatcher's resignation. The Group invited 
her to become its President but finally they decided to make 
her Honorary President. However, M. Thatcher's stance 
towards Europe remained quite negative. She publicly 
admitted that she did not approve of J. Major's decisions on 
further unity. This resulted in some tension between them 
(The Guardian, 11/3/91). 
2.4.3. Recession - Interest Rates 
The fact that interest rates went up in Germany (The 
Guardian, 1/2/91) was presented as one reason for keeping 
them high in Britain as well. Since Britain had decided to 
join the ERM, she had to follow the rest of the countries' 
decisions. Nevertheless, the membership in the ERM was seen 
as one of the reasons for not overcoming the recession (The 
Guardian, 7/1/91). 
2.4.4. Eastern Europe 
-------------- 
Many Eastern European countries that have been recently 
moving towards democracy expressed an interest in joining the 
EC. The case of East Germany, which, after the unification 
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with West Germany, became automatically a member, made other 
countries willing to join. The abolition of Commecon (the 
Eastern alternative to EC) is another reason why these 
countries are eager to become members of the EC. Poland, for 
instance, announced (The Guardian, 8/3/91) that she will not 
be put back by being refused membership. Yet, with 
applications by other countries (Turkey, Cyprus) having been 
pending for quite a long time, it is doubtful that these 
countries (Eastern European) will soon become members of the 
EC. 
3. METHOD 
3.1. Procedure 
The first questionnaire was sent to 534 undergraduate 
students in the University of Surrey. Students were randomly 
selected from a list (provided by the Registry) consisting of 
all the undergraduate students of British nationality in all 
departments of the University of Surrey. From this list, 30 
(thirty) students from each department were randomly 
selected. The only exception was the department of 
Sociology, which has a total of 24 undergraduate students. 
In this case, all students of this department were included 
in the sample. This first questionnaire was sent, by 
internal mail, on the 10th of December, 1990. By the 9th of 
January, 1991, (which was decided to be the final date for 
accepting questionnaires) 126_ questionnaires had been sent 
back completed. The response rate was 23.6%. It has to be 
mentioned here that third year students are usually away from 
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the University for their 'industrial year'. However, from 
the list of students, it was not possible to single them out. 
It could therefore be argued that the response rate might 
have been higher if these students were not included in the 
sample. 
The second questionnaire was sent to the 125 students who had 
completed the first one and agreed to participate again in 
the study. This questionnaire was sent the 15th of February, 
1991, (two months after the first one). By the 14th of 
March, 1991, (which was again decided to be the final date 
for accepting questionnaires, again giving respondents a 
month to complete it) and after a reminder letter, (sent on 
the 5th of March, 1991) 86 were received completed. The 
response rate was 68.8%. 
3.2. The sample 
Due to the specific aim of this study; i. e. to investigate 
change, only the respondents who had answered both 
questionnaires were included in the sample to be further 
described. 
There were 86 respondents, 42 males and 44 females, all 
undergraduate students and all British. The age range was 
from 18 to 32 years (mean age was 20.68). Thirty-three 
students (38.4%, 17 males, 16 females) were in their first 
year of studies, twenty-six (30.2%, 14 males, 12 females) 
were in their second, four (4.7%, 1 male, 3 females) in their 
third and twenty-three (26.7%, 10 males, 13 females) in their 
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fourth. The distribution of students by department varies 
considerably, from one (Electrical Engineering) up to nine 
(Linguistic and International Studies). (For the 
distribution of students by department see Table 1, Appendix 
D. 1. ) 
3.3. The Questionnaires 
------------------ 
Both questionnaires are included in Appendix D. 2. 
3.3.1. The first Questionnaire (Time 1) 
-------------------------------- 
Section A: THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
This section consisted of 19 (nineteen) statements which 
could be True or False. Respondents were asked to put the 
appropriate number (i. e. 1 for True, 2 for False and3 for 
Don't know) in the boxes provided. Statements were selected 
to cover a wide variety of facts about the EC (such as 
countries that are or are not members, important dates in the 
history of EC, initials that are commonly used to refer to EC 
institutions and so on ) and, at the same time, to be of 
different degree of difficulty. The statements in this 
section came from already existing questionnaires 
(Hewstone, 1986, Hoggart (Observer Magazine), 28 October 
1990) and from the interview data described in Chapter 6. 
The aim of this section was to establish an index of 
knowledge for the specific sample. This index could be used 
as a form of involvement with the target idea, in the sense 
that it could provide an indication of how much respondents 
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were informed about the EC. Furthermore, an index of 
background knowledge could be useful in understanding how 
people make sense of new information; i. e. how they approach, 
understand and explain it. 
Section B: YOUR VIEWS ABOUT BRITAIN 
This section consisted of 17 (seventeen) statements involving 
beliefs about Britain as a country , about the preservation 
of British identity and about the importance of international 
co-operation. Here, respondents were asked to express their 
agreement or disagreement with each of the statements, on a 
five-point Likert type scale. Most of the statements (11) 
were identical with the"ones used in the previous 
questionnaire (described in Chapter 6). The rest of the 
statements (6) were created for the specific purposes of this 
study. 
There were statements involving beliefs about Britain (e. g. 
'British democracy is the model for the rest of the world'), 
beliefs about the preservation of British national identity 
and traditions (e. g. 'Britain should stick to its own 
traditions') and others involving beliefs about international 
co-operation (e. g. 'Countries will only be able to survive if 
they act together'). 
The aim of this section was to provide indices of people's 
beliefs towards Britain as a country, about the preservation 
of British traditions and about international co-operation. 
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Section C: POLITICS 
In this section, respondents were asked about their political 
preferences, both in national and European politics. There 
were questions about which party they would vote for in a 
general election, which party they consider most pro- 
European, which party they believe can best represent 
Britain's interest in the EC, whether they voted in the last 
European elections and, if so, for whom and finally, for 
whom they would vote in future European elections. 
All these questions aimed at establishing the sample's 
interest and participation in political events as well as 
respondents', political preferences. Such a general index of 
interest and participation in politics could be related to 
the way people feel about a much more specific political 
event, such as the unification of Europe. Furthermore, 
information from this section could be used in describing the 
sample in terms of political affiliations. 
Section D: YOUR INTEREST IN CURRENT AFFAIRS 
This section had two aims. First to enable the description 
of the sample's specific characteristics, in terms of 
interest in current affairs, sources of information, trust in 
these sources and active participation in action groups. 
Second, by knowing what the sources of information are that 
the respondents rely upon (i. e. daily and Sunday papers, 
magazines, TV programmes about current affairs), one could 
establish what amount and what type of information they were 
receiving about the events that might take place between Time 
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1 and Time 2. 
Respondents were asked about the daily and Sunday paper(s) as 
well as the magazines they read and whether or not they 
belonged to any action, group, and, if they did, which group 
this was. They were also asked to rate their interest in 
national, international and European politics (on a five- 
point scale ranging from Very Much to Not at All), their 
intentions to keep in touch with European events by reading 
articles, watching TV programmes and discussing (on a three- 
point scale ranging from Often to Never) and their reliance 
on and influence from different sources of information in 
forming political opinions (on a three-point scale ranging 
from Not at All to A Lot). Finally, respondents were asked 
to indicate how often (on a three point scale ranging from 
Often to Never) they watch each of a number of TV programmes 
about current affairs. 
Besides the two reasons for the inclusions of this section in 
the questionnaire mentioned above, the questions about 
general interest in politics and keeping in touch with 
European events were expected to provide two separate indices 
of involvement (one general and one closely related with the 
new idea) which might be involved in the representational 
process. 
Section E: YOUR VIEWS ABOUT CURRENT AFFAIRS 
The aim of this section was to investigate different aspects 
of political ideology within this specific sample. Finding 
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(in the existing literature) standardised scales of political 
ideology proved to be a very difficult task. Although there 
is plenty of literature dealing with such topics and related 
ones such as authoritarianism, political cynicism, and so on, 
most of it tends to be rather out-dated and not relevant to 
current developments. Therefore, it was considered more 
appropriate to develop an all together new set of items 
concerning political ideology. The first step for such a 
task was to try and describe the different facets of 
political ideology. A list of such facets was created and 
each facet had two opposite ends; one for conservatism and 
another for liberalism. For example, government's relation 
with the general public was described as 'Welfare (nanny) 
state' for liberalism and as 'Private provision/Self help' 
for conservatism, environmental concern was described as 
'Concern before we can afford it' for liberalism and as 'Wait 
till we can afford to save the world' for conservatism, and 
so on. After it was decided which facets would be included 
in the questionnaire they were discussed in a group 
discussion, with other researchers in the department of 
Psychology. During this discussion each facet was described 
and defined and its inclusion in the questionnaire was 
debated in terms of whether it would be useful in eliciting 
information related to the aims of the study. Furthermore, 
relative literature was referred to. Then, items covering 
all different facets and both ends of each facet were created 
by the researchers who took part in the first task. After 
this, two separate individuals (not involved in either of the 
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previous two tasks) were asked to sort into categories all 
the different items. These two individuals were given cards 
(each card had an item) and were told that they could sort 
them into as many categories as they wanted, as many times as 
they wanted and with different distinctions every time. When 
they had finished the task they were asked to say in what 
categories they had sorted the cards and which cards (items) 
fell under each category. The items that both individuals 
sorted in consistency between them and in accordance with the 
persons that created them were considered as items able to 
investigate what this section aimed at investigating. 
There were thirty-two items involving welfare (e. g. 'The 
government must increase both taxes and social spending'), 
the environment (e. g. 'The threat to the environment from 
pollution is overstated'), political cynicism (e. g. 
'Political parties are only interested in vote's not in 
people's opinions'), multiculturalism (e. g. 'British culture 
has benefited by the many different cultures existing in 
Britain today'), extreme conservativism (e. g. 'Taxpayers 
should not be, expected to pay for people who do not want to 
work'), extreme liberalism (e. g. 'People should be allowed to 
express their political views freely however offensive other 
people might find them') and nationalism (e. g. 'Nationalist 
sentiments can only result in hatred'). The aim was to 
include as many different facets of political ideology as 
possible. Respondents were asked to express agreement or 
disagreement with each item on a five-point Likert type 
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scale. 
It was expected that answers to these items would provide 
indices of political ideology and, in the case of political 
cynicism, an index of the way of approaching politics which 
could be related to a new political event. 
Section F: YOUR VIEWS ABOUT EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN 
UNIFICATION IN 1992 
This section was included in order to enable the 
establishment of one or more indices of respondents' views, 
ideas and opinions about Europe and the European unification, 
as well as their understanding of the effects that such an 
event could have on Britain. Items for this section were 
created specifically for the purposes of this study. The 
items from the previous questionnaire were not used because 
the emphasis here was on the more recent events (such as the 
unification of West and East Germany, problems in British 
government due to disagreements about Europe, and so on). 
Four informal interviews-discussions were conducted (with 
people within the department of Psychology; one researcher, 
two postgraduate students and one secretary) during which 
interviewees were asked to express their opinions, ideas, 
feelings, fears and so on about Europe and the European 
unification. After this, common themes, appearing in all 
interviews, were used to create new items for this section of 
the questionnaire. Such themes, and consequently the items 
created (twenty-six), involved language (e. g. 'Different 
languages will always create barriers between European 
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countries'), economy (e. g. 'Many British companies will go 
bankrupt after the unification of Europe'), Britain's 
reluctance to fully participate in the unification (e. g. 
'Politicians in Britain will never surrender their power to a 
central European government'), differences between countries 
that make unification difficult (e. g. 'The countries of 
Europe will never be able to work together because they have 
different needs') and recent events in Eastern Europe (e. g. 
'The EEC should increase its budget in order to help the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe in their progress 
towards democracy'). Respondents were asked to express 
agreement or disagreement for each statement on a five-point 
Likert type scale. 
In this 'section, respondents were mostly-made to 'predict' 
what the effects of unification might be upon Britain and, in 
general, to express their opinions and views about something 
that has not taken place yet; something that is new and 
unfamiliar to them. It was expected that from the answers to 
this section one or more indices could be developed 
describing respondents' views and being related with some (or 
all) of the indices created from the previous sections. 
Section G: YOUR BACKGROUND 
This section aimed at providing as much information as 
possible about the sample. Respondents were asked questions 
about the specific course they are doing, the department they 
are doing it in, whether this course is related in any way 
with Europe and, if so, in what way. For these questions, 
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respondents had to write their answers in the space provided. 
Furthermore, respondents gave information about their year of 
study, their nationality (in order to confirm that they were 
British) their age and gender. 
Finally, at the end of the questionnaire, respondents were 
thanked for answering it, were given some space to express 
comments and criticisms and were asked to give an address, if 
they were not going to be at the University when the second 
questionnaire was sent to them. 
3.3.2. The second Questionnaire (Time 2) 
--------------------------------- 
The second questionnaire was 
in Ti. "Sections A, B, C, ýD, 
any changes, whereas section 
by a new section; YOUR VIEWS 
the only difference between 
section is described below. 
almost identical to the one sent 
E and F were repeated without 
G (YOUR BACKGROUND) was replaced 
ABOUT RECENT EVENTS. This is 
the two questionnaires. The new 
Section G: YOUR VIEWS ABOUT RECENT EVENTS 
This section had a number of different aims: (i) To have 
respondents themselves mention what they have seen as 
significant social or political events that happened in the 
two months between T1 and T2. Therefore, questions 1 to 5 of 
this section requested from respondents to write which (in 
their opinion) were the significant events that happened both 
in the world in general and in Britain in particular. These 
questions aimed at establishing whether the events included 
in the questionnaire as significant were the same as the ones 
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respondents themselves considered as such. 
(ii) To establish the degree of importance that certain 
specific events that did happen between Ti and T2 had for 
respondents themselves. So, in question 6, respondents were 
asked to rate the importance that ten events had for them 
personally, on a scale ranging from 'I have not heard about 
it' to 'Very important'. The ten events were the following: 
a. The war in the Gulf, b. The clashes between police and 
civilians in Lithuania (Soviet Union), c. The changes in the 
relations between the South African government and the ANC, 
d. The destruction of environment in the Gulf from the oil 
slicks, e. The maintenance of high interest rates in Britain, 
f. The Cannon Street Station train crash, g. The closure of 
Holy Loch military base, h. Disagreements between member 
countries in the EEC, about the handling of the war in the 
Gulf, i. The landing of American B-52 bombers in Britain, 
and j. The IRA terrorist attack on Downing street. 
(iii) The third aim of this section was to establish the 
degree of importance that respondent have seen as put upon 
the same ten events (as mentioned above) by the media as a 
whole. Question 7 requested from them exactly this and the 
range was from 'No-importance' to 'A lot of importance'. 
(iv) Establishing the respondents' perception of degree of 
objectivity with which the above mentioned ten events were 
presented by the media was another aim of this section. In 
question 8 respondents were asked to rate the objectivity of 
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presentation on a scale ranging from 'Biased' to 'Unbiased'. 
(v) Furthermore, it was necessary to establish whether 
significant events that had happened between Ti and T2 have 
had any effect on the way respondents view the unification of 
Europe. So, in question 9 they were asked to write any 
positive and any negative arguments for the unification that 
might have arisen from two of the events; namely the war in 
the Gulf and the events in Lithuania. This question aimed at 
eliciting from respondents their beliefs, explanations and 
'theories', about the EC and unification. It was expected 
that by writing the different arguments, respondents would 
express any ideas they had about the EC and the unification 
of Europe. In question 10, they were asked whether their 
views towards the unification have changed (either positively 
or negatively) or have not changed due to both of these 
events. This question aimed at establishing whether the 
respondents, themselves, considered that any of these events 
had changed their views in any way. 
It has to be pointed out that the ten events with which 
respondents were presented were chosen because they had been 
intensively presented and discussed by the media. The only 
exceptions could be considered the Cannon Street Station 
train crash and the closure of the Holy Loch military base. 
These two events were included in the list as a means of 
establishing respondents' ability to'differentiate between 
events and their respective importance. Every effort was 
made to present these events as objectively as possibly. The 
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two events that were isolated in questions 9 and 10 were 
selected because they were considered of national and 
international importance and because they were often 
mentioned in relation to Europe and the European Community. 
In general, this section was aiming at establishing 
respondents' subjective evaluation of events in order to 
enable the comparison of what they thought as significant 
with what was generally ('objectively') presented as 
significant by the media, for the time span between Time I 
and Time 2. 
4. ANALYSIS 
The information gathered by the two questionnaires was 
analysed by multivariate techniques, which allowed the 
description of the sample, the creation and comparison of 
indices between times, the investigation of relations between 
indices and the testing of hypothetical models. 
The open-ended questions, included in the second 
questionnaire, were analysed in terms of content. Here, 
emphasis-was put on the frequency with which different themes 
occurred in responses. Responses were classified into 
categories, either pre-established (according to the findings 
of the previous study) or specifically occurring in this 
study and mentioned by at least five people. The space that 
was provided for respondents' answers and the specific 
questions asked did not allow an elaborate analysis of this 
information. In any case, the main purpose of this study 
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(i. e. to investigate change), shifted the focus from the 
specific content of the target representation to the change 
of some of its components. Therefore, this information was 
analysed in order to establish any consistency with 
information coming from the previous study. The coding and 
classification was done by one person. (For the coding 
scheme, see Appendix D. 3. ). 
5. COMMENTS ABOUT THE DESIGN AND THE METHOD 
---------------------------------------- 
As mentioned before, one way to detect any possible change in 
people's representation of something new was to design a 
longitudinal study. This could have been achieved by a time- 
series design or by adopting a historical perspective. A 
longitudinal design, however, was considered more appropriate 
in this-case because it could enable the investigation of any 
possible changes in the representational systems of the same 
individuals over time. This present study was designed and 
conducted (in terms of timing) so as to be as close as 
possible to the significant events that took place. 
Furthermore, the aims of this study dictated the need to 
monitor the media for the time between the two parts of it so 
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as to acquire an 'objective' understanding of what the 
significant events were. 
Although the purpose of this study was to investigate change, 
again, the theoretical framework within which it was 
conducted implied that a single method would not prove 
sufficient. Yet, the time limits did not allow the use of 
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methods such as interviews. Using only questionnaires, on 
the other hand, would not permit one to talk about 
representations in their full complexity. The questionnaires 
were used with complete understanding that only some 
components of a representation could be tackled by it; 
namely, attitudes, beliefs and opinions. Any possible 
change, therefore, would have been in these components. 
Furthermore, the use of a number of open ended questions gave 
the opportunity to describe people's beliefs and explanations 
about the EC and the unification, as they themselves 
expressed them, as well as the spread of these beliefs and 
explanations in the specific population. 
6. RESULTS 
6.1. Some information about the Sample (Frequencies) 
----------------------------------------------- 
Twenty-eight students (32.6%) said that the course they were 
doing in the University was related in some way to Europe, 
whereas fifty-eight (67.4%) said that it was not. 
Respondents were asked to say (in an open-ended question) 
what this relation was. They were allowed to give up to two 
different answers if they felt that the course was related to 
Europe in more than one way. Most people who believed there 
was a relation (22) said that they would be able to go to 
Europe for their industrial (third) year, whereas seventeen 
said that they were learning foreign languages. (For all 
relations and frequencies see Table 2, Appendix D. 1. ). 
Respondents were asked in both questionnaires about their 
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political affiliations. There were some differences in their 
answers between Time 1 and rime 2. However, these can be 
attributed to the fact that they were asked which party they 
would vote for and not which party they had actually voted 
for. So, in terms of political preferences respondents can 
be described as follows. The biggest group (32.9% for T1 and 
31.4°6 for T2) said they would vote for the Conservatives in a 
general election, 20.0% (Ti) and 19.8% (T2) said they would 
vote for the Labour Party, 12.9% (Ti) and 9.3% (T2) said they 
would vote for the Liberal Democrats, 11.8% (Ti) and 16.3% 
(T2) said they would vote for the Green Party. 17.6% (Ti) 
and 19.8% (T2) were uncertain. Finally, 3.5% (Ti) and 2.3% 
(T2) said that they would not vote. 
When respondents were asked which party they would vote for 
in future elections for the European Parliament their answers 
were as follows: again the biggest group (33.7% for T1 and 
27.9% for T2) said they would vote for the Conservatives, 
14.0% (Ti) and 17.4% (T2) for Labour, 9.3% (Ti) and 8.1% (T2) 
for the Liberal Democrats, 19.8% (Ti) and 18.6% (T2) for the 
Green Party. 18.6% (Ti) and-25.6% (T2) were uncertain whom 
they would vote for. Finally, 4.7% (T1) and 2.3% (T2) said 
they would not vote. 
There are some more things to be said about respondents' 
political preferences and beliefs. When they were asked 
which political party they thought is more pro-European, the 
answers were as follows: the biggest group (34.5% for Ti and 
28.2% for T2) this time seemed to favour the Liberal 
v 323 
Democrats, 19.0% (Ti) and 14.1% (T2) favoured the Labour 
Party, 16.7% (Ti) and 21.2% (T2) the Conservatives, 13.1% 
(TI) and 18.8% (T2) the Green Party. 11.9% (Ti) and 15.3% 
(T2) believed that none of these parties is pro-European. 
Finally, 4.8% (Ti) and 2.3% (T2) said that they did not know. 
However, responses changed dramatically when respondents were 
asked which party they believed was most able to represent 
Britain's interests in the Community. Here, the biggest 
group (50.6% for T1 and 48.8% for T2) believed that it is the 
Conservative Party, 18.8% (Ti) and 17.4% (T2) favoured 
Labour, 11.8% (Ti) and 10.5% (T2) the Liberal Democrats, 2.4% 
(Ti) and 7.0% (T2) the Green Party. 12.9% (Ti) and 14.0% 
(T2) said that none of these parties is able to represent 
Britain's interests in the Community. (For the changes in 
respondents' preferences over time see Tables 3a, 3b, 3c and 
3d, Appendix D. 1. ). 
Only a small percentage of respondents (14,16.3%) said that 
they had voted in the previous European election. 
Responses to the different politics questions demonstrated 
that respondents had no clear-cut or strongly held political 
affiliations, hence the changes from Ti to T2. If their 
answers are seen strictly in terms of percentages for each 
political party, the biggest groups consistently supported 
the Conservatives, with Labour coming second in preference, 
the Liberal Democrats coming third and the Green party coming 
fourth. This was true both for general national elections 
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and for European elections. The change in preferences 
observed when respondents were asked to say which is the most 
pro-European party, where Liberal Democrats come first, 
followed by Labour. at Ti, then by the Conservatives and then by the 
Green party, is not surprising if one takes into account the 
general reluctance of the Conservative party towards European 
unity. However, even if the Conservative party was generally 
seen as less pro-European than others, it was considered the 
only one that can be trusted to protect Britain's interests 
within the Community. It has to be also mentioned that in 
all of these questions there were rather large percentages of 
respondents who did not express any political preference. 
Another aspect that was investigated by both questionnaires 
was interest in and keeping in touch with current affairs. 
Information gathered about this aspect adds to the 
description of the sample. Again there were differences 
between Time 1 and Time 2. People most probably answered 
these questions in terms of what they have been doing 
recently (i. e. close to the date they completed the 
questionnaire) and not in terms of what they have been doing 
over a long period of time. 
Seventeen (19.8% for Ti) and nine (10.5% for T2) respondents 
said that they read a daily newspaper everyday, forty-three 
(50.0% for T1) and forty-four (51.2% for T2) said that they 
do so three times a week. Twenty-four (27.9% for Ti) and 
twenty-three (26.7% for T2) said that they never do so. 
There were 2 missing answers for T1 and 10 for T2. 
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Respondents were also asked to give the name(s) of up to two 
daily newspapers they read. The most frequently mentioned 
daily newspaper was 'The Times', followed by 'The Daily 
Mail'. (For frequencies in terms of daily papers see Table 
4a, Appendix D. 1. ). 
Forty-six (53.5% for T1) and forty-four (51.2% for T2) 
respondents said that they read a Sunday paper, whereas 
thirty-nine (45.3% for Ti) and forty-one (47.7% for T2) said 
that they do not. There was one missing case in both T1 and 
T2. Again, respondents were asked to give the name(s) of the 
Sunday paper(s) they read. For Time 1 they were allowed to 
name two, but it seemed that some were reading more. So, for 
Time 2 they were allowed to name three. The most frequently 
mentioned Sunday paper was 'The Sunday Mail', followed by 
'The Sunday Times'. (For frequencies in terms of Sunday 
papers see Table 4b, Appendix D. 1. ). 
Forty-five (52.3% for Ti) and forty-six (53.5% for T2) 
respondents said that they regularly read magazines, whereas 
forty-one (47.7% for Ti) and thirty-nine (45.3% for T2) said 
that they do not. There was one missing case for T2. There 
were thirty-one different magazines mentioned by respondents. 
Practically each individual was reading a different magazine. 
However, there were six individuals who said that they read 
the 'The Economist'. 
Most people said that they were quite a lot interested in 
British politics, but, -generally, less interested in 
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international and European politics. (For frequencies see 
Table 5, Appendix D. 1. ). 
In terms of keeping in touch with European events by reading 
articles in newspapers and magazines, by watching related 
programs on TV and by discussing them with others, most 
respondents said that they did so sometimes. (For 
frequencies see Table 6, Appendix D. 1. ). 
Respondents were also asked how often they tend to watch each 
one of a large number of current affairs programs on TV. 
Most people said that they often (or, at least, sometimes) 
watch the news. Yet, in terms of current affairs programmes, 
the majority of people said that they never watch most of 
them. (For frequencies see Table 7, Appendix D. 1. ). 
Another question that was considered important in order to 
gather information about the sample's characteristics was how 
much they take into account the opinions and ideas of others 
when they are forming their own opinions about politics and 
current affairs. Also, it was important to establish what 
the communication processes were for the sample during that 
time, since such processes may influence the generation and 
development of social representations. Respondents were 
found to be influenced, at least a little, by their friends, 
the press, radio and TV, their parents, and politicians. 
(For frequencies see Table 8, Appendix D. 1. ). It was 
expected that such information could be used in further 
analysis, so as to discuss possible differences in factors 
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influencing people's opinions over time. It could have been 
the case that people would rely on different sources of 
influence in Time 1 than in Time 2. For instance, in Time 2 
people might have been found to rely more on information from 
the media than on friends or family. Yet, no significant 
differences were found between times. 
Finally, the majority of respondents 70, (81.4% for T1) and 
73 (84.9% for T2), said that they were not members of any 
political, action or environmental group. Only 15 (17.4% for 
T1) and 13 (15.1% for T2) said that they were. Respondents 
were also asked to name the group(s) they were members of. 
They were allowed to mention up to two different groups. 
(For frequencies in terms of groups see Table 9, Appendix 
D. 1. ). There are some differences between the groups for Ti 
and those for T2, these could be attributed to the 
possibility that respondents were mentioning the groups they 
support, without actually being members of them, or to the 
possibility that they became members of or left a group 
between Ti and T2. 
Summarising all of the above findings, it can be said that 
the sample showed a conservative tendency, it was found to be 
fairly interested in current affairs and keeping in touch 
with them but not actively participating in groups and 
movements. 
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6.2. Significant events and change in views about unification: 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
What the respondents said 
------------------------- 
6.2.1. Introduction 
------------ 
This section aims at investigating whether the events that 
have been already described as significant, and the ones that 
respondents themselves considered significant, were the same. 
This was necessary in order to be able to proceed in 
discussing the possible influence of these events on the 
target representation and the representational process. 
Furthermore, this section will present the arguments that 
respondents saw as arising from specific significant events 
that may influence the unification of Europe (both positively 
or negatively). By presenting these arguments, it is 
expected that it will be possible to discuss what 
respondents' ideas, explanations and 'theories' are, always 
in relation to the target representation. Finally, 
respondents' own estimations of any possible change in their 
views about unification will be discussed. 
6.2.2. Significant events according to respondents 
------------------------------------------- 
Respondents were first asked to write the three most 
significant social and/or political events that had happened 
in the world during the two months between T1 and T2. They 
were asked to write first the most significant event, then 
the second most significant and then the third. In each 
case, they were allowed to mention up to two events. The 
maximum number of events that a respondent could mention was 
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six. Furthermore, they were specifically asked to give their 
own personal opinion; i. e. what events they themselves saw as 
significant. In the same way they were asked about 
significant political and/or political events that happened 
in Britain for the same period of time. In this case they 
were asked for two events (most significant and second most 
significant) and again they were allowed to mention up to two 
events for each question. The maximum was four events. (For 
international and national events, see Tables 10a, 10b, 10c, 
lla, lib, Appendix D. 1. ). 
As the tables show, the events that respondents themselves 
defined as very significant, both internationally and 
nationally, were, to a great extent, the ones that were 
presented extensively and as very significant by the media 
and were discussed earlier in this chapter. The Gulf crisis, 
the problems in the Soviet republics and East Europe in 
general, and events in South Africa were considered (by 
respondents) as the most important events that took place 
between T1 and T2 on the international scene. On the 
national scene, on the other hand, the most significant 
events were the recession and its implications (unemployment, 
high interest rates), the resignation of M. Thatcher and the 
change of Prime Minister, and Britain's relations with the 
EC. However, as mentioned before, these results show that 
there is not a clear cut distinction between national and 
international events. Significant international events were 
seen as having national importance and vice versa. These 
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results do, however, demonstrate, that respondents' and the 
media's, as a whole, definition of important events were very 
similar. Thus, what have been here discussed as objective 
and subjective significant events tend to be the same. As 
mentioned before, the date when respondents completed the 
second questionnaire might have not been the same. There 
were, therefore, some differences in their description of 
significant events. 
6.2.3. Arguments about unification as a result 
--------------------------------------- 
of significant events 
--------------------- 
Respondents were also asked to write both positive and 
negative arguments about the unification of Europe arising 
from the Gulf crisis and the events in Lithuania. Answers 
were analysed and codified in terms of content. The outcome 
of this analysis is presented below. (For the coding scheme 
see Appendix D. 3. ) 
6.2.3.1. The Gulf crisis 
--------------- 
Positive arguments for unification 
------------------------------------- 
The first general positive argument was that European 
countries were brought together. This category was divided 
into a number of sub-categories, all of which involved this 
idea. The most common and rather simple argument was that 
because of the Gulf crisis countries advanced towards further 
unity. For an argument to be included in this sub-category, 
it had to simply mention the idea of advance in unity, 
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without any further explanation. Such an argument occurred 
41 times. 
The second commonest argument (19 occurrences) involved the 
idea of power. For a response to be classified under this 
sub-category, it had to mention that, as a result of the Gulf 
crisis, the EC countries have understood that if they are 
closer to each other they acquire and they demonstrate more 
power, and thus, are motivated towards further integration. 
In some cases, this idea was related to the possible 
independence (at least in terms of defence policies) from the 
U5. 
Another often mentioned idea (13 occurrences) was that of 
agreement and co-operation. Again, for a response to be 
included in this sub-category, it had to involve the idea 
that, since EC countries demonstrated their ability to agree 
and co-operate with each other on an issue such as the Gulf 
crisis, they may come closer and move towards further unity. 
A fourth sub-category included arguments suggesting that 
unity implies more influence. Arguments included in this 
sub-category involved the idea that, because they were 
united, the EC countries were able to have more influence 
over the Gulf crisis and that this will motivate further 
unity between countries. Such an argument occurred 11 times. 
The general idea of unity was also related to the sharing of 
financial and military responsibilities. In this sub- 
category the fact that EC countries had to share between them 
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both the financial and military responsibilities that arose 
due to the Gulf crisis was seen as one more indication of co- 
operation and of-ability to sort out such problems. Such an 
argument was mentioned 8 times. 
A second general category involved the idea that the EC's 
image worldwide improved as a result of its participation in 
and handling of the Gulf crisis, since the EC countries 
presented themselves as peace makers. Responses in this 
category considered them (the EC countries) able to negotiate 
peace in the Gulf. Accordingly, this was seen as 
strengthening bonds between EC countries and provided one 
more positive argument for unification. It was mentioned 6 
times. 
Finally, there were a number of responses (10) implying that 
the Gulf crisis made no difference in providing any positive 
arguments towards further European integration. 
Negative arguments for unification 
---------------------------------- 
The general idea underlying all negative arguments seen as a 
result of the Gulf crisis was that the EC countries were 
brought apart. The first sub-category involved the most 
frequent response (28 occurrences) which was that 
disagreements in the handling of the crisis were seen as one 
more argument against unification. Countries that disagree 
the way EC countries were seen to disagree on this issue 
could not be expected to become politically and economically 
united. 
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The second sub-category involved the idea that countries were 
brought apart because the crisis demonstrated that they have 
different aims and needs. For a response to be included 
here, it had to mention that the crisis brought to the 
surface long standing differences between countries that 
block further unification. Such an argument occurred 27 
times. 
The third-sub-category involved the idea of countries being 
split due to lack of balance of support. For responses to be 
included in this sub-category, they had to mention that 
certain member countries of the EC gave more in terms of 
financial and military support for the Gulf crisis than 
others and that this created one more negative argument 
against unification. It occurred 16 times. 
It has to be mentioned here that only three respondents 
believed that the Gulf crisis did not create any negative 
arguments against further European integration. 
6.2.3.2. The events in Lithuania 
----------------------- 
Positive arguments for unification 
---------------------------------- 
The general idea underlying all positive arguments mentioned 
as an outcome of the events in Lithuania was that it showed 
that united is better. The first sub-category involved the 
idea that united countries have more influence. For a 
response to be classified under this sub-category it had to 
mention that the EC countries saw that they could exercise 
334 
more influence as a group than as individual ones and that 
this provided a motivating factor for further unification. 
Such responses were the most frequently occurring (38 times). 
The second idea, stressing again the belief that united is 
better, implied that united countries can offer more help and 
protection. The fact that the EC countries came together in 
reacting to the events in Lithuania was seen as better in 
providing help and protection to the republics that were 
facing problems than if the countries had acted 
independently. Such an argument occurred 14 times. 
Yet, there were a number of respondents (11) that believed 
that the events in Lithuania made no difference and provided 
no positive arguments for further European integration. 
Negative arguments for unification 
The negative arguments mentioned as a result of the events in 
Lithuania could be divided into three general categories. 
The first involves specifically the EC countries and what 
they should learn from these events. The first sub-category 
involved the idea that the EC countries should learn that 
there is no need for unity. For responses to be included in 
this sub-category they had to present the events in Lithuania 
as an example of what happens if nations are forced to unite 
with others or to suggest that it is imperative for countries 
to be independent. This was considered as a negative 
argument against further European unification and it was 
mentioned 18 times. 
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The second sub-category involved the idea that nationalist 
sentiments have to be respected. Again, responses in this 
sub-category used the events in Lithuania as an example of 
what happens if national institutions are not respected. 
This idea was used as a negative argument against further 
European integration and occurred 5 times. 
A second general category involved the idea that unification 
was obstructed because the EC countries demonstrated 
inability to adopt a common reaction in relation to the 
events in Lithuania. Such an argument occurred five times 
and implied that this inability showed that integration will 
be unattainable if countries cannot agree on common actions. 
The third general category involved the idea that the EC 
countries should not believe that changes do take place in 
Eastern Europe. The only sub-category that was included in 
this general one included responses mentioning that Eastern 
Europe is under communist control. The idea implied by such 
an argument (which occurred 13 times) was that plans to 
integrate Eastern European countries in the EC or to even 
extend co-operation with them should be put aside. 
Finally, there were 10 respondents who believed that the 
events in Lithuania made no difference in producing negative 
arguments against further European integration. 
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6.2.4. Changes in respondents views about unification as 
------------------------------------------------- 
they themnelven reported them 
----------------------------- 
As Table 6 presents the vast majority of respondents said 
that their views about European unification did not change as 
an outcome either of the Gulf crisis or the events in 
Lithuania. 
Table 6: Change and lack of change of respondents' views about 
------- the unification of Europe due to the war in the Gulf 
and the events in Lithuania. 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Much morel More No change ; More IMuch more 
Positive ; Positive I (Negative ; Negative 
---------- I---------- I ---------- ; ---------- I --------- I ---------- 
IGulf 541 66 82 
IIIIII 
---------; ---------- ; ---------- I----------I--------- _---------- 
(Lithuania; 1141 78 11; - 
1II1111 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
6.2.5. Change or lack of change? 
------------------------- 
Conclusions from what the respondents said 
The first set of questions involving respondents' own and 
subjective accounts of what happened to be the most 
significant national and international events showed that 
respondents had agood knowledge of the events that took 
place between T1 and T2. All of them were able to mention at 
least one national and one international event of great 
significance. Furthermore, they were able to mention a large 
variety of events. Finally, as mentioned before, the events 
mentioned by respondents were more or less the same as the 
ones that the media as a whole dealt with extensively and 
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considered as very significant. When the respondents were 
asked to rate the importance of a group of events (for 
themselves and as seen by the media) and the objectivity with 
which these events were presented, the group consisted of 
events that they themselves had defined as significant, since 
the selection was made on the media coverage of events around 
this time. From these findings, it could be concluded that 
respondents themselves believed that a number of significant 
events had taken place during the time this study covered, 
and that these events were the same as the ones that the 
media considered significant. 
As far as positive and negative arguments for unification are 
concerned, most respondents were able to mention at least one 
(either positive or negative, resulting either from the Gulf 
crisis or the events in Lithuania). What is interesting here 
is that although respondents mentioned arguments, they also 
said that their views about the unification of Europe had not 
changed in any way. This means that either the arguments 
were seen as balancing each other, or that people believe 
that such arguments are not going to be taken under 
consideration if the EC countries are going to proceed into 
greater unity, or, finally, that although they are able to 
see the arguments, their own opinions do not change. 
It was expected that, in mentioning arguments about 
unification, respondents would reveal their ideas, 
explanations and 'theories' about the EC and the unification. 
According to responses in this section, it could be suggested 
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that respondents saw the EC as a group of countries which if 
united, can influence international politics, can be 
powerful and can advance peace in the world. Yet, these 
countries were seen as being different (in terms of needs and 
aims), something that results into disagreements and 
difficulties in deciding and acting as a group. Furthermore, 
there was also the idea that too close links between 
countries are a threat to national institutions. 
Such findings are consistent with the ones that have been 
discussed in the previous chapter. They show, once more, 
that people share popular ideas about the EC and the 
unification of Europe. Furthermore, the consistency between 
beliefs about the EC and people's ideas about further 
unification of Europe indicates that people relied on what 
they already knew (and what is generally believed) about the 
EC and projected it into the future so as to explain the 
unification, which is something that has not yet happened. 
Yet, in general, ideas, beliefs and 'theories' were rather 
simple and although people were able to mention both positive 
and negative arguments, in most of the cases these arguments 
were on the opposite ends of the same dimension. However, 
the specific questions and the space allowed for answers did 
not give the opportunity to people to express any further 
ideas they may have had about the topic. 
To conclude, the findings so far (from the monitoring of the 
media and the specific-questions in the questionnaire) showed 
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that significant events had taken place between Time 1 and 
Time 2, that these events were acknowledged and considered 
important by respondents themselves but that, overall the 
sample did not report changes in"views about the unification 
of Europe as a result of some of these events. 
6.3. Creation of indices: Factor analysis - Reliability 
-------------------------------------------------- 
testing 
Section A: THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
All nineteen items in this section were investigating 
knowledge about the European Community. When reliability 
testing was conducted for all of them they were found to 
scale together reliably (Cronbach's alpha= . 7391, mean=10.70, 
Standard deviation=3.48, Standardised item alpha=. 7283, 
N=79). The new variable created from this items is an index 
of respondents' knowledge about the EC, for Ti. 
For T2, these 19 items were, again, scaling together 
(alpha= . 6365, mean=10.86, Standard deviation=3.01, 
Standardised item alpha=. 6091, N=84). This variable is 
indexing respondents' knowledge about the EC, for T2. At 
both times, the higher scores indicate more knowledge. 
Section : YOUR VIEWS ABOUT BRITAIN 
For Time 1 responses, oblimin factor analysis was conducted 
for all items in this scale. This analysis was confirmatory, 
since it was expected that there would be three clusters 
of items indexing (i) Nationalist beliefs, (ii) Beliefs 
about the preservation of British identity and, (iii) 
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(*) Exploratory oblimin factor analysis was undertaken prior to the 
reported confirmatory analysis, for all sections of the questionnaire. 
For reasons of brevity this exploratory analysis is not reported here. 
Internationalist beliefs. Accordingly, three factors were 
extracted explaining 41.7% of the total variance. (The 
oblimin rotation converged in 13 iterations). 
In factor 1 (for items and loading weights see Table 12a, 
Appendix U. 1. ) there were six items involving both beliefs 
about Britain as a country (e. g. 'No other country is as good 
as Britain') and about preservation of national identity 
(e. g. 'Britain should stick to its own traditions'). These 
six items were found to scale together reliably 
(alpha= . 7522, mean=17.59, Standard deviation=3.95, 
Standardised item alpha=. 7535, N=84). The derived variable 
created from these items is indexing respondents' nationalist 
beliefs, for Ti. 
The same six items were found to construct a reliable scale 
for T2 (alpha= . 6593, mean=17.99, Standard deviation=3.31, 
Standardised item alpha=. 6644, N=85). This derived variable 
is, again, an index of respondents' nationalist beliefs, for 
T2. At both times the higher scores indicate stronger 
nationalist beliefs. 
Nationalist beliefs, as a scale measured in this study were 
not found to consist of the same items as in the previous 
one. This difference can be attributed to two reasons. 
First, both the number and the nature of the sample were 
different for the two studies. Secondly, in the first study, 
the sample was neither large nor representative enough to 
enable the suggestion that the scale was standardised. 
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According to these two reasons, it was not surprising that 
the Nationalism scales consisted of different items for the 
two studies. 
There were five items in factor 2 (for items and loading 
weights see Table 12b, Appendix D. 1. ), all involving co- 
operation between countries (e. g. 'Countries will only be 
able to survive if they act together'). These items were 
found to scale together reliably (alpha= . 6207, mean=16.96, 
Standard deviation=2.97, Standardised item alpha=. 6213, 
N=85). The new variable is indexing respondents' beliefs in 
international co-operation, for Ti. 
The same five items were also found to create a reliable 
scale for T2, although the alpha this time was rather low 
(alpha= . 5564, mean=17.30, Standard deviation=2.64, 
Standardised item alpha=. 5580, N=86). This new variable is, 
again, an index of respondents' beliefs in international co- 
operation, for T2. At both times the higher scores indicate 
stronger belief in co-operation. 
Although this scale was less reliable in T2 than in T1, the 
purpose of this study being to investigate change made it 
necessary to use it. 
There were five items in factor 3 (see Table 12c, Appendix 
D. 1. ). The items in this factor were not scaling together 
(alpha= 
. 4242) for Ti, so the analysis was not repeated for 
T2. 
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It should be pointed out that the structure of these factors 
was not simple; certain items were found to load on more than 
one factor (see Tables 12a, 12b and 12c, Appendix D. 1. ). In 
these cases the content of items and their loading weights, 
determined which scale they belonged to. (For factor 
correlations see Table 12d, Appendix D. 1. ). 
Section D: YOUR INTEREST IN CURRENT AFFAIRS 
The three items in question 5 from this section involving 
interest in British, international and European politics were 
-found to scale together reliably (alpha= . 8147, mean=9.99, 
Standard deviation=2.41, Standardised item alpha= . 8150, 
--- N=86) . ---- The- new .. variable- is -an. -index _ of__respondents' general 
interest in politics, for T1. 
These three items were, also, creating a reliable scale for 
T2 (alpha= . 7812, mean=9.89, Standard deviation=2.52, 
Standardised item alpha= . 7815, N=85). This variable 
is 
indexing respondents' general interest in politics, for T2. 
At both times, the higher scores indicate more interest. 
The three items in question 6 from this section involving 
contact with European issues and events (by reading 
newspapers/magazines, watching TV programs and discussing 
with others) were found to scale together reliably 
(alpha= . 6874, mean=5.98, Standard deviation =1.33, 
Standardised item alpha= . 6858, N=86). The new variable 
is 
an index of respondents' contact with European issues and 
events, for TI. 
343 
These three items were, also, scaling reliably for T2 (alpha= 
. 7550, mean=5.93, standard 
deviation=1.49, Standardised item 
alpha=. 7585, N=86). This variable is indexing respondents' 
contact with European issues and events, for T2. For both 
times, the higher scores indicate more contact. 
" Section E: YOUR VIEWS ABOUT CURRENT AFFAIRS 
For responses in Time 1, confirmatory oblimin factor analysis 
was conducted for all items in this scale. In this case, it 
was expected that there. would be eight clusters of items 
indexing: (i) Beliefs about the preservation of the 
environment, (ii) Political: cynicism, (iii) Beliefs about the 
welfare state, (iv) Liberalism, (v) Conservativism, 
(vi). Multiculturalism, (vii) Nationalism, and (viii) Economy. 
Accordingly, eight factors were extracted explaining 61.2% of 
the total variance. (The oblimin rotation converged in 56 
iterations). 
There were nine items loading on factor 1 (see Table 13a, 
Appendix D. 1. ) all related to welfare and government's 
intervention (e. g. 'The welfare state makes people nowadays 
less willing to look after themselves', 'It is the 
responsibility of the government to take care of people who 
cannot take care of themselves'). The nine items in this 
factor were found to scale together reliably (alpha= . 7870, 
mean=31.98, Standard deviation=5.40, Standardised item 
alpha=. 7840, N=85). This new variable is indexing 
respondents' beliefs about the welfare state and liberal vs. 
conservative views, for Ti. 
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The same nine items were, also, scaling reliably for T2 
(alpha= . 7625, mean=31.16, Standard deviation=5.22, 
Standardised item alpha= . 7655, N=86). This derived variable 
is indexing respondents' beliefs about welfare state and 
liberal vs. conservative views, for T2. At both times, the 
higher scores indicate more support for the welfare state and 
" more liberal views. 
There were six items (see Table 13b, Appendix D. 1. ) loading 
on factor 2, all involving environmental issues (e. g. 
'Whatever the cost we must act now to clean up the 
environment before it is too late'). These items were found 
---- to-scale -together -reliably -(alpha=- . 8275, --mean=24.29, -.. 
Standard deviation=3.88, Standardised item alpha=. 8338, 
N=_86). The new variable is indexing respondents' beliefs in 
the preservation of the environment, for Ti. 
The same six items were, also, scaling together reliably for 
T2 (alpha= . 8151, mean=23.71, Standard deviation=3.76, 
Standardised item alpha=. 8199, N=86). This derived variable 
is indexing respondents' beliefs in the preservation of the 
environment, for T2. At both times the higher scores, 
indicate stronger support for the preservation of 
environment. 
There were four items (see Table 13c, Appendix D. 1. ) loading 
on factor 3, all involving people's trust or lack of trust in 
politicians' genuine interest in the general public and for 
their own influence on political decisions (e. g. 'I do not 
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think that politicians care much about what people like me 
think'). A fifth item ('People like me have no say in what 
the government does') was added to these four items for the 
reliability testing. This was done because it was related to 
them conceptually and because, although it was loading on 
factor 5 (. 46), it was also loading on this factor (. 32). 
" The five items were scaling together reliably (alpha= . 7798, 
mean=15.93, Standard deviation=3.66, Standardised item 
alpha=. 7895, N=. 86). The derived variable created by these 
items is indexing respondents' political cynicism, for T1. 
The same five items were also scaling for T2 (alpha= . 7832, 
- --- -- ---mean=16.03, ---Standard deviation=3.42, ---Standardised- item 
alpha=. 7971, N=86). The derived variable is an index of 
respondents' political cynicism, in T2. At both times, the 
higher scores indicate stronger political cynicism; i. e. less 
belief in people's own participation in and control over 
political decisions and less trust -in politicians. 
There were three items (see Table 13d, Appendix D. 1. ) loading 
on factor 4. Although these three items were scaling together 
(alpha=. 6398) they did not hang together conceptually. 
Furthermore, if Item 24 ('Taxpayers should not be expected to 
pay for people who do not want to work') were to be deleted 
then alpha would be . 6619, but this would leave only two 
items in the factor. For these reasons no new variable was 
created for Ti and the analysis was not repeated for T2. 
There were three items (see Table 13e, Appendix D. 1. ) loading 
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on factor 5. These three items were not scaling together 
(alpha= -. 1286) for Ti, so the analysis was not repeated for T2. 
There were. four items (see Table 13f, Appendix D. 1. ) loading 
on factor 6. Although these four items were found to scale 
together (alpha=. 5865) they did not make sense conceptually. 
So, there was no scale created from these items in Ti and the 
" analysis was not repeated in T2. 
Since there were only two items (see Table 13g, Appendix 
D. 1. ) loading on factor 7, reliability testing was not 
conducted either in T1 or, T2. 
Finally, there was only one item loading on factor 8 (see 
Table 13h, Appendix D. 1. ). 
Again, the structure of this factor analysis was not simple; 
there wera items loading on more than one factor (see Tables 
13a, 13b, 13e, 13f, 13g, and Table 13i for factor 
correlations, Appendix D. 1. ). 
Section F: YOUR VIEWS ABOUT EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN 
UNIFICATION IN 1992 
Oblimin factor analysis for the items in this section 
extracted eight factors, after 32 iterations, explaining 
62.9% of the total variance. However, items in these factors 
were not hanging together conceptually and some of the 
factors were also strongly correlated with each other. 
Reliability testing was, therefore, conducted for all twenty- 
six items in this section. They were found to scale together 
reliably (alpha= . 8162, mean=83.29, Standard deviation=10.74, 
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Standardised item alpha= . 8431, N=85). The derived variable 
created by these items is an index of respondents' general 
views about unification, for Ti. 
These 26 items were, again, found to scale together reliably, 
in Time 2 (alpha= . 8162, mean=82.12, Standard deviation=9.68, 
Standardised item alpha=. 8077, N=85). This derived variable 
is an index of respondents' general views about unification, 
for T2. At both times the higher scores indicate more 
positive views. 
Section G: YOUR VIEWS ABOUT RECENT EVENTS 
This section appeared only in the second questionnaire. 
First, questions 6 (Importance of specific events as seen by 
respondents), 7 (Importance of the same events as presented 
by the media in general) and 8 (Objectivity in the 
presentation of these events by the media) were factor 
analysed separately, using oblimin factor analysis. All 
three factor analyses came out with three factors, but it was 
apparent that, in fact,. there were two factors within each 
set of items for each question. Confirmatory oblimin factor 
analysis for all ten items (events) in the question about the 
importance of events as seen by respondents themselves 
extracted two factors, explaining 45.7% of the total 
variance. (The oblimin rotation converged in 7 iterations). 
On factor 1 loaded five items (see Table 14a, Appendix 
D. 1. ), all involving international events. Reliability 
scaling between these items showed that they scale together 
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(alpha= . 7005, mean=17.05, Standard deviation=2.30, 
Standardised item alpha= . 7342, N=86). A new variable was 
created indexing the degree of importance that respondents 
themselves put upon events that happened in the international 
scene. The higher scores indicate more importance. 
On factor 2 loaded four items (see Table 14b, Appendix D. 1. ), 
all involving events that happened in Britain. These items 
were scaling together reliably (alpha=. 6063, mean=11.69, 
Standard deviation=1.95, Standardised item alpha=. 6101, 
N=86). This derived variable is indexing the degree of 
importance that respondents themselves put upon events that 
------- ----happened -in Britain. __- _The. -higher scores 
indicate more 
importance. (For factor correlations see Table 14c, Appendix 
D. 1. ). 
Confirmatory oblimin factor analysis for the items in the 
question concerning the importance put upon the events by the 
media as a whole extracted two factors explaining 43.5% of 
the total variance. (The oblimin rotation converged in 5 
iterations. ) Item 1 (the war in the Gulf) was not included 
in this analysis because all respondents believed it was 
given a lot of importance by the media and therefore its 
variance was zero. 
On factor 1 loaded five items (see Table 15a, Appendix D. l. ), 
all involving national and international events of 
importance. These items were scaling together (alpha=. 5786, 
mean=11.54, Standard deviation=1.76, Standardised item 
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alpha=. 5931, N=85). The new variable is indexing the 
importance that respondents believed that the media vut upon 
events that were of national and international importance. 
The higher scores indicate more importance. 
On factor 2 loaded four items (see Table 15b, Appendix D. 1. ) 
involving events of lesser importance than the ones in factor 
1. Item 10 ('The IRA terrorist attack on Downing Street') 
was the only one not hanging conceptually with the rest of 
the items. The first reliability testing showed that the 
alpha would increase if this item were to be omitted from the 
scale. Therefore, the reliability testing was repeated for 
remaining -three . 
items (7, 
_ 
8- and 9) ._ _These -items 
were___ 
. _. _ 
scaling together reliably (alpha= . 6169, mean=5.09, Standard 
deviation=1.35, Standardised item alpha=. 6197, N=84). The 
new variable is indexing the importance that respondents 
believed the media put-upon events that were less important 
than events in the previous scale. The higher scores 
indicate more importance. - (For factor-correlations see Table 
15c, Appendix D. 1. ). 
Confirmatory oblimin factor analysis for the items in the 
question concerning the objectivity with which events were 
presented by the media extracted two factors, explaining 
45.7% of the total variance. (The oblimin rotation converged 
in 11 iterations). There were six items in factor 1 (see 
Table 16a, Appendix D. 1. ), all involving events extensively 
covered by the media. These items were scaling together 
reliably (alpha= . 6730, mean=13.25, Standard deviation=8.71, 
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Standardised item alpha= . 6664, N=85). The derived variable 
is an index of the degree of objectivity in the presentation 
of events that were extensively covered by the media. The 
higher scores indicate more objectivity. It has to be 
pointed out that, actually, these events were the ones that 
occupied the media most. It is quite possible that what 
respondents were scoring these events for, was the extent of 
coverage rather than objectivity. 
In factor 2 loaded three items (see Table 16b, Appendix D. 1. ) 
involving events less extensively covered than the ones in 
factor 1. These items were scaling together reliably 
(alpha=-- . 6323, . -mean=5.73, -Standard 
deviation=1.54, 
Standardised item alpha=. 6435, N=84). The new variable is an 
index of the degree of objectivity in the presentation of 
events less extensively covered by the media than the 
previous ones. The higher scores indicate more objectivity. 
For these two factors the structure was not simple; there 
were items loading in both of them (see Table 16a, for factor 
correlations see Table 16c, Appendix D. 1. ). 
Table 7 presents all the derived variables created by the 
analyses described in this section. 
Before proceeding to further results from this study there 
are two points to be made. First, not all the expected 
scales were derived from the answers of this specific sample. 
There may be two explanations for this. On the one hand, it 
may be that the number of respondents in this sample (86) was 
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rather small and did not produce the expected variety in 
answers. On the other hand, it may be that specific items in 
the different sections of the questionnaire did not work in 
the expected way in eliciting responses. 
Secondly, since in most of the factor analyses the structure 
was not a simple one, no claims about the validity of the 
scales can be made. The'scales are believed to measure what 
they are considered to, but within this specific population. 
A larger'sample would have been necessary to enable such' 
claims. 
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Table 7: Variables created by factor analysis and reliability 
------- testing both at Time 1 and Time 2. 
------------------ ----------------------------------------------- 
! TIME 1! TIME 2! 
-- --------------------- ----------- 
! VARIABLE IaI Mean I St. D.! NaI Mean I St-D. 1 N 
!! { !! 1 !! 
----------------- ------ - ----- 1 ------ ---{l {----! ------ ! Nationalism 1.751 17.59! 3.95 ; 84 1.661 17.991 3.31 85 I 
; ----------------- --- 1------ --- 
i------I 
------ 
! Internationalism 1.62; 16.961 2.97 1 85 1.56; 17.30; 2.64 186 ; 
- ----- ---- --- ------ ------ ---- 
; Welfare 11.79,31.981 5.40 1 85 1.761 31.16; 5.22 86 1 
----' --- *------ ------ 
! Environment 1.83! 24.29! 3.88 1 86 1.81; 23.711 3.76 1 86 1 
----------------- ; --- ; ------ i !! i! ; Political 1.78; 15.93; 3.66 1 86 1.781 16.031 3.42 1 86 1 
; Cynicism {II IIII {{ 
----------------- I---; ------ {------l----1---; ------ I ------ {---- { 
! Views about !. 82;. 83.29; 10.74 1 85 11.821 82.19! 9.68 1 85 1 
! Unification !!! 1{1! 1! 
l ----------------- I --- l ------ I ------ {----l --- II I ---- ; 
! Interest in 1.811 9.991 2.41 ! 86 1.781 9.891 2.52 1 85 { 
! Politics !!! 1!!! !! 
---'--- ------' -- ---'----! 
! Contact with 1.69{ 5.98! 1.33 ! 86 1.751,5.93; 1.49 ! 86 1 
; Europe 11 ;; .{! {; 
--- ; ---! ! ! l---l------; ------{----; 
; Knowledge 1.741 10.70; 3.48 1 79 1.64! 10.861 3.01 1 84 1 
' --- I ------ I ------ i ---- I 
! Importance !. N/A 1.701 17.051 2.30 1 86 1 
! of Events A It I1 !1 
l----------------- l------------ ---------- {---I------ { ------ I---- { 
; Importance ! N/A 1.61; 11.691 1.95 1 86 1 
! of Events B ! I! 1 1! 
----- --- ------ ------ I ---- I 
! Importance ! N/A 1.581 11.541 1.76 1 85 1 
! from Media, -A { III !! 
----------------- ------------- ---------- ------' ' 
! Importance ! N/A 11.62! 5.091 1.35 ! 84 1 
! from Media B !!! 1! 
----------------- ------ ' --- i ------ I ------l----! 
; Objectivity N/A 1.67; 13.25! 8.71 1 85 ! 
; of Media A ! !! 1 !! 
I ---------------- ------------- --------- ; --- I ------ I ------! ---! ! Objectivity I N/A 1.631 5.7311 1.54 1 84 1 
lot Media B 
------------------ 
I 
------------- 
!II 
---------------------- ------------ 
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6.4. Investigating differences in constructs and the target 
---------------------------------------------------- 
representation between times - T-tests 
-------------------------------------- 
6.4.1. T-tests for scales between times 
-------------------------------- 
According to the theoretical hypothesis; i. e. that it is 
possible to detect changes in pre-existing belief systems, 
kinds of involvement and in some aspects of the target 
representation between times, and that these changes might be 
attributed to the significant events that took place during 
this time, t-tests were conducted for some of the derived 
scales, for which it was hypothesised that they might change 
over time. These scales were the following: 
(i) Nationalism and Internationalism: it was expected that 
both beliefs in one's country and beliefs in international 
co-operation might become stronger after the war, since such 
an event could increase both nationalist feelings and 
demonstrate the necessity of international co-operation. 
(ii) Welfare: it was hypothesised that the political events 
that were presented as nationally significant, such as the 
change of the Prime Minister in the U. K. might have produced 
a change towards stronger conservative beliefs. 
(iii) Environment: it was expected that beliefs about the 
preservation of the environment could become less strong due 
to the events that took place between Ti and T2. The 
significance of such events (like the Gulf war) might have 
created an indifference to issues like such as the 
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preservation of the environment. 
(iv) Interest in politics: it was believed that the events 
that took place between Ti and T2 might have increased the 
sample's interest in politics since they were considered 
quite important and people might have become interested in 
them. 
(v) Views about unification: this t-test was conducted in 
order to test the hypothesis that general views about 
unification would not change as a whole. 
Since the number of t-tests conducted was rather large, only 
results significant in two-tail probability were considered. 
Only two scales were found to differ significantly between Ti 
and T2; namely Preservation of the environment and Welfare 
(Conservatism/Liberalism). 
As far as Preservation of the environment is concerned, it 
was found that in T2 respondents were supporting 
significantly less the preservation than they were in Ti 
(t=2.41, df=85, P(0.05). This finding could be attributed to 
different reasons. First, it could be that the events that 
took place between Ti and T2 (and especially the Gulf crisis) 
diminished the importance of things such as environmental 
concern. Secondly, people might have felt that whatever 
individuals think about and do for the preservation of the 
environment, it does not make any difference when major 
environmental disasters will take place anyway, as in the 
case of the oil spills in the Gulf. This might have caused a 
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kind of 'helplessness' that could have produced the observed 
difference in environmental concern. 
In terms of Welfare, respondents were found to be 
significantly less in favour of the welfare state; i. e. to 
hold significantly less liberal views in T2 than they did in 
Ti (t=2.69, df=85, P<0.01). This change, again, could be 
attributed to a number of reasons. It is quite possible that 
the change of Prime Minister might have had such an effect, 
especially in a younger population, since the new Prime 
Minister (J. Major) was heralded as the 'new conservative 
blood'. Furthermore, the recession might have made 
respondents consider social spending (something related to 
the Welfare state and Liberalism) as one more burden for the 
taxpayer. Finally, it could also be suggested that the 
handling of the war in the Gulf by the Conservative Cabinet 
was seen as generally successful (so successful actually that 
for a certain period of time there were suggestions of a 
'khaki general election' that would ensure the Conservatives 
another five years in power), so there was an increase in 
support for them in the general public, something that may 
have been reflected in this specific population. 
The rest of the t-tests conducted for scales showed non 
significant differences between times. As expected, general 
views about unification were not found to change 
significantly between times. Accordingly, focus was put upon 
the specific items of the scale so as to detect whether 
changes had occurred in-specific aspects of views about 
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unification. 
6.4.2. T-tests for items of views about European unification 
----------------------------------------------------- 
between times 
------------- 
Again, which items would be tested for change over time was 
decided in terms of the theoretical hypotheses and the 
specific events that took place between Ti and T2. It was 
expected that only specific aspects of views about the 
unification of Europe might change. These aspects involved 
the relation of Britain with other European countries and 
with Europe in general, compared with Britain's relation with 
the US (items 6 and 11), industry (items 22 and 24), 
unemployment (item 12) and monetary policy (item 20). Such 
aspects were considered possible to undergo changes because 
they involved issues that were related to the events that 
took place between T1 and T2. 
Again, the number of the t-tests to be conducted was rather 
large so only results significant in two-tail probability 
were considered. There were only four items (out of the six 
mentioned above ) in which responses were found to differ 
significantly between times. Specifically, these items were: 
(i) Item No 6: ''Britons have more in common with the French 
and Germans than with the Americans'. It was found that in 
T2 respondents agreed significantly less with this item than 
they did in Ti (t=2.23, df=84, P<0.05). This difference 
showed that in T2 respondents tended to believe more than 
they did in T1 that'Britons have more in common with the 
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Americans than with the French or Germans. This finding 
could be seen as directly related to the war in the Gulf, 
during which Britain and the US were seen to be in much more 
agreement than Britain was with her European counterparts. 
(ii) Item No 12: If European workers are allowed to work in 
Britain, British workerq will face unemployment'. It was 
found that in T2 respondents agreed more with this item than 
in-Ti (t=2.39, df=83, P<0.05). Accordingly, respondents in 
T2 believed significantly more that British workers may face 
unemployment if European workers were allowed to work in 
Britain. This finding could be attributed to the 
consistently rising unemployment figures in Britain (and 
especially in the estimate of two million unemployed people 
that was announced between Ti and T2). It is not surprising 
that respondents believed that the situation would worsen if 
European workers were to work in Britain and that this belief 
became stronger over time. 
(iii) Item No-20: 'A common European monetary policy will 
result in less power for the Finance ministers of each 
country'. The t-test showed that in T2 respondents disagreed 
significantly more with this item than they did in Ti 
(t=-2.82, df=85, P(O. 01). So, in T2 respondents believed 
significantly less that Finance ministers will lose power. 
This finding could be accounted for by the fact that during 
this period Britain decided to join the ERM and proposed the 
use of a 'hard-ECU'. None of these events was presented as 
capable of reducing the power of the Chancellor of the 
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Exchequer (Finance minister) in Britain. 
(iv) Item No 24: 'Many British companies will go bankrupt 
after the unification of Europe'. The t-test showed that in 
T2 respondents agreed more with this item than they did in Ti 
(t=3.21, df=85, P<0.005). This indicated that, in T2, 
respondents believed more that British companies will go 
bankrupt after the unification of Europe. Again, this 
finding is consistent with the events that took place between 
Ti and T2; recession was getting worse and many companies had 
announced cuts in numbers of employees. So, it is not 
surprising that people believed that if competition increased 
the situation could worsen. 
The comparisons of responses in the remaining two items 
(11; 'USA, not Europe, is Britain's natural ally' and 
22; 'British industry will face increased competition after 
the unification of Europe') showed non significant 
differences over time. For the first of these two items 
(No. 11), it was observed that people remained uncertain over 
time.. For the second (No. 22) the mean score in T1 indicated 
a high degree of agreement ('ceiling effect') so, it might 
have been difficult to have a significant rise in agreement 
in T2. Yet, the tendency was towards more agreement with the 
statement in T2. 
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6.4.3. Conclusions 
The; four items for which agreement was found to change 
significantly from Ti to T2, show that although views about 
unification as a whole did not change significantly, certain 
aspects of it did.. The fact that views about unification was 
a unidimentional construct did not allow any prediction that 
it will change significantly, especially within a rather 
short period of time. However, the changes observed in the 
four items indicate that the aspects of people's views about 
unification that differ significantly from T1 to T2, are the 
ones that would have been expected to change in relation to 
the significant events that took place, nationally and 
internationally, during this time. 
These findings add some information to that presented 
previously. It was shown that respondents themselves did not 
consider the significant events that happened between Ti and 
T2 able to change their views about unification substantially. 
This finding is supported by the fact that views about 
unification as a whole did not change significantly over 
time. Still, it was shown that there were some changes in 
aspects of these views and that these changes could be 
accounted for by the events that took place between times. 
6.5. Investigating change in the relations between variables 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Correlations 
------------ - 
Having established the stability of views about unification 
as a whole over time and the aspects of these views that did 
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change, the next step was to proceed to investigating any 
changes in relations between variables over time. 
Correlations were conducted between variables from Ti and 
variables from T2 separately. The aims here were (a) to 
observe relations (or lack of relations) for Ti and T2 and 
(b) to see whether these were consistent between Ti and T2. 
All significant correlations for both times were in the 
expected direction. There were a number of relations between 
variables that remained stable between times. (For Zero 
order correlations see Table 8 for Ti and Table 9 for T2). 
The negative relations between the course's (respondents were 
doing) relation to Europe and contact with and knowledge 
about Europe indicated that if the course was related to 
Europe, people tended to demonstrate more contact and 
knowledge. 
General interest in politics was consistently and positively 
related with contact with European events and knowledge about 
Europe. Furthermore, contact and knowledge were also 
consistently and positively related to each other. 
Concern about the preservation of environment had a stable 
and positive relation with both welfare and gender. The 
first relation indicated that the more the concern, the more 
the support for the welfare and the stronger the liberal 
beliefs. The second indicated that females consistently 
tended to be more concerned about environmental issues. 
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Table 8: Zero order correlations - Time 1 variables 
? aTA 
. 
DfllU HU1 EN1 PCi UNI1 TT[OI1 CTh T1 T1} NtM F, URLL1 
-. 2370 
Th'I AT1 ( 81) 
1 . 015 
-. 2114 . 2377 
WELL ( 83) ( 84) 
P=. 028 P=. 015 
. 1889 . 2373 
EN1 n. s. ( 85) ( 85) 
P=. 042 P--. 014 
. 1856 
PC1 n. s. n. s. ( 85) n. s. 
P=. 044 
-. 4178 . 5846 -. 1971 
UNI1 ( 83) ( 84) n. s. n. s. ( 85) 
F=. 000 x. 000 P=. 035 
. 2195 . 1867 
D=Ll n. s. ( 85) n. s. n. s. n. s. ( 85) 
P=. 022 P=. 044 
. 2545 . 1847 . 5138 
ODN71 n. s. ( 85) n. s. n. s. n. s. ( 85) ( 86) 
1ß. 009 1-. 045 P=. 000 
. 2446 . 3368 . 3174 . 2941 
Till D. S. ( 79) n. s. n. s. n. s. ( 78) ( 79) ( 79) 
P=. 015 P=-. 001 P-. 002 P=. 004 
-. 1801 -. 2941 -. 1868 
EUREL1 n. s. n. s. n. s. n. s. n. s. ( 85) n. s. ( 86) ( 79) 
P=. 050 1=. 003 P=. 050 
. 2185 
GEM ER n. s. n. s. n. s. ( 86) n. s. n. s. n. s. n. s n. s. n. s. 
P=. 022 
VARIABLE l1 BELS 
KtTA: Nationaliun, IWJNAT1: Internationalism, H l: Welfare, Thl: thrir tent, 
f'c1: 11olitical Cynicisru, UA71: Unification, INTJOL1: Interest in Politics, 
CJQVT1: Contact with grope, T1KNUti': Knowledge about Europe, 
FUREL1: Course's relation with Europe 
n. s.: Non significant correlation 
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Table 9: Zero order correlations - Time 2 variables 
1ATB INTNAT2 WELS FN2 K2 UN12 IWIT012 (X)NI'2 T210M f JRE 1 
-. 3494 
LVINAT2 ( 85) 
P=. 001 
-. 2114 . 2281 
WEL2 ( 85) ( 86) 
P--. 026 P=. 017 
. 2786 
E N2 n. s. n. s. ( 86) 
f`ß. 005 
-. 3478 . 1781 
P2 ( 85) n. s ( 86) n'. s. 
N. 001 P=. 050 
-. 4578 . 4590 . 2139 
UNI2 ( 84) ( 85) ( 85) n. s. n. s. 
P=. 000 P--. 000 P--. 025 
. 2141 
1w1F0L2 n. S. ( 85) n. s. n. s. n. s. n. s. 
Y=. 025 
. 2770 . 1855 . 5324 
COiV'I2' n. s. ( 86) n. s. n. s. n. s. ( 85) ( 85) 
P--. 005 P=. 045 P=. 000 
. 1968 . 2854 . 2793 
T2K 0W n. s. n. s. n. s. n. s. n. s. ( 83) ( 83) ( 84) 
P=. 037 P=. 004 P=. 005 
-. 3669 -. 2468 
EL ml n. s. n. s. n. s. n. s. n. s. n. s. n. s. ( 86) ( 84) 
P=. 000 N. 010 
-. 1864 . 1980 
GEHER n. s. n. s. ( 86) ( 86) n. s. n. s. n. s. n. s. n. s. n. s 
P=. 043 P=. 034 
VARIABLE LABELS 
N1TB: 'Nationalism, LYTNAT2: Internationalism, WEL2: Welfare, E42: Fhvironment, 
Pc2: Political Cynicism, UNI2: Unification, 'I ML2: Interest in Politics, 
al'JT2: Contact with Europe, T2K [ : Knowledge about Europe, 
£IJREL1: Course's relation with Europe 
n. s: Non significant correlation 
363 
Political cynicism was positively related with welfare. This 
relation was consistent between times, but rather weak, 
showing that people who demonstrated less trust in 
politicians tended to be the more liberal ones. 
Welfare had, consistently, a negative relation with 
nationalism and a positive one with beliefs in international 
co-operation. These relations suggested that the more 
liberal respondents' beliefs, the weaker their nationalist 
beliefs, whereas the stronger their beliefs were in 
international co-operation. 
Nationalism was negatively related, in both times, with 
beliefs in international co-operation and general views about 
unification. On the other hand, beliefs in international co- 
operation were consistently and positively related to general 
interest in politics, contact with Europe and general views 
about unification. 
Finally, general views about unification had a positive (but 
weak in both times) relation with contact with European 
issues and, again, a positive relation with knowledge about 
Europe. This second relation, however, was much stronger and 
of a higher level of significance in Ti. than in T2. 
However, there were a number of relations between variables 
that were observed at one time and not at the other. First 
are presented the relations observed at T1 and not at T2. 
Concern about the preservation of the environment was 
364 
positively related with beliefs in international co- 
operation. The finding that the first scale changed 
significantly between times can explain the lack of relation 
between these two variables in T2. 
There was also a negative relation between political cynicism 
and views about unification. The fact that this relation was 
not observed in T2 was rather peculiar, since views about 
unification did not change significantly between times and 
political cynicism was not expected to change. Partial 
correlation analysis showed that for Ti the relation remains 
significant when controlling for the two variables' relations 
with-the same variables--in-T2--(r=-. 252, --N=81, P=. 011-when 
controlling for political cynicism T2, r=-20, N=81, P=. 035 
when controlling for unification T2, r=-. 298, N=80, P=. 003 
when controlling for both). For T2, the partial correlation 
analysis showed no significant relation between variables. 
T-tests between two groups, split in terms of median score on 
political cynicism, and compared in terms of means on 
unification, showed no statistically significant differences 
for either time. However, in Ti the more politically cynical 
group scored lower on views about unification than the less 
politically cynical one, whereas in T2 this is reversed; the 
more politically cynical group scored higher on views about 
unification than the less'politically cynical one. This 
could explain why in T1 the relation between variables 
indicates that the higher the political cynicism, the less 
positive the views about unification, whereas in T2 the 
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relation disappears. The more dramatic change was observed 
between the mean scores of non politically cynical on views 
about unification for Ti and T2 (85.49 and 81.25, 
respectively). This shows that people who tend to believe 
that their participation in and opinions about politics can 
have an effect tend to hold less positive views about 
unification in T2 than they did in T1. It could be suggested 
that these people's views may be influenced by the recent 
disagreements between European countries on issues such the 
Gulf crisis and political and economic union. On the other 
hand, people who do not believe that they can influence 
political decisions in any way and that politicians will go 
on and do whatever they want no matter what the general 
public thinks, seem to remain more consistent, as far as 
their views about unification of Europe are concerned 
(Ti : mean=81.25, T2 : mean=82.75). This might imply that 
these people do not actually care about what is happening in 
politics in general and in European politics in particular, 
so events that took place could not change their views in any 
way. - 
Furthermore, in Ti there was a positive relation between 
general views about unification and interest in politics. 
Again, this relation called for more detailed investigation, 
since none of the variables changed significantly between 
times. On the one hand, the significant positive relation in 
T1 was a rather weak one, a-fact that may explain its 
disappearance in T2. On the other hand, when respondents 
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were split into two groups in terms of median scores on 
interest in politics and compared in terms of views about 
unification for both times, it became obvious that for T2 the 
group that was found to report more interest in politics was 
expressing less positive views about unification than the 
corresponding group in Ti (although with no statistical 
significance). It could be suggested that this group's 
interest in politics might have led to more information about 
the events that took place in the political scene between T1 
and T2 and about the way these events have affected the 
relations between member countries of the EC. This in turn 
could explain the drop in this group's support for the 
unification of Europe. 
Finally, a positive relation observed, in T1, between 
beliefs in international co-operation and knowledge about 
Europe was not observed in T2. This shift might be caused by 
the fact that, although in Ti the two groups of respondents, 
divided in terms of median score in knowledge, differed (but 
not significantly) in terms of their beliefs in international 
co-operation (the group that demonstrated less knowledge was 
scoring lower on international co-operation), in T2 the two 
groups scored almost the same on beliefs in international co- 
operation. This may mean that from Ti to T2 knowledge about 
Europe stopped playing any role in people's beliefs about 
international co-operation. It is quite possible that the 
significant events that took place in the international scene 
had an effect on this; i. e. when events of such importance 
I 
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take place, then beliefs about international co-operation may 
become quite independent from what people know about Europe. 
Similarly, there were a number of relations observed at T2 
but not at Ti. -First, beliefs about the welfare state were 
negatively related with gender (indicating less liberal views 
for females) and positively with general views about 
unification. In both cases, the significant change in the 
welfare scale between times can account, at least partly, for 
the lack of relation in Ti. As far as the first relation is 
concerned, t-tests between males and females in terms of 
beliefs in the welfare state for both times indicated 
(although with no statistical significance) that in T2 
females score lower on Welfare than they do in T1. This 
shift could further explain why the relation between 
variables is significant in T2, whereas it is not in T1. 
As far as the'relation between welfare and views about 
unification is concerned, when respondents were split into 
two groups in terms of median scores on welfare and compared 
in terms of difference of means in views about unification 
for both times, the results explained this finding further. 
In Ti, the difference of means between respondents strongly 
supporting the welfare state (liberals) and those that do not 
(conservatives) in terms of views about unification was not 
statistically significant (t=-1.76, N=82, P=0.08). However, 
in T2 this difference became statistically significant 
(t=-2.54, N=83, P<0.05), indicating that, in T2, respondents 
who supported strongly the welfare state (liberals) held 
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significantly more positive views about the unification than 
respondents who did not support the welfare state 
(conservatives). This could be explained if one takes into 
account the recent differences between the British government 
and its European counterparts. People who support the 
government (i. e. Conservatives) and have witnessed the 
disagreements over the handling of the Gulf war and over 
further political and economic integration between Britain 
and the other countries in the EC may feel less positive 
towards the unification. On the other hand, people who 
oppose the government (i. e. Liberals) have been generally 
seen as more positive towards unification, since -if nothing 
else- the Conservatives have never been at ease with the 
idea of European integration. The present sample was already 
shown to believe, irrespective of political preferences, that 
the Liberal Democrats are considered to be the most pro- 
European party in Britain. This general tendency, together 
with the fact that the Conservative government was recently 
seen as having a hard time in Europe, can explain the finding 
that the more liberal of the respondents tended to be more 
positive towards European unification than the Conservative 
ones, especially after these recent events. 
Another relation observed at T2 and not at Ti, was the 
negative one between political cynicism and nationalism. 
Since political cynicism was not expected to change and 
nationalism was not found to change significantly over time, 
this relation was further investigated. Partial 
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correlation analysis was conducted, controlling for the 
relation of these variables between times. This analysis 
showed that, indeed, in Ti (controlling for the two 
variables' relation with political cynicism and nationalism 
for T2) there was no significant relation between them 
(r=-. 04, N=79, P=. 375). In T2, however (controlling for the 
two variables relation with political cynicism and 
nationalism for T1) the relation was significant (r=-. 20, 
N=79, P=. 038). This indicated that, in fact, there was a 
change within the sample between Ti and T2; i. e. respondents 
moved towards the extreme of the scales, leaving the means 
almost the same but affecting the relation between variables. 
This was tested by splitting the sample into two groups for 
Ti and two groups for T2 according to the median score in the 
political cynicism scales for Ti and T2 respectively. 
T-tests showed that for Ti there was no significant difference 
between the means of the two groups on the nationalism scale 
(t=1.28, df=82, P=0.20). However, for T2 the two groups were 
significantly different in terms of nationalism (t=3.71, 
df=83,. P<0.001). This showed that the group that scored 
higher on political cynicism in T2 expressed significantly 
weaker nationalist beliefs than the one that scored lower. 
It could be suggested that a significant event as the war in 
the Gulf might have made people who believe in their 
influence upon political decisions and trust politicians in 
general experience and express strong nationalist sentiments. 
On the other hand, people who believe that they have no 
influence whatsoever on political decisions and that 
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politicians will do whatever they want, no matter what the 
general public believes, should not be expected to feel any 
strong nationalist sentiments just because their country is 
involved in the war. These people will be expected to 
believe that no matter what they think, a war is something 
handled by politicians, who are not to be trusted in any 
case, and if politicians decide to involve the country in 
this war, this has nothing to do with national pride but only 
with personal interests and ambitions. (For more details and 
further analysis see Appendix D. 4. ). 
Finally, there was a negative relation between concern about 
the preservation of environment and year of study, observed 
only in T2, indicating that the longer respondents have been 
in the university, the less concerned they tended to be with 
environmental issues. The significant change in the 
environment scale between times is possibly the reason for 
this change in the relation between the two variables. 
Before going on to discuss the results from the relations 
between variables, the relations between these variables and 
the importance and objectivity of events that took place 
between time 1 and time 2 have to be presented. (For 
correlations see Table 10) 
The general finding from these correlations is that none of 
the indices of importance or objectivity of events was found 
to be significantly related to general views about 
unification. Some of these indices were only related to 
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Table 10: Correlations between variables (T2) and importance 
-------- and objectivity of events 
Gflv'DER YEAR DMOL2 UWF2 72t, 'N 1i IIJREL 1 NATB I& AT2 UNI2 EN 2 M2 PC2 AGE 
. 2201 . 3691 . 2307 . 2447 
DUIORT1 ***( 86) ** ***( 86) ( 86) ( 86) 
P=. 021 ? =. 000 P=. 016 P=. 012 
. 2380 . 2401 . 2736 . 1949 
Dma 2( 86) ( 86) ( 85) **( 86) 
1=. 014 P=. 013 P=. 006 P=. 036 
. 2617 
OBJECT! *( 85) * * 
P=. 008 
. 2633 
IEDIAi *( 85) * ** 
P=-. 007 
. 2379 . 2068 
MEDIA2 *( 84) * ( 83) 
P=. 015 P=. 030 
**** 
. 2111 
* (86) 
P=. 026 
-. 2046 
*( 85) 
P=. 030 
******** 
**** 
VARIABLE 
YEAR: 
LABELS 
Year of study 
INT}012: Interest in Politics 
aim: Contact with Firope 
T2KNc : Knowledge about Europe 
Mail: Course's relation with Europe 
NATB: Nationalism 
7N NAT2: Internationalism 
UNI2: Unification 
E3v2: Euvirorrient 
ham?: Welfare 
I'C2: iblitical Cynicism 
IMF'OF11: Importance that respondents the selves put upon events that 
happened in the international scene 
InM2: Importance that respondents themselves put upon events that 
happened in Britain 
OBJDCTI: Objectivity in the presentation of events that 
were extensively covered by the media 
lEDIA1: Importance that respondents believed the media put upon 
events that were of national and international importance 
MEDIA2: Importance that respondents believed the m eia put upon 
events that were less important 
*: Not significant correlation 
**** 
i 
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contact with European events, interest in politics, political 
cynicism, welfare and the preservation of environment. 
Specifically, the importance that respondents themselves put 
upon international events was positively correlated with 
contact with European events. Also, the importance they 
thought had been put by the media on less significant events 
(such as the closure of the Holy Loch military 
base) was positively related with general interest in 
politics. The importance of international events, as seen by 
respondents themselves, was positively related with their 
beliefs about the preservation of the environment, their 
support for the welfare state and political cynicism. 
Finally, the objectivity with which very significant events 
were presented by the media was negatively related with 
political cynicism. 
All other significant relations between these indices and the 
rest of the variables involved 'demographic' characteristics 
of the sample and involvement indices. Therefore, importance 
of national events as seen by respondents was positively 
related with gender, age and with year of study, indicating 
more importance for females, for older respondents and for 
students with more years of university education. Also, 
importance of national events was negatively correlated with 
the course respondents were doing in the university, 
indicating that when their course was related to Europe, 
respondents tended to put more importance on these events. 
Importance of events, as presented by the media and for both 
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groups of events (very significant and less significant), was 
related, positively, with the year of study. Year of study 
was also related, but this time negatively, with the 
objectivity with which very significant events were presented 
by the media, indicating that the more years respondents have 
been in the university, the less objective they consider the 
presentation of these events. 
6.5.1. Conclusions 
There are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from the 
results of the correlations between variables. First, it was 
shown that, although most variables did not change 
significantly over time, the relations between them did. 
Specifically, the relation between views about unification 
and a number of variables was modified over time. As already 
mentioned, these changes could be attributed to the 
significant events that took place between T1 and T2. 
Furthermore, the relations between variables that are 
expected to be used in the explanation and understanding of 
the unification (such as nationalism and political cynicism) 
were also found to change over time. In addition, views 
about unification were found to have a rather weak relation 
with contact with European events at both times and no 
significant relation with interest in politics in T2. Also, 
there was a drop in the relation between views about 
unification and knowledge about Europe, from Ti to T2, both 
in terms of strength and level of significance. Finally, 
views about unification were not found to be related with the 
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different indices of importance of events that took place 
between Ti and T2, or the objectivity with which these events 
were presented. 
All these findings, together with the fact that the events 
that took place between times were, both 'objectively' and by 
the respondents themselves, considered very significant, 
indicated that the lack of change in views about unification 
cannot be attributed to lack of significant events or to 
respondents' not considering these events as, indeed, 
significant. Yet, it has been already demonstrated that 
respondents themselves said that their views did not change 
and this was also confirmed by the lack of any change in the 
scale measuring views about unification and the lack of any 
relation between the importance of these events and 
unification. There are a number of possible explanations for 
these findings. On the one hand, it could be suggested that 
the events that happened between T1 and T2 and the 
information about them were perceived as being in agreement 
with what was already believed for the unification. Thus, 
even though these events were acknowledged as significant, 
they did not create any change in views about the 
unification. However, if one accepts that, indeed, new 
information was perceived as being in agreement with already 
existing ideas, then it becomes rather difficult to explain 
the changes in specific aspects of the views about 
unification. In such a case, one would not expect any 
changes either in the views of unification as a whole or in 
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specific aspects of it. The specific aspects of the views 
about unification that were found to change over time 
indicated that the new information was perceived as such and 
it might have triggered these changes, since changes were 
observed in aspects that were related to the events that took 
place between times. On the other hand, it could be argued 
that views about unification as a whole did not change 
because this might have disturbed the stability of people's 
understanding of such an idea. Although significant events 
were acknowledged as such, they were not allowed to interfere 
with the views about unification. It could be said that 
change was sacrificed for the sake of stability. However, 
the changes in specific aspects of the views about 
unification indicated that, although stability was preserved 
in these views as a whole, some peripheral elements were 
allowed to change. Furthermore, the weak relations between 
views about unification and variables considered to measure 
different kinds of involvement indicated that people's views 
were not so much related with what they knew about or their 
actual contact with and interest in Europe, but more with 
variables considered to measure pre-existing belief systems. 
This was one more indication that it is not the facts but the 
beliefs that play the most significant role in the 
understanding of unification. So, before drawing any further 
and general conclusions, it was necessary to investigate 
which variables are involved in this understanding as well as 
the importance of these variables in this process. Finally, 
it was also necessary to investigate any changes in the 
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structure of this process over time. 
6.6. Testing the explanation of views about unification 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Modelling (Regressions) 
----------------------- 
For the creation of the path-like model that follows, the 
theoretical hypotheses, the findings of the previous study 
and of the correlations between variables as presented above 
were used. Table 11 shows the hypothetical model tested by 
multiple regression, for both Ti and T2. 
It was expected that interest in politics and political 
cynicism would precede more specific political ideas, such as 
ideas about the welfare state (conservativism/liberalism) and 
about the preservation of the environment. In a sense, the 
first group of constructs deals with 'approaches' to 
politics, whereas the second represents political ideology 
for this specific sample. Accordingly they were expected to 
have the above presented positions in the model. These 
constructs were followed by beliefs in international co- 
operation and nationalism. It was believed that this group 
of constructs would function as a mediator between the 
previous groups and the outcome construct (views about 
European unification). The rationale for this was that the 
way people approach politics and their political opinions 
will be 'filtered' through their nationalist and 
internationalist beliefs before being used as templates for 
explaining something new and unfamiliar. Furthermore, 
political ideology constructs were seen as more general than 
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Table 11:, Hypothetical model tested by multiple regressions. 
Interest in 
National--------- 
Politics 
------I 
I ternationalism 
Interest in 
International Welfar 
Politics 
Views about 
European 
___, 
-Unification 
Interest in 
European Environment-- 
Events 
Ntion ism 
Political 
Cynicism- 
:. Hypothesised relationship 
------------- : Relationship possible 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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internationalism and nationalism, which specifically involved 
beliefs in one's country and beliefs about relations between 
countries. It was considered that, in relation to 
unification, these were the most theoretically founded 
positions in the model. 
Before going on to explain how the regression analyses were 
conducted, certain points have to be clarified. First, 
constructs that have been placed together on the same level 
of the model were seen as covering similar aspects of more 
global constructs but not seen as identical. Correlations 
between variables placed on the same level were rather low. 
(For zero order correlations for the variables included in 
the regressions see Table 12; for Ti and Table 13; for T2). 
However, an exception was made for the three interest in 
politics items. In this case, it was considered necessary to 
break the interest in politics scale into individual items, 
since it was important to investigate how each one of them 
was behaving within the model and also because, as a scale, 
general interest in politics was not related to views about 
unification at T2. The correlations between interest in 
national, international and European politics, 
therefore, 
are higher than would have been allowed otherwise. 
Secondly, since one of the aims of this study was to compare 
Ti with T2, only the respondents who had no missing scores on 
all scales and items in both times were selected, reducing 
the number of respondents in these analyses to 79. 
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Furthermore a number of variables that could (theoretically) 
be in the model were not included for specific reasons. The 
course's (respondents were doing in the university) relation 
to Europe was not found to correlate with Views about 
Unification, so the former could not be used in explaining 
the latter. Also, the correlations between interest in 
politics, knowledge about Europe and contact with Europe were 
found to actually function in such a way, if put in the 
model, so as to absorb between them the covariance that each 
one of them shared with views about unification. Finally, 
importance of national and international events were not 
included, since they were not found to be related with views 
about unification. 
According to all of the above two sets of (Enter-type) 
regressions were conducted separately for Time 1 and Time 2. 
These regressions, due to the nature of the hypotheses, 
followed a number of steps. The first step was to regress, 
separately, welfare and environment (as dependent variables) 
onto the three interest in politics items and political 
cynicism. The second step was to regress, again separately, 
beliefs in international co-operation (internationalism) and 
nationalism (as dependent) onto the three interest in 
politics items, political cynicism, welfare and environment. 
The fourth and final step was to regress views about European 
unification (dependent) onto all of the previously mentioned 
variables. The path-like models that were created from these 
regressions are presented in Table 14 and 15. 
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Table 12: Zero order correlations for variables included in 
--------- regression analyses for Ti 
INT1 INT2 INT3 PC1 WELl EN1 INTNAT1 NATA 
INT2 . 68 
INT3 . 50 . 62 
PC1 -. 10 -. 15 -. 04 
WELl . 06 -. 12 -. 08 . 21 
EN1 . 00 . 07 . 03 -. 03 . 20 INTNAT1 . 15 . 27 . 27 -. 06 . 24 . 16 
NATA -. 08 -. 04 -. 23 -. 17 -. 18 -. 02 -. 22 
UNI1 . 06 . 14 . 26 -. 19 . 17 . 11 . 60 -. 41 
Variable Labels 
--------------- 
INT1 : Interest in National Politics 
INT2 : Interest in International Politics 
INT3 : Interest in European Events 
PC1 : Political Cynicism 
WEL1 : Welfare State (Conservativism/Liberalism) 
EN1 : Environment 
INTNAT1 : Internationalism 
NATA : Nationalism 
UNI1 : Views about European Unification 
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Table 13: Zero order correlations for variables included in 
--------- regression analyses for T2 
T2INT1 T2INT2 T2INT3 PC2 WEL2 EN2 INTNAT2 NATB UNI2 
T2INT2 . 62 
T2INT3 . 38 . 61 
PC2 -. 12 -. 02 -. 13 
WEL2 -. 02 -. 07 -. 13 . 18 EN2 -. 06 -. 01 . 03 . 16 . 25 INTNAT2 . 08 . 33 . 17 . 17 . 20 . 08 
NATB . 04 -. 09 -. 15 -. 40 -. 19 -. 07 -. 32 UNI2 . 00 . 13 . 21 -. 03 . 21 . 07 . 48 -. 43 
Variable Labels 
T2INT1 : Interest in National Politics 
T2INT2 : Interest in International Politics 
T2INT3 : Interest in European Events 
PC2 : Political Cynicism 
WEL2 : Welfare (Conservative/Liberalism) 
EN2 : Environment 
INTNAT2 : Internationalism 
NATB : Nationalism 
UNI2 : Views about European Unification 
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Table 14: Path model resulting from multiple regression 
-------- analyses for Time 1. 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Interest in 
National Internationalism 
Politics 
Interest in .3 . 49 International Welfare 
Politics Views about 
European 
Interest in Unification 
European Environment 2 
Events -. 31 r =. 50 
Political 
`Nationalism 
24 
Cynicism 
N=79 
=Summary of Sub-Analyses 
----------------------- 
2 
IOutcome Variable 
------------------------ 
Adj. R 
----------- 
F 
--------- 
Sign. 
------ 
I Welfare . 04 1.85 n. s. IEnvironment -. 04 . 17 n. s. 1lnternationalism . 13 2.90 <0.05 Nationalism . 05 1.74 n. s ; Unification . 44 8.70 0.00 
383 
Table 15: Path model resulting from multiple regression 
-------- analyses for Time 2. 
Interest in 
National 
Politics 
Internationalism 
Interest in 46ý 36 
International Welfare . 24 Politics View3 
about 
Interest in European 
European Environment /Unification 
Events -. 42 38 2 
Nationalism r 
Political 
=. 39 
Cynicism -. 29 
N=79 
Summary of Sub-Analyses 
2 
Outcome Variable 
----------------- 
Adj. R F Sign. 
--- 
Welfare 
-------------- 
-. 002 
--------- 
. 95 
------- 
n. s. 
Environment -. 02 . 64 n. s. 
Internationalism . 15 2.72 <0.05 Nationalism . 15 2.79 <0.05 Unification . 30 4.27 0.00 
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(For non-significant relations between variables as produced 
by the regression analyses, see Tables 17a, 17b, 17c, 17d, 
17e, 18a, 18b, 18c, 18d, 18e, Appendix D. 1. ) 
The path model that was tested twice by the regression 
analyses described above presents certain relations, direct 
and indirect, between variables. Analytically, when tested 
for T1 the model explains 50% of the total variance of the 
dependent variable; i. e. views about European 
unification. This path model showed that there were three 
variables directly related to views about unification; 
political cynicism (beta=-. 24), nationalism (beta=-. 31) and 
beliefs about international co-operation (beta=. 49). 
Furthermore, welfare was found to be indirectly related to 
views about unification through its direct relation to 
beliefs about international co-operation (beta=. 30). 
Finally, interest in European events was also indirectly 
related to unification through its direct relation to 
nationalism (beta=-. 33). Both these indirect relations were 
positive between the first independent variables (welfare and 
interest in European events) and the dependent one (views 
about unification). Interest in national and international 
politics, as well as environment, were not found to be 
related (either directly or indirectly) with any of the rest 
of the variables. 
When tested for T2, the model was more complex than the one 
described above. However, here only 39% of the total 
variance of the dependent variable (views about unification) 
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was explained. Again, the same three variables were found to 
be directly related to unification; political cynicism 
(beta=-. 29), nationalism (beta=-. 38) and beliefs about 
international co-operation (beta=. 36). Furthermore, there 
were three variables indirectly related to views about 
unification; welfare through its direct relation to beliefs 
about international co-operation (beta=. 24), interest in 
international politics again through its relation to beliefs 
about international co-operation (beta=. 46), and political 
cynicism through its direct relation to nationalism 
(beta=-. 42). Welfare and interest in international politics 
were related positively with views about unification. 
However, the two negative relations between political 
cynicism and nationalism and nationalism and views about 
unification would suggest a positive relation between 
political cynicism and unification. Nevertheless, this 
cannot be accepted, since the direct relation between these 
two variables was a negative one. In this case, it can be 
suggested that the amounts of variance shared by these two 
variables and nationalism are independent. 
Finally, interest in national politics and European events 
were not found to be related to any of the variables in the 
model. 
6.6.1. Discussion and conclusions 
-------------------------- 
The first conclusion that can be drawn from the testing of 
the model at both times concerns the way views about 
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unification seem to be explained. This is a general 
conclusion and it supports the findings of the previous 
study, as far as the anchoring mechanism is concerned. At 
both times the model showed that views about unification are 
explained, to a significant extent, by pre-existing belief 
systems (nationalism and internationalism, directly and 
welfare, indirectly), and that they are, also, related to 
different kinds of involvement (political cynicism, directly 
and interest in politics; European in Ti and international in 
T2, indirectly). Once more these findings indicate that the 
anchoring mechanism may operate when people are faced with 
something new and unfamiliar. There is a consistent pattern 
in the relation of views about unification and constructs 
that are considered to be pre-existing belief systems and 
kinds of involvement which supports the hypothesis that 
people rely on what they already know and believe in order to 
explain and understand something new. Furthermore, the 
relation between different kinds of involvement and the new 
idea suggested that it is quite possible that when people 
have specific relations to the new object, either in terms 
of interest or in their way of approaching politics in 
general, then, 'again, these may be involved in the way they 
would understand something new. These findings also supported 
the belief that anchoring may be a selective mechanism since, 
in"both cases, constructs related to the new idea were found 
to contribute to its explanation. For instance, welfare, 
which was generally seen as an index involving political 
beliefs and specifically beliefs about the governments' 
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intervention, was involved in this process, whereas beliefs 
about the preservation of the environment (which cannot be 
considered a specifically European issue) was not. 
However, the focus of these analyses was put upon 
similarities and differences in the way that the views about 
unification were explained over time. The testing of the 
model, at both times, showed that these views are 
consistently and directly explained by people's nationalist 
and internationalist beliefs, as well as by their political 
cynicism. Furthermore, views about unification were 
consistently, but indirectly, related to respondents' support 
for the welfare state (and conservatism vs. liberalism). 
One change observed in the testing of the model between T1 
and T2 was that in Ti it was interest in European events that 
was related to views about unification (indirectly and 
through nationalism), whereas in T2 it was interest in 
international politics (indirectly and through 
internationalism). However, the rather high correlation 
between interest in European events and interest in 
international. politics (. 62 for T1 and . 61 for T1) and the 
correlation between nationalism and internationalism (-. 22 
for Ti and -. 32 for T2 ) may be the reason for this 
difference between times. It is possible that this 
difference is an artefact of the relations between these two 
sets of variables. 
A second change was that, in T2, there was a relation between 
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political cynicism and nationalism which was not present in 
Ti. This relation (for T2) and the lack of it (for Ti) has 
been already discussed. However, here it takes on a 
different sort of importance, since both variables are found 
to be related to views about unification. It could be argued 
that when the relation between two predicting variables 
changes, then, although the outcome variable does not change 
as such, the sub-structure onto which it is based may change. 
On the other hand, it could, alternatively, be argued that 
again this is the outcome of an artefact. If one goes back 
to the correlations between variables included in the 
regression (Tables 12 and 13), then one will observe that 
there are some differences in them for T1 and T2. The 
correlation between political cynicism and interest in 
European events is very low (-. 04) for Ti, whereas in T2 it 
is -. 13, the correlation between interest in European events 
and nationalism is -. 23 (Ti) and -. 15 (T2) and that between 
nationalism and political cynicism is -. 17 (Ti) and -. 40 
(Ti). These differences in the correlations between these 
three-variables over time and the way the specific kind of 
regression used in this analysis works (i. e. it selects the 
variable that fits better in the model) could be the 
explanation for this difference in the two outcome models. 
When the-model-was tested for T1, it might have been-interest 
in European events (since it had a stronger relation to 
nationalism than political cynicism did) that was selected. 
However, in T2, political cynicism might have been selected, 
since, this time, this variable had a stronger relation with 
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nationalism. 
The main observation that can be drawn from both models is a 
consistency over time in the way the views about unification 
are explained by the different preceding variables. The 
power of independent variables in determining the dependent 
remains stable across time. What changes is the value that 
different independent variables contribute to the explanation 
of the new between times. Specifically, internationalism's 
contribution drops from T1 to T2 whereas nationalism's and 
political cynicism's increase. It could be argued that the 
significant events that took place between T1 and T2 might 
have influenced the value of the different parameters in 
explaining the-views about unification. The drop in 
internationalism's contribution and the simultaneous increase 
in that of nationalism and political cynicism might be an 
outcome of the events that happened, which might have made 
people to put different weight on the specific systems of 
beliefs and kind of involvement. Alternatively, it could 
once more be the way this specific kind of regression 
analysis operates that produced these differences of weights, 
always depending on the correlations between variables. 
As'mentioned the importance of national and'international 
events were not found (from the correlations) to be related 
to views about unification. This finding, together with the 
fact that contact with and knowledge about Europe were not 
part of this process of understanding views about 
unification, indicated that respondents relied on what they 
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believed about their country (nationalism), co-operation 
between countries (internationalism), and politicians' 
genuine interest in the general public (political cynicism), 
and not on what had actually happened and how significant it 
was. 
To summarise the findings from the testing of the model for 
both times, it has to be mentioned again that views about 
unification were found to be directly explained (at both 
times) by the same variables. The changes observed in the 
variables indirectly explaining views about unification, in 
the relation between variables explaining directly these 
views and the weights of specific variables in explaining the 
outcome variable could be considered artefacts of the 
specific analysis used. 
These findings, together with the consistency in the views 
about unification as a scale over time, indicate that the 
tendency in explaining unification was towards stability and 
not towards change. Since it has been already established 
that significant events had taken place and that these were, 
both objectively and subjectively, considered really 
significant, these findings indicate that it is possible that 
change was not allowed to take place so as not to disturb 
this stability. Even though changes had occurred both in 
variables preceding views about unification (such as welfare) 
and between relations of variables (such as political 
cynicism and nationalism)', the flow of the model and the 
relations between'views about unification and the preceding 
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variables did not change. 
7. CHANGE OR LACK OF CHANGE? 
------------------------- 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
----------------------------------- 
What has been observed is that there were a number of 
significant. events that took place during the period of two 
months that intervened between the two parts of these study. 
These events (or at least one of these events; i. e. a war) 
were presented by the media and considered by respondents as 
very important. It can neither be argued that not even one 
important event took place, nor that people did not know 
about this event, nor that they did not take it into account, 
nor that they did not consider it important. So, if the 
argument of the theory that representations are changed or 
modified during periods of social upheaval (and this was such 
a period), was right, then one would expect a change in the 
evaluative aspect of the target representation that was 
indexed in this study. Yet, no change was observed in this 
aspect, as a whole. The small changes that were observed 
were in specific facets (considered to be related to the 
significant events that took place) of this evaluative 
aspect. This lack of overall change could be attributed to 
the possible agreement between the new information about the 
events and the target representation. However, the fact that 
some facets of the target did change over time and that these 
facets were related to the events indicates that the new 
information and the target may not be in absolute agreement. 
An alternative-explanation, therefore, may be that the aim of 
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representations and of the representational process is to 
induce stability. Significant events happened, people knew 
about them and considered them important, yet, allowing them 
to interfere in the representational process could have 
resulted to instability. This instability might have been 
avoided by anchoring the target new idea onto the same pre- 
existing belief systems and kinds of involvement and by 
actively selecting the ones that, themselves, did not change 
significantly over time. The importance of events was not 
found to be part of this anchoring process. 
According to all of the above, it could be suggested that the 
hypothesised activity and selectivity of the anchoring 
mechanism might have a functional explanation; i. e. it may 
function so as to induce stability and avoid change. Indeed, 
if the aim of anchoring is to facilitate familiarisation, 
then it would have been improper to allow change. Because 
change means 'different', 'other', 'new', whereas familiar 
means 'similar', 'same', 'old'. 
The finding that there were some changes in specific aspects 
of the target new idea, and that these were consistent with 
some of the significant events, allows some further 
conclusions to be drawn. First, as expected and predicted, 
although the evaluative aspect of the representation of 
target idea did not changed as a whole, there were changes in 
the periphery of this aspect of the representation. As 
suggested in the introduction to this chapter, it is the 
peripheral elements of a representation that may change, 
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whereas its nucleus remains stable. The results of this 
study indicated that the evaluation of the target 
representation as a whole did not change and this whole has 
to be considered as the nucleus of the present 
representation; having both an organising and creative 
function; that is, to maintain, the overall image of 
unification stable (Abric, 1984). Elements of this whole, 
though, were found to change, indicating that such elements 
might be in the periphery of the representation and, as such, 
vulnerable to modification. It could be argued that these 
elements might have 'escaped' the organising function of the 
nucleus in order to serve another purpose; that is to absorb 
the effects of the significant events and allow stability to 
be maintained overall. Also, these changes produced one more 
piece evidence supporting°the selectivity of the 
representational process, since the changes were not on 
random facets but on the ones that one would expect in 
relation to the events. Finally, these changes showed that 
the events were acknowledged and, in a way, they might have 
been accommodated and absorbed by small changes in the 
periphery of the representation, but they were not allowed to 
inflict any major changes that would have disturbed the 
nucleus of it. 
Before moving on to more conclusions, it should be repeated 
that this study focused only on some components of a 
representation; namely attitudes and opinions about a target 
object. This choice was made because of the specific aim and 
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design of this study. The findings of the previous study, in 
which a more complex multi-methodological approach was used, 
demonstrated consistency in information coming from different 
methods. There is no reason to deny that similar findings 
might have been observed, if a similarly complex approach was 
to be adopted in this second study. Yet, this is a 
hypothesis which has not been tested. The fact that this 
study had to be designed and conducted in a very limited time 
period, which was dictated by the events and could not be 
controlled, led to the decision that it was better to 
investigate at least parts of the representation than to go 
for a 'grasp all' approach and run the risk of 'lose all'. 
The aim of this study; i. e. to investigate possible changes 
in a representation in the making, dictated the necessity to 
act fast and follow the flow of external events. However, 
the representational process has been considered throughout 
the present piece of-work as a dynamic and interactive one, 
so if one wanted to arrive to a certain understanding of how 
this process may take place and what its functions may be, 
then one had to adopt such an approach. 
What these findings further imply is that, even if no change 
was observed, the representational process should be 
considered, as hypothesised, a dynamic one. Change may not 
be the only indication of activity and of process. The fact 
that small changes were observed in the periphery of the 
target representation is an indication that people actively 
interacted with the information about significant events, 
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even if the outcome of this interaction was stability in the 
nucleus of the representation. People might have 
accommodated the importance of events by allowing small 
changes in the periphery of the representation and by 
inducing the stability which was necessary to preserve the 
nucleus of the-representation. 
Furthermore, lack of change does not imply lack of process. 
People received information and it was obvious that they 
processed this information, but again, the outcome was 
stability instead of change. 
The longitudinal design that was adopted for this study 
proved a very useful tool in investigating any possible 
change. This study was made possible because the Gulf war 
took place and because it was an event that one could predict 
happening, even two months before its actual start. This 
event and the importance that it carried made it possible to 
argue that, indeed, the target representation was studied 
under conditions of social upheaval. It is rather difficult 
to imagine what other kind of event could have allowed such a 
design to be used with similar efficiency. Still, the 
argument for longitudinal designs (as well as time-series and 
historical approaches) in the study of social representations 
remains, and the belief that the representational process 
could be investigated by such approaches is strengthened. It 
is believed that the conclusions of this study could not have 
been drawn if the target representation had been studied only 
once. The finding that the representational process is a 
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dynamic one, even if its outcome is to induce stability, 
suggests that it has to be studied by longitudinal designs. 
The conclusions of this study lead to certain suggestions 
about further investigation as far as the representational 
process is concerned. First, there is an indication that the 
anchoring mechanism may be taking place under specific 
conditions, such as relatedness between pre-existing systems 
of belief and the unfamiliar target. Also, it is quite 
possible that there may be different degrees of anchoring and 
that these may depend on the salience of the pre-existing 
belief systems. These conditions and degrees call for 
further and detailed investigation, so as to enable a better 
understanding of the processes of social representations. 
Furthermore, change in representations should not be ruled 
out. It could be suggested that, since social upheaval was 
not found to produce change, it may actually be the day-to- 
day contact with something that started as new and 
unfamiliar and was explained in such a way so as not to 
disrupt stability that may lead to slow but more significant 
change. For instance, if one was to go back to the 
population that participated in this study in two years' time 
(after the unification of Europe in 1992 has taken place), 
then one might find significant changes in the representation 
of unification. Although in such a case it could not be 
argued that it is something new and unfamiliar, one could 
expect that it might be explained by different constructs and 
that itself isrdifferent. It may seem self-contradictory, 
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but it might well be the case that it is familiarity that 
allows change. This means that only after something has 
become familiar may the day-to day interaction inflict more 
dramatic changes than one event, isolated in time, might 
inflict. A single event, even if it is very related to a 
target object, is, itself, something new that may require 
understanding and explanation before it can inflict changes 
on specific targets. On the other hand, when a target object 
becomes part of the representational system of individuals, 
then it may both induce changes to the whole system, and it 
itself may be altered. Continuing with the same example 
given above, it could be suggested that, after the 
unification of Europe, people may understand better what it 
really means, how much it affects them and their country, 
which are the benefits and the bad effects coming from it 
and, as a result, alter their ideas, beliefs, images, 
attitudes and explanations of it. Having a sort of 'personal 
experience' of something that they used to consider strange 
and unfamiliar, people may develop a more differentiated 
representation of a target object, which could be different 
from the one they held to begin with. So, what seems to be 
important is the stage that the representational process is 
in, as far as the possibility of change is concerned. It 
could be hypothesised that well established and 'deep' 
representations would never (or very rarely) change, either 
under social upheaval or through time. On the other hand, 
not yet established and unfamiliar ideas would not change 
under conditions of social upheaval, because, at this point, 
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there is need for stability. Yet, one would expect that in 
these cases, familiarity may bring change. Therefore, it 
might only be that representations that are between the 
previous two in terms of degree of the representational 
process could be affected by significant social events. 
Actually, there was an indication for such a possibility in 
" the present findings; nationalism and internationalism did 
not change over time, nor did views about unification and 
only political ideology constructs were found to change 
between times. 
I 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
PROCESSES OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATION: GENERAL DISCUSSION AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
------------ 
This chapter is divided in two parts. In the first part some 
general ideas that are a product of the work conducted for 
this present piece of work are going to be presented and 
discussed. The second part will deal with the specific 
findings of this work and the theoretical and methodological 
developments that arise from this work. 
2. PART ONE: INTEGRATIVE APPROACHES TO THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
REPRESENTATIONS 
--------------- 
Working within the discipline of Social Psychology and 
dealing with social phenomena made evident how important it 
is to consider and. 'borrow' ideas and findings from other 
social sciences as well as to adopt methods of investigation 
used by disciplines other than Social Psychology. This 
understanding seems to be in line with Moscovici's (1990) 
call for communication between and even the union of 
different social sciences, which he considers to be "versions 
of a common pursuit" (p. 68). 
In conducting the present piece of work, it became apparent 
that while studying a social phenomenon within the framework 
of social representations, one had to engage in a social 
psychological reading of information coming from other social 
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sciences. Before being able to investigate the different 
aspects of the EC and the unification of Europe one had first 
to acquire knowledge and some understanding of history, 
politics, economics and cultural anthropology. 
If Moscovici (1990) is right, then for a long time social 
psychologists have been neglecting the valuable information 
that can be 'borrowed' from other disciplines and can help 
the social psychological understanding of social phenomena. 
Similarly, scientists such as economists, historians, 
sociologists and so on have not been taking into account the 
findings of social psychologists that would allow them to put 
into perspective the phenomena they"are investigating. This 
results in scientists from different disciplines working in 
their own small 'niches', ignoring many factors that may 
affect social phenomena. They end up producing evidence that 
lacks a more global understanding and that is of no interest 
or use scientists other than those working in the'same 
discipline. 
It seems that the nature of the work undertaken in the 
present study is in line with Hilde Himmelweit's (1990) calls 
for a Societal Psychology. She argued that there is a need 
to emphasise social, institutional and cultural environments 
when studying social phenomena. 
While studying different aspects of young Britons' views 
about the EC and the unification of Europe, it was necessary 
to take account of Britain's history, both as a nation and as 
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a member of the EC, the political situation in Britain and 
all over Europe, the cultural implications of a wider 
European integration and social and political events taking 
place around the world. These factors influenced both the 
organisation of the different studies and the interpretation 
of the results coming from them. 
It could be argued, however, that the adoption of such an all 
embracing approach to social phenomena could only result in 
studies that are context (i. e. time, culture and so on) 
specific. Yet, and as Himmelweit (1990) argued, the aim of 
a Societal Psychology should be the development of conceptual 
models rather than the search for invariant laws. Conceptual 
models "would seek to indicate the relevant parameters and 
their modes of interaction and would seek explanations for 
variation in their strength and role" (p. 24). For example, 
results from the studies discussed in the two previous 
chapters indicated how the anchoring of a new idea might be 
taking place-and gave some ideas about which may be the pre- 
existing belief systems to-which the new idea is going to be 
anchored. It is'believed that if the same study were to be 
replicated"with-either different populations, or in the 
future, or in another country, for example, similar patterns 
of relations between new ideas and pre-existing reality 
systems would be likely to occur. It is quite likely that 
there would be variations in the content and in the role of 
the pre-existing systems, but the point is that the pattern 
of relations would be similar. These possible variations, 
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then, may call for a social psychological understanding of 
forces operating in the specific context in which the 
replication might take place. Again, these forces might be 
political, environmental, historical, cultural or economic. 
It is, believed that social psychologists, nowadays, have 
understood the need to consider all these forces in 
investigating and explaining social phenomena. Yet, in the 
study of social representations it seems that such an 
approach may be compulsory. Social representations do not 
exist. in a vacuum,. outside society, culture, ideology and 
history. They are created by people who belong in society, 
who are born in a specific culture, who have to deal with 
their own and world history and who are subjected to the 
events, ideas and beliefs of their own times. On the other 
hand, social representations are present and are called upon 
when people have to make sense of the world, of their 
history, of events that take place and of others around them. 
When Himmelweit (1990) argued about a Societal Psychology she 
referred often to social representations and she suggested 
that such an approach (i. e. one emphasising social, 
institutional and cultural environments and the way they 
affect and are affected by the members of a particular 
society) is the most appropriate to the study of social 
representations. Her ideas accord with those of Moscovici 
(1984a, 1987) when he argued both for the need for social 
psychology to be in touch with other social sciences and the 
necessity of studying social phenomena by taking into account 
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factors such as history, politics, economics, anthropology 
and sociology. 
The experience acquired by conducting the present piece of 
work leads, unavoidably, to the same conclusions. In the 
beginning, before any 'hands-on' experience, these ideas of 
Moscovici (1981a, 1984b, 1987), as mentioned in the 
introduction to chapter one, sounded interesting, but somehow 
'idealistic'. Yet, it is now understood that the completion 
of this work might not have been possible without taking into 
account all these forces and factors. 
3. PART TWO: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
----------------------------------------------------- 
3.1. Theoretical developments 
------------------------ 
The second part of this chapter aims to discuss the work 
conducted for this thesis and, if possible, to draw out 
some ideas for future investigation within the framework of 
social representations. 
The two studies described in the two previous chapters 
investigated the processes of social representation by 
employing a multi-methodological approach and a longitudinal 
design. The theoretical questions originated in the theory 
of Social Representations and focus was put upon the 
anchoring mechanism as a part of the familiarisation process. 
Specifically, the aims of these two studies involved the 
investigation of the occurrence of anchoring, the conditions 
under which it may take place and the functions it may serve. 
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The first study employed a multi-methodological and a step- 
by-step approach; i. e. a number of different methods of 
gathering and analysing data were used and the findings from 
each method were employed so as to progress to the next one 
and to arrive at some understanding of anchoring as a 
mechanism and as a part of the representational process. The 
target new idea, the anchoring of which was investigated was 
the unification of Europe in 1992. First it was established 
that a specific pre-existing belief system (i. e. the 
representation of the EC) existed in the press and in a 
target population (i. e. young Britons). Investigating the 
representation of the EC as presented by the press allowed 
the creation of investigatory tools to be used in further 
studies, as well as the discussion of this system at a 
different level (i. e. a part of the mass-media). 
Having established that at least some components of the 
representation of the EC existed and were shared by the 
target population, the second step in this study was to 
investigate whether the evaluation of the unification of 
Europe (as an aspect of the representation of the target new 
idea ) was to be anchored on ideas about the EC and other 
pre-existing belief systems as well as different kinds of 
involvement (such as contact with the EC and evaluation of 
the possible effects of unification). 
The second study built up from the findings of the first one 
and aimed at investigating further the possible functions of 
anchoring. For this study a longitudinal design was adopted 
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since emphasis was placed upon the changes that might occur 
in a target representation and upon the representational 
process under conditions of social upheaval. It was expected 
that under such conditions the factors influencing anchoring 
and the conditions under which it takes place could become 
apparent. 
The results from both studies indicated a consistency in the 
relations between the measured aspect of the new 
representation and a number of pre-existing belief systems. 
People's views about the unification of Europe were found to 
be related to nationalist and internationalist beliefs, views 
about the EC and a specific facet of political ideology; 
namely beliefs about the welfare state. All these different 
constructs were considered to be pre-existing belief systems 
and they were found to have a consistent relation to the new 
target-idea. This was considered to be an indication that 
the anchoring mechanism may operate during familiarisation 
with a new idea. 
If this is the case; i. e. if anchoring indeed takes place and 
if what was inferred by the evidence provided by the two 
studies was indeed anchoring, then there are a number of 
conclusions to be drawn about the representational process. 
First, it indicated that the understanding and explanation of 
something new is not independent of whatever is already known 
and believed. Pre-conceived ideas may influence the way 
people will approach and understand something that seems 
strange and unfamiliar. For example, in both the analysis of 
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the press and the studies conducted it was found that the 
dominant representation of the EC (as something both good and 
bad but mostly bad for Britain as a nation) was referred to 
when discussing the unification of Europe. So, something 
that is unknown, that has not happened yet was represented - 
in an anticipatory way- by references to pre-conceived ideas. 
This seems to be in agreement with Moscovici's (1984b) 
description of anchoring as a mechanism that enables 
familiarisation with something new. It could also be argued 
that, if the findings are to be considered as supporting the 
notion of anchoring, that the evidence gathered is congruent 
with a number of propositions that Moscovici (1984b) put 
forward when discussing this mechanism. So, it could be 
suggested that when giving their evaluation of the 
unification of Europe people were categorising it; i. e. they 
were establishing a positive or negative relation to it. It 
is quite possible that people, in order to categorise it, 
were comparing it to what they already knew about the EC, or 
possibly the US (which is a group of states united 
politically and economically) or the USSR (which was, when 
the studies were taking place, another group of states united 
with each other). 
Furthermore, the findings indicated that, as Moscovici 
(1984b) suggested, representations depend on memory. What 
people could retrieve from memory about things they knew 
about the EC seemed to be related with their views about 
unification. 
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However, all these conclusions could be drawn only if it is 
accepted that anchoring indeed takes place. Yet, the 
evidence provided by the studies conducted is not strong 
enough to prove that this is the case. As has been 
mentioned, anchoring was inferred from these findings; i. e. 
the findings support the notion of anchoring but they do not 
prove it. So, in a way, anchoring remains rather problematic 
since it is believed that it may not ever be possible 
unequivocally to prove or disprove its taking place. 
Inferring anchoring puts it in a category of constructs that 
can be used to"explain findings and phenomena but that cannot 
themselves be proven or disproven. An analogy could be drawn 
from psychoanalysis. For example, one could refer to the 
notion of transference as-discussed within the psychoanalytic 
framework. ý Transference is defined as that part of the 
therapy where the client experiences feelings towards the 
therapist similar to the ones he/she felt for a significant 
other earlier in his/her life. So, when such emotions are 
experienced and expressed, transference is called upon to 
explain what is taking place. Yet, this may'not be the case. 
It could be argued that these feelings are experienced 
because the client feels that the therapist is responsible 
for forcing him/her relive pain (or happiness, or distress 
and so on). So, although transference may be used to explain 
the experience of these feelings, it cannot itself be proven 
or disproven. Yet, as a construct it was found to have 
significant clinical and explanatory value. Similarly, this 
may be the case for anchoring. Although it may not be proven 
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or disproven beyond doubt, it may be useful in explaining the 
way people approach, understand and represent social 
phenomena. 
However, if what has been investigated in the two studies 
was not anchoring, then inevitably one would ask 'what was 
it? '. One could suggest that what was observed were just 
constructs being related to each other without any order in 
terms of time. So, it could be argued that, for instance, 
nationalist beliefs and views about the EC are related to 
views about unification but they do not pre-date them. 
However, it is believed that, although all constructs were 
measured at the same time, that views about the unification 
of Europe constitute an aspect of an anticipatory 
representation of something that has not happened yet. On 
the other hand there is some evidence that, for example, 
nationalist beliefs are established quite early in life 
(Jaspars, Van De Geer, Tajfel and Johnson, 1972). 
Furthermore, it could be suggested that views about the EC 
refer to an institution that already exists, that has a 
history and has had several effects on Britain so far. 
Another alternative explanation for the present findings 
might be that constructs that were considered to be pre- 
existing belief systems were not functioning as such and that 
their relation to the new idea could be explained 
differently. For example, if one takes again nationalist 
beliefs, it could be argued that this construct did not 
function as a pre-existing belief system. Instead, 
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nationalist beliefs might be an index of salience of group 
membership. As such nationalism might have been expected to 
be related to views about unification not as a pre-existing 
belief system but rather as afactor influencing selective 
exposure to information about unification or non-negotiated 
acceptance of a group's representation of the EC and 
unification. 
From the above mentioned alternative explanations of the 
present findings, it becomes rather obvious that one of the 
problems one faces when inferring a process or a function is 
that one will never cease to wonder whether the 'preferred' 
explanation is the correct one and whether there are other 
alternative explanations that could prove more useful or 
conclusive. Yet, a way of studying anchoring directly or a 
way of proving or-disproving its existence and functions 
remains to be found. 
If, however, it is once more accepted that what has been 
investigated might have been anchoring, then one could go on 
to discuss further other findings. In both studies it was 
indicated that anchoring could be an actively selective 
mechanism. This notion was supported by the consistent 
finding that new ideas tend to anchor onto related pre- 
existing systems. For example, in the second study it was 
observed that views about the unification of Europe were 
consistently related to ideas about welfare and not to 
beliefs about the preservation of the environment. The first 
could be considered to be related to views about unification 
410 
since it refers to politics and, specifically, to a left- 
right ideological dimension and unification is considered to 
be a political event. The second, although it was considered 
to be a facet of political ideology, may be seen as not 
necessarily related to politics. Therefore, it was not called 
upon for the explanation and understanding of unification. 
If one accepts that anchoring is an actively selective 
mechanism then the next question to be addressed is: 'what 
guides this selectivity? '. As mentioned already one of the 
rules guiding selectivity may be relativity. So, it could be 
argued that when explaining and understanding something new, 
people may refer to related pre-existing belief systems in 
order to compare, classify and categorise new ideas. It 
seems logical that in such a case specific and related belief 
systems would be called upon. For instance, in , the 
first 
study it was found that views about unification were related 
to nationalism and to views about the EC and not to racism. 
This was explained by the understanding that racism may be a 
construct referring to individuals belonging to different 
groups and not to institutions (as the EC and the 
unification). As such, racism may not have been seen as 
related to unification and thus it was not involved in the 
representational process. Relatedness, in this case, could 
be determined by a number of factors. Belief systems could 
be seen as related to a new idea because they may belong to 
the same frame of reference, or because they may have a 
relation in terms of time, or because they may have a causal 
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relationship. 
Another rule guiding this selectivity of the anchoring 
mechanism may be the salience of different belief systems for 
different groups. It could be argued that through group 
membership and thus through involvement or exposure different 
individuals may experience different degrees of salience of 
different belief systems. For a group of people a specific 
belief system may be more prominent and more readily 
available for reference than others. In such cases one might 
expect that this belief system, rather than an other, will be 
called upon for the explanation for something new. So, going 
back to the example of racism, it could be suggested that 
racism was not called upon not because it is unrelated to 
views about unification but because it was not a salient 
belief system for the specific group investigated. 
To take'this line of argument a little further, let's say 
that a number of people happen to witness a fatal accident. 
If these people were later asked how they explained and 
understood the event and some of them happened to be highly 
religious, then one would expect that these people would turn 
to (select) their religious beliefs for the understanding of- 
the event. For another group of people (not necessarily 
atheists but possible not very religious) religion, or 
'religiosity' in that case, may not be a system called upon, 
being a non-salient one. 
Another rule guiding the selectivity of anchoring might be 
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based on involvement. Although involvement has been 
discussed as a factor itself related to the representational 
process and it is going to be discussed as such later in this 
chapter, here it is going to be treated as a possible rule of 
selectivity. Involvement may refer to emotions, goals, 
motivation and so on. For instance, let's say that there is 
a group of workers who are told they are to become 
redundant because the factory, is-to be sold to a European 
buyer. This group of people may be subjected to a specific 
kind of information, for example, that it is the government's 
fault that the factory has to be sold. In such a case one 
would expect that political ideology may be a belief system 
selected if these people were to be asked about their views 
about unification. What one has here is a series of 
relations leading to the selection of a specific belief 
system onto which the new idea is going to be anchored. 
Different types of involvement may lead to different types of 
contact and exposure to different types of information and 
these may lead to the selection of different kinds of belief 
systems for the explanation and understanding of the new 
idea. 
The question that logically follows, if one accepts that 
anchoring does take place and that it is an actively 
selective mechanism, is what is the purpose of this 
selectivity. 'What is really achieved when people select some 
and not other belief systems on which to anchor something 
new? This question was investigated by the second study that 
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was discussed in chapter seven. In this study the same aspect 
of the target representation (i. e. views about the 
unification of Europe) was studied over time, by a 
longitudinal design. The period that intervened between the 
two times, of investigation was considered to be a period of 
social upheaval. A war that involved Britain as well as many 
other countries was taking place and a number of other 
significant events occurred during this time. ' 
The theory of Social Representations offered rather confusing 
information to enable accurate predictions of what the 
effects of social upheaval could be upon the target 
representation and the representational process. If one were 
to accept Moscovici's (1984b) claim that representations 
change during such periods, then the predictions might have 
been as follows: (a) the content of the aspect of the 
representation investigated would change, and/or (b) the pre- 
existing systems selected for the explanation of the new 
would be different between times, and/or (c) the relation 
between the pre-existing belief systems used for the 
explanation of the new would change, altering the structure 
onto which the new was to be anchored. If any or all of the 
above predictions were to be proven correct, then one could 
argue that the purpose of selectivity of anchoring might be 
to induce change iný. the representational process as well as 
in its outcome;. i. e. in the representation. 
On the other hand, one could turn to the Echebarria and Paez 
(1989) claim that people select from memory (i. e. select to 
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store and retrieve) information congruent with already 
existing beliefs so as to explain something now and keep it 
in line with what is already believed. Similarly, one could 
consider Moscovici's (1984b) argument that "memory's density 
prevents them (representations) from undergoing modifications 
on the one hand and, on the other, allows them a certain 
amount of independence from present events" (p. 43), which 
would support a conclusion that no change should occur. 
Finally, there is Abric's (1984) suggestion that only 
elements in the periphery of the representation are allowed 
to change whereas the nucleus of it remains the creative and 
organising part of it which is resistant to change. If one 
were to accept all these ideas and arguments, then one would 
make the following predictions: (a) the aspect of the target 
representation investigated would not change as a whole, but 
there might be small changes in the peripheral elements of 
it, and/or (b) the pre-existing belief systems on which the 
new was going to be anchored would remain the same, and/or 
(c) the relations between pre-existing belief systems would 
remain stable over time. If this were the case then one 
could suggest that the purpose of selectivity may be to 
maintain stability in the representational system. 
The findings from this study supported the second set of 
predictions. What was observed was the lack of any dramatic 
change in the representational system in general. There were 
only small changes observed in specific facets of the 
evaluative aspect of the unification of Europe, whereas this 
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aspect of the representation was not found to change as a 
whole. This finding is in accordance with Abric's (1984) 
claim that only peripheral components of a representation 
would be allowed to change, while the nucleus of it remains 
unchanged. The facets that were found to change were related 
to the events that were taking place during the time of the 
investigation and referred to unemployment, the economy and 
the relation between Britain and the US. The questions that 
arise from this finding are: (a) why was it these facets that 
changed and (b) why was there not an overall change in the 
evaluative aspect of the target representation? 
As far as the first question is concerned it could be argued 
that, first, these facets were related to the events that 
were taking place and were considered by respondents, 
themselves, 'to be'important. Unemployment was rising 
severely, the economy was weakening and, during the Gulf war, 
the ties between Britain and the US were shown to be 
stronger than Britain's ties with the rest of her European 
counterparts in the EC. Second, it could also be suggested 
that these aspects of life were more salient during this 
period since they were referred'to frequently by the media. 
So, at this specific point in time these aspects might have 
been at the periphery of the representation and, thus, 
vulnerable to change. 
As far as the'second question is concerned, the lack of 
overall change in the'evaluative aspect of the representation 
may be explained if one considers it to be, as a whole, the 
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nucleus of the representation. If this is the case, then one 
could argue that, as a whole, views about unification had an 
organising function to perform; i. e. to keep the overall 
image of unification stable. The facets that were found to 
change might have 'escaped' (or might have been 'allowed to 
escape') this organising function so as to absorb the effects 
of the events that took place and allow the preservation of 
an overall stability. 
Furthermore, it was observed that the target new idea was 
consistently (i. e. at both times of investigation) related to 
the same pre-existing belief systems. The small changes in 
the strength of these relations, as mentioned in chapter 
seven, could-be attributed to statistical artefacts. In 
general the pattern of relations between pre-existing belief 
systems and the target new representation remained the same 
over time. These findings gave some indication that a 
possible. purpose of-the selectivity of the anchoring 
mechanism might be to preserve stability and avoid an overall 
change. Again, since stability-was inferred from the 
findings and was not proven as such, one had to. look for 
possible alternative explanations. 
As already mentioned, one alternative explanation might be 
that the events that took place, although considered very 
important, were not, seen as related to the unification of 
Europe, so they could not trigger change either in the 
representation or in the representational process. Yet, if 
this were the-case then one would not expect to find even the 
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small changes in the facets of the views about unification 
that were related to these events. 
The same counter-argument could be used if one were to 
suggest that the findings might imply an absolute agreement 
between the new information about recent events and what was 
already believed. If that were the case then the lack of 
overall change might be attributed to the possibility that 
information about the Gulf war or the events in the Soviet 
Republics and so on produced arguments and ideas for the 
unification that were in agreement with what people already 
believed about it. Again, this does not seem to be the case 
if 'one takes into account that certain facets of views about 
unification did change and that these facets were related to 
the events that had taken place. On the other hand, it could 
also be argued that the lack of change may be an outcome of 
people perceiving new information as in agreement with what 
they already knew and believed. But this idea brings back 
the notion of selectivity, not in terms of pre-existing 
belief systems this time, but of selective perception and 
recall of information so as to preserve the stability of the 
representation and the representational system. 
Another alternative explanation for the observed lack of 
change in the specific belief systems that were found to be 
related to-the target new idea might be that the ones 
included in the investigation of the representational process 
were not those that might have been, differentially, referred 
to in times of upheaval. As mentioned, views about 
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unification were consistently found to be related to 
nationalism, internationalism and welfare. It could be 
suggested that there may be other pre-existing belief systems 
that might have been related to views about unification at 
Time 1 and not at Time 2 and vice versa. For example, 
beliefs about imperialism or religiosity, if they were to be 
included in the investigation, might have been called upon 
for the explanation and understanding of the unification of 
Europe at Time 2 (i. e. after the Gulf war) and not at Time 1. 
If this were the case then it could be suggested that, even 
if views about unification as a whole were found to remain 
unchanged, that there was a change in the representational 
process, since the new would have been informed by different 
pre-existing belief systems at different times. 
Again, as in the question of anchoring's occurrence, there is 
no proof that its function is to preserve stability. There 
is only some indication that this might be the case and there 
will always be alternative explanations of the findings. 
Yet, even if one accepts that stability is the purpose of 
anchoring, one should regard it as a process and, 
furthermore, as a dynamic one (Moscovici, 1984b). Even if 
there may be an overall lack of change, new information is 
perceived and processed, even if the outcome is to accept and 
keep only that part of the information that is congruent with 
what is-already believed (Echebarria and Paez, 1989). This 
implies that people may actively interact with information, 
select (possibly unconsciously) those pieces that are 
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relevant to and consistent with their beliefs. It may be 
this information that they store and retrieve in order to 
explain and understand something new. 
If, however, one accepts that the function of anchoring is to 
preserve stability in representations and in the 
representational system, then one would inevitably wonder 
whether and how social change might take place. If every new 
idea is anchored onto specific pre-existing belief systems in 
order to preserve stability, then is there any chance for 
social change to occur? The answer to this question has to 
be 'yes'. There is plethora of historical evidence that 
shows that representations do change and often this change is 
quite dramatic and spectacular. For example, the 
representation of women in western societies has changed 
dramatically during this century. This change has not 
occurred overnight and it involved struggle and dedication. 
Some could also argue that the change is not as dramatic as 
one may want to present it. Women are still fighting for 
equal pay, equal representation in governments and 
parliaments and so on. Similar examples could be drawn for 
the case of blacks, people with physical or mental handicaps 
and a range of other marginalised social groups. 
So, representations do change. Immediately one would go on 
to ask 'how? '. What are the conditions under which 
representations might change? One answer to this question 
could relate to time and familiarity (or exposure). As an 
example one could take the case of people with physical 
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disabilities. For years these people were confined in their 
homes or in institutions and were often believed to be 
'freaks', 'monsters' and so on. Recently (and due to a 
number of reasons to be discussed later) physically disabled 
people started becoming more socially visible, getting 
educated and employed. It could be argued that, at the 
beginning, these people might have been faced with all the 
pre-existing ideas that able-bodied people held in relation 
to them. Yet, with time and with exposure (e. g. sharing 
classrooms and workplaces with them) able-bodied people might 
have come to recognise that some of their ideas were wrong 
and might have started changing their representations. This 
change may make even more disabled people to emerge into 
social contexts and, as a result, more able-bodied people may 
become familiar with them and alter their representations of 
and their behaviour towards them. Further, as more disabled 
people emerge, the environment itself has to be modified so 
as to allow them to move more freely and accommodate their 
special needs. So, one sees on a day-to-day basis ramps to 
allow the movement of wheel-chairs, special public telephones 
for people who are deaf and so on. Again, these 
manifestations of acceptance help more physically disabled 
people to emerge into the social context and act as constant 
reminders to the able-bodied majority that these people 
exist, have equal rights and should be given equal 
opportunities. 
Another condition for changing-social representations may be 
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power. Power can take different forms and can be 
demonstrated by different sources. It can take the form of 
propaganda, social campaigns, advertisements, pressure and so 
on. It can be demonstrated by governments, the media and 
specific groups in society. For example, it was propaganda 
that in Germany, during the second World War, changed the 
representation of Jews from rather successful merchants to 
the 'enemies of the nation' and led to the massacre of 
millions of people. Another example could be drawn from the 
pressure of certain groups (especially medical ones) that 
changed the representation of smoking from a habit to 
something extremely hazardous. Going back to the example of 
the physically disabled people, it has to be mentioned that 
the changes that might have occurred could also be attributed 
to the lobbying of groups of disabled people for equal 
opportunities, to social campaigns (such as the one that was 
launched in Britain in 1986-1987'by the Spastics Society), as 
well as to government's legislation relating to the 
employment of physically disabled people. It cannot be 
denied that social representations do change, yet, it is 
believed that there area number of conditions (such as the 
ones mentioned here) that have to be satisfied before changes 
are to occur. 
If' one goes back to the present target representation; i. e. 
the unification of Europe, then one could make some 
predictions as to the conditions under which it may change. 
It may change after a number of years, if the unification 
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indeed takes place, and if people acquire first hand 
experience of what it is and what it means. It could also 
change if political parties and leaders changed their views 
about unification and if this change were to be given 
extensive coverage by the media. It could also change if 
there were public campaigns about how much better (or how 
much worse) people would be in a united Europe. It is not 
suggested that any of these conditions would be sufficient to 
change people's representation of the unification of Europe 
or that this could ever be an overnight change. What is 
suggested is that history has shown that representations 
change, that they can be manipulated and that they are not 
fossilised entities. This, however, has a methodological 
implication. If change does take place over a large 
timescale then it may be necessary to, specifically, use 
methods such as archival and historical analysis in order to 
study this change of social representations over time. 
Both studies showed that there are consistent relations 
between a new idea and different kinds of involvement. Views 
about-unification were found to be related to kinds of 
involvement such as contact, evaluation of the effects of 
unification and political cynicism. Different types of 
involvement have been considered as factors that explain why 
different groups may hold different representations of the 
same target object. It cannot be denied that there exists 
diversity in society and that different people do have 
different ideas about the same objects. However, it is 
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believed that, although the outcome of the representational 
process may be different for different groups, the pattern of 
the process itself may be similar and, as such, predictable. 
Yet, if one shifts one's attention from the process to the 
outcome, then the importance of different kinds of 
involvement with an object becomes apparent. Because it is 
the outcome; i. e. the representation that constitutes the 
'reality' that people have and have to cope with. However, 
objects of representations do exist before they become social 
representations and are considered to be independent from 
them. This, in a sense, objective reality might be filtered 
during the representational process through pre-existing 
beliefs and different kinds of involvement before becoming 
people's 'reality'. This 'reality' is not seen as a mirror 
image of what has been called objective reality. It is bound 
to be subjected to alterations, distortions and so on. On 
the other hand, it is believed that reality never ceases to 
exist outside representations. 
For example, the unification of Europe, as an idea, existed 
in the minds of a few people, from Hitler to Churchill, 
before it became a social representation. Similarly, an 
event like the war in the Gulf is real in itself before it 
becomes a social representation. When such events become 
'real', it could be argued that they may become differently 
'real' for different groups of people. These different 
'realities' could be explained in terms of the different 
kinds of involvement groups of people may have with the 
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target. 
For instance, British fishermen who were told that the 
European Parliament overruled the British Parliament's 
decision that prohibited Spanish fishermen from fishing in 
British waters, British European MPs and workers who have a 
secure job because the factories they work for export to EC 
countries, may have different 'realities' about the 
unification, from each other. Similarly, soldiers who fought 
in the Gulf war, Kuwaiti families who found themselves exiled 
during the war, families that lost relatives in the war and 
people who were only informed by the press and TV about it, 
may all have different 'realities' about this war. 
The unification and the war, as realities, are considered to 
belong to a reified universe, untouchable by individuals. 
Individuals' 'reality' is their own interpretation, 
understanding, and 'theory' about an object and this creation 
of 'reality' may be related to the different forms that 
involvement can take. 
If really different groups hold different representations for 
the same target then one would expect a constant conflict 
between representations tobe demonstrated in everyday life. 
Conflict may not manifest-itself as such but as 
differences'in ideas,, beliefs an d practices towards objects 
that people encounter in everyday life. This in a way can 
explain the variability that exists in today's society. Yet, 
in several cases there might exist''dominant' 
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representations, shared by very large groups of people. In 
such cases one may have to turn to issues of 'power' in order 
to understand the sharedness of such representations. It may 
be'the case that the general public accepts the ideas, 
beliefs and explanations given about an object by a few 
people who are considered to be 'the authorities' or to have 
'power'. If the general public does not have any alternative 
source of information but these 'powerful elites' then it may 
accept and share these ideas, beliefs and explanations. 
Nevertheless, it is believed that there will always be groups 
of people that will hold different ideas and beliefs due to a 
number of possible reasons such as personal experience, 
relation to other sources of information, necessity or habit. 
3.2. Methodological Developments 
--------------------------- 
The present piece of work advanced the argument that social 
representations and the representational process have to be 
studied using a structured multi-methodological approach. 
This argument is based both on the theory of Social 
Representations and the empirical work conducted within this 
theoretical framework. 
k number of scientists (e. g. Verges, 1987, Purkhardt and 
Stockdale, forthcoming) suggested that the nature of the 
concept of social representations renders the use of multi- 
methodological approaches compulsory in its investigation. A 
social representation as a theoretical concept is a complex 
one (Moscovici, 1973), so its different components need to be 
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investigated by different methods each of which may prove the 
most useful and appropriate for the elicitation of those 
different components. 
Although this multi-methodological requirement has been 
understood and, as shown in chapter three, has been acted 
upon in most empirical studies of social representations, 
what seemed to be missing was the understanding that such 
approaches have to be structured and specifically organised 
for the purposes of each different study. Maybe it is for 
this reason that, although this requirement is recognised and 
multi-methodological approaches are used, scientists, such as 
Augustinos (1991), still argue for it: "the use of a wide 
range of methodologies and analyses is needed to come to some 
empirical translations of Moscovici's notion of a 'thinking 
society'" (p. 203). Similarly, Himmelweit (1990) in her 
discussion of a more global and comprehensive societal 
psychology claimed that: "We, -need to adopt a much wider range 
of research tools.... There is no one best method; what 
matters is the careful evaluation of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the various methodologies available and 
decisions based on their appropriateness for the task in 
hand" (pp. 28-29). 
The first study conducted for the present piece of work (as 
described in chapter six) could be considered an empirical 
demonstration of the notion of a structured multi- 
methodological approach. The specific questions and 
hypotheses investigated emerged from the theory of Social 
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Representations. The next step was to consider the aims of 
the study; i. e. what specific aspects of social 
representations and the representational process were to be 
investigated, and then to organise different methods of 
investigation and analysis, so as to arrive at a structured 
multi-methodological approach for the achievement of the 
specific aims. 
From the very beginning, a number of issues were taken into 
consideration. - First, no method of investigation or of 
analysis of information is 'limitations-free'. Every single 
one of them has advantages and drawbacks which, often, become 
more evident when they are used in the study of social 
representations. The use of multi-methodological approaches 
could be the answer to this problem. Different methods can 
compensate for each other's limitations, they can complement 
each other, they can fill in the gaps that others leave and 
answer-the questions that other methods leave unanswered. 
Second, different methods, if they are to prove useful, 
should not be seen as independent from each other. One 
should build upon the findings of one method and produce 
arguments and hypotheses to be tested by others. Also, 
findings from one method can be used to create investigatory 
tools for the study of new questions and hypotheses. 
As mentioned, the first study can be considered a 
demonstration of the use of multi-methodological approaches 
in the study of social representations. For example, a 
different method was used for the investigation of the 
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representation of the EC in the media (i. e. analysis of the 
press) and another for its investigation in a specific 
population (i. e. interviews). Similarly, different methods 
were used for tackling different components of this 
representation; attribute check-lists for images of different 
European countries, questionnaires for opinions and attitudes 
and interviews for explanations and 'theories'. Finally, 
different methods were used to answer different questions 
concerning the representation and the representational 
process. When the question involved the existence or not of 
a belief system (i. e. the representation of the EC) within a 
specific population, an interview was used to establish 
whether certain components of the representation existed and 
were shared by the specific population. When the question 
involved the occurrence of anchoring, a questionnaire was 
used to allow the creation of indices and then, with the 
appropriate analysis, the investigation of relationships 
between them. 
As already mentioned, this structured multi-methodological 
approach also proved useful in a different sense, especially 
for the study of social representations. The limitations of 
methods, such as questionnaires, were compensated by the use 
of the interview, a more generally accepted method for the 
investigation of social representations. Furthermore, 
questions that data from the questionnaires left unanswered 
or did not answer satisfactorily were answered by information 
from the analysis of the press or the interviews. 
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Although it is not argued that either the need and/or the use 
of multi-methodological approaches originated in this present 
piece of work, it is believed that this work proposed and 
practically demonstrated that this has to be an organised and 
structured task, based on the theoretical aims of each study. 
This really means that each time scientists decide to 
investigate either the construct or the process of social 
representation they, themselves, will have to develop the 
structured multi-methodological approach that will best suit 
the purposes of their study. 
Choosing the different methods 
purposes of a study should not 
task if one has beforehand dec 
to be asked. What may prove a 
the integration of information 
methods. 
that would best serve the 
be considered a very difficult 
ided on the specific questions 
much more difficult task is 
produced by the different 
The first thing to be mentioned here is that as there is no 
'recipe' for the use of specific methods for each different 
study; similarly there is no 'recipe' for the integration 
and interpretation of the results produced by the different 
methods. Second, it is believed that a certain amount of 
flexibility in analysing and interpreting results could prove 
useful in the integration of a variety of information. For 
example, categories and themes arising from content analysis 
may offer useful insights if they were to undergo 
multivariate analysis. Similarly, quantitative data may 
provide different information if, instead of being simply 
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treated as, for instance, factors, they were to be examined 
in terms of structure and meaning. 
Nevertheless, the integration of results produced by 
different methods may prove a challenge for scientists who 
decide to employ multi-methodological approaches. Again, how 
different pieces of information are going to be interpreted 
and integrated should be determined by the specific purposes 
of each study. 
The first study conducted for the present piece of work 
could, once more, be used as a practical example. So, let's 
say that a study started out to investigate the 
representation of an object in a single group, such as the 
representation of the EC in a group of young Britons as in 
this study, using interviews, questionnaires and attribute 
checklists. In this case the information from the different 
sources was consistent and hence unproblematic. If, on the 
other hand, conflicting information was produced then one 
would have to trace the possible reasons for this 
inconsistency. One possible reason might be that the 
criteria for inclusion of different individuals in the group 
were not the right ones. So, the conflicting information may 
be the result of the presence of different sub-groups within 
the group. Another reason may be that different aspects of 
the representation are differentially salient, so some of the 
methods employed may not have been strong enough to elicit 
non-salient aspects of it, whereas others were. This is why 
it is important before setting out to investigate a 
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representation to have set criteria about which components of 
it must be present to permit the conclusion that it exists 
within a target population. 
In the case that the aim of a study is to investigate the 
same target representation in different groups, as in the 
study discussed here was the representation of the EC in the 
press and in a specific population. For this purpose 
analysis of the press and interviews were employed. For this 
specific study, a certain degree of consistency between 
information was treated as unproblematic since it was 
hypothesised that the representation of the EC as presented 
by the press and the one held by young Britons would have 
similarities, at least in terms of content and issues of 
'power', 'ownership' and the circularity of the 
representation were addressed. However, in most of such 
studies one may expect to find systematic differences in the 
representations of different groups. Consistency, therefore, 
in such cases may be considered as problematic. Again, one 
will need to trace and explain the possible reasons why 
consistency may occur. As previously, the criteria for 
inclusion of people in different groups may need to be 
redefined or the criteria for what constitutes a 
representation (or different ones) may need to be 
reconsidered. Also, one should always consider the strength 
of the specific methods used in'eliciting representations. 
For example, let's say that a researcher wanted to 
investigate the social representations of Europe in young 
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pupils and adults and that he/she expected that these are 
going to be different for these specific groups. He/she 
might have used drawings to elicit pupil's representations 
and interviews for those of adults. If these representations 
were found to be similar, then he/she could argue that indeed 
there are no differences and could explain this finding with 
theoretical arguments. On the other hand, he/she would need 
to consider what specific aspects of the representation the 
methods used were able to elicit. So, one could argue that 
the drawings did not include explanations of and 'theories' 
about but only images of Europe. It may be, therefore, that 
images are similar for the two groups and what differentiates 
them are those components of the representation that were 
missing. As mentioned, knowing and acknowledging the 
limitations and the strength of each method as well as its 
potential to elicit specific aspects of representations is 
very important in the analysis, interpretation and 
integration of results. 
Finally, there may be studies that aim to answer specific 
questions about the target representation. For example, in 
the study discussed here the aim was to investigate the 
anchoring of views about unification on pre-existing belief 
systems. Again, consistent and/or complementary information 
coming from different sources was used in order to develop 
arguments about anchoring as a mechanism, its nature and 
functions. For example, from the analysis of both the press 
and the questionnaire data there was some indication that 
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ideas about unification were informed by pre-existing belief 
systems such as nationalism and views about the EC. Yet, 
there may be cases where one is faced with conflicting 
information. Let's say, for the sake of argument, that in 
this study information derived from the analysis of the press 
indicated that the ideas informing views about unification 
were different from those indicated by the analysis of the 
questionnaire data. In such a case one would again have to 
consider the possibility that some of the components of the 
representation or that some of what have been considered to 
be pre-existing belief systems may be more salient than 
others, as well as that different methods may have different 
strength in eliciting them. Also, it may be possible that 
the conflict or the inconsistency may be an artefact of the 
different methods chosen. So, if this is the case, it may 
mean that different methods were able to tackle totally 
different aspects of the representation or the 
representational system. Finally, one may need to go back to 
the theory of Social Representations in order to find 
possible explanations of the conflict. Yet, again, there is 
no guarantee that the answers and the explanations will be 
there. It is possible that the theory, itself, will provide 
inconsistent information. It is believed that, if this is 
the case, one should engage in further empirical 
investigation and consider as many as possible alternative 
hypotheses and explanations. 
To conclude, it is understood that only with the consistent 
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and thorough adoption and application of a structured multi- 
methodological approach in the study of social 
representations would it be possible to arrive at specific 
rules for a systematic integration of information. 
Another methodological argument put forward by the present 
piece of work concerns the adoption of longitudinal designs 
in the study of process of social representations. For the 
second study (described in chapter seven) a longitudinal 
design was used for the investigation of possible change in a 
target representation and the representational process. 
Although substantial change was not observed, the 
longitudinal design proved useful since it allowed the 
discussion of. the possible function of anchoring as a 
mechanism of familiarisation with a new idea. So, it was 
possible to discuss the observed stability both in the 
investigated aspect of the representation and the 
representational process, itself. It was also possible to 
establish and discuss the minor changes in specific facets of 
the representation. Since it has been argued that change 
does take place, even if this was not the case in this 
specific study, it is believed that longitudinal designs are 
necessary in the study of the creation and development of 
social representations as forms of social change. 
A longitudinal design was preferred to a historical or time- 
series approach because it allowed the investigation of the 
same object in the same population over time in order to 
detect possible changes in this object, as well as in the 
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different relationships observed during the representational 
process. Yet, both historical and time-series approaches 
might prove useful in other studies investigating social 
representations from a different perspective or with 
different aims. As mentioned, such approaches could prove 
especially useful if one accepts the argument that social 
change may take place over a large, rather than a short, 
timescale. 
It seems appropriate to conclude this chapter by going back 
to the considerations with which it opened and discussing 
once more Moscovici's (1981a, 1987,1990) and Himmelweit's 
(1990) ideas about a societal psychology, social 
representations' place within it and, in general, the place 
of social representations within social psychology. They 
both argued for the need for social psychologists to consider 
findings from other social sciences and the importance of 
taking into account social, institutional and cultural 
environments in the study of social phenomena. If one 
considers the discussion for the methodological arguments 
that this piece of work put forward and if one stops for a 
minute and looks at the different methods and designs 
discussed and proposed here, then one thing becomes quite 
evident. It looks as if some of the methods are really 
'borrowed' from other social sciences or else that some are 
also used by them. For instance, observation is a method that 
cultural anthropologists use and reading and analysing 
published material is often used by historians. So, in fact 
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social psychologists and other social scientists have been 
using similar methods of investigation. What seems to be 
missing, as both Moscovici (1981a, 1990) and Himmelweit 
(1990) argued, is the communication between them, the sharing 
of these findings and the acknowledgement that some of the 
findings of one science can be of use for another. If this 
is understood and taken on board by scientists working within 
the theory of Social Representations, together with the need 
to consider the different factors that may influence social 
phenomena, then Moscovici's (1987) call for a social 
psychology that will rank as a major, science alongside 
anthropology, economics and sociology, study problems of our 
time and deal with them in a historical dimension, may 
eventually be realised. 
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Table 1: Percentages of people believing that Britain should go in 
------- (or remain in) or stay out (or withdraw) and of people 
with no opinion on the subject. (Jowell and Airey, 1985) 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1 11963 11966 11970 11974 11975* 11983 11984**l 
I% 1% 1% % 1% 1% 1% 
IBritain should: IIII! II1 
III! IIIII 
IGo in/Remain in 132 133 154 1 50 1 68 1 53 148 
(Stay out/Withdraw 1 29 1 32 1 17 146 132 1'42 1 45 
INo opinion 1 39 1 35 129 14 I- 15 I61 
IIIIIII 
I------------------------------------------------------------- I 
!*= Referendum 
1 ** = European Elections 
1I 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 2: British public's views on Community membership 
------- (Eurobarometre, Nos. 16 to 29,1981-1988). 
--------------------- 
I 
----------- 
A GOOD 
------------------- 
I NEITHER GOOD 
------------ 
A BAD I 
DATE OF I -THING I ''NOR BAD 
I THING 
POLL I 
-------------------- 
% 
---------- 
I%1 
----------------- 
% 
----------- II 
! September 1973 31 
I1 
22 34 
I 1974-1980 (14 pls)I 35- 22 36 
I April 1981 24 I 24 1 48 
October 1981 - 27 I 27 41 
April 1982 27 24 43 
October 1982 I 29 1 26 } 40 
April 1983 I 28 1 29 36 
! October 1983 I 36 30 28 
1 March/April 1984 1 34 I 30 I 30 I 
I October 1984 I 38 I 25 1 33 
March/April 1985 1 37 I 28 I 30 
! Octob. /Nov. 1985 1 38 I 28 I 30 I 
I March/April 1986 1 37 I 28 I 29 1 
I March/April 1987 1 43 I 25 I 26 1 
I Octob. /Nov. 1987 1 
---------------------- 
46 
---------- 
1 25 I 
------------------- 
24 1 
------------ 
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Table 3: British public's opinion about whether or not Britain 
------- benefite d from her membership of the EC and, if she did, 
whe ther she benefited more, less or as much as other 
cou ntrie s (Eurobarometre, Nos. 17 (1982), 19 (1983) and 
22 to 29 (1984-1988)). 
------------ ----- ------------------------------------------------- 
; BENEFIT- More Less As Much Don'tIDID NOTIDON'T1 
ED Know BENEFITIKNOW I 
, DATE OF II 
(POLL ._i 
I III 
-- - ----------------------- --------- I -------I-----; March/April 1983 I 32 14 46 21 191 57 1 11 
1 
IMarch/April 1984 1 32 8 53 22 171 56 I 12 1 
October 1984 I 32 12 48 29 111 57 1 11 1 
March/April 1985 1 31 I 55 1 14 ; 
IOctob. /Nov. 1985 1 34 53 1 13 1 
March/April 1986 I 33 I 50 I 17 I 
IMarch/April 1987 1 39 I 46 I 14 
IOctob. /Nov. 
------------ 
1987 
----- 
{ 49 
------------------------- 
I 42 1 10 1 
------------------------ 
Table 4: British public's support for European unification 
------- (Eurobarometre, Nos. 16 to 29,1981-1988). 
------------- ----- ------------ 
IVERY MUCH 
--------- 
ITO SOME 
--------- 
ITO SOME 
------------------ 
IVERY MUCHIDON'T 
I FOR {EXTENT I EXTENT AGAINST IKNOW 
{ FOR {AGAINST I 
DATE OF { { { 
(POLL 
--------- ----- 
{ 96 
-I ----- 
9 
-------- 
I% 
I -------- 
{ 
I --------- 
I% 
I ------ I I --- 
September 1973 
----- 
1 14 
I 
{ 23 I 15 15 1 33 
11975-1980 (7 pis) 23 36 13 19 1 19 
1April 1981 17 I 35 { 14 15 19 1 
10ctober 1981 20 1 44 13 8 115 
1April 1982. 1 17. { 39 19 12 1 13 
; October 1982 1 21 I 40 { 15 6 118 
1April 1983 1 20 { 40 I 15 {5 120 1 
{October - 1983 1 29 { 41 I9 {5 1 16 
IMarch/April 1984 1 17 I 45 1 16 17 i 15 1 
$October 1984 I 25 { 44 I 11 14 1 16 
{March/April 1985 1 30 { 38 1 11 14 117 1 
IOctob. /Nov. 1985. 1 27 I 26 { 15 8 { 24 1 
{March/April 1986 { 22 1 45 = 11 {5 1 17 = 
(March/April 1987 1 29 42 10 16 i 13 
{Octob. /Nov. 
------------- 
1987 
------ 
1 24 
----------- 
1 45 
--------- 
1 11 
--------- 
17 
---------- 
1 13 1 
-------- 
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Table 3: British public's opinion about whether or not Britain 
------- benefite d from her membership of the EC and, if she did, 
whether she benefited more, le ss or as much a s other 
countrie s (Eurobarometre, Nos. 17 (1982 ), 19 (1983) and 
22 to 29 (1984-1988)). 
------------ ----- ---------------------- 
! BENEFIT- More Less A 
--------- 
s Much Do 
------------------ 
n'tIDID NOTIDON'T1 
ED Know IBENEFITIKNOW 
IDATE OF I 
POLL %% 
I I Ii 
I----------- ----- -I -------------------- --------- --- . 
(March/April 1983 I 32 14 46 21 191 57 1 11 
(March/April 1984 1 32 8 53 22 171 56 I 12 1 
October 1984 1 32 12 48 29 111 57 1 11 1 
(March/April 1985 1 31 55 1 14 
Octob. /Nov. 1985 1 34 53 1 13 1 
(March/April 1986 I 33 50 1 17 1 
(March/April 1987 1 39 1 46 1 14 1 
IOctob. /Nov. 
------------ 
1987 
------ 
1 49 
--------------------- =-------- 
I 
------ 
42 1 10 1 
------------ 
Table 4: British public's support for European unifica tion 
------- (Eurobarometre, Nos. 16 to 29, 1981-198 8). 
------------- 
I 
----- --------------------- 
IVERY MUCH ITO SOME 
--------- 
ITO SOME 
------------------ 
IVERY MUCHIDON'T I 
FOR (EXTENT I EXTENT I AGAINST 1KNOW I 
I FOR (AGAINST 1 1 
(DATE OF I1 1 1 II 
, POLL 1I I 1I 
I------------------I---------- --------- 
ISeptember 1973 1 14 I 23 I 15 I 15 133 
11975-1980 (7 pis) 1 23 1 36 1 13 19 1 19 
(April 1981 1 17 I 35 I 14 1 15 1 19 
(October 1981 1 20 1 44 1 13 8 115 1 
1April 1982 1 17 1 39 I 19 1 12 1 13 
(October 1982 1 21 I 40 I 15 16 1 18 
1April 1983 1 20 1 40 1 15 15 1 20 
; October 1983 1 29 1 41 I 9 15 1 16 
IMarch/April 1984 1 17 1 45 1 16 17 1 15 
{October 1984 1 25 I 44 1 11 14 1 16 
IMarch/April 1985 1 30 I 38 1 11 14 1 17 I 
IOctob. /Nov. 1985 I 27 I 26 1 15 8 124 
IMarch/April 1986 1 22 I 45 1 11 I5 117 
(March/April 1987 1 29 I 42 1 10 16 1 13 
IOctob. /Nov. 
------------- 
1987 
----- 
1 24 1 45 1 
---------------------- 
11 
-------- 
17 
------ 
1 13 I 
------------ 
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Table 5: British public's attitudes towards the idea of a 'United 
------- States of Europe' (Eurobarometre, Nos. 22,24,1984-1985). 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
IDATE OF GOOD IDEA IT DEPENDS BAD IDEA DON'T KNOW I 
IPOLL %%%% 
I --------------------------------------------------------------- 
IDecember 1984 32 8 48 12 
{Octob. /Nov. 1985 30 8 50 12 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 6: British public's opinion on whether to speed up, slow 
------- down, or continue as at present for European unification 
(Eurobarometre, No. 22,1984). 
-------------- ---------------- 
(SPEED UP 
-------------- 
CONTINUE AS 
------------- 
{ SLOW DOWN 
--------- 
I DON'T 
IDATE OF I { AT PRESENT I 1 KNOW 
IPOLL 
----------- 
I 
------ 
% 
------ ------ 
I% 
- - 
I% 
---- I -- 
{September 
{ -- 
1973 1 
------- 
17 1 
I - 
40 
{ - --------- 
{ 24 
--- I 
1 19 I 
(October 1975 1 24 45 I 18 1 13 1 
IMay/June/Nov. 1976 1 24 1 44 21 1 11 
{Apr. /May 1977+1 { { 
(Oct. /N0v. 1978 I 23 1 37 I 20 1 10 { 
! Apr. /Oct. 1979 I 23 I 46 1 17 I 14 I 
$October 
--------------- 
1984 1 
-------- 
25 1 
-------- 
49 I 
-------------- 
13 
------------ 
I 13 1 
--------- 
Table 7: British public's awareness of European Parliament and 
-------- forthcoming elections (Eurobarometre, No 22,1984). 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
(RECENTLY Mention of No mention ofINO SEEN/HEARD I 
(DATE OF I HEARD Elections Elections I DON'T KNOW I 
I POLL I `"k %%I%I 
I -------------- _ --------------------------------- I -------------- I 
IIII 
(April 19791 55 25 30 1 45 I 
IMar. /Apr. 19841 72 10 62 1 28 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table 8: British public's impression of the European Parliament on 
------- basis of things read or heard (Eurobarometre, No 24,1985). 
----------- 
I 
--------- 
IN 
------- 
FAVOUR 
------------------------------ 
NEITHER FAVOUR. IUNFAVOURABLE 
-------- 
IDON'T 
DATE OF NOR UNFAVOUR. (KNOW 
POLL 
_ ---------- ----- I --- 
% 
------- 
% 
--- 
% f9 
October 19821 18 
I ------------ I -- 
1 16 
----------- 
59 
I ------ 
I7= 
(March/Apr. 19831 23 1 26 I 39 1 11 
IMarch/Apr. 19851 20 I 22 1 49 17I 
(Oct. /Nov. 
----------- 
19851 
--------- 
24 
------- 
I 12 I 
------------------- 
58 
----------- 
16I 
--------- 
Table 9: British public's feeling of being a citizen of Europe 
-------- (Eurobarometre, Nos. 17 (1982), 19 (1983), 26 (1986)). 
------------ 
IDATE OF 
------ ---------- 
I OFTEN 
------------ 
(SOMETIMES I 
--------- 
NEVER I 
---------- 
NO REPLY( 
I POLL 
---------- ----- 
I% I%I %I %1 
I- 
(April/June 
-- 
1982 
-I ------- 
17 
-I ---------- I 
20 1 
------- I 
72 1 
--------- I 
11 
1April 1983 18 I 16 1 74 I 2I 
IOctob. /Nov. 1985 1 11 1 17 I 70 I 2 
lOctob. /Nov. 
------------- 
1986 
------ 
1 11 
--------- 
I 21 1 
------------- 
67 I 
-------- 
11 
---------- 
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APPENDIX B. 1. 
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EXAMPLE FOR CODING OF INFORMATION GATHERED FROM THE PRESS 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
The first element of Tory propaganda 
was the instruction 
that the European elections did not 
matter (1). This in part derived 
Parliament from the impotence of the 
European Parliament, something which 
this Government, along with most 
others, is happy to preserve. Why 
should anyone take seriously a 
ballot for membership of such a 
chamber, when the House of Commons 
is safely in Conservative hands, 
perhaps in perpetuity? 
But the propaganda in which the Tory 
leadership believes, and which 
emanates from its every pore, has 
deeper origins than that. We get 
the message that the European 
elections are unimportant because 
they concern an entity which Britain 
spends all its time not fighting for 
but fighting against (2). Of course 
ministers pay lip-service to their 
pro-European feelings, and the Prime 
Minister characterises herself as 
Europe's truest friend. But that is 
not how people, in their guts, 
really see her: nor, one suspects, 
would she like it if they did. Her 
vision of Europe lacks all nobility 
(3). 
The Guardian, 15.6.89, p. 19 
(1) "... European elections did not matter... " : coded under the 
sub-theme 'Non-importance of Elections' 
(2) "... the European elections are unimportant because they 
concern an entity which Britain spends all its time not 
fighting for but fighting against. " : coded under the sub- 
theme 'Disagreements and arguments' (Negative aspects - 
Relations between Britain and the EC). 
(3) "Her vision of Europe lacks all nobility. " : coded under the 
sub-theme 'Anti-Europeans' (Conservative Party). 
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CODING SCHEME FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE PRESS 
----------------------------------------------- 
1. Views about the EC in general 
1.1. Positive 
1.1.1. Single free market 
1.1.2. Co-operation 
1.1.3. Challenge 
1.2. Negative 
1.2.1. Fear of protectionism 
1.2.2. Bureaucracy 
1.2.3. Isolation from the rest of the world 
2. Britain and the EC 
2.1. Positive 
2.1.1. Co-operation 
2.1.2. 'good European' 
2.1.3. Influence within EC 
2.1.4. Promising future 
2.1.5. Demonstration of commitment 
2.2. Negative 
2.2.1. Disagreements and arguments 
2.2.2. Anti-Europeans 
3. National Identity, Nationalism, Sovereignty 
3.1. Danger of losing national identity 
3.2. Danger of losing national sovereignty 
3.3; Preserving identity and sovereignty 
3.4. Independent within Europe 
3.5. Need to preserve identity is outdated 
3.6. Nationalism 
3.7. The effects of 'surrendering' 
4. Interference 
4.1. Fear of interference 
4.2. Fight against interference 
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5. Isolation 
5.1. Others moving without Britain 
5.2. Britain being left out 
6. The elections for the European Parliament 
6.1. Lack of awareness 
6.2. Low participation 
6.3. Non-importance of elections 
6.4. Socialist danger 
7. The Conservative party 
7.1. Good Europeans 
7.2. Anti-Europeans 
8. Monetary Union 
8.1. Opposition 
8.2. Acceptance 
8.3. Compromise 
9. The European Social Charter 
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Table 1: No of questionnaires sent by wave, the responses 
------- by wave and sex, the total responses by wave and 
by sex, and the response rates by wave. 
-------- 
1 
{------- 
------ 
------ 
------------ 
------------ 
----------- 
I 
- {--------- 
------------- 
RESPONSES 
------------- 
------- 
------- 
-------- 
I 
-------I 
I 
I No of 
{------- 
quest. 
------ 
sent to 
------------ 
!I 
! Males I 
I--------{ 
I 
Females I 
----------I-- 
Total 
------{ 
! 
{ 
-------{ 
I 
! Wave 
------- 
1 
------ 
242 
------------ 
II 
12 I 
- I-------- I 
! 
8I 
---------- { -- 
20 
------ i 
8.2 ! 
------- i 
I 
$ Wave 
{------- 
2: 
------- 
213 
----------- 
iI 
I6I 
- I-------- I 
I 
11 1 
---------- I-- 
I 
17 I 
------ I 
I 
8.0 { 
-------{ 
I 
I Wave 
I------- 
3 
------- 
342 
----------- 
II 
{ 67 1 
- l-------- l 
I 
71 I 
---------- ! 
I 
138 I 
I 
I 
42.6 I 
I 
I 
$ Total 
-------- ------- 
797 
----------- 
iI 
1 85 I 
----------- 
! 
90 I 
------------- 
175 
------- 
! 
22.4 
-------- 
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Table 2: Components of the representation of EC (Interviews) 
Case No. K? M- OPIN C FLING FACT DXPLANA- 'TEARY' PAST SELF DIEHR- 
LEDGE BFL TIQN PRES NF 
FUNKE 
ENTIATIC* 
5752 Sane Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
4576 Saale Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes No 
5346 Sane Yes No No No No No Yes No 
4494 Sane Yes No No Yes No No No No 
5741 Little Yes No Yes Yes No No No No 
5539 Sane Yes No Yes Yes No No No No 
5422 No Yes No No Yes No No No No 
4589 No No No Yes No No No No No 
4790 Little Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes No 
4569 Little Yes No No Yes Yes No No No 
4059 Good Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
4148 Sane Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No No 
4463 Little Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No 
5802 Sae Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
4708 Little Yes No No Yes Yes No No No 
4741 Good Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
4826 Good Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
4586 Good Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No No 
4599 Little Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes 
4345 Sane Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
4262 Sane Yes No No Yes Yes No No No 
5215 Sane Yes No No Yes No No No No 
5231 Good Yes No No Yes Yes No No No 
5309 Good Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No No 
5345 Score Yes No Yes No No No No No 
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Table 2 (cont. ) 
--------------- 
Case No. K? Oi- OPINIC? i FF IM FACT' F LAMA- 'THEORY' PAST SELF DIFFER- 
LEDGE BE= TICK PRE ERr E, tn : Ic}I 
5111 No Yes No No Yes No No No No 
4179 No Yes No No Yes No No No No 
4590 No Yes No No Yes No No No No 
4501 Sane Yes No No Yes Yes No No No 
4750 Little Yes No No No No No No No 
5397 Little Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
4499 Little Yes No No Yes No No No No 
4681 Little Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No 
4294 Good Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No No 
4347 Little Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No No 
4350 Sane Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
4370 Sane Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
4376 Sane Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
5796 Good Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes 
5807 Little Yes No No Yes No No No Yes 
5183 Sane Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
5123 Little Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
5172 Sane Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
5049 Good Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
5156 No Yes No No Yes No No No No 
5405 Sane Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes No 
5781 Little Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes No 
4637 Sane Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
5139 Little Yes No No Yes Yes No No No 
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Table 3: Frequencies of interest in and keeping in touch 
------- with European happenings and events 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Very Much Quite a Lot= Some (Very Little Not at alll 
I Interest I 33 1 66 1 85 1 33 I 61 
11 (14.7%) 
III 
I (29.5%) 1 (37.9%)I (14.7%) I (2.7%) 1 
---------I----------- I ----------- 
II 
I-------- I- 
I 
----------- I 
I 
----------I I Keeping I 14 I 61 1 77 I 51 I 17 1 
1 in touch 1 (6.3%) 1 
III 
------------------------ 
(27.2%) I 
I 
------------ 
(34.4%)I 
I 
----------- 
(22.8%) I 
I 
----------- 
(7.6%) I 
t 
----------- 
Table 4: Frequencies of keeping in touch with European 
------- happenings and events by reading, watching TV 
and discussing about them 
----------- 
Never I 
---------- 
Hardly 
---------------- 
lOccasionallyf 
---------- 
Quite I 
----------- 
Very 
!I 
---------- I------- 
Ever II 
! ------- 
a Lot I Often I 
-- I 
Read I 19 
---------- 
34 
---- I- 
1 103 I 
--------- I 
56 I 
---------- 
11 
I (8.5%) I 
! --------I --------- I 
(15.2%) 
---------- 
I (46.0%) I 
-I ------------ I - 
(25.0%) I 
--------- 
(4.9%) 1 
----- -- I 
I Watch 1 17 I 38 I 98 
I 
59 1 
--- 
11 I 
fI '(7.6%) I 
l---------I--------- 
(17.0%) 
---------- 
I (43.8%) I 
-I ------------ I- 
(26.3%) 1 
----- --- 
(4.9%) f 
----- I I 
I Discuss I 33 I 61 1 95 I 
I - 
23 I 
----- 
11 I 
II (14.7%) I 
----=---------------- 
(27.2%) 
---------- 
I (42.4%) 1 
---------------- 
(10.3%) 1 
---------- 
(4.9%) 
---------- 
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Table 5a: Items and loading weights for Factor 1 (Nationalism) 
------- 
I ITEM 
------ 
-------------------------------------------------- 
NOI ITEM I 
--I------------------------ 
---------- 
LOADING I 
1 
----------------------I 
"British democracy is the model for the rest 
---------I 
. 63 of the world" f 
4 
{ 
f 
"No other country is as good as Britain" { . 74 
{7 
{ 
"Britain has the most beautiful countryside . 65 1 in the world" { 
II i 1 10 1 "The British education system is the best . 65 I in the world" 
f 11 1 "International law should not impose changes . 55 1 { on the British law" I I 
{ 
{ 12 "Britain should never have given independence{ . 51 to the colonies" (also in Factor 2; -. 37) 
1 
{ 13 
1 
1 "Britain's economy should be the only factor 1 
1 
. 47 I determining the value of the pound" (also inl 
I Factor 2; -. 31) 
1 
1 
I I 
{ 14 
I 
1 "Britain has the most professional army { . 57 { 
------- 
I in the world". { 
--------------------------------------------------- --------- 
Table 5b: Items and loading weights for Factor 2 (Commitment to 
-------- Europe) 
--------- 
ITEM NOI 
--------_ 
----------------- 
ITEM 
----------------- 
------------------------------ 
I 
----------------------------- I 
---------- 
LOADING 
--------- 
=3I "Britain should actively participate in the I -. 86 
1 developments in Europe" 
1 II 
{5I "Britain should actively encourage the 1 -. 80 
=1 unification of Europe" 1 
I (also in Factor 3; -. 35) i I 
{ I 
I91 "Britain should accept the changes occurring 1 -. 73 I 
=I 
----------- 
in Europe". 
---------------- ------------------------------ ---------- 
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Table 5c: Items and loading weights for Factor 3 (Preservation of 
-------- traditions) 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
I ITEM NOI ITEM I LOADING 
I--------I------------------------------------- 
II! I 
2i "Britain's national identity has to -. 72 
II be preserved" 
IIII 
61 "Britain should stick to its own 1 -. 63 
II traditions" I1 
I81 "Britain's internal affairs should be I -. 70 
I controlled by British politicians" 1I 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 5d: Factor Correlations (Factors 1,2 and 3, Section B) 
------------------------------------------- 
1 FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 
FACTOR 1 1.00000 
FACTOR 2 -. 29855 1.00000 
I FACTOR 3 . 14049 -. 08352 1.00000 I 
------------------------------------------- 
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Table 6: Items and loading weights for Factor 1 (General views 
------- about EC) 
---------- 
ITEM NOI 
I--------I 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
ITEM (LOADING I 
----------------------------------------------- I------- 
II 
1 
I 
"Britain has benefited from her membership I . 74 
= of the EEC" I 
II I I 
{2 "Britain's economy has become less competitivel -. 50 
t as a result of the EEC" I 
: II 
3I "Britain contributes too much to the I -. 62 I 
EEC budget" I 
I 1 
14 "Britain has gained political power from I . 64 I 
her membership of the EEC" i 
I 
I 
I fI 
15 "The EEC interferes with the national I -. 66 I 
I government of Britain" I 
I 
I 
I II 
16 { "EEC membership gave Britain the opportunity I . 62 I 
II to influence European policies for her own I I 
---------- 
advantage" I 
------------------------------------------------ --------- 
Table 7: Items forming the Racism scale. 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
!- "It is OK for people from different races to get married". 
- "I would not mind working with people from other races". 
- "I would not want a person from another race to 
be my 
boss". 
"It is OK for people from different races to live 
together". 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
------------------ 
We are interested in what you think about the plans of Britain and 
the other countries in the European Economic Community (EEC) to 
form a united Europe after 1992. Some people think that this 
would be a good thing for Britain, some that Britain has nothing 
to gain from it, whilst others think that it will be a bad thing 
for Britain. The unification of Europe will mean the extension 
of the links that already exist among the member countries of the 
EEC. 
So I'd like us first to talk about what you know about the EEC and 
whether you think it has affected Britain so far. 
1. Perhaps a good place to start is by you telling me which 
countries are members of the EEC. 
a) Do you know of any other countries currently applying to 
join the EEC? IF YES, which? 
2. Do you know when Britain joined the EEC? 
3. Present them with a card with all member countries and ask: 
Can you tell me in which order they joined the EEC? In cases 
when you may think that two or more countries joined the EEC 
simultaneously you can put these countries together. 
4. Do you think Britain has benefited from joining the EEC? 
If YES, How? 
If NO, Why do you think it hasn't benefited? 
5. Do you think it had any bad effects on Britain? 
What? 
6. What do you think the aims of the EEC are? 
7. Do you think the community has been successful in achieving 
these aims? 
8. What do you think the member countries wanted to achieve when 
they joined the EEC? 
Now I would like us to talk more about the particular reason 
for 
which certain countries might have joined or might want to 
join 
the EEC. I've got here a list of reasons and a list of countries 
and I would like you to tell me how important, you think, each one 
of these reasons was for each country. Let's start with 
Britain. 
9. *Produce one by one the cards with Reasons and Very Important 
to Not important at all scale * Ask how important each reason 
was for each of the seven countries for joining the EEC and 
then go to the next card; i. e. next reason. 
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How important for [Britain] 
[France] 
[Turkey] (do you 
[Portugal] 
[Italy] 
[Greece] 
[Germany] 
think, might be) 
do you think, was 
[the strengthening of her national defence] 
[protecting the interests of Western Europe] 
(bringing about economic expansion in Europe] 
[helping achieve lasting peace in Europe] 
[increasing the standard of living throughout the EEC] 
[achieving a greater mutual understanding between European 
nations] 
(providing the third block between the two super-powers] 
[development of their economy at the expense of richer 
countries] 
[taking advantage of other countries' technological 
achievements] 
[dominating other countries] 
(exploiting other countries] 
as a reason for joining the EEC? 
10. Which country do you think influences EEC policies most? 
Why do you think so? 
11. Do you feel that the EEC has affected your life in any way? 
In what way? 
12. Could you have voted (were you eligible to vote) in the last 
European elections? 
For those who were NOT eligible to vote - If you could vote, 
would you have voted in the last European parliament elections 
For those who were eligible to vote - Did you vote in the 
last European parliament elections? 
13. IF YES, Which party did you/would you have vote/d for? 
Why did/would you vote for them? 
IF NO, Why didn't/wouldn't you vote? 
14. Finally, we would like to know how much each of the following 
characteristics, you think, applies to each of the member 
countries of the EEC as well as the United States and Turkey. 
For the set of statements below, we would like you to mark on 
the line from Very much... to... Not at all where you think a 
particular country would fall. For example, if the 
characteristic was high annual rainfall level and the 
countries were Britain and Turkey the marks on the line could 
be like this 
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Applies Doesn't apply 
Very much at all 
High Annual <------- X-------------------------------- X------ 
rainfall BR. TUR. 
You may think that a characteristic applies to one country as 
much it applies to another. If this is the case, put the 
names of these countries next to the same mark on the line. 
If you feel that you don't know how much a characteristic 
applies to a particular country, write the name of this 
country next to 'Don't know' 
Good quality food 
Pollution 
Industrial conflict 
Fashionable 
Commitment to the defence of Western Europe 
High literacy level 
Unemployment 
Prosperity 
Suffers from Terrorism 
Healthy 
Good performance in sports 
Sense of humour 
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C 
"WHAT DO YOU THINK...? " 
YOUR VIEWS ABOUT EUROPE 
/ 
In the past you have told us a lot about your views on 
British politics. In 1992, changes will take place to bring 
about the unification of Europe and Europe will play a 
bigger part in British politics. We would like you to tell 
us what you think about the EEC and the unification of 
Europe. 
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SECTION A: YOUR CONTACT WITH OTHER COUNTRIES 
YES NO 
1. Have you been abroad In the last five years? I 
If yes, please write down which countries 'You've been to: 
2. Do you speak any language(s) other than English? 
YES NO 
If yes, 
a) which language(s)? 
b) Please tick the appropriate box below to show how fluently you can read, write and 
speak In the above language(s). 
Language 
} 
Read 
Wrlta 
Speak 
Road 
Wrtto 
Speak 
Basic 
II 
I 
Ii 
Intermediate Fluent 
I 
I 
YES NO 
3. Would you ever consider living abroad? 1. J 
If yes, please write down In which country 
FOR OFFICE 
USE ONLY 
-(1-4) 
(s) 
(s) 
(7) 
(70) 
(1r-17) 
... 
(78) 
(t3-23) 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
(2e) 
(29) 
(30) 
, 
(31-35) 
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YES NO 
(36) 
4. Do you know any people who live In a European country _ 
other than Britain? 
If yes, please write below your relationsh ip with them (ep. friends, brother/sister) and 
tick the appropriate box to show how well you know them. 
Very Quite Not very Hardly 
well well well at all 
m, ,, 
ii gi "i (37-39) 
(40-42) 
ii c ii 
(43-45) 
Ii 
(46-48) 
Very Quite Some Very Not 
much a lot little at all ( ) 
5. Are you Interested in what's happening II IJ iI f -71, -' 
so 
In Europe? ý 
6. Do you try to keep In touch with what's i ii 
happening in Europe? 
Never Hardly Occasion- Quite Very 
ever allyoften' often 
7. Do you read about Europe in i (52) 
newspapers/magazines? (53) 
8. Do you watch news or documentaries 1` I] 11 11 
about Europe on T. V.? 
9. Do you discuss what's happening In (54) 
Europe with other people? 
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SECTION B: YOUR VIEWS ABOUT BRITAIN 
People have different opinions about many things. Here is a list of opinions. You may agree with some of 
them and disagree with others. Sometimes you will agree strongly and at other times you will disagree 
strongly. Now and then you may be uncertain whether you agree or disagree. Please read each statement 
and put a tick to the box which is right for you. 
Strongly Agree Uncortsln Dlsagrss Strongly 
auras disagree 
1. British democracy is the 
model for the rest of the world. 
2. Britain's national idsntlty has f 7-71 
to be presorvsd. 
3. Brltaln should actively participate 
II (1}. II 
In the developments In Europe. 
4. No other country Is as good as 
f 7-71 
Britain. 
5. Britain should actively encourage 
the unification of Europe. 
f7771 f= 6. Britain should stick to its own 
traditions. 
7. Britain has the most beautiful 
countryside In the world. 
8. BrItaln's Intomal affairs should be EZD 
controlled by British politicians. 
9. Britain should accept the changes 
occuring In Europe. 
10. The British education system Is 
the best In the world. 
11. International laws should not 
Impose changes on the British law. 
I1 
F! 
r7l 
II 
.- f= 
ý' 
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(so) 
(6; ) 
(s2) 
(s3) 
(64) 
(s3) 
(es) 
ýs>> 
"(66) 
. ___(s9) 
. 
_(7o) 
FOR OFFICE 
USE ONLY 
Strongly Acme Uncertain Disagree Strongly 
agree disagree 
12. Britain should never have given ri gj 
Independence to the colonies. 
13. Britain's economy should be the 
only factor determining the value 
of the pound. 
14. Britain has the most professional u1 ýý 
army In the world. 
15. Britain should not rely upon I 
alliances with other countries. 
SECTION C: YOUR VIEWS ABOUT THE EEC 
Britain has been a member of the EEC for fifteen years. People have different opinions about how this 
effects Britain. Here is a list of such opinions. You will agree with some and disagree with others. 
Please read each statement and put a tick in the box which is right for you. 
Strongly Apra. Uncertain Disagree Strongly 
agree dlugii. 
1. Britain has benoftttod from hic f= f 77 F 
membership of the EEC. 
2. Britain'* economy has become lass 
competitive as a result of the EEC. 
3. Britain contributes too much to 
the EEC budget. 
4. Britain has gained political power 
from har membership of the EEC. 
E. The EEC Interferes with the 1 
national gover nt of Britain. 
6. EEC membership pave Britain the 
opportunIty to Influence European 
policies for her own advantage. 
. ý. (7t) 
(72) 
(73) 
(74) 
175-77 
-178-001 
CARD 2 
. _, (1) 
iav 
(3) 
_(') 
`(a) 
_(6) 
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SECTION D: YOUR VIEWS ABOUT THE UNIFICATION OF EUROPE 
A. People have different opinions about the wn# cation of Europe which will take place in 1992. Here is a 
list of such opinions. You may agree with some of them and disagree with others. Sometimes you will agree 
strongly and at other times you will disagree strongly. Now and then you may be uncertain whether you 
agree or disagree. Please read each statement and put a tick in the box which ist right for you. 
Strongly Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly 
aýrw disagree 
1. In a united Europe, Britain will 
lose its Indivldwlity. 
2. Actor 1992, It will be easy for people J F] 
my ape to work In Europe. 
3.1 feel that the unification of Europe II 
Is a worthless Idea. 
4. British culture will be enriched f II 1-71 
In a united Europe. 
5.1 oppose any movanment towards .i Lj II 
uniting Europe. 
6. Actor 1992, people of my age will 
hays mori opportunities to study In 
Europo. 
7.1 would like to sM Europe unit led. 
S. Britain's traditions are thrsatsnod 
by the unification of Europa. 
111 II 
11 
I1 UI 
9. When Europe Is united, people of my 
ape will have more opportunities to 
travel. 
. 
10. A united Europa wm have nothing to 
offer to young pople In Britain. 
f 771 f =- 
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_l(o) 
(r? ) 
_(r2) 
_l(3) 
(74) 
_(15) 4i 
ä b 
____(IC) 
(17) s` 
i 
_(te) 
_(19) 
i 
FOR OFFICE 
USE ONLY 
11. I would be wliling to make 
personal sacrifices to help bring 
about the unification of Europe. 
12. In a united Europe, Britain will 
lose Its control over Internal affairs. 
13. Brltaln will benefit from being 
part of a unitod Europe. 
Strongly Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly 
agree disagree 
111 'c l 
I. I 
14. After 1992, - young people will be I1 1] FJ 
expected to spend too much of their 
time learning foreign languages. 
15. I believe that the unification of I] 
Europe can never be achieved. 
16. I will feel more loyalty to the united Li ii 
Europe than to Britain. 
17: *Atter 1992, young people will have to I1 I] 
compete with Europeans for jobs In 
Britain. 
I II I 
IIII 
I. r+ 
UJ 
18. Traditional British values will be LI 
lost when Europe Is united. 
19.1 would be willing to work In Europe iJ_ IJ 
after 1992... 
20.1 feel that I am a citizen of Europe. 
21. Ina United Europe, Britain's L1 11 I] 
Influence upon world affairs 
will become stronger. 
_(20) 
-(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
(23) 
____(30) 
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B. People also have different opinions about the possible effects the unification of Europe will have on 
different aspects of the economy and the way of life in Britain. Here is a list of such aspects. You may 
think that some of them will be affected whereas others will not. In addition you may think that some 
effects will be good and that others will be bad for Britain. Please read each item on the list and indicate 
(1) whether or not you think that each one of them will be affected and (2) whether the effect, or lack of 
effect, will be good or bad. 
Unification of Europe (1) Yes No Don't 
will have an effect on know 
1. agricultural productivity 1 0 
ýý 
2. trade Il [II 
3. defense of Britain U [1 F1 
4. Britain's position of power I CI [I 
In international politics 
5. the development of the arts Q Q FI 
6. the development of science 
and technology 
7. International politics [__] [I L 
8. freedom to travel II [-ý Q 
9. conservation of the 
environment 
10. international peace 
II II F1 
11. Britain's sovereignty ýý II CI 
12. British culture II II 
13. British traditional way of life [ý II 
FI 
14. employment opportunities in FI CI Q 
Britain 
15. British educational system Q II 
[I 
16. cost of living in Britain C] QL1 
17. earnings in Britain C] C] [_] 
18. the rich in Britain 
19. the poor in Britain C'ý II [I 
20. the Conservative party 
21. the Labour party CI I] [] 
22. the Green party II [1 
(2) Good Neither Bad 
good 
ý noI II 
[I (III 
CI CI Cl 
(35-36) 
, __. 
(37-38) 
___ 
(39-40) 
(41-42) 
III 
ý1 1 
_ 
(43-44) 
IJ ý EI _ 
(45-46) 
II II _ 
(47-48) 
Lý II -- 
(6t-52) 
Ii 
rý ( - 
t55-5s) 
Cý Li i (a7-ss) 
C_] Cý D (as-so) 
Ci I (sr-62) 
II _ 
(63-64) 
-(65-66) 
Cý r---1 L -(67-69) 
II II I - 
(69-70) 
i CýCý _(71-72) 
II II _ , 
(73-74) 
II II (75-76) 
ýI C1 - 
(77-78) 
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CODING SCHEME FOR THE CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE INTERVIEWS 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
1. Economy and Trade 
1.1. Variety of products 
1.2. Surpluses, expensive products, unemployment 
2. Togetherness, Closeness, Friendship 
2.1. General 
2.1.1. Alliance or third super-power 
2.1.2. Balance and equality 
2.1.3. Communication and understanding 
2.2. In relation to Britain 
2.2.1. Necessity 
2.2.2. Loss of independence 
2.2.3. Britain not fairly treated 
3. Other countries 
3.1. France and Germany 
3.1.1. Power, strength 
3.1.2. Have a say 
3.2. Strong/Big vs. Weak/Small 
4. Britain and other countries 
4.1. Us - Them 
4.2. Compromise and changing ways of doing things 
5: Britain as a country 
5.1. Nationalist beliefs 
5.1.1. Bigger 
5.1.2. More powerful 
5.1.3. Make and impose decisions 
5.1.4. Disagreements with other countries 
5.1.5. Equal to big super-powers 
6. Experiences and feelings for the EC 
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Table 1: Distribution of respondents by department. 
------------------------------- 
DEPARTMENT 
{------------------------------ 
------------ 
N 
-I --------- 
---------- 
%{ 
- 
ECONOMICS 
I 
I4 
--------{ 
4.7 I 
MATERIALS SCIENCE/ENGIN. I6I 7.0 
MECHANICAL ENGINEERING 71 8.1 { 
LINGUISTIC/INTERN. STUDIES 9 10.5 
SOCIOLOGY 151 5.8 { 
PSYCHOLOGY {6I 7.0 
CHEMICAL ENGINEERING {2 2.3 
MSTHI* {6 7.0 
-DANCE I2I 2.3 I MICROBIOLOGY 4 4.7 
1 CHEMISTRY 5{ 5.8 
I MATHEMATICS 17 8.1 1 
MUSIC I6{ 7.0 
BIOCHEMISTRY 8I 9.3 
CIVIL ENGINEERING 5 5.8 { 
PHYSICS 3 3.5 
I ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING 
------ -- - - 
111 
--------- 
1.2 1 
--------I { - ------- ------------- 
= TOTAL 
1------ - 
I I 
I 86 1 
---------- 
- 
100.0 I 
--------{ ------------------------ 
1 *MSTHI : MANAGEMENT STUDIES 
- 
IN TOURISM 
- 
1 AND INDUSTRY 
I 
-------------------------------- ----------- 
1 
I 
---------- 
Table 2: Relation of the course, -that respondents were doing at the 
------- University, with Europe. 
--------------------------- 
RELATION 
------------ 
----------------------- --------- 
INI 
-- 
I can 
------------ 
go to Europe for 
---------- - 
----------------------- 
my industrial year 
----------------------- 
I------ 
22 I 
-------- 
I am 
-- 
learning foreign l 
- 
anguages 
- -- - - -------- 
I 17 
------ -------- 
S The 
-------------- --- 
course itself is 
-- - -- - - --- 
related to Europe 
-I 
I 
(e. g. lectures about 
------- ---------- 
Europe) 
----------------------- 
3 
- I------ -------- 
=I can 
- 
work in Europe in the future 
--------------------- 
I2I 
- ý------ý -------- 
II can 
------------------ 
travel 
-- 
---------------------- 
=11 
-- -- - 
I 
------ 
Total 
--------- 
------------------ 
------------------ 
- 
----------------------- 
45 = ' 
--------- 
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Table 3a: Cross-tabulation for party in general elections, T1 by T2 
T2 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Ti CONSERVA{ LABOUR; LIBERAL IGREEN IUNCERTAINI I WOULD 
TIVE II DEMOCRATI I NOT VOTE 
----------- ; --------- I ------- I --------- I ------ { --------- I ---------- I CONSERVA I 25 I 3; i 
TIVE IIII 
I ---------- I --------- I ------- I --------- I------ I--------- I---------- 
I LABOUR 15 1111 
IIII1i1 
{---------- I--------- I------- I--------- :: 
{ LIBERAL {8II3{ 
I DEMOCRAT II{1 
i---------- {---------I------- {---------I------I--------- {---------- 
I GREEN Ii91i 
IIIIIII 
I ---------- {--------- I------- I--------- iI ------ --------- I ---------- 
I UNCERTAINI 1I2III 11 11 
IIII11 
i i---------I-------I---------I------I---------; ---------- 
II WOULD III11I1{1 
{ NOT VOTE IIIII 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3b: Cross-tabulation for party in future European elections, 
-------- Ti by T2 
T2 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Ti I CONSERVAI LABOURI LIBERAL IGREEN IUNCERTAINI I WOULD 
{ TIVE DEMOCRATI { NOT VOTEI 
ICONSERVA I 22 I2I11I4 
ITIVE II 
------ I --------- --------- 
ILABOUR 1 10 {1IIIIII 
ILIBERAL 24111 
IDEMOCRAT I{ 
(GREEN {1111 10 141 
1II111{ 
1UNCERTAINI II2131 10 111 
I11I1II 
II WOULD 11I1I131I 
INOT VOTE I1IIIII 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table 3c: Cross-tabulation for most pro-European party, T1 by T2 
T2 
-- -- - ---- 
Ti 
- 
I 
---- --- 
CONSERVAI 
-- ---- 
LABOURI 
----------- ------ 
LIBERAL IGREEN ! NONE 
---- 
OF 
------------ 
I DON'T 
---------- 
TIVE I 
-- ----- - ----- 
DEMOCRATI ITHEM 
--- ------ - -- 
KNOW 
I 
ICONSERVA 
- -I 
12 I 
I - 
1 
- I - - I----- 
11I 
--- 
1 
- I--------- --------- 
ITIVE Z I II 
ILABOUR 3 51 13 4 
I$ I I II II 
ILIBERAL 2 41 ----- 17 3 --- 3 - --------- 
IDEMOCRAT 
- -- --- - --------- IGREEN 1 - - 28 
I . 11 ! 
INONE OF 1 I 21 2121 4 
ITHEM 1 1 1 1 
II DON'T 1 1 1 I1 1 12 
KNOW I 
------------ ---------- 
I 
-------- 
II 
--------------------- --- ------------ 
Table 3d: Cross-tabulation for party best representing U. K. 's 
-------- interest in the EC, Ti by T2 
T2. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Ti CONSERVAI LABOUR( LIBERAL (GREEN INONE OF I DON'T I 
TIVE I DEMOCRATI ITHEM I KNOW 
I --------- I ------- I --------- I ------ I --------- { --------- 
CONSERVA 32 2133 3 
TIVE I II I 
---------- I --------- I------- I --------- I II 
LABOUR I 
1 
3 I 10 $ 3 
I I 
----------I --------- 
11I 
I------- {---------I------ 
II 
; --------- { 
LIBERAL 2 3f41 I 
i DEMOCRAT i 
---------- I --------- I------- {--------- I------ I---------I--------- 
I GREEN I1 
I 
1 
III !I 
---------- I--------- 
II 
I------- I--------- I------ I--------- ; --------- 
I NONE OF 1 4 II1I2 I4II 
i THEM I II III 
------ --------- --------- 
$I DON'T I {I1 11i2 
KNOW I 
------------- -------- 
II1 
------------------------- 
I1 
-------------------- 
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Table 4a: Daily newspapers that respondents said they were 
-------- reading, both Ti and T2. 
(First and second newspaper mentioned added up) 
-------------------------- 
I DAILY NEWSPAPER I 
- - - - - 
------- 
N(T1) 
------- 
---------- 
I N(T2) 
{ I I----- --------- - ---- 
TIMES 18 
--------I 
I 17 { 
DAILY MAIL 14 I 15 { 
INDEPENDENT I 13 I 17 
GUARDIAN I 10 I 12 
DAILY TELEGRAPH I 9 1 11 { 
I DAILY MIRROR 4 13 
DAILY EXPRESS I 2 16{ 
STANDARD I 1 I2 
TODAY I 1 11 
{ SUN I 1 I-I 
{ DAILY STAR I 1 I-I 
I SPORT I - I1 
I FINANCIAL TIMES I - I1 
{ VARIOUS I 
- - -- 
3 
------ 
11 
{--------{ { - -------------------- 
{ TOTAL I 
--------------------------- 
77 
------ 
I 87 
---------- 
Table 4b: ' Sunday papers that respondents said they were 
-------- reading, both Ti and T2 
(First and second paper mentioned added up) 
{ SUNDAY PAPERS 
----------------------------- 
----------- 
I N(T1) { 
---------- 
N(T2) 
---------- 
------------------ 
{ MAIL 
I-------- { 
{ 17 I 
--------- { 
14 
{ TIMES { 14 12 
{ OBSERVER {7{ 6{ 
{ INDEPENDENT I6I 8 
{ EXPRESS {41 4 
NEWS OF THE WORLD 14{ 2I 
{ MIRROR 14 1 
{ TELEGRAPH {31 2I 
{ NORWEGIAN I-{ 1I 
{ VARIOUS 
------ 
I-I 
I-------- i 
2 
---------I {----------------------- 
{ TOTAL 
------------------------------ 
{ 59 I 
---------- 
52 
---------- 
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Table 5: Interest in politics, Ti and T2 
VERY QUITE SOME VERY I NOT AT { 
{ MUCH 
-- ----- 
IA 
--- 
LOT 
---- - 
I 
I--- ------ 
1L 
{-- 
ITTLE I ALL { 
----- 
N % 
---- 
I 
IN 
- 
- 
% 
------ 
IN 
I --- 
% 
------ 
IN 
-- 
------- 
% 
----- 
----- I ----- 
IN 
----{ ---- 
%{ 
------------ 
{British 
---------- 
1T1112 
- 
14.0 
I- - 
133 38.4 130 34.9 
I 
19 
-- 
10.5 
I 
{2 2.3 { 
Ipolitics {T2{13 15.1 {32 37.2 126 30.2 110 11.6 14 4.7 1 
_ ------------- I--I ---- 
{International{T1{ 7 
----- 
8.1 
I --- 
{24 
------ 
27.9 
- 
I --- 
132 
--- 
------ 
37.2 
------ 
I -- 
118 
I -- 
------- 
20.9 
------- 
{ 
{5 
----- 
5.8 1 
---- Z 
(politics 
{--{ ---- 
IT2{ 8 
----- 
9.3 
I --- 
{26 
----- 
30.2 
-- 
I 
128 
--- 
32.6 
------ 
117 
I-- 
19.8 
------- 
I 
16 
----- 
I 
7.0 { 
----I 1----------- 
(European 
{ 
--I--{---- 
IT11 7 
---- -- 
----- 
8.1 
- -- 
I--- 
130 
--- 
---- 
34.9 
------ 
I 
137 
I --- 
43.0 
------ 
111 
I -- 
12.8 
------- 
I 
I1 
I ----- 
1.2 { 
---- { 
ievents 
------------ 
I I 
IT21 5 
---------- 
- - 
5.8 
----- 
I 
132 
---- 
37.2 
------ 
130 
---- 
34.9 
------ 
117 
--- 
19.8 
------- 
{1 
------ 
1.2 { 
---- 
N for Ti : 86 
N for T2 : 85 
Table 6:, Contact with European issues and events, Ti and T2 
OFTEN I SOMETIMES 
------ 
I 
--- 
NEVER 
--------1 
------------- 
I-- 
IN 
-------- 
% 
I---- 
IN 
- 
I - 
%I 
------- I 
N 
--- 
%I 
-------- I ----- - I Reading about 
1 
----- 
IT1 
-I -- 
124 
-------- 
27.9 
----- - 
I --- 
1 53 
I ---- 
61.6 1 
-------I 
9 
--- 
10.5 I 
---- ---- 
I Europe 
------------ 
I--- 
IT2 
-I-- 
122 
- - 
25.6 
------- 
1 49 
I ---- 
57.0-1 
-------1 
15 
--- 
17.4 1 
----I --- ------ 
I Watching 
-I--- 
IT1 
-1-- 
110 11.6 1 62 72.1 1 14 
- 
16.3 I 
1 programmes 1--- -I-- --------I ---- -------I --- --------I 
1 about Europe 
------ 
IT2 
- - 
115 
-- 
17.4 1 
-------- I 
53 
---- 
61.6 1 
------- I 
18 
--- 
20.9 1 
-------- I ------- ----- 
I Discussing about 
-- I 
IT1 
-I 
18 
- 
9.3 1 
-------- I 
57 
---- 
66.3 1 
------- I 
21 
--- 
24.4 
-------- I I 
Europe 
------------------ 
I --- 
IT2 
----- 
-I- 
18 
---- 
9.3 1 
--------- 
60 
---- 
69.8 1 
-------- 
18 
--- 
20.9 1 
--------- 
N for Ti : 86 
N for T2 : 86. 
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Table 7: Watching TV current affairs programmes, Ti and T2 
I OFTEN 
---- 
I SOMETIMES I 
------------- I 
NEVER 
------------- I ----- 
I T1 
--- 
I T2 
I 
I T1 I T2 I T1 I T2 1 
I I% I% 
---- I 
I%I 
------ I 
% 
------ 
I% 
I------I ------------------- 
16 o'clock News 
------- 
154.7 
----- 
I------ I 
158.1 
I ----- I 
-- 
138.4 
------ I 
1 29.1 1 
------ I 
7.0 
----- 
111.6 1 
I ------ I 1 ----------------- 
IC4 News 
-I 
1 4.7' 1 7.0 
------I 
1 29.1 
------I 
1 36.0 
------I 
1 66.3 
------ 
1 55.8 1 
I------I 1------------------ 
ITomorrow's World 
-I----- 
123.3 
I 
1 20.9 1 50.0 
----I 
1 52.3 
------ 
1 26.7 
I------ 
125.9 1 
i------I 1------------------ 
INews at 10 
-I----- 
123.3 
I- -----I 
1 24.4 
-- 
160.5 1 51.2 1 16.3 1 23.3 I 
I ------------------ - I----- I------ I ------ I ------ I ------ I ------ I 
INewsnight 1 4.7 1 3.5 130.2 
-- 
1 40.7 
------ 
165.1 
I------ 
1 54.7 1 
I------1 1------------------ 
19 o'clock News 
-I-----I 
137.2 
------I 
43.0 
---- 
152.3 
I 
1 46.5 
----- 
110.5 
I------ 
I 9.3 1 
I------I 1------------------ 
; Question Time 
-I-----I 
1 9.3 
------I 
I 8.1 1 
- 
------ 
43.0 
------ 
I- 
143.0 
I------ 
147.7 
I------ 
1 47.7 1 
I------1 1------------------ 
140 Minutes 
-I-----I 
1 2.3 
I ----- 
I 3.5 144.2 1 53.5 
------ 
1 53.5 
I------ 
1 41.9 1 
I------I 1------------------ 
IThis Week 
-I-----I 
I -- 
------I 
I 1.2 1 
------ 
14.0 
I 
1 18.6 
-- 
186.0 
------ 
1 79.1 1 
I ------ I I ------------------ 
ICity Program 
-I -----I 
I -- 
------ I 
I -- I 
------ 
5.8 
I ---- 
1 5.8 
I 
1 94.2 1 93.0 1 
1------------------ -I-----I ------I ------ I------ ------- 1 ------ I Dispatches 1 -- I -- I 7.0 1 10.5 1 93.0 
--- 
1 88.4 1 
I ------ ------ 1 ---- 
IPanorama 
1------------ 
-I -----I 
15.8 I 
------ I 
3.5 1 
------ 
61.6 
I ------ 
1 62.8 
--- 
I --- 
132.6 
------ 
132.6 
I------I ------ 
INature 
--------- ---- 
-I-----I 
1 4.7 
------I 
7.0 1 
------I 
33.7 1 
I --- 
33.7 
----- 
1 61.6 
------ 
1 58.1 1 
I------1 1 ----- 
(World in Action 
-1-----I 
1 1.2 1 
------I 
-1.2 1 
------I 
45.3-1 
I - 
52.3 1 53.5 1 45.3 1 
---I 1------------------ 
(Behind Headlines 
-I-----I 
11.2 1 
------I 
-- 1 
------I 
4.7 I 
------I 
9.3 
-- 
------ 
194.2 
---- - 
I--- 
1 89.5 1 
I------I 1------------------ 
(Critical Eye 
- 
-I-----I 
I -- 
------I 
-- 1 
------I 
------I 
1.2 1 
------I 
---- I 
1.2 1 
------I 
- 
98.8 
------ 
1 97.7 1 
I------I ------------- 1---- 
IPublic Eye 
-I-----I 
I -- I -- 1 
------I 
1.2 I 
------I 
7.0 1 
------I 
98.8 
------ 
1 91.9 1 
I------I 1------------------ 
(Omnibus 
-I-----I 
1 3.5 1 
-----I 
1.2 1 
------I 
38.4 1 
------I 
25.6 1 
------1 
58.1 
------ 
1 72.1 1 
I------I 1------------------ 
; World this Week 
-I 
11.2 I 
-----I 
-- 1 
------I 
16.3 1 
------I 
12.8 1 
------I 
82.6 
------ 
1 86.0 1 
I------I 1------------------ 
IOn the Record 
-I 
1 4.7 1 
- -I 
5.8 1 
------ I 
22.1 1 
------ I 
16.3 1 
------ I 
73.3 
------ 
176.7 1 
I ------ I 
(Walden Interview 
------------------- 
-- - 
12.3 1 
-------- 
1.2 1 
------- 
19.8 1 
------- 
19.8 1 
------- 
77.9 
-- 
1 77.9 1 
N for Ti : 86 
N for T2 : 85 
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Table 8: Source and amount of influence in forming political 
------- opinions, T1 and T2 
NOT 
I----- 
AT ALL 
------- I 
A LITTLE 
------------- 
IA 
I ----- 
LOT 
T1 I T2 I T1 I T2 
- 
T1 
------} 
I T2 
---------------- 
I 
I----- I------ I ------ 
I% 
------ 
% 
--- 
I%I 
Parents 124.4 1 17.4 54.7 
I I 
160.5 
--- 
19.8 
I-----I 
122.11 
I --------------- I ----- I ------ I ------ I ------ I ------ I ----- I Siblings 
--------------- 
159.3 
I----- 
61.6 1 
1------ 
28.8 
-- 
127.9 7.5 I 7.01 
Friends 
t --------------- 
130.2 
I ----- 
I 
12.8 
I ------ I 
---- 
61.6 1 
------ 
I------I 
72.1 
I ------ I 
------ 
7.0 
---- 
I-----I 
115.11 
I Press 
I --------------- 
123.3 
I ----- 
123.3 1 
I ------ I 
67.4 1 
------ 
65.1 I 
------ 
-- 
8.1 
-- 
I-----I 
1 11.61 
I Radio/TV 
1--------------- 
123.3 
I----- 
1 23.3 1 
---- 
I 
61.1 1 
-- 
I 
65.1 1 
---- 
14.0 
I ----- I 
111.61 
I Politicians 
---------------- 
134.9 
------ 
I-- I 
133.7 1 
-------- 
----I 
54.7 1 
------- 
------I 
59.3 1 
------- 
------ 
9.3 
------ 
I-----I 
I 7.01 
------- 
Table 9: Groups mentioned, Ti and T2 (First and second group 
------- added up) 
---------------------------------------------- 
I GROUP 
--------------- 
-------- 
I N(T1) 
--------- 
I N(T2) I 
------------------------------ I GREENPEACE 
I------- 
!7 
I------- 
I 10 I 
FRIENDS OF THE EARTH 14 1 
MUSICIANS AGAINST NUCLEAR ARMS 2 1 
I YOUNG CONSERVATIVES 12 - I AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 1 1 
I LABOUR PARTY 11 1 
BRITISH UNION FOR ABOLITION OF VIVISECTION I11 - 0 ANIMAL WELFARE 1 I -I 
I UNION OF JEWISH STUDENTS I- I 1I 
I WORLD WILDLIFE FUND -I 1 
I CONSERVATIVE ASSOCIATION I- I 1I 
I EARTH ACTION -1 1} 
I LEAGUE AGAINST ANIMAL CRUELTY I- 1 1 
I CONSERVATIVE STUDENTS 
---------------------------------------------- 
I- 
--------- 
11 
-------- 
TOTAL 19 20 
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Table 10a: First most significant, international event 
-------------------------------------- 
EVENT I FREQUENCY 
{ GULF WAR 78 { 
f LITHUANIA I 4 
{ CHRISTMAS I 1 
{ RESIGNATION OF M. THATCHER 1 1 
GORBATCHEV CHANCING STANCE I 1{ 
I GROUND WAR IN THE GULF I 1{ 
{ FAMINE IN E THIOPIA 1I 
{ REVOLUTION IN IRAQ 1 1 
TOTAL 1 88 
------------------------------------ 
Table 10b: Second most significant, international event 
------------------------------- 
EVENT 
------------ 
FREQUENCY 
------------------------------ I-----------; I LITHUANIA 1 47 
I SOUTH AFRICA/APARTHEID 110 
GULF WAR 8 I 
OIL-SLICKS/GULF 3 
RESIGNATION OF M. THATCHER I3 
TERRORISM IN UK 3 
I IRA ATTACK TO NO. 10 12 
CHANGE OF PM IN UK I2 
I MOVES TO EUROPEAN UNITY I1 
{ SNOW IN BRITAIN I1I 
I CONFLICTS/TALKS FOR ANC 1 
i GATT TALKS I1 
I PEACE PROPOSAL/GULF I1I 
TOTAL I 83 
------------------------------------ 
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Table 10c: Third most significant, international event 
----------------------------------------- 
EVENT IFREQUENCY 
{ SOUTH AFRICA/APARTHEID 1 21 
LITHUANIA 15 { 
{ OIL SLICKS IN GULF 5 
{ YUGOSLAVIAN UNREST 3 
EVENTS IN ALBANIA { 3{ 
ISRAEL NOT RETALIATING IRAQ 2 
RESIGNATION OF M. THATCHER { 2{ 
! IRA ATTACK TO NO 10 1{ 
CHANGE OF PM IN UK 1{ 
1 BOMBING OF ISRAEL { 1I 
CONFLICTS/TALKS FOR ANC { 11 
NEAR COLLAPSE OF US 1{ 
UN COUNTRIES WORKING TOGETHER 1 1 
I PEACE EFFORTS BY USSR/GULF I 1I 
! VIRGIN BIRTHS 1 1 
I END OF GULF WAR { 11 
! WORSENING OF ISRAELS' RELATIONSI { 
! WITH PALESTINIANS I 1! 
I IMPRISONING OF LEADERS OF { ! 
I CHINESE STUDENTS ! 11 
TOTAL 1 63 
--------------------------------------- 
Table lla: First most significant, national event 
----------------------------------- 
EVENT 
{---------------------------------- 
------------ 
{FREQUENCY I 
I ---------- 
I GULF WAR 55 
RECESSION I7 
CHANGE OF PM 15 
IRA ATTACK IN NO 10 {4 
TERRORISM I3{ 
RESIGNATION OF M. THATCHER I3 
UNEMPLOYMENT 2 
{ HIGH INTEREST RATES 2 
SPENDING ON TROOPS/GULF 1 
I DISAGREEMENTS WITH EC 1 
LITHUANIA 1 
{ EFFECTS ON OIL INDUSTRY BY WAR 1{ 
I PEACE PROPOSAL/GULF 1 
{ CUT OF INTEREST RATES {11 
I WARS' EFFECT ON TOURISM {1{ 
SENDING SOLDIERS TO THE WAR I1I 
I B-52 BOMBERS IN UK 
------------------ 
I11 
I----------I {---------------- 
I TOTAL 
----------------------------------- 
90 
------------ 
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Table lib: Second most significant, national event 
-------------------------------------- 
EVENT IFREQUENCY 
TERRORISM { 10 ! 
IRA ATTACK IN NO 10 { 8 
{ RECESSION 8 
{ UNEMPLOYMENT 4 
CUT OF INTEREST RATES I 4I 
LITHUANIA { 4{ 
RESIGNATION OF M. THATCHER 4 
RETHINKING OF POLL-TAX 3 
{ HIGH INTEREST RATES 3! 
{ SOUTH AFRICA 3 
{ CANNON STREET TRAIN CRASH 2 
ECU-ERM 2 
CHANGE OF PM 1 
{ DISAGREEMENTS WITH EC 1 1 
EC TALKS 1 
GULF WAR 1 1I 
FAILURE TO AGREE ON GULF WARI 1{ 
{ GATT TALKS 1 1 
{ OIL SLICKS IN GULF I 1I 
! YELTSIN VS GORBATCHEV I 1! 
BREAKDOWN OF BRITISH RAIL I 1 
{ CAP PROBLEMS I 11 
INCREASE OF PATRIOTISM I 1I 
EEC TALKS/REMOVAL OF TRADE I 
BARRIERS 1 11 
TOTAL 1 68 
------------------------------------ 
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Table 12a:. Items and loading weights for Factor 1 (Nationalism) 
----------- 
I ITEM NO{ 
-- - -- 
-------------------------------- 
ITEM 
-------------------------- - 
-------- 
---- 
----------- 
LOADING 
{ -I -- - 
41 
----- 
No other country is as good as 
---- 
Britain 
I---------I 
. 73 ! 
I1 British democracy is the model for the 
! 
1 . 69 I rest of the world I 
II 
6 Britain should stick to its own 
I 
I 
I 
. 67 
traditions 
II 
3 Britain's national identity has 
I 
to be 
1 
. 67 
II 
preserved 
I I 
91 The British education system is the 1 . 64 I 1 best in the world I I 
I 
10 1 Britain's international affairs 
I 
should I . 50 ! 1 be controlled by British politi cians I I 
I 
------------ 
(Also on, Factor 3; -. 47) 
------------------------------- 
I 
--------- 
I 
--------- 
Table 12b: Items and loading weights for Factor 2 (Beliefs in 
--------- international co-operation) 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
i ITEM NOI ITEM LOADING 
I---------I ---------------------------------------- I--------- 
11 I Countries will only be able to survive . 78 I if they act together I 
i1I 
13 i Britain should accept rules and . 61 
regulations imposed by international I 
treaties 
II 
5 Britain cannot stand alone in the . 60 I international scene 
IIii 
I 12 I International laws should not impose I -. 53 1 
I changes on British law II 
iIII 
17 I National interests should not I . 44 i 
iI override international co-operation 
II (Also on Factor 3; . 34) 11 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table 12c: Items and loading weights for Factor 3 (Section A) 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
ITEM NOI ITEM I LOADING I 
--------- I ---------------------------------------I---------I 
16 International problems have caused . 70 
unnecessary arguments and divisions in 
I British politics 
II 
71 Britain has the most beautiful . 57 
countryside in the world { 
II1I 
2I Individual countries cannot influence I . 52 
international developments as much as I 
i groups of countries 
IIII 
15 1 Britain has the most professional army I . 40 I 
II in the world iI 
II (Also on Factor 1; . 31 II 
IfI{ 
{8I Different countries should focus on { . 36 1 
II things that unite them and not on I 
II things that divide them I 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 12d: Factor Correlations (Factors 1,2 and 3, Section A) 
----------------------------------------------- 
i FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3I 
I FACTOR 1 1.00000 I 
FACTOR 2 -. 14147 1.00000 I 
I FACTOR 3 . 05193 . 09579 1.00000 
----------------------------------------------- 
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Table 13a: Items and loading weights for Factor 1 (Welfare) 
------- 
ITEM 
------- 
--------------------------------------------- 
NOI ITEM 
------------------ ---------------- -- - - 
---------- 
LOADING 
i 
2 
I -- I - - 
! The government must increase both taxest 
---------I 
. 71 f and social spending 
f 
11 
II 
The poll-tax will stop local councils 
f 
-. 60 
spending too much money 
f (Also on Factor 7; . 32) f 
23 
iI 
1 People who decide to pay for private I 
f 
-. 56 
! education for their children should be f f 
allowed to pay less tax 
(Also on Factor 7; . 36) I ! 
f 
10 
fI 
! Workers should not be allowed to strike{ -. 56 
I if it will hurt the industry concerned I 
! 
(Also on Factor 5; . 36) ! 
30 
II 
! The best possible health care should be! 
! 
. 56 f available to everybody regardless of 
f 
the to the tax-payers 
! 
22 f We should try to provide jobs for . 54 ! everybody even if taxes have to be I f 
raised to do so 
29 1 The welfare state makes people nowadaysl -. 52 f 
f less willing to look after themselves 
f 
I (Also on Factor 4; -. 39) 
9 ! It is the responsibility of the . 51 ! f government to take care of people who I 
f cannot take care of themselves 
I (Also on Factors 4 and 7; . 31, . 35) I 
I 
16 I Everybody should be responsible for 1 -. 37 f 
I buying the best health insurance they 
I can afford I 
--------- 
I (Also on Factor 5; . 35) ! 
-------------------------------------------- 
! 
--------- 
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Table 13b: Items and loading weights for Factor 2 (Environment) 
-------- 
ITEM 
------- 
------------------------------------------- 
NOI ITEM 
--I---------------------------------------- I 
---------- 
LOADING I 
--------- 
21 We have the means to clean up the I -. 82 
lenvironment, we should spend money 
Ion it now I 
I 
I 
I 
28 (Whatever the cost we must act now -. 80 
Ito clean up the environment before I I 
lit is too late 
I I I 
15 
I 
IThe cost of "green policies" is . 78 
Itoo great 
I I 
7 
I 
IIf we do not act immediately to clean upI -. 69 
Ithe environment, it will be too late I I 
I(Also on Factor 6; -. 38) f 
I 
I 
I 1 
{ 31 
I 
IWe should not go too far down the road 1 . 63 
Ito cleaning up the environment while ourl I 
Icompetitors continue to pollute the I I 
I Iworld (Also on Factor 8; . 35) I I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
IThe threat to the environment from 1 . 51 I (pollution is overstated I 
-------- 
I(Also on Factor 8; . 35) 1 
-------------------------------------------- 
I 
---------- 
Table 13c: Items and loading weights for Factor 4 (political 
--------- Cynicism) 
----------- 
ITEM NOI 
-------I 
---------------------------------------- 
ITEM 
---------------------------------------- 
----------- 
LOADING 
I--------- -- 
= 19 Politicians are mainly in government I . 88 I 
I for their own benefit and not for the I 
I benefit of the community I 
II 
13 Political parties are only interested I . 81 
II in votes, not in people's opinions It 
II 
I 26 1 Generally speaking, MPs do not lose I -. 78 I 
I touch with ordinary people I 
II II 
I 25 1 I do not think that politicians care 1 . 77 1 
II 
----------- 
much about what people like me think 
--------------------------------------- 
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Table 13d: Items and loading weights for Factor 4 (Section E) 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
ITEM NOI ITEM I LOADING 
---------------------------------------- I---------I 
1I 
1 20 Multiculturalism simply results in no I -. 79 
culture 1f 
IIiI 
14 I British culture has benefited by the . 76 
many different cultures existing in II 
1 Britain today 1I 
III1 
I 24 1 Taxpayers should not be expected to payl -. 46 1 
1I for people who do not want to work II 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 13e: Items and loading weights for Factor 5 (Section E) 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
ITEM NOI ITEM LOADING 
---------I---------------------------------------- I--------- 
I 12 Referendums should be held to decide -. 64 
I major political decisions I 
I 
5' 1 People like me have no say in what the I . 46 II government does (Also on Factors 3 and I= 
Z18; . 32, . 45) 1 III 
I81 Industries work better if governments 1 . 41 do not interfere with them II 
I (Also on Factor 4; -. 41) II 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table 13f: Items and loading weights for factor 6 (Section E) 
----------- 
! ITEM NOI 
l---------_ 
----------- 
ITEM 
----------- 
--------------- 
--------------- 
------------- 
-------------- 
------------ 
LOADING 
---------- 
II 
17 I All efforts must be made to bring 
II 
! . 76 I everybody up to the same educational I! 
level I= 
II 
18 I Democracy will only truly work when 
II 
. 74 I, I everybody has a say in al l major 
1 
political decisions II 
I4 The level of the poll-tax should be 
I! 
. 37 II linked to people's abilit y to pay it II 
II 
6I We should all belong to a global 
II 
I . 37 I culture (Also on Factors 2 and 5; II 
f! 
----------- 
-. 33, . 32) 
----------- --------------- -------------- 
I 1 
----------- 
Table 13g: Items and loading weight for Factor 7 (Section E) 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
I ITEM NOI ITEM I LOADING 
I---------I---------------------------------------- I--------I 
iIII 
1 27 1 National groups should always strive tot . 74 1 I1 maintain their identity I 
IIiI 
I 32 1 Nationalist sentiments can only result 1 -. 40 1 
I1 in hatred (Also in Factor 6; . 34) 11 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table-13h: Item and loading weight for Factor 8 (Section E) 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
ITEM NOI ITEM I LOADING { 
{---------1----------------------------------------I---------I 
1III 
{31 People should be allowed to express I . 84 { 
II their political views freely however I{ 
I offensive other people might find them I 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table 13i: Factor Correlations (Factors 1,2,3,4,5,6,7, and 
--------- 8, Section E) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
FACTORI FACTOR2 FACTORS FACTOR4 FACTOR5 FACTOR6 FACTOR? FACTOR8 
FACTOR1 1.00000 
FACTOR2 -. 11504 1.00000 
FACTOR3 . 11996 . 00851 1.00000 IFACTOR4 . 12340 -. 02954 -. 00361 1.00000 IFACTOR5 -. 11426 . 02996 . 03517 . 00548 1.00000 IFACTOR6 . 24057 -. 15541 . 13890 . 13011 -. 06353 1.00000 FACTOR7 -. 08742 -. 06861 -. 08201 -. 01143 . 01429 -. 00914 1.00000 1 FACTOR8 -. 01537 -. 02585 . 07045 -. 00731 -. 05931 . 08593 . 04384 1.00000 1 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table 14a: Items and loading weights for Factor 1 (Importance of 
--------- international events) 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
ITEM NOI ITEM LOADING 
I---------I----------------------------------------I---------I 
II 
=21 The clashes between police and 1 . 89 11 civilians in Lithuania (Soviet Union) 
I{{ 
3{ The changes in the relations between . 69 {I the South African government and 
I the ANC { 
1III 
{11 The war in the Gulf I . 69 III{ 
I8I Disagreements between member countries I . 64 I1 in the EEC, about the handling of the I{ 
I war in the Gulf i{ 
1II 
{4I The destruction of environment in 1 . 51 { I the Gulf from the oil-slicks II 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 14b: Items and loading weights for Factor 2 (Importance of 
--------- national events) 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
I ITEM NOI ITEM I LOADING I 
I---------_---------------------------------------- I---------I 
III 
6I The Cannon Street Station train crash . 88 IIII 
51 The maintenance of high interest rates . 79 I in Britain II 
IeII 
I9I The landing of American B-52 bombers inl . 48 II Britain I 
III 
10 1 The IRA terrorist attack on Downing 1 . 40 1 Street I 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 14c: Factor Correlation (Factors 1 and 2, Importance) 
------------------------------------ 
I FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2I 
I FACTOR 1 1.00000 1 
I FACTOR 2 . 31930 
1.00000 I 
------------------------------------ 
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Table 15a: Items and loading weights for Factor 1 (Importance of 
--------- very significant events - Media) 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
I ITEM NOI ITEM LOADING 1 
---------I---------------------------------------- I--------- 
IIII 
3 The changes in the relations between . 82 I the South African government and the I 
I ANC 
IIII 
51 The maintenance of high interest rates I . 65 I in Britain. I 
III 
I2I The clashes between police and I . 64 II civilians in Lithuania (Soviet Union) II 
III1 
I4I The destruction of environment in the 1 . 63 Gulf from the oil-slicks II 
IsII 
6I The Cannon Street Station train crash I . 38 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 15b: Items and loading weights for Factor 2 (Importance of 
--------- not very significant events - Media) 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
{ ITEM NO{ ITEM { LOADING I 
{---------I---------------------------------------- I---------I 
II 
{7 The closure of the Holy-Loch American 1 . 82 I military base tI 
{{I 
{91 The landing of American B-52 bombers . 73 { {{ in Britain I{ 
III1 
{ 10 1 The IRA terrorist attack on Dowining . 52 Street I 
I11 
{8{ Disagreements between member countries I . 47 I I1 in the EEC, about the handling of the II 
1I war in the Gulf I 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 15c: Factor Correlations (Factors 1 and 2, Importance - 
--------- Media) 
FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 
FACTOR 1 1.00000 
FACTOR 2 . 24616 
1.00000 
504 
Table 16a: Items and loading weights for Factor 1 (Objectivity) 
-------- 
ITEM 
I------- 
------------------------------------------- 
NOI ITEM 
--; ---------------------------------------- 
----------- 
I LOADING 
{---------{ 
4 
I 
I The destruction of the environment 
!I 
. 77 I I in the Gulf from the oil-slicks 
I (Also on Factor 2; . 48) I I 
10 
I 
{ The IRA terrorist attack on Downing 
1 
I . 70 I Street I 
I 
6 
I 
i The Cannon Street Station train crash 
I1 
1 . 58 
I2 
{ 
1 The clashes between police and 
I 
. 57 { I I civilians in Lithuania (Soviet Union) II 
I I 
{1 
I 
I The war in the Gulf 
I 
. 51 1 I 
{3 
I 
I The changes in the relations between 
iI 
I . 40 I South African government and ANC II 
I 
-------- 
I (Also on Factor 2; -. 40) 
------------------------------------------- 
II 
----------- 
Table 16b: Items and loading weights for Factor 2 (Objectivity) 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
ITEM NOI ITEM I LOADING 
1---------1---------------------------------------- _---------1 
9 The landing of American B-52 bombers -. 75 
in Britain 
I111 
7I The closure of the Holy Loch American 1 -. 74 1 
{I military base I1 
1II 
8 Disagreements between member countries 1 -. 58 1 
1I in the EEC, about the handling of the I1 
1I war in the Gulf. 11 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 16c: Factor Correlations (Factor 1 and 2, objectivity) 
---------------------------------- 
I FACTOR 1 FACTOR2 
I FACTOR 1 1.00000 
IFACTOR 2 -. 22691 1.00000 
---------------------------------- 
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Table 17a: Beta weights as occurred from the regression 
--------- analysis (Ti). Dependent variable : Welfare 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
{ Dependent Variable : Welfare 
I 
I Independent Variable Beta F Sign. F{ 
{{ 
1 Political 
{ Cynicism . 19 3.05 . 08 { 
Interest in 
European Events -. 07 . 26 . 61 
Interest in 
National Politics . 27 3.25 . 07 
Interest in 
International Politics -. 23 1.76 . 19 1 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 17b: Beta weights as occurred by the regression 
--------- analysis (Ti). Dependent variable : Environment 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Dependent Variable : Environment { 
{ Independent Variable Beta F Sign. F{ 
{{ 
{ Political { 
{ Cynicism -. 02 . 03 . 86 
Interest in 
European Events -. 001 . 00 . 99 
Interest in 
National Politics / -. 09 . 30 . 59 
Interest in 
International Politics . 13 . 50 . 48 
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Table 17c: Beta weights as occurred from the regression 
--------- analysis (Ti). Dependent variable : Internationalism 
------------------------------------- 
Dependent Variable : Internationalism 
{ Independent Variable Beta F Sign. F 
I I 
{ Environment . 08 . 49 . 48 
{ 
i Interest in 
I National Politics -. 17 1.33 . 25 I I I 
Political I 
I Cynicism -. 08 . 59 . 44 I I 
! Welfare . 30 6.86 . 01 { 
Interest in 
European Events . 21 2.33 . 13 I 
I 
I Interest in I 
I International Events . 27 2.71 . 10 I 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 17d: Beta weights as occurred from the regression 
--------- analysis (Ti). Dependent variable : Nationalism 
------------------------ 
Dependent Variable : 
------------ 
Nationalism 
-------- ----------- 
Independent Variable Beta F Sign. F 
I 
Environment . 01 . 01 . 91 I I 
I Interest in 
I National Politics . 00 . 00 . 99 
I 
I Political 
I Cynicism 
- 
-. 13 1.27 . 26 I I I 
! Welfare -. 17 2.13 . 15 
Interest in 
European Events -. 33 5.42 . 02 
Interest in 
National Politics . 13 . 55 . 
46 
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Table 17e: Beta weights as occurred from the regression 
--------- analysis (Ti). Dependent variable : Views about 
unification 
-------------------------------------------- 
Dependent Variable : Views about unification 
Independent Variable Beta F Sign. F 
Nationalism -. 31 11.58 . 00 
I Environment . 01 . 01 . 93 
I Interest in 
National Politics -. 10 . 68 . 41 
I 
Political 
Cynicism -. 24 7.04 . 01 I I 
{ Internationalism . 49 26.34 . 00 1 I 
Welfare . 05 . 30 
I 
. 58 { 
Interest in I 
European Events . 13 1.26 . 26 { 
Interest in 
International Politics -. 04 . 09 . 76 { 
Table 18a: Beta weights as occurred from the regression 
--------- analysis (T2). Dependent variable : Welfare 
---------------------------- 
Dependent Variable : Welfare 
Independent Variable Beta F Sign. FI 
I Political 
Cynicism . 17 2.28 . 13 1 = 1 
= Interest in 
= International Politics -. 04 . 07 . 79 f I I 
Interest in = 
I European Events -. 11 . 60 . 44 1 Z I 
I Interest in S 
I National Politics . 07 . 23 . 63 1 
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Table 18b: Beta weights as occurred from the regression 
--------- analysis (T2). Dependent variable : Environment 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Dependent Variable : Environment 
Independent Variable Beta F Sign. F 
Political 
I Cynicism 
I . 
17 2.03 . 16 
Interest in 
I 
International Politics -. 03 . 03 . 86 
I Interest in 
I 
I European Events 
I . 
09 . 42 . 52 
I Interest in 
I 
National Politics -. 06 . 14 . 70 1 
Table 18c: Beta weights as occurred from the regression 
--------- analysis (T2). Dependent variable : Internationalism 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Dependent Variable : Internationalism 
I Independent Variable Beta F Sign. FI 
Welfare 
. 24 4.55 . 04 
Interest in 
European Events . 03 . 06 . 80 
Political 
Cynicism . 17 2.33 . 13 
Environment . 05 . 20 . 66 
Interest in 
National Politics -. 18 1.68 . 20 
Interest in 
International Events . 46 8.45 . 00 
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Table 18d: Beta weights as occurred from the regression 
--------- analysis (T2). Dependent variable : Nationalism 
---------------------------------- 
Independent Variable : Nationalism 
Variable Beta F Sign. .F 
{ Welfare -. 18 2.52 . 12 
I Interest in 
European Events 
1 
-. 26 3.68 . 06 
{ Political 
1 
{ Cynicism -. 42 14.06 . 00 I 
Environment 
f 
. 02 . 03 
I 
. 85 I 
{ Interest in 
{ National Politics 
I . 
09 . 47 . 49 
I Interest in 
I 
{ 
I International Politics -. 03 . 03 . 86 ! 
Table 18e: Beta weights as occurred from the regression 
--------- analysis (T2). Dependent variable : Views about 
unification 
------------------------------------ 
Dependent Variable : Views about 
I 
------------------- 
unification 
Independent Variable Beta F 
I 
Sign. FI 
I Nationalism -. 38 11.51 . 00 1 I I 
Interest in 
National Politics -. 03 . 06 . 81 f 
Environment -. 00 . 00 
f 
. 96 I 
Welfare . 10 . 88 
1 
. 35 
f 
Internationalism . 36 10.28 . 00 I I 
f Political 
I Cynicism -. 29 6.44 . 01 f 
f 
f Interest in 
I European Events . 09 . 51 . 47 
I Interest in I 
I International Politics 
--------------------------- 
-. 03 
--------- 
. 03 
-------- 
. 86 
----------- 
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APPENDIX D. 2. 
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A. THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
Here are some statements about the European Economic 
Community. Some of them are true, whereas others are 
false. Please put the number to reflect whether you 
think they are true or false into each box. 
TRUE FALSE DON'T RNOW 
123 
1. Sweden is a member of the M. 
2. Britain joined the EEC in 1973. 
3. The initials ERM stand for 
European Rate Mechanism. II 
4. The first treaty signed by founder 
members of the EEC was the Treaty of Rome. 
5. Switzerland is a member of the EEC. 
a 
6. After 1992, British judges will be 
appointed by the European court. 
7. Spain and Greece were the last two 
countries to join the EEC. 
8. Portugal is a member of the EEC. 
II 
9. The initials CAP stand for Common 
Agricultural Policy. 
10. Jacques Delors is the President of the 
European Commission. 
11. The last elections for the European 
Parliament took place in June 1990. 
12. Turkey is a member of the EEC. 
Q 
13. The initials ECU stand for 
European Currency unit. 
14. After 1992, people in Britain 
will drive on the right. 
ED 
15. The next elections for the European 
Parliament will take place in 1994. 
16. The EEC was founded in 1957. 
II 
17. Elections for the European Parliament 
take place every five years. 
F-I 
18. The Presidency of the EEC rotates; 
i. e. it is handed to a different member 
country, every two years. 
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(1-4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
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19. The European Parliament is located 
in Brussels. 
B. YOUR VIEWS ABOUT BRITAIN 
Below is a list of statements concerning Britain as a country 
and her relations with the rest of the world. You may agree 
with some of them and disagree with others. Please indicate 
how much you agree or disagree with each statement by placing 
the appropriate number in each of the boxes below. 
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree 
12345 
1. British democracy is the model for 
the rest of the world. 
2. Individual countries cannot influence 
international developments as much as 
groups of countries. 
3. Britain's national identity has to be 
preserved. 
4. No other country is as good as Britain. 
S. Britain cannot stand alone in the 
international scene. 
6. Britain should stick to its 
own traditions. 
7. Britain has the most beautiful 
countryside in the world. 
8. Different countries should focus on the 
things that unite then and not on things 
that divide them. 
9. The British education system is the 
best in the world. 
10. Britain's internal affairs should be 
controlled by British politicians. 
11. Countries will only be able to survive 
if they act together. 
12. International laws should not impose 
changes on British law. 
(23) 
F7 
(24) 
(25) 
Ci 
(26) 
II (27) 
0 
0 
a 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
(31) 
0 
II 
13. Britain should accept rules and 
regulations imposed by international treaties. 
14. Britain's economy should be the only ýI 
factor determining the value of the pound. 
(32) 
(33) 
(34) 
(35) 
(36) 
(37) 
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15. Britain has the most professional a 
army in the world. 
16. International problems have caused 
unnecessary arguments and divisions in 
British politics. " 
17. National interests should not override 
international cooperation. 
C. POLITICS 
Here are some questions concerning your political 
preferences and voting behaviour. Please answer all 
of them by ticking the appropriate boxes. 
1. If there was a general election tomorrow 
which political party would you vote for? 
a) Conservative 
b) Labour 
c) Liberal Democrats 
d) Green 
e) Uncertain 
f) I would not vote 
q) Other (please specify) 
2. Which party, do you think, is the most 
pro-European? 
a) Conservative 
b) Labour 
C) Liberal Democrats 
d) Green 
e) None of then 
f) Other (please specify) 
3. Which party, do you think, is most able to 
represent Britain's interests in the 
European Coemmi ty? 
a) Conservative 
b) Labour 
c) Liberal Democrats 
d) Green 
e) None of then 
f). Other (please specify) 
4. Did you vote in the last European elections ? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
C) I was not eligible to vote 
5. If you did vote, whom did you vote for? 
a) Conservative 
b) Labour 
C) SLO (Social Liberal Democrats) 
d) Green 
e) Other (please specify) 
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(38) 
(39) 
(40) 
(41-42) 
(43-44) 
(45-46) 
(47) 
(48-49) 
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6. If there were European elections tomorrow 
which political party would you vote for? 
a) Conservative 
b) Labour 
c) Liberal Democrats 
d) Green 
e) Uncertain 
f) I would not vote 
g) Other (please specify) 
D. YOUR INTEREST IN CURRENT AFFAIRS 
Here are some questions concerning your interest in current 
affairs and the things you do in order to keep in touch 
with them. Please answer all of them by ticking the 
appropriate boxes. 
1. How often do you read a daily newspaper? 
a) Every day 
b) Three times a week 
c) Never 
2. If you do read a daily newspaper, which 
newspaper is this? 
(Please write) 
3. Do you read a Sunday paper? 
Yes No 
If Yes, which? (Please write) 
4. Do you regul1 arl read any magazines ? 
Yes No 
If Yes, which? (Please write) 
5. Please indicate, by putting the appropriate numbers in 
the boxes below, how interested you are in the following. 
Very Much Quite a Lot Some Very Little Not at all 
1.2345 
a. British politics 
b. International politics - 
c. European events - 
6. Please indicate, by putting the appropriate numbers in 
the boxes below, how often you do each of the following. 
I OFTEN SOMETIMES NEVER 123 
a. Read news and articles about Europe 
in newspapers/magazines? 
b. Watch programs on T. V. about Europe? 
c. Discuss European events with others? 
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(54) 
(55-56) 
(57) 
(58-59) 
(60) 
(61-62) 
(63) 
(64) 
(65) 
(69) 
(70) 
(71) 
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7. Please indicate, by putting the appropriate numbers in 
in the boxes below, how often you watch each of the 
following TV programs. 
1 OFTEN SOMETIMES " NEVER 123 
-6 0' clock News (BBCI) 
- Channel 4 News (C4) 
- Tomorrow's world (BBC1) 
- News at 10 (ITV) 
- Newsnight (BBC2) 
-9 a' clock News (BBC1) 
- Question Time (BBCI) 
- 40 Minutes (BBC2) 
- This Week (ITV) 
- The City Program (ITV) 
- Dispatches (C4) 
- Panorama (BBC1) 
- Nature (BBC2) 
- World in Action (ITV) 
- Behind the Headlines (BBC2) 
- Critical Eye (C4) 
- Public Eye (BBC2) 
- Omnibus (BBC1) 
- The World this Week (C4) 
- On the Record (BBC1) 
- The Walden interview (ITV) 
8. Please rate, by putting the appropriate numbers 
in the boxes below, how much you take into account 
the opinions and ideas of each of the following 
when you form your own opinions about political 
issues and current affairs. 
NOT AT ALL A LITTLE A LOT 
123 
a) Parents 
b) Brother(s)/Sister(s) 
c) Friends 
d) The press (newspapers/magazines) 
e) Radio and T. V. 
f) Politicians 
9. Are you currently a member of any political 
and or action and/or environmental group? 
Yes No ý 
If yes, please give the name of the group(s). 
A 
(72) 
(73) 
(74) 
(75) 
(76) 
(77) 
(78) 
(79) 
(80) 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(12) 
_ 
(13) 
(14) 
_ 
(15) 
_ 
(16) 
_ 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
(20-21) 
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E. YOUR VIEWS ABOUT CURRENT AFFAIRS 
Here are some statements that concern current affairs. 
You may agree with some of them and disagree with others. 
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree by placing 
a number in each of the boxes below. 
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
12345 
1. The threat to the environment from 
pollution is overstated. 
2. The government must increase both taxes 
and social spending. 
3. People should be allowed to express their 
political views freely however offensive 
other people might find them. 
4. The level of the Poll-tax should be 
linked to people's ability to pay it. 
S. People like me have no say in what 
the Government does. 
6. We should all belong to a global culture. 
7. If we do not act immediately to clean up 
the environment, it will be too late. 
8. Industries work better if governments 
do not interfere with them. 
9. It is the responsibility of the government 
to take care of people who cannot take care 
of themselves. 
10. Workers should not be allowed to strike 
if it will hurt the industry concerned. 
11. The Poll-tax will stop local councils 
spending too much money. 
12. Referendums should be held to decide 
major political decisions. 
13. Political parties are only interested 
in votes, not' in' people's opinions. -- 
14. British culture has benefited by the 
many different cultures existing in 
Britain today. 
15. The cost of "green policies" is too great. 
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(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
Q 
(25) 
(26) 
n 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
b 
0 
O 
11 
I 
(30) 
(31) 
(32) 
(33) 
(34) 
(35) 
(36) 
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16. Everybody should be responsible for 
buying the best health care insurance 
they can afford. 
17. All efforts must be aade to bring 
everybody up to the same educational level. 
18. Democracy will only truly work when 
everybody has a say in all major political 
decisions. 
19. Politicians are mainly in politics for 
their own benefit and not for the benefit 
of the community. 
20. Multiculturalism simply results in no culture. 
21. We have the means of cleaning up the 
environment, we should spend money on it now. 
22. We should try to provide jobs for everybody 
even if taxes have to be raised to do it. 
23. People who decide to pay for private 
education for their children should be 
allowed to pay less tax.. 
24. Taxpayers should not be expected to pay 
for people-who do not want to work. 
25. I do not think, that, politicians care 
such about what people like me think. 
26. Generally speaking, MPs do not lose 
touch with ordinary people. 
27. National groups should always strive to 
maintain their identity. 
28. Whatever the cost we must act now to clean 
up the environment before it is too late. 
29. The welfare state makes people nowadays 
less willing to look after themselves. 
30. The best possible health care should be 
available to everybody regardless of the 
cost to the taxpayer. 
31. We should not go too far down the road to 
cleaning up the environment while our 
competitors continue to pollute the world. 
32. Nationalist sentiments can only result 
in hatred. 
rý 
I 
I] 
a 
0 
0 
II 
Q 
0 
I . "1 
I 
0 
II 
L-i 
0 
I 
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(37) 
(38) 
(39) 
(40) 
(41) 
(42) 
(43) 
(44) 
(45) 
(46) 
(47) 
(48) 
(49) 
(50) 
(51) 
(52) 
(53) 
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P. YOUR VIEWS ABOUT EUROPE AND 
THE EUROPEAN UNIFICATION IN 1992 
Here are some statements that concern Europe and the 
unification of Europe in 1992, as well as Britain's 
position in relation to these. You may agree with some 
of them and disagree with others. Please indicate how 
much you agree or disagree with each statement by placing 
a number in each of the boxes below. 
Strongly Agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree 
12345 
1. People in Britain are not prepared to 
face the changes the unification of Europe 
will bring. 
2. Since most people in Europe speak English, 
there is no reason why British people should 
learn European languages. 
3. Britons will never feel themselves Europeans. 
4. Europe will not be united for, at least, Q 
15 to 20 years. 
5. Different languages will always create a 
barriers between European countries. 
6. Britons have more in common with the French a 
and Germans than with'the Americans. 
7. Newspapers should inform the general public a 
about events and developments in Europe. 
8. Politicians in Britain will never surrender 
their power to a central European government. 
9. The nations of Europe'are too different to 
allow the creation of a United States of Europe. 
10. It is'unrealistic for Britain to remain 
outside a united Europe. 
11. USA, not Europe, is Britain's natural ally. 
II 
12. If European workers are allowed to work in ýi 
Britain, British workers will face unemployment. 
13. The countries of Europe will never be able to 
work together because they have different needs. 
JI 
0 
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(55) 
(56) 
(57) 
(58) 
(59) 
(60) 
(61) 
(62) 
(63) 
(64) 
(65) 
(66) 
(67) 
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14. Britain needs Europe more than Europe 
needs Britain. 
I 
15. It will not be profitable for Britain 
to unite with poorer countries in Europe. 
I, 
16. A united Europe will offer opportunities only to 
the wealthy, middle-class population in Britain. 
17. National and European Parliaments have 
to exist in parallel. 
18. A united Europe can never become a national 
goal for Britain. 
19. European countries will never be interested 
in each other's well-being. 
20. A common European monetary policy will 
result in less power for the Finance 
ministers of each country. 
21. The unification of Europe has already caused 
too many internal problems in Britain. 
22. British industry will face increased 
competition after the unification of Europe. 
23. Politicians in Britain should stop arguing 
about Europe and concentrate on internal 
affairs. 
24. Many British companies will go bankrupt 
after the unification of Europe. 
25. A unified Germany can be integrated into the 
EEC without any problem. 
I I, 
Ii 
a 
a 
26. The EEC should increase its budget in order to 
help the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe in their progress towards democracy. 
G. YOUR BACKGROUND 
1. What course are you currently doing at the 
University? 
Please write 
2. In which department are you doing this course? 
Please write 
(68) 
(69) 
(70) 
(71) 
(72) 
(73) 
(74) 
(75) 
(76) 
(77) 
(78) 
(79) 
(80) 
(1) 
(2) 
(3-4) 
(5-6) 
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3. Is the course you are doing now related, in any 
way, with Europe? (Eg. You have to learn a European 
language, you have to go to a European country for 
your industrial year, etc. ) 
Tes No E 
If Yes, please specify 
4. In what year of undergraduate studies are 
you now? 
Please write 
S. Is your nationality British? 
Yes No l 
If No, please specify 
6. How old are you?. 
Years Months (Please write) 
7. Are you male or Female__ (Please tick) 
(7) 
(8-9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12-13) 
(13-14) 
(15) 
Thank you for your help. 
If you have any cooaents on this questionnaire, please write 
then below. 
If you would like to participate again in this study and you 
are not going to be at the University next term, please write 
below the adress you could be contacted. - 
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A. THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CO? *IUNITY 
Here are some statements about the European Economic 
Community. Some of them are true, whereas others are 
false. Please put the number to reflect whether you 
think they are true or false into each box. 
TRUE FALSE DON'T KNOW 
123 
1. Sweden is a member of the EEC. 
2. Britain joined the EEC in 1973. 
3. The initials ERM stand for 
European Rate Mechanism. 
4. The first treaty signed by founder 
members of the EEC was the Treaty of Rome. 
5. Switzerland is a member of the EEC. 
6. After 1992, British judges will be 
appointed by the European court. 
7. Spain and Greece were the last two 
countries to join the EEC. 
8. Portugal is a member of the EEC. 
9. The initials CAP stand for Common 
Agricultural Policy. 
10. Jacques Delors is the President of the 
European Commission. 
11. The last elections for the European 
Parliament took place in June 1990. 
12. Turkey is a member of the EEC. 
13. The initials ECU stand for 
European Currency Unit. 
14. After 1992, people in Britain 
will drive on the right. 
15. The next elections for the European 
Parliament will take place in 1994. 
16. The EEC was founded in 1957. 
17. Elections for the European Parliament 
take place every five years. 
i 18. The Presidency of the EEC rotates; 
i. e. it is handed to a different member 
country, every two years. 
0 0 
II 
r1 
L1 
Ii 
D 
D 
D 
I1 
LI 
II I1 
I1 
D 
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(1-4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(%) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
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19. The European Parliament is located 
in Brussels. , 
B. YOUR VIEWS ABOUT BRITAIN 
Below i's a list of statements concerning Britain as a country 
and her relations with the rest of the world. You may agree 
with some of them and disagree with others. Please indicate 
how much you agree or disagree with each statement by placing 
the appropriate number in each of the boxes below. 
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree 
12345 
1. British democracy is the model for 
the rest of the world. 
2. Individual countries cannot influence 
international developments as much as 
groups of countries. 
3. Britain's national identity has to be 
preserved. 
4. No other country is as good as Britain. 
5. Britain cannot stand alone in the 
international scene. 
6. Britain should stick to its 
own traditions. 
7. Britain has the most beautiful 
countryside in the world. 
8. Different countries should focus on the 
things that unite them and not on things 
that divide them. 
9. The British education system is the 
best in the world. 
10. Britain's internal affairs should be 
controlled by British politicians. 
11. Countries will only be able to survive 
if they act together. 
12. International laws should not impose 
changes on British law. 
13. Britain should accept rules and 
regulations imposed by international treaties. 
14. Britain's economy should be the only 
factor determining the value of the pound. 
H 
I1 0 11 
a 
D 
D 
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(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
(31) 
(32) 
(33) 
(34) 
(35) 
(36) 
(37) 
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15. Britain has the most professional 
army in the world. ýI 
16. International problems have caused 
unnecessary arguments and divisions in 
British politics. 
17. National interests should not override 
international cooperation. 
C. POLITICS 
Here are some questions concerning your political 
preferences and voting behaviour. Please answer all 
of them by ticking the appropriate boxes. 
1. If there was a general election tomorrow 
which political party would you vote for? 
a) Conservative 
b) Labour 
C) Liberal Democrats 
d) Green 
e) Uncertain 
f) I would not vote 
g) Other (please specify) 
2. Which party, do you think, is the most 
pro-European? 
a) Conservative 
b) Labour 
_. c) Liberal Democrats 
d) Green 
e) None of them 
f) Other (please specify) 
3. Which party, do you think, is most able to 
represent Britain's interests in the 
European Community? 
a) Cönservätive 
b) Labour 
c) Liberal Democrats 
d) Green 
e) None of them 
f) Other (please specify) 
4. Did you vote in the last European elections ? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) I was not eligible to, vote 
5. If you did vote, whom did you vote for? 
a) Conservative 
b) Labour' 
c) SLD (Social Liberal Democrats) 
d) Green "_ 
e) Other (please specify) 
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(39) 
(40) 
(41-42) 
(43-44) 
(45-46) 
(47) 
(48-49) 
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6. If there were European elections tomorrow 
which political party would you vote for? 
a) Conservative 
b) Labour 
c) Liberal Democrats 
d) Green 
e) Uncertain 
f) I would not vote 
g) Other (please specify) 
D. YOUR INTEREST IN CURRENT AFFAIRS 
Here are some questions concerning your interest in current 
affairs and the things you do in order to keep in touch 
with them. Please answer all of them by ticking the 
appropriate boxes. 
1. How often do you read a daily newspaper? 
a) Every day 
b) Three times a week 
c) Never 
2. If you do read a daily newspaper, which 
newspaper is this? 
(Please write) 
3. Do you read a Sunday paper? 
Yes f1 No Lý 
If Yes, which? (Please write) 
4. Do you regularly read any magazines ? 
Yes No I1 
If Yes, which? (Please write) 
5. Please iridicatO, by putting the appropriate numbers in 
the boxes below, how interested you are in the following. 
Very Much Quite a Lot Some Very Little Not at all 
12345 
a. British politics 
b. International politics 
c. European events 8 
6. Please indicate, by putting the appropriate numbers in 
the boxes below, how often you do each of the following. 
OFTEN SOMETIMES NEVER 
123 
a. Head news and articles about Europe 
in newspapers/magazines? 
b. Watch programs on T. V. about Europe? 
C. Discuss European events with others? 
(50-51) 
(52) 
(53-54) 
(55-56) 
(57-58) 
(59) 
(60-61) 
(62-63) 
(64-65) 
(66) 
(67-68) 
(69-70) 
(71-72) 
(73-74) 
(75) 
(76) 
(77) 
(78) 
(79) 
____ 
(80 
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7. Please indicate, by putting the appropriate numbers in 
in the boxes below, how often you watch each of the 
following TV programs. 
OFTEN SOMETIMES NEVER 
123 
-6 o' clock News (BBC1) 
- Channel 4 News (C4) 
- Tomorrow's world (BBC1) 
- News at 10 (ITV) 
- Newsnight (BBC2) 
-9 o' clock News (BBC1) 
- Question Time (BBC1) 
- 40 Minutes (BBC2) 
- This Week (ITV) 
- The City Program (ITV) 
- Dispatches (C4) 
- Panorama (BBCI) 
- Nature (BBC2) 
- World in Action (ITV) 
- Behind the Headlines (BBC2) 
- Critical Eye (C4) 
- Public Eye (BBC2) 
- Omnibus (BBC1) 
- The World this Week (C4) 
- On the Record (BBC1) 
- The Walden interview (ITV) 
8. Please rate, by putting the appropriate numbers 
in the boxes below, how much you take into account 
the opinions and ideas of each of the following 
when you form your own opinions about political 
issues and current affairs. 
NOT AT ALL A LITTLE A LOT 
123 
a) Parents 
b) Brother(s)/Sister(s) 
C) Friends 
d) The press (newspapers/magazines) 
e) Radio and T. V. 
f) Politicians 
9. Are you currently a member of any political 
and/or action, and/or environmental group? 
Yes II No [. ý 
II Yes, please give the name of the group(s). 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
(31) 
(32) 
(33-34) 
(35-36) 
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E. YOUR VIEWS ABOUT CURRENT AFFAIRS 
Here are some statements that concern current affairs. 
You may agree with some of them and disagree with others. 
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree by placing 
a number in each of the boxes below. 
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree 
12345 
1. The threat to the environment from 
pollution is overstated. 
2. The government must increase both taxes 
and social spending. 
3. People should be allowed to express their 
political views freely however offensive 
other people might find them. 
4. The level of the Poll-tax should be 
linked to people's ability to pay it. 
5. People like me have no say in what 
the Government does. 
6. We should all belong to a global culture. 
7. If we do not act immediately to clean up 
the environment, it will be too late. 
B. Industries work better if governments 
do not interfere with them. 
9. It is the responsibility of the government 
to take care of people who cannot take care 
of themselves. 
10. Workers should not be allowed to strike 
if it will hurt the industry concerned. 
11. The Poll-tax will stop local councils 
spending too much money. 
12. Referendums should be held to decide 
major political decisions. 
13. Political parties are only interested 
in votes, not in people's opinions. 
14. British culture has benefited by the 
many different cultures existing in 
Britain today. 
15. The cost of "green policies" is too great. 
D 
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(37) 
(38) 
(39) 
(40) 
(41) 
(42) 
(43) 
(44) 
(45) 
(46) 
(47) 
(48) 
(49) 
(50) 
(51) 
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I 
f 
16. Everybody should be 
buying the best hea 
they can afford... 
17. All efforts, must be 
everybody up to. the 
10. Democracy will only 
everybody has a say 
decisions. 
responsible for 
lth care insurance 
made-to bring 
game educational level. 
truly work when 
in all major political 
19. Politicians are mainly in poli4ics for 
their own benefit and not, for.. the -beneflit 
of the community. 
20. Multiculturalism simply results. in no culture. 
21. We have the means of cleaning up the 
etivirorment, we should spend money on it now. 
22. We should try to provide jobs for everybody 
even if taxes have tp. be ray-id-to do it. 
23. People who decide to pay for. private 
education for their children should be 
allowed to pay less tax. 
24. Taxpayers should not be-expected to pay 
for people who do not want to work. 
25. I do not think that politicians care 
much about what people like me think. 
26.! Generally speaking, MPs do not lose 
; touch with ordinary people. 
27. +Nätional groups should always strive to 
maintain Their identity. 
28., Whatever the cost we must act now to clean 
: up- the environment before it is too late. 
29., The welfare state makes people nowadays 
less willing to look after themselves. 
30. The best possible health care should be 
available to everybody regardless of-the 
cost to the taxpayer. 
31. We should not go too far down the road to 
cleaning up the environment while our 
competitors continue to pollute the world. 
32. Nationali. -. t sentimer. }r Paz result 
in hatred. 
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r'. YOUR VIEWS ABOUT EUROPE AND 
THE EUROPEAN UNIFICATION IN 1992 
Here are some statements that concern Europe and the 
unification of Europe in 1992, as well as Britain's 
position in relation to these. You may agree with some 
of them and disagree with others. Please indicate how 
much you agree or disagree with each statement by placing 
a number in each of the boxes below. 
Strongly Agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly Disagree 
123"45 
1. People in Britain are not prepared to 
face the changes the unification of Europe 
-will bring. 
; 2. Since most people in Europe speak English, 
there is no reason why British'people should 
learn European languages. 
I. Britons will never feel themselves Europeans. 
4. Europe will not be united for, at least, 
15 to 20 years. 
5. Different languages will always create 
barriers between European countries. 
6. Britons have more in common with the French 
and Germans than with the Americans. 
7. Newspapers should inform the general public 
about events and developments in Europe. 
8. Politicians in Britain will never surrender 
their power to a central European government. 
9. The nations of Europe are too different to 
allow the creation of a United States of Europe. 
10. It is unrealistic for Britain to remain 
outside a united Europe. 
11. USA, not Europe, is Britain's natural ally. 
12. If European workers are allowed to work in 
Britain, British workers will face unemployment. 
13. The countries of Europe will never be able to 
work together because they have different needs. 
14. Britain needs Europe more than-Europe 
needs Britain. 
15. It will not be profitable for Britain 
to unite with poo=er countries in Europe. 
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16. A united Europe will offer opportunities only to 
the wealthy, middle-class population in Britain. 
17. National and European Parliament's have 
to exist in parallel. 
18. A united Europe can never become a national 
goal for Britain. 
19. European countries will never be interested 
in each other's well-being. 
20. A common European monetary policy will 
result'in less power for the Finance 
ministers of each country. 
21. The unification of Europe has already caused 
too many internal problems in Britain. 
22. British industry will face increased 
competition after the unification of Europe. 
23. Politicians in Britain should stop arguing 
about'Europe and concentrate on internal 
affairs. 
24. Many $ritish companies will go bankrupt 
after the unification of Europe. 
25. A unified Germany can be integrated into the 
EEC without any problem. 
26. The EEC should increase its budget in order to 
help the countries of Central and-Eastern 
Europe in their progress towards democracy. 
G. YOUR VIEWS ABOUT RECENT EVENTS 
Li 
1 
_, 
1 
Lý 
1 
Lý 
In this section you are asked first, to write which were 
the events (that happened in the last two months) and, in 
your opinion, have great political or social significance. 
Then you are asked to rate the importance of a number of 
events (that again took place in the last two months) and 
were presented, discussed and commented upon by the media. 
1. In your opinion, which was the most significant 
political or social event that happened in the world 
in-the last two months? Please write below 
a 
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2. In your opinion, which was the second most significant 
political or social event that happened in the world in 
the last two months? Please write below 
1 3. Besides the two events you wrote above, was there any 
other political or social event that happened in the 
last two months and, in your opinion, was very 
significant worldwide? Please write below 
4. In your opinion, which was the most significant 
political or social event that happened in the last 
two months that may affect British interests? 
Please write below 
5.. Besides the event you wrote above, was there any 
other political or social event that happened in the 
last two months and, in your opinion, may affect 
British interests? Please write below 
a 
c2 
(22-23) 
(24-25) 
(26-27) 
(28-29) 
(30-31) 
(32-33) 
(34-35) 
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6. Please rate the importance that each of the following 
events that happened in the last two months had for 
you personally. Please use the scale below, and put 
thelappropriate. number in the boxes provided. 
I HAVE NOT NOT AT ALL A LITTLE VERY 
HEARD ABOUT IMPORTANT IMPORTANT IMPORTANT 
191d vJ 7 
a. The War in the Gulf. 
b. The clashes b4tween police 
and civilians in Lithuania 
(Soviet Union): 
c. The changes in the relations 
between the South African 
government and the ANC. 
d. The destruction of environment 
in the Gulf from the oil slicks. ýI 
e. The maintenance of high 
interest rates in Britain. 
f. The Cannon Street Station 
train crash. 1 
g. The closure of Holy Loch 
American military base. 
L--j 
h. Disagreements between member 
countries in the EEC, about the 
handling of the war in the Gulf. 
i. The landing of American B-52 
bombers in Britain. 
j. The IRA terrorist attack on 
Downing street. 
7. Ploase rate the importance that was put upon each of the 
following events by the media as a whole; newspapers, 
radio, T. V. Please use the scale below and put the 
appropriate number in the boxes provided. 
NO A LITTLE A LOT OF 
IMPORTANCE IMPORTANCE IMPORTANCE 
123 
a. The'War in the Gulf. 
b. The clashes between police 
and civilians in Lithuania 
(Soviet Union). 
C. The changes in the relations 
between the South African 
government and the ANC. 
d. The destruction of environment 
in the Gulf from the oil slicks. 
e. The maintenance of high 
interest rates in Britain. 
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f. The Cannon Street Station 
train crash. 
g. The closure of Holy Loch 
American military base. 
h. Disagreements between member 
countries in the EEC, about the 
handling of the war in the Gulf. 
i. The landing of American B-52 
bombers: in Britain. 
J. The IRA terrorist attack on 
Downing street. 
8. How do you judge the information you received by the 
media as a whole for each of the following events? 
Please use the scale below and put the appropriate 
number in the boxes provided. 
BIASED NEITHER BIASED 
NOR UNBIASED 
12 
a. The War in the Gulf. 
b. The clashes between police 
and civilians in Lithuania 
(Soviet Union). 
C. The changes in the relations 
between the South African 
government and the ANC. 
d. The destruction of environment 
in the Gulf from the oil slicks. 
e. The maintenance of high 
interest rates in Britain. 
f. The Cannon Street Station 
train crash. 
g. The closure of Holy Loch 
American military base. 
h. Disagreements between member 
countries in the EEC, about the 
handling of the war in the Gulf. 
i. The landing of American B-52 
bombers in Britain. 
j. The IRA terrorist attack on 
Downing street. 
a 
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9. Now, I would like to ask you to concentrate on two of 
the events that happened in the last two months; 
(a) the War in the Gulf and 
(b) the clashes between police and civilians in Lithuania. 
These two events might provide new arguments, positive as 
well as negative, concerning the unification of Europe. 
I would like you to write the arguments (both positive 
and negative) that you think. might have been created by 
both these events, in the spaces provided. 
'(a) THE WAR IN THE GULF 
I POSITIVE ARGUMENTS NEGATIVE ARGUMENTS 
FOR UNIFICATION FOR UNIFICATION 
(b) THE CLASHES BETWEEN POLICE AND CIVILIANS IN LITHUANIA 
POSITIVE ARGUMENTS NEGATIVE ARGUMENTS 
FOR UNIFICATION FOR UNIFICATION 
t 
(68-69) 
(70-71) 
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(74-75) 
(76-77) 
(78-79) 
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10. Have your personal views about the unification of 
Europe changed after the beginning of the Gulf War, 
and in what way? Please tick the.. appropriate box. 
a. Yes, I am now much more in favour of 
the unification' than I was before., 
b. Yes, I am now more in favour of the 
unification than I was before. 
c. No, I feel the same., 
d. Yes, I am now more against the;? 
unification than I was before. 
e. Yes, I am now much more against the 
unification than I was before. 
11. Have your personal views about the unification of 
Europe'changed after you heard about the clashes 
between police and civilians in Lithuania, and in 
what way? Please tick the appropriate box. 
a. Yes, I am now much more in favour of 
the unification than I was before. 
b. Yes, I am now more in favour of the 
unification than I was before. 
c. No, ,l 
feel the same. 
d. Yes,,! I am now more against the 
unification than I was before. 
e. Yes; I am now much more against the 
unification than I was before. 
" tý 
" Thank you for your help. 
if you have any comments on this questionnaire, please write 
them below. 
a 
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CODING SCHEME FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS FOR ARGUMENTS ABOUT UNIFICATION 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
THE CULF CRISIS 
--------------- 
1. Positive arguments 
------------------ 
1.1 European countries were brought together 
1.1.1. Because of the Gulf crisis countries advanced towards 
further unity 
1.1.2. Power 
1.1.3. Agreement, co-operation 
1.1.4. Unity implies more influence 
1.1.5. Sharing of financial and military responsibilities 
1.2. Peace makers 
1.3. No difference 
2. Negative arguments 
------------------ 
2.1. European countries were brought apart 
2.1.1. Disagreements 
2.1.2. Different aims and needs 
2.1.3. Lack of balance of support 
539 
THE EVENTS IN LITHUANIA 
----------------------- 
1. Positive arguments 
------------------ 
1.1. United is better 
1.1.1. United countries have more influence 
1.1.2. Offer more help and protection 
1.2. No difference 
2. Negative arguments 
------------------ 
2.1. EC countries: what they should learn 
2.1.1. No need for unity 
2.1.2. Nationalist sentiments have to be respected 
2.2. Inability to adopt common reaction 
2.3. EC countries should not believe that changes do take 
place in Eastern Europe 
2.3.1. Communist control 
2.4. No difference 
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More details on the difference in the relation between 
------------------------------------------------------ 
political cynicism and nationalism over time 
-------------------------------------------- 
The change in the relation between political cynicism and 
nationalism, although not predicted or related with the 
theoretical arguments of the study, was considered very 
interesting and it was investigated in depth. 
When it was first observed, the argument produced was that, 
after the Gulf crisis, nationalist beliefs became stronger 
for the non politically cynical respondents, whereas 
politically cynical ones demonstrated less nationalist 
beliefs. This was based on the belief that what has happened 
was that people move towards the extremes of the political 
cynicism scale, leaving the means similar over time, but 
affecting the relation between political cynicism and 
nationalism. 
Yet, further analysis showed that, when split in terms of 
median scores on political cynicism, the two groups were not 
the same over time. People moved from one group to the other 
over time. (See Table E. 4a, below). 
Table E. 4a: Cross-tabulation between high-low political 
---------- cynicism over time 
T2 
Ti 
------------------------- 
I Low I High I 
---------- I------------ I---------- 
Low I 28 I 13 I 
I---------I------------ I----------I 
High 9I 36 I 
----------------------------------- 
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This implied that one could not argue about differences 
between politically cynical and non politically cynical 
respondents (as two stable groups) over time. The only 
argument that could be made was that in T2 the people who 
scored high on political cynicism showed significantly weaker 
nationalist beliefs than people who scored low on political 
cynicism (again in T2); whereas this was not true for Ti. 
Yet, when the two groups (high and low political cynicism) 
for T2 were compared in terms of nationalism in Ti it was 
found that, again, they differed significantly (T=2.66, 
df=82, p<. 01). So, it was the fact that people moved between 
groups that caused the difference in the relation between the 
two variables over time and not changes within groups. 
Analysis of variance (MANOVA) for the two groups (high and 
low political cynicism) in terms of nationalism did not show 
significant interaction between the two variables over time. 
When the upper and lower quartiles on scores on political 
cynicism were used to extract two groups (high and low 
political cynicism), again, it was found that some 
respondents moved from one group to the other over time. (See 
Table E. 4b). In this case, however, the two groups differed 
significantly on nationalism , for both times (T1: T=2.27, 
df=33, p(. 05, T2: T=2.80, df=33, p<. 01). 
Yet, again, analysis of variance (MANOVA) showed that there 
was no significant interaction between the two variables over 
time. So, the most probable explanation of this finding 
543 
remains that people in the middle of the scale moved from one 
group to the other over time and that this created the 
difference in the relation of political cynicism and 
nationalism, over time. 
Table E. 4b: Cross-tabulation between high-low political 
---------- cynicism (only upper and lower quartiles) over 
time 
T2 
Ti 
------------------------- 
I Low I High 1 
----------1------------1----------1 
1 Low 1 18 {61 
_---------1------------ 1----------1 
t High 1I 17 1 
----------------------------------- 
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